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+92
-12
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ name: Rust CI
|
||||
on:
|
||||
push:
|
||||
branches:
|
||||
- tls
|
||||
- master
|
||||
pull_request:
|
||||
types: [opened, repoened, synchronize]
|
||||
@@ -16,16 +15,19 @@ jobs:
|
||||
backend_feature:
|
||||
- u64_backend
|
||||
- u32_backend
|
||||
toolchain:
|
||||
- nightly
|
||||
- 1.41.0
|
||||
name: test
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- name: Checkout sources
|
||||
uses: actions/checkout@v2
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Install nightly toolchain
|
||||
- name: Install ${{ matrix.toolchain }} toolchain
|
||||
uses: actions-rs/toolchain@v1
|
||||
with:
|
||||
profile: minimal
|
||||
toolchain: nightly
|
||||
toolchain: ${{ matrix.toolchain }}
|
||||
override: true
|
||||
components: rustfmt, clippy
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -35,25 +37,103 @@ jobs:
|
||||
command: test
|
||||
args: --no-default-features --features ${{ matrix.backend_feature }}
|
||||
|
||||
benches:
|
||||
name: cargo bench compilation
|
||||
cross-test:
|
||||
name: Test on ${{ matrix.target }} (using cross)
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
strategy:
|
||||
fail-fast: false
|
||||
matrix:
|
||||
target:
|
||||
# 32-bit x86
|
||||
- i686-unknown-linux-gnu
|
||||
backend_feature:
|
||||
- u64_backend
|
||||
- u32_backend
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@v2
|
||||
- uses: hecrj/setup-rust-action@v1
|
||||
- run: cargo install cross
|
||||
# Note: just use `cross` as you would `cargo`, but always
|
||||
# pass the `--target=${{ matrix.target }}` arg. (Yes, really).
|
||||
- run: cross test --verbose --target=${{ matrix.target }} --no-default-features --features ${{ matrix.backend_feature }}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
slow-hash-test:
|
||||
name: Test on ${{ matrix.target }} with slow hash
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
strategy:
|
||||
fail-fast: false
|
||||
matrix:
|
||||
backend_feature:
|
||||
- u64_backend
|
||||
- u32_backend
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@v2
|
||||
- uses: hecrj/setup-rust-action@v1
|
||||
- run: cargo test --verbose --features slow-hash --no-default-features --features ${{ matrix.backend_feature }}
|
||||
|
||||
serde-test:
|
||||
name: Test on ${{ matrix.target }} with serde support
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
strategy:
|
||||
fail-fast: false
|
||||
matrix:
|
||||
backend_feature:
|
||||
- u64_backend
|
||||
- u32_backend
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@v2
|
||||
- uses: hecrj/setup-rust-action@v1
|
||||
- run: cargo test --verbose --features serialize --no-default-features --features ${{ matrix.backend_feature }}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
simple-login-test:
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
strategy:
|
||||
fail-fast: false
|
||||
matrix:
|
||||
toolchain:
|
||||
- nightly
|
||||
- 1.41.0
|
||||
name: test simple_login command-line example
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- name: install expect
|
||||
run: sudo apt-get install expect
|
||||
- name: Checkout sources
|
||||
uses: actions/checkout@v2
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Install nightly toolchain
|
||||
- name: install rust
|
||||
uses: actions-rs/toolchain@v1
|
||||
with:
|
||||
profile: minimal
|
||||
toolchain: stable
|
||||
toolchain: ${{ matrix.toolchain }}
|
||||
override: true
|
||||
components: rustfmt, clippy
|
||||
- name: Run expect (which then runs cargo run)
|
||||
run: expect -f scripts/simple_login.exp
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Run cargo bench --no-run
|
||||
uses: actions-rs/cargo@v1
|
||||
digital-locker-test:
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
strategy:
|
||||
fail-fast: false
|
||||
matrix:
|
||||
toolchain:
|
||||
- nightly
|
||||
- 1.41.0
|
||||
name: test digital_locker command-line example
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- name: install expect
|
||||
run: sudo apt-get install expect
|
||||
- name: Checkout sources
|
||||
uses: actions/checkout@v2
|
||||
- name: install rust
|
||||
uses: actions-rs/toolchain@v1
|
||||
with:
|
||||
command: bench
|
||||
args: --features "bench" --no-run
|
||||
profile: minimal
|
||||
toolchain: ${{ matrix.toolchain }}
|
||||
override: true
|
||||
components: rustfmt, clippy
|
||||
- name: Run expect (which then runs cargo run)
|
||||
run: expect -f scripts/digital_locker.exp
|
||||
|
||||
clippy:
|
||||
name: cargo clippy
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
|
||||
name: Publish
|
||||
|
||||
on:
|
||||
release:
|
||||
types: [published] # Only publish to crates.io when we formally publish a release
|
||||
# For more on how to formally release on Github, read https://help.github.com/en/articles/creating-releases
|
||||
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
publish:
|
||||
runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
|
||||
strategy:
|
||||
matrix:
|
||||
os: [ubuntu-latest]
|
||||
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- uses: hecrj/setup-rust-action@v1
|
||||
with:
|
||||
rust-version: ${{ matrix.rust }}
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@master
|
||||
- name: Login to crates.io
|
||||
run: cargo login $CRATES_IO_TOKEN
|
||||
env:
|
||||
CRATES_IO_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.crates_io_token }} # https://help.github.com/en/actions/automating-your-workflow-with-github-actions/creating-and-using-encrypted-secrets
|
||||
- name: Dry run publish opaque-ke
|
||||
run: cargo publish --dry-run --manifest-path Cargo.toml
|
||||
- name: Publish opaque-ke
|
||||
run: cargo publish --manifest-path Cargo.toml
|
||||
env:
|
||||
CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.crates_io_token }}
|
||||
@@ -2,4 +2,5 @@
|
||||
.vscode/
|
||||
src/.DS_Store
|
||||
/target
|
||||
Cargo.lock
|
||||
**/*.rs.bk
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,5 +1,51 @@
|
||||
# Changelog
|
||||
|
||||
## 0.6.1 (January 25, 2022)
|
||||
|
||||
* Fix `zeroize` implementing `Drop` on `enum`s now
|
||||
|
||||
## 0.6.0 (June 30, 2021)
|
||||
|
||||
* Synced implementation with draft-irtf-cfrg-opaque-05, which changes
|
||||
the envelope structure and introduces a ServerSetup object to be
|
||||
maintained by the server
|
||||
* Various security improvements: non-zero scalars, zeroizing on drop,
|
||||
constant-time operations
|
||||
* Adding serde support behind a feature
|
||||
* Supporting common traits (eb59676)
|
||||
* Swapping out scrypt for argon2 (535b9b8) for the slow-hash feature
|
||||
* Adding support for common traits on public structs
|
||||
* Updated dependencies
|
||||
|
||||
## 0.5.0 (March 1, 2021)
|
||||
|
||||
* Removed dependency on generic-bytes-derive package
|
||||
|
||||
## 0.4.0 (February 26, 2021)
|
||||
|
||||
* Adherence to protocol format described in
|
||||
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-opaque-03
|
||||
* Renamed to_bytes() and try_from() to serialize() and deserialize() for
|
||||
top-level structs
|
||||
* Conformed all message type parameters to be parameterized in the
|
||||
Ciphersuite object
|
||||
|
||||
## 0.3.1 (February 11, 2021)
|
||||
|
||||
* Re-exporting the rand library (and including it as a dependency instead of
|
||||
just rand_core)
|
||||
* Exposing a convenience function for converting from byte array to Key type
|
||||
|
||||
## 0.3.0 (February 8, 2021)
|
||||
|
||||
* General API and documentation improvements, including the support of custom
|
||||
identifiers, optional result parameters, and the use of the export key
|
||||
* Compliance with RFC 8017 on data serialization functions (I2OSP / OS2IP)
|
||||
* Adherence to protocol format described in
|
||||
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-opaque-02
|
||||
* Added parameters for key exchange additional data
|
||||
* Added simple_login and digital_locker examples
|
||||
|
||||
## 0.2.1 (October 22, 2020)
|
||||
|
||||
* Changed visibility of hash module to be public
|
||||
|
||||
Generated
-1057
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
+25
-27
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
[package]
|
||||
name = "opaque-ke"
|
||||
version = "0.2.1"
|
||||
version = "0.6.1"
|
||||
repository = "https://github.com/novifinancial/opaque-ke"
|
||||
keywords = ["cryptography", "crypto", "opaque", "passwords", "authentication"]
|
||||
description = "An implementation of the OPAQUE password-authenticated key exchange protocol"
|
||||
@@ -10,39 +10,37 @@ edition = "2018"
|
||||
readme = "README.md"
|
||||
|
||||
[features]
|
||||
default = ["u64_backend"]
|
||||
slow-hash = ["scrypt"]
|
||||
default = ["u64_backend", "serialize"]
|
||||
slow-hash = ["argon2"]
|
||||
bench = []
|
||||
u64_backend = ["curve25519-dalek/u64_backend", "x25519-dalek/u64_backend"]
|
||||
u32_backend = ["curve25519-dalek/u32_backend", "x25519-dalek/u32_backend"]
|
||||
u64_backend = ["curve25519-dalek/u64_backend"]
|
||||
u32_backend = ["curve25519-dalek/u32_backend"]
|
||||
serialize = ["serde", "base64", "generic-array/serde", "curve25519-dalek/serde"]
|
||||
|
||||
[dependencies]
|
||||
curve25519-dalek = { version = "3.0.0", default-features = false, features = ["std"] }
|
||||
argon2 = { version = "0.2", optional = true }
|
||||
base64 = { version = "0.13", optional = true }
|
||||
curve25519-dalek = { version = "3.1.0", default-features = false, features = ["std"] }
|
||||
digest = "0.9.0"
|
||||
displaydoc = "0.1.7"
|
||||
fiat-crypto = { version = "0.1.5"}
|
||||
generic-array = "0.14.4"
|
||||
hkdf = "0.9.0"
|
||||
hmac = "0.9.0"
|
||||
rand_core = "0.5.1"
|
||||
scrypt = { version = "0.4.1", optional = true }
|
||||
sha2 = "0.9.1"
|
||||
subtle = { version = "^2.2.1", default-features = false }
|
||||
thiserror = "1.0.20"
|
||||
x25519-dalek = { version = "1.0.1", default-features = false, features = ["std"] }
|
||||
zeroize = "1.1"
|
||||
generic-bytes = { version = "0.1.0" }
|
||||
hkdf = "0.11.0"
|
||||
hmac = "0.11.0"
|
||||
rand = "0.8"
|
||||
serde = { version = "1", features = ["derive"], optional = true }
|
||||
subtle = { version = "2.3.0", default-features = false }
|
||||
thiserror = "1.0.22"
|
||||
zeroize = { version = "~1.1", features = ["zeroize_derive"] }
|
||||
|
||||
[dev-dependencies]
|
||||
anyhow = "1.0.32"
|
||||
base64 = "0.12.3"
|
||||
criterion = "0.3.3"
|
||||
anyhow = "1.0.35"
|
||||
base64 = "0.13.0"
|
||||
bincode = "1"
|
||||
chacha20poly1305 = "0.7.1"
|
||||
hex = "0.4.2"
|
||||
lazy_static = "1.4.0"
|
||||
serde_json = "1.0.57"
|
||||
proptest = "0.10.1"
|
||||
rand = "0.7"
|
||||
|
||||
[[bench]]
|
||||
name = "oprf"
|
||||
harness = false
|
||||
required-features = ["bench"]
|
||||
serde_json = "1.0.60"
|
||||
sha2 = "0.9.2"
|
||||
proptest = "0.3"
|
||||
rustyline = "1"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ OPAQUE is a PKI-free aPAKE that is secure against pre-computation attacks and ca
|
||||
Documentation
|
||||
-------------
|
||||
|
||||
The API can be found [here](https://docs.rs/opaque-ke/) along with an example for usage.
|
||||
The API can be found [here](https://docs.rs/opaque-ke/) along with an example for usage. More examples can be found in the [examples](./examples) directory.
|
||||
|
||||
Installation
|
||||
------------
|
||||
@@ -22,15 +22,16 @@ Installation
|
||||
Add the following line to the dependencies of your `Cargo.toml`:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
opaque-ke = "0.2.1"
|
||||
opaque-ke = "0.6.1"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Resources
|
||||
---------
|
||||
|
||||
- [OPAQUE academic publication](https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/163.pdf), including formal definitions and a proof of security
|
||||
- [draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-05](https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-06), containing a specification for the OPAQUE protocol
|
||||
- [draft-irtf-cfrg-opaque-05](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-irtf-cfrg-opaque-05.html), containing a detailed (byte-level) specification for OPAQUE
|
||||
- ["Let's talk about PAKE"](https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2018/10/19/lets-talk-about-pake/), an introductory blog post written by Matthew Green that covers OPAQUE
|
||||
- [opaque-wasm](https://github.com/marucjmar/opaque-wasm), a WebAssembly package for this library
|
||||
|
||||
Contributors
|
||||
------------
|
||||
@@ -41,7 +42,7 @@ To learn more about contributing to this project, [see this document](./CONTRIBU
|
||||
|
||||
#### Acknowledgments
|
||||
|
||||
Special thanks go to Hugo Krawczyk for helping to clarify discrepancies and making suggestions for improving
|
||||
Special thanks go to Hugo Krawczyk and Chris Wood for helping to clarify discrepancies and making suggestions for improving
|
||||
this implementation.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
-145
@@ -1,145 +0,0 @@
|
||||
// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
|
||||
// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
|
||||
|
||||
#[macro_use]
|
||||
extern crate criterion;
|
||||
|
||||
use criterion::Criterion;
|
||||
use curve25519_dalek::edwards::EdwardsPoint;
|
||||
use curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoPoint;
|
||||
use generic_array::arr;
|
||||
use opaque_ke::{
|
||||
group::Group,
|
||||
oprf::{generate_oprf1_shim, generate_oprf2_shim, generate_oprf3_shim, OprfClientBytes},
|
||||
};
|
||||
use rand::{prelude::ThreadRng, thread_rng};
|
||||
use sha2::Sha256;
|
||||
|
||||
fn oprf1(c: &mut Criterion) {
|
||||
let mut csprng: ThreadRng = thread_rng();
|
||||
let input = b"hunter2";
|
||||
|
||||
c.bench_function("generate_oprf1 with Ristretto", move |b| {
|
||||
b.iter(|| {
|
||||
let OprfClientBytes {
|
||||
alpha: _alpha,
|
||||
blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
|
||||
} = generate_oprf1_shim::<_, RistrettoPoint>(&input[..], None, &mut csprng).unwrap();
|
||||
})
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn oprf1_edwards(c: &mut Criterion) {
|
||||
let mut csprng: ThreadRng = thread_rng();
|
||||
let input = b"hunter2";
|
||||
|
||||
c.bench_function("generate_oprf1 with Edwards", move |b| {
|
||||
b.iter(|| {
|
||||
let OprfClientBytes {
|
||||
alpha: _alpha,
|
||||
blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
|
||||
} = generate_oprf1_shim::<_, EdwardsPoint>(&input[..], None, &mut csprng).unwrap();
|
||||
})
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn oprf2(c: &mut Criterion) {
|
||||
let mut csprng: ThreadRng = thread_rng();
|
||||
let input = b"hunter2";
|
||||
|
||||
let OprfClientBytes {
|
||||
alpha,
|
||||
blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
|
||||
} = generate_oprf1_shim::<_, RistrettoPoint>(&input[..], None, &mut csprng).unwrap();
|
||||
let salt_bytes = arr![
|
||||
u8; 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23,
|
||||
24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32,
|
||||
];
|
||||
let salt = RistrettoPoint::from_scalar_slice(&salt_bytes).unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
c.bench_function("generate_oprf2 with Ristretto", move |b| {
|
||||
b.iter(|| {
|
||||
let _beta = generate_oprf2_shim::<RistrettoPoint>(alpha, &salt).unwrap();
|
||||
})
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn oprf2_edwards(c: &mut Criterion) {
|
||||
let mut csprng: ThreadRng = thread_rng();
|
||||
let input = b"hunter2";
|
||||
|
||||
let OprfClientBytes {
|
||||
alpha,
|
||||
blinding_factor: _blinding_factor,
|
||||
} = generate_oprf1_shim::<_, EdwardsPoint>(&input[..], None, &mut csprng).unwrap();
|
||||
let salt_bytes = arr![
|
||||
u8; 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23,
|
||||
24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32,
|
||||
];
|
||||
let salt = RistrettoPoint::from_scalar_slice(&salt_bytes).unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
c.bench_function("generate_oprf2 with Edwards", move |b| {
|
||||
b.iter(|| {
|
||||
let _beta = generate_oprf2_shim::<EdwardsPoint>(alpha, &salt).unwrap();
|
||||
})
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn oprf3(c: &mut Criterion) {
|
||||
let mut csprng: ThreadRng = thread_rng();
|
||||
let input = b"hunter2";
|
||||
|
||||
let OprfClientBytes {
|
||||
alpha,
|
||||
blinding_factor,
|
||||
} = generate_oprf1_shim::<_, RistrettoPoint>(&input[..], None, &mut csprng).unwrap();
|
||||
let salt_bytes = arr![
|
||||
u8; 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23,
|
||||
24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32,
|
||||
];
|
||||
let salt = RistrettoPoint::from_scalar_slice(&salt_bytes).unwrap();
|
||||
let beta = generate_oprf2_shim::<RistrettoPoint>(alpha, &salt).unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
c.bench_function("generate_oprf3 with Ristretto", move |b| {
|
||||
b.iter(|| {
|
||||
let _res = generate_oprf3_shim::<RistrettoPoint, Sha256>(input, beta, &blinding_factor)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
})
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn oprf3_edwards(c: &mut Criterion) {
|
||||
let mut csprng: ThreadRng = thread_rng();
|
||||
let input = b"hunter2";
|
||||
|
||||
let OprfClientBytes {
|
||||
alpha,
|
||||
blinding_factor,
|
||||
} = generate_oprf1_shim::<_, EdwardsPoint>(&input[..], None, &mut csprng).unwrap();
|
||||
let salt_bytes = arr![
|
||||
u8; 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23,
|
||||
24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32,
|
||||
];
|
||||
let salt = RistrettoPoint::from_scalar_slice(&salt_bytes).unwrap();
|
||||
let beta = generate_oprf2_shim::<EdwardsPoint>(alpha, &salt).unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
c.bench_function("generate_oprf3 with Edwards", move |b| {
|
||||
b.iter(|| {
|
||||
let _res =
|
||||
generate_oprf3_shim::<EdwardsPoint, Sha256>(input, beta, &blinding_factor).unwrap();
|
||||
})
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
criterion_group!(
|
||||
oprf_benches,
|
||||
oprf1,
|
||||
oprf2,
|
||||
oprf3,
|
||||
oprf1_edwards,
|
||||
oprf2_edwards,
|
||||
oprf3_edwards
|
||||
);
|
||||
criterion_main!(oprf_benches);
|
||||
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ targets = [
|
||||
# The path where the advisory database is cloned/fetched into
|
||||
db-path = "~/.cargo/advisory-db"
|
||||
# The url of the advisory database to use
|
||||
db-url = "https://github.com/rustsec/advisory-db"
|
||||
db-urls = ["https://github.com/rustsec/advisory-db"]
|
||||
# The lint level for security vulnerabilities
|
||||
vulnerability = "deny"
|
||||
# The lint level for unmaintained crates
|
||||
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ yanked = "warn"
|
||||
# The lint level for crates with security notices. Note that as of
|
||||
# 2019-12-17 there are no security notice advisories in
|
||||
# https://github.com/rustsec/advisory-db
|
||||
notice = "warn"
|
||||
notice = "deny"
|
||||
# A list of advisory IDs to ignore. Note that ignored advisories will still
|
||||
# output a note when they are encountered.
|
||||
ignore = [
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,329 @@
|
||||
// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
|
||||
// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
|
||||
|
||||
//! Demonstrates an implementation of a server-side secured digital locker using
|
||||
//! the client's OPAQUE export key, over a command-line interface
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! A client can password-protect a secret message to be stored in a digital locker,
|
||||
//! controlled by the server. The locker's contents are only revealed to the holder
|
||||
//! of the password when attempting to open the locker.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! The client-server interactions are executed in a three-step protocol
|
||||
//! within the account_registration (for password registration) and
|
||||
//! account_login (for password login) functions. These steps
|
||||
//! must be performed in the specific sequence outlined in each of these
|
||||
//! functions.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! The CipherSuite trait allows the application to configure the
|
||||
//! primitives used by OPAQUE, but must be kept consistent across the steps
|
||||
//! of the protocol.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! In a more realistic client-server interaction, the client must send
|
||||
//! messages over "the wire" to the server. These bytes are serialized
|
||||
//! and explicitly annotated in the below functions.
|
||||
|
||||
use chacha20poly1305::aead::{Aead, NewAead};
|
||||
use chacha20poly1305::{ChaCha20Poly1305, Key, Nonce};
|
||||
use rustyline::error::ReadlineError;
|
||||
use rustyline::Editor;
|
||||
use std::process::exit;
|
||||
|
||||
use opaque_ke::{
|
||||
ciphersuite::CipherSuite,
|
||||
rand::{rngs::OsRng, RngCore},
|
||||
ClientLogin, ClientLoginFinishParameters, ClientRegistration,
|
||||
ClientRegistrationFinishParameters, CredentialFinalization, CredentialRequest,
|
||||
CredentialResponse, RegistrationRequest, RegistrationResponse, RegistrationUpload, ServerLogin,
|
||||
ServerLoginStartParameters, ServerRegistration, ServerSetup,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// The ciphersuite trait allows to specify the underlying primitives
|
||||
// that will be used in the OPAQUE protocol
|
||||
#[allow(dead_code)]
|
||||
struct Default;
|
||||
impl CipherSuite for Default {
|
||||
type Group = curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoPoint;
|
||||
type KeyExchange = opaque_ke::key_exchange::tripledh::TripleDH;
|
||||
type Hash = sha2::Sha512;
|
||||
type SlowHash = opaque_ke::slow_hash::NoOpHash;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
struct Locker {
|
||||
contents: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
password_file: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Given a key and plaintext, produce an AEAD ciphertext along with a nonce
|
||||
fn encrypt(key: &[u8], plaintext: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
let cipher = ChaCha20Poly1305::new(Key::from_slice(&key[..32]));
|
||||
|
||||
let mut rng = OsRng;
|
||||
let mut nonce_bytes = [0u8; 12];
|
||||
rng.fill_bytes(&mut nonce_bytes);
|
||||
let nonce = Nonce::from_slice(&nonce_bytes);
|
||||
|
||||
let ciphertext = cipher.encrypt(nonce, plaintext.as_ref()).unwrap();
|
||||
[nonce_bytes.to_vec(), ciphertext].concat()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Decrypt using a key and a ciphertext (nonce included) to recover the original plaintext
|
||||
fn decrypt(key: &[u8], ciphertext: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
let cipher = ChaCha20Poly1305::new(Key::from_slice(&key[..32]));
|
||||
cipher
|
||||
.decrypt(
|
||||
Nonce::from_slice(&ciphertext[..12]),
|
||||
ciphertext[12..].as_ref(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
.unwrap()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Password-based registration and encryption of client secret message between a client and server
|
||||
fn register_locker(
|
||||
server_setup: &ServerSetup<Default>,
|
||||
locker_id: usize,
|
||||
password: String,
|
||||
secret_message: String,
|
||||
) -> Locker {
|
||||
let mut client_rng = OsRng;
|
||||
let client_registration_start_result =
|
||||
ClientRegistration::<Default>::start(&mut client_rng, password.as_bytes()).unwrap();
|
||||
let registration_request_bytes = client_registration_start_result.message.serialize();
|
||||
|
||||
// Client sends registration_request_bytes to server
|
||||
let server_registration_start_result = ServerRegistration::<Default>::start(
|
||||
&server_setup,
|
||||
RegistrationRequest::deserialize(®istration_request_bytes[..]).unwrap(),
|
||||
&locker_id.to_be_bytes(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
let registration_response_bytes = server_registration_start_result.message.serialize();
|
||||
|
||||
// Server sends registration_response_bytes to client
|
||||
|
||||
let client_finish_registration_result = client_registration_start_result
|
||||
.state
|
||||
.finish(
|
||||
&mut client_rng,
|
||||
RegistrationResponse::deserialize(®istration_response_bytes[..]).unwrap(),
|
||||
ClientRegistrationFinishParameters::default(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
let message_bytes = client_finish_registration_result.message.serialize();
|
||||
|
||||
// Client encrypts secret message using export key
|
||||
let ciphertext = encrypt(
|
||||
&client_finish_registration_result.export_key,
|
||||
secret_message.as_bytes(),
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
// Client sends message_bytes to server
|
||||
|
||||
let password_file = ServerRegistration::finish(
|
||||
RegistrationUpload::<Default>::deserialize(&message_bytes[..]).unwrap(),
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
Locker {
|
||||
contents: ciphertext,
|
||||
password_file: password_file.serialize(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Open the contents of a locker with a password between a client and server
|
||||
fn open_locker(
|
||||
server_setup: &ServerSetup<Default>,
|
||||
locker_id: usize,
|
||||
password: String,
|
||||
locker: &Locker,
|
||||
) -> Result<String, String> {
|
||||
let mut client_rng = OsRng;
|
||||
let client_login_start_result =
|
||||
ClientLogin::<Default>::start(&mut client_rng, password.as_bytes()).unwrap();
|
||||
let credential_request_bytes = client_login_start_result.message.serialize();
|
||||
|
||||
// Client sends credential_request_bytes to server
|
||||
|
||||
let password_file =
|
||||
ServerRegistration::<Default>::deserialize(&locker.password_file[..]).unwrap();
|
||||
let mut server_rng = OsRng;
|
||||
let server_login_start_result = ServerLogin::start(
|
||||
&mut server_rng,
|
||||
&server_setup,
|
||||
Some(password_file),
|
||||
CredentialRequest::deserialize(&credential_request_bytes[..]).unwrap(),
|
||||
&locker_id.to_be_bytes(),
|
||||
ServerLoginStartParameters::default(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
let credential_response_bytes = server_login_start_result.message.serialize();
|
||||
|
||||
// Server sends credential_response_bytes to client
|
||||
|
||||
let result = client_login_start_result.state.finish(
|
||||
CredentialResponse::deserialize(&credential_response_bytes[..]).unwrap(),
|
||||
ClientLoginFinishParameters::default(),
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
if result.is_err() {
|
||||
// Client-detected login failure
|
||||
return Err(String::from("Incorrect password, please try again."));
|
||||
}
|
||||
let client_login_finish_result = result.unwrap();
|
||||
let credential_finalization_bytes = client_login_finish_result.message.serialize();
|
||||
|
||||
// Client sends credential_finalization_bytes to server
|
||||
|
||||
let server_login_finish_result = server_login_start_result
|
||||
.state
|
||||
.finish(CredentialFinalization::deserialize(&credential_finalization_bytes[..]).unwrap())
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
// Server sends locker contents, encrypted under the session key, to the client
|
||||
let encrypted_locker_contents =
|
||||
encrypt(&server_login_finish_result.session_key, &locker.contents);
|
||||
|
||||
// Client decrypts contents of locker, first under the session key, and then under the export key
|
||||
let plaintext = decrypt(
|
||||
&client_login_finish_result.export_key,
|
||||
&decrypt(
|
||||
&client_login_finish_result.session_key,
|
||||
&encrypted_locker_contents,
|
||||
),
|
||||
);
|
||||
String::from_utf8(plaintext).map_err(|_| String::from("UTF8 error"))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn main() {
|
||||
let mut rng = OsRng;
|
||||
let server_setup = ServerSetup::<Default>::new(&mut rng);
|
||||
|
||||
let mut rl = Editor::<()>::new();
|
||||
let mut registered_lockers: Vec<Locker> = vec![];
|
||||
loop {
|
||||
display_lockers(®istered_lockers);
|
||||
|
||||
println!("Enter an option (1 or 2):");
|
||||
println!("1) Register a locker");
|
||||
println!("2) Open a locker\n");
|
||||
let readline = rl.readline("> ");
|
||||
match readline {
|
||||
Ok(line) => {
|
||||
if line != "1" && line != "2" {
|
||||
println!("Error: Invalid option (either specify 1 or 2)");
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
match line.as_ref() {
|
||||
"1" => {
|
||||
let (password, secret_message) = get_two_strings(
|
||||
"Choose a password",
|
||||
"Set a secret message",
|
||||
&mut rl,
|
||||
None,
|
||||
);
|
||||
let locker_id = registered_lockers.len();
|
||||
registered_lockers.push(register_locker(
|
||||
&server_setup,
|
||||
locker_id,
|
||||
password,
|
||||
secret_message,
|
||||
));
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
"2" => {
|
||||
let (locker, password) = get_two_strings(
|
||||
"Choose a locker number",
|
||||
"Enter the password",
|
||||
&mut rl,
|
||||
None,
|
||||
);
|
||||
let locker_index: usize = match locker.parse() {
|
||||
Ok(index) => index,
|
||||
Err(_) => {
|
||||
println!("Error: Could not find locker number");
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
if locker_index >= registered_lockers.len() {
|
||||
println!("Error: Could not find locker number");
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
match open_locker(
|
||||
&server_setup,
|
||||
locker_index,
|
||||
password,
|
||||
®istered_lockers[locker_index],
|
||||
) {
|
||||
Ok(contents) => {
|
||||
println!("\n\nSuccess! Contents: {}\n\n", contents);
|
||||
}
|
||||
Err(err) => {
|
||||
println!(
|
||||
"\n\nError encountered, could not open locker: {}\n\n",
|
||||
err
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
_ => exit(0),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
Err(err) => {
|
||||
handle_error(err);
|
||||
exit(0)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Helper functions
|
||||
|
||||
fn display_lockers(lockers: &Vec<Locker>) {
|
||||
let mut locker_numbers = vec![];
|
||||
for (i, _) in lockers.iter().enumerate() {
|
||||
locker_numbers.push(i);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
println!(
|
||||
"\nCurrently registered locker numbers: {:?}\n",
|
||||
locker_numbers
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Handle readline errors
|
||||
fn handle_error(err: ReadlineError) {
|
||||
match err {
|
||||
ReadlineError::Interrupted => {
|
||||
println!("CTRL-C");
|
||||
}
|
||||
ReadlineError::Eof => {
|
||||
println!("CTRL-D");
|
||||
}
|
||||
err => {
|
||||
println!("Error: {:?}", err);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// A function run on the client which extracts two strings from the CLI
|
||||
fn get_two_strings(
|
||||
s1: &str,
|
||||
s2: &str,
|
||||
rl: &mut Editor<()>,
|
||||
string1: Option<String>,
|
||||
) -> (String, String) {
|
||||
let query = if string1.is_none() { s1 } else { s2 };
|
||||
let readline = rl.readline(&format!("{}: ", query));
|
||||
match readline {
|
||||
Ok(line) => match string1 {
|
||||
Some(x) => (x, line),
|
||||
None => get_two_strings(s1, s2, rl, Some(line)),
|
||||
},
|
||||
Err(err) => {
|
||||
handle_error(err);
|
||||
exit(0)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,232 @@
|
||||
// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
|
||||
// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
|
||||
|
||||
//! Demonstrates a simple client-server password-based login protocol
|
||||
//! using OPAQUE, over a command-line interface
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! The client-server interactions are executed in a three-step protocol
|
||||
//! within the account_registration (for password registration) and
|
||||
//! account_login (for password login) functions. These steps
|
||||
//! must be performed in the specific sequence outlined in each of these
|
||||
//! functions.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! The CipherSuite trait allows the application to configure the
|
||||
//! primitives used by OPAQUE, but must be kept consistent across the steps
|
||||
//! of the protocol.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! In a more realistic client-server interaction, the client must send
|
||||
//! messages over "the wire" to the server. These bytes are serialized
|
||||
//! and explicitly annotated in the below functions.
|
||||
|
||||
use rustyline::error::ReadlineError;
|
||||
use rustyline::Editor;
|
||||
use std::collections::HashMap;
|
||||
use std::process::exit;
|
||||
|
||||
use opaque_ke::{
|
||||
ciphersuite::CipherSuite, rand::rngs::OsRng, ClientLogin, ClientLoginFinishParameters,
|
||||
ClientRegistration, ClientRegistrationFinishParameters, CredentialFinalization,
|
||||
CredentialRequest, CredentialResponse, RegistrationRequest, RegistrationResponse,
|
||||
RegistrationUpload, ServerLogin, ServerLoginStartParameters, ServerRegistration, ServerSetup,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// The ciphersuite trait allows to specify the underlying primitives
|
||||
// that will be used in the OPAQUE protocol
|
||||
#[allow(dead_code)]
|
||||
struct Default;
|
||||
impl CipherSuite for Default {
|
||||
type Group = curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoPoint;
|
||||
type KeyExchange = opaque_ke::key_exchange::tripledh::TripleDH;
|
||||
type Hash = sha2::Sha512;
|
||||
type SlowHash = opaque_ke::slow_hash::NoOpHash;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Password-based registration between a client and server
|
||||
fn account_registration(
|
||||
server_setup: &ServerSetup<Default>,
|
||||
username: String,
|
||||
password: String,
|
||||
) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
let mut client_rng = OsRng;
|
||||
let client_registration_start_result =
|
||||
ClientRegistration::<Default>::start(&mut client_rng, password.as_bytes()).unwrap();
|
||||
let registration_request_bytes = client_registration_start_result.message.serialize();
|
||||
|
||||
// Client sends registration_request_bytes to server
|
||||
|
||||
let server_registration_start_result = ServerRegistration::<Default>::start(
|
||||
&server_setup,
|
||||
RegistrationRequest::deserialize(®istration_request_bytes[..]).unwrap(),
|
||||
username.as_bytes(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
let registration_response_bytes = server_registration_start_result.message.serialize();
|
||||
|
||||
// Server sends registration_response_bytes to client
|
||||
|
||||
let client_finish_registration_result = client_registration_start_result
|
||||
.state
|
||||
.finish(
|
||||
&mut client_rng,
|
||||
RegistrationResponse::deserialize(®istration_response_bytes[..]).unwrap(),
|
||||
ClientRegistrationFinishParameters::default(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
let message_bytes = client_finish_registration_result.message.serialize();
|
||||
|
||||
// Client sends message_bytes to server
|
||||
|
||||
let password_file = ServerRegistration::finish(
|
||||
RegistrationUpload::<Default>::deserialize(&message_bytes[..]).unwrap(),
|
||||
);
|
||||
password_file.serialize()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Password-based login between a client and server
|
||||
fn account_login(
|
||||
server_setup: &ServerSetup<Default>,
|
||||
username: String,
|
||||
password: String,
|
||||
password_file_bytes: &[u8],
|
||||
) -> bool {
|
||||
let mut client_rng = OsRng;
|
||||
let client_login_start_result =
|
||||
ClientLogin::<Default>::start(&mut client_rng, password.as_bytes()).unwrap();
|
||||
let credential_request_bytes = client_login_start_result.message.serialize();
|
||||
|
||||
// Client sends credential_request_bytes to server
|
||||
|
||||
let password_file = ServerRegistration::<Default>::deserialize(password_file_bytes).unwrap();
|
||||
let mut server_rng = OsRng;
|
||||
let server_login_start_result = ServerLogin::start(
|
||||
&mut server_rng,
|
||||
&server_setup,
|
||||
Some(password_file),
|
||||
CredentialRequest::deserialize(&credential_request_bytes[..]).unwrap(),
|
||||
username.as_bytes(),
|
||||
ServerLoginStartParameters::default(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
let credential_response_bytes = server_login_start_result.message.serialize();
|
||||
|
||||
// Server sends credential_response_bytes to client
|
||||
|
||||
let result = client_login_start_result.state.finish(
|
||||
CredentialResponse::deserialize(&credential_response_bytes[..]).unwrap(),
|
||||
ClientLoginFinishParameters::default(),
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
if result.is_err() {
|
||||
// Client-detected login failure
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
let client_login_finish_result = result.unwrap();
|
||||
let credential_finalization_bytes = client_login_finish_result.message.serialize();
|
||||
|
||||
// Client sends credential_finalization_bytes to server
|
||||
|
||||
let server_login_finish_result = server_login_start_result
|
||||
.state
|
||||
.finish(CredentialFinalization::deserialize(&credential_finalization_bytes[..]).unwrap())
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
client_login_finish_result.session_key == server_login_finish_result.session_key
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn main() {
|
||||
let mut rng = OsRng;
|
||||
let server_setup = ServerSetup::<Default>::new(&mut rng);
|
||||
|
||||
let mut rl = Editor::<()>::new();
|
||||
let mut registered_users = HashMap::<String, Vec<u8>>::new();
|
||||
loop {
|
||||
println!(
|
||||
"\nCurrently registered usernames: {:?}\n",
|
||||
registered_users.keys()
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
println!("Enter an option (1 or 2):");
|
||||
println!("1) Register a user");
|
||||
println!("2) Login as a user\n");
|
||||
let readline = rl.readline("> ");
|
||||
match readline {
|
||||
Ok(line) => {
|
||||
if line != "1" && line != "2" {
|
||||
println!("Error: Invalid option (either specify 1 or 2)");
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
let (username, password) = get_two_strings("Username", "Password", &mut rl, None);
|
||||
match line.as_ref() {
|
||||
"1" => {
|
||||
registered_users.insert(
|
||||
username.clone(),
|
||||
account_registration(&server_setup, username, password),
|
||||
);
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
"2" => match registered_users.get(&username) {
|
||||
Some(password_file_bytes) => {
|
||||
if account_login(&server_setup, username, password, password_file_bytes)
|
||||
{
|
||||
println!("\nLogin success!");
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
// Note that at this point, the client knows whether or not the login
|
||||
// succeeded. In this example, we simply rely on client-reported result
|
||||
// of login, but in a real client-server implementation, the server may not
|
||||
// know the outcome of login yet, and extra care must be taken to ensure
|
||||
// that the server can learn the outcome as well.
|
||||
println!("\nIncorrect password, please try again.");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
None => println!("Error: Could not find username registered"),
|
||||
},
|
||||
_ => exit(0),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
Err(err) => {
|
||||
handle_error(err);
|
||||
exit(0)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Helper functions
|
||||
|
||||
// Handle readline errors
|
||||
fn handle_error(err: ReadlineError) {
|
||||
match err {
|
||||
ReadlineError::Interrupted => {
|
||||
println!("CTRL-C");
|
||||
}
|
||||
ReadlineError::Eof => {
|
||||
println!("CTRL-D");
|
||||
}
|
||||
err => {
|
||||
println!("Error: {:?}", err);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// A function run on the client which extracts two strings from the CLI
|
||||
fn get_two_strings(
|
||||
s1: &str,
|
||||
s2: &str,
|
||||
rl: &mut Editor<()>,
|
||||
string1: Option<String>,
|
||||
) -> (String, String) {
|
||||
let query = if string1.is_none() { s1 } else { s2 };
|
||||
let readline = rl.readline(&format!("{}: ", query));
|
||||
match readline {
|
||||
Ok(line) => match string1 {
|
||||
Some(x) => (x, line),
|
||||
None => get_two_strings(s1, s2, rl, Some(line)),
|
||||
},
|
||||
Err(err) => {
|
||||
handle_error(err);
|
||||
exit(0)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
|
||||
#!/bin/expect -f
|
||||
# Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
|
||||
# LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
|
||||
|
||||
set timeout 1
|
||||
spawn cargo run --example digital_locker
|
||||
match_max 100000
|
||||
sleep 1
|
||||
expect "*
|
||||
\r
|
||||
Currently registered locker numbers: \\\[\\\]\r
|
||||
\r
|
||||
Enter an option (1 or 2):\r
|
||||
1) Register a locker\r
|
||||
2) Open a locker\r
|
||||
\r
|
||||
"
|
||||
sleep .1
|
||||
send -- "1\r"
|
||||
expect "Choose a password: \r"
|
||||
send -- "foo\r"
|
||||
expect "Set a secret message: \r"
|
||||
send -- "bar\r"
|
||||
expect "*
|
||||
\r
|
||||
Currently registered locker numbers: \\\[0\\\]\r
|
||||
\r
|
||||
Enter an option (1 or 2):\r
|
||||
1) Register a locker\r
|
||||
2) Open a locker\r
|
||||
\r
|
||||
"
|
||||
sleep .1
|
||||
send -- "2\r"
|
||||
expect "Choose a locker number: \r"
|
||||
send -- "1\r"
|
||||
expect "Password: \r"
|
||||
send -- "foo\r"
|
||||
expect "*Error: Could not find locker number\r
|
||||
\r
|
||||
Currently registered locker numbers: \\\[0\\\]\r
|
||||
\r
|
||||
Enter an option (1 or 2):\r
|
||||
1) Register a locker\r
|
||||
2) Open a locker\r
|
||||
\r
|
||||
"
|
||||
sleep .1
|
||||
send -- "2\r"
|
||||
expect "Choose a locker number: \r"
|
||||
send -- "0\r"
|
||||
expect "Password: \r"
|
||||
send -- "baz\r"
|
||||
expect "*Error encountered, could not open locker: Incorrect password, please try again.\r
|
||||
\r
|
||||
Currently registered locker numbers: \\\[0\\\]\r
|
||||
\r
|
||||
Enter an option (1 or 2):\r
|
||||
1) Register a locker\r
|
||||
2) Open a locker\r
|
||||
\r
|
||||
"
|
||||
sleep .1
|
||||
send -- "2\r"
|
||||
expect "Choose a locker number: \r"
|
||||
send -- "0\r"
|
||||
expect "Password: \r"
|
||||
send -- "foo\r"
|
||||
expect "*
|
||||
\r
|
||||
*Success! Contents: bar\r
|
||||
\r
|
||||
Currently registered locker numbers: \\\[0\\\]\r
|
||||
\r
|
||||
Enter an option (1 or 2):\r
|
||||
1) Register a locker\r
|
||||
2) Open a locker\r
|
||||
\r
|
||||
"
|
||||
sleep .1
|
||||
send -- ""
|
||||
expect eof
|
||||
Executable
+84
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
|
||||
#!/bin/expect -f
|
||||
# Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
|
||||
# LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
|
||||
|
||||
set timeout 1
|
||||
spawn cargo run --example simple_login
|
||||
match_max 100000
|
||||
sleep 1
|
||||
expect "*
|
||||
\r
|
||||
Currently registered usernames: \\\[\\\]\r
|
||||
\r
|
||||
Enter an option (1 or 2):\r
|
||||
1) Register a user\r
|
||||
2) Login as a user\r
|
||||
\r
|
||||
"
|
||||
sleep .1
|
||||
send -- "1\r"
|
||||
expect "Username: \r"
|
||||
send -- "foo\r"
|
||||
expect "Password: \r"
|
||||
send -- "bar\r"
|
||||
expect "*
|
||||
\r
|
||||
Currently registered usernames: \\\[\"foo\"\\\]\r
|
||||
\r
|
||||
Enter an option (1 or 2):\r
|
||||
1) Register a user\r
|
||||
2) Login as a user\r
|
||||
\r
|
||||
"
|
||||
sleep .1
|
||||
send -- "2\r"
|
||||
expect "Username: \r"
|
||||
send -- "baz\r"
|
||||
expect "Password: \r"
|
||||
send -- "quux\r"
|
||||
expect "*Error: Could not find username registered\r
|
||||
\r
|
||||
Currently registered usernames: \\\[\"foo\"\\\]\r
|
||||
\r
|
||||
Enter an option (1 or 2):\r
|
||||
1) Register a user\r
|
||||
2) Login as a user\r
|
||||
\r
|
||||
"
|
||||
sleep .1
|
||||
send -- "2\r"
|
||||
expect "Username: \r"
|
||||
send -- "foo\r"
|
||||
expect "Password: \r"
|
||||
send -- "baz\r"
|
||||
expect "*Incorrect password, please try again.\r
|
||||
\r
|
||||
Currently registered usernames: \\\[\"foo\"\\\]\r
|
||||
\r
|
||||
Enter an option (1 or 2):\r
|
||||
1) Register a user\r
|
||||
2) Login as a user\r
|
||||
\r
|
||||
"
|
||||
sleep .1
|
||||
send -- "2\r"
|
||||
expect "Username: \r"
|
||||
send -- "foo\r"
|
||||
expect "Password: \r"
|
||||
send -- "bar\r"
|
||||
expect "*
|
||||
\r
|
||||
*Login success!\r
|
||||
\r
|
||||
Currently registered usernames: \\\[\"foo\"\\\]\r
|
||||
\r
|
||||
Enter an option (1 or 2):\r
|
||||
1) Register a user\r
|
||||
2) Login as a user\r
|
||||
\r
|
||||
"
|
||||
sleep .1
|
||||
send -- ""
|
||||
expect eof
|
||||
+5
-15
@@ -6,18 +6,16 @@
|
||||
//! Defines the CipherSuite trait to specify the underlying primitives for OPAQUE
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::{
|
||||
errors::InternalPakeError, hash::Hash, key_exchange::traits::KeyExchange, keypair::KeyPair,
|
||||
map_to_curve::GroupWithMapToCurve, slow_hash::SlowHash,
|
||||
hash::Hash, key_exchange::traits::KeyExchange, map_to_curve::GroupWithMapToCurve,
|
||||
slow_hash::SlowHash,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
use rand_core::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
|
||||
use digest::Digest;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Configures the underlying primitives used in OPAQUE
|
||||
/// * `Group`: a finite cyclic group along with a point representation, along
|
||||
/// with an extension trait PasswordToCurve that allows some customization on
|
||||
/// how to hash a password to a curve point. See `group::Group` and
|
||||
/// `map_to_curve::GroupWithMapToCurve`.
|
||||
/// * `KeyFormat`: a keypair type composed of public and private components
|
||||
/// * `KeyExchange`: The key exchange protocol to use in the login step
|
||||
/// * `Hash`: The main hashing function to use
|
||||
/// * `SlowHash`: A slow hashing function, typically used for password hashing
|
||||
@@ -26,19 +24,11 @@ pub trait CipherSuite {
|
||||
/// an extension trait PasswordToCurve that allows some customization on
|
||||
/// how to hash a password to a curve point. See `group::Group` and
|
||||
/// `map_to_curve::GroupWithMapToCurve`.
|
||||
type Group: GroupWithMapToCurve;
|
||||
/// A keypair type composed of public and private components
|
||||
type KeyFormat: KeyPair + PartialEq;
|
||||
type Group: GroupWithMapToCurve<UniformBytesLen = <Self::Hash as Digest>::OutputSize>;
|
||||
/// A key exchange protocol
|
||||
type KeyExchange: KeyExchange<Self::Hash, Self::KeyFormat>;
|
||||
type KeyExchange: KeyExchange<Self::Hash, Self::Group>;
|
||||
/// The main hash function use (for HKDF computations and hashing transcripts)
|
||||
type Hash: Hash;
|
||||
/// A slow hashing function, typically used for password hashing
|
||||
type SlowHash: SlowHash<Self::Hash>;
|
||||
/// Generating a random key pair given a cryptographic rng
|
||||
fn generate_random_keypair<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
|
||||
rng: &mut R,
|
||||
) -> Result<Self::KeyFormat, InternalPakeError> {
|
||||
Self::KeyFormat::generate_random(rng)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,353 +0,0 @@
|
||||
// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
|
||||
// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
|
||||
#![allow(clippy::let_and_return)]
|
||||
|
||||
//! Field arithmetic modulo \\(p = 2\^{255} - 19\\), using \\(64\\)-bit
|
||||
//! limbs with \\(128\\)-bit products.
|
||||
|
||||
use core::fmt::Debug;
|
||||
use core::ops::Neg;
|
||||
use core::ops::{Add, AddAssign};
|
||||
use core::ops::{Mul, MulAssign};
|
||||
|
||||
use subtle::Choice;
|
||||
use subtle::ConditionallyNegatable;
|
||||
use subtle::ConditionallySelectable;
|
||||
use subtle::ConstantTimeEq;
|
||||
|
||||
use zeroize::Zeroize;
|
||||
|
||||
use fiat_crypto::curve25519_64::*;
|
||||
|
||||
/// A `FieldElement51` represents an element of the field
|
||||
/// \\( \mathbb Z / (2\^{255} - 19)\\).
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// In the 64-bit implementation, a `FieldElement` is represented in
|
||||
/// radix \\(2\^{51}\\) as five `u64`s; the coefficients are allowed to
|
||||
/// grow up to \\(2\^{54}\\) between reductions modulo \\(p\\).
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Note
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// The `curve25519_dalek::field` module provides a type alias
|
||||
/// `curve25519_dalek::field::FieldElement` to either `FieldElement51`
|
||||
/// or `FieldElement2625`.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// The backend-specific type `FieldElement51` should not be used
|
||||
/// outside of the `curve25519_dalek::field` module.
|
||||
#[derive(Copy, Clone)]
|
||||
pub struct FieldElement51(pub(crate) [u64; 5]);
|
||||
|
||||
impl Debug for FieldElement51 {
|
||||
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut ::core::fmt::Formatter) -> ::core::fmt::Result {
|
||||
write!(f, "FieldElement51({:?})", &self.0[..])
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl Zeroize for FieldElement51 {
|
||||
fn zeroize(&mut self) {
|
||||
self.0.zeroize();
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl ConstantTimeEq for FieldElement51 {
|
||||
/// Test equality between two `FieldElement`s. Since the
|
||||
/// internal representation is not canonical, the field elements
|
||||
/// are normalized to wire format before comparison.
|
||||
fn ct_eq(&self, other: &FieldElement51) -> Choice {
|
||||
self.to_bytes().ct_eq(&other.to_bytes())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl<'b> AddAssign<&'b FieldElement51> for FieldElement51 {
|
||||
fn add_assign(&mut self, _rhs: &'b FieldElement51) {
|
||||
let input = self.0;
|
||||
fiat_25519_add(&mut self.0, &input, &_rhs.0);
|
||||
let input = self.0;
|
||||
fiat_25519_carry(&mut self.0, &input);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl<'a, 'b> Add<&'b FieldElement51> for &'a FieldElement51 {
|
||||
type Output = FieldElement51;
|
||||
fn add(self, _rhs: &'b FieldElement51) -> FieldElement51 {
|
||||
let mut output = *self;
|
||||
fiat_25519_add(&mut output.0, &self.0, &_rhs.0);
|
||||
let input = output.0;
|
||||
fiat_25519_carry(&mut output.0, &input);
|
||||
output
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl<'b> MulAssign<&'b FieldElement51> for FieldElement51 {
|
||||
fn mul_assign(&mut self, _rhs: &'b FieldElement51) {
|
||||
let input = self.0;
|
||||
fiat_25519_carry_mul(&mut self.0, &input, &_rhs.0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl<'a, 'b> Mul<&'b FieldElement51> for &'a FieldElement51 {
|
||||
type Output = FieldElement51;
|
||||
fn mul(self, _rhs: &'b FieldElement51) -> FieldElement51 {
|
||||
let mut output = *self;
|
||||
fiat_25519_carry_mul(&mut output.0, &self.0, &_rhs.0);
|
||||
output
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl<'a> Neg for &'a FieldElement51 {
|
||||
type Output = FieldElement51;
|
||||
fn neg(self) -> FieldElement51 {
|
||||
let mut output = *self;
|
||||
fiat_25519_opp(&mut output.0, &self.0);
|
||||
let input = output.0;
|
||||
fiat_25519_carry(&mut output.0, &input);
|
||||
output
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl ConditionallySelectable for FieldElement51 {
|
||||
fn conditional_select(
|
||||
a: &FieldElement51,
|
||||
b: &FieldElement51,
|
||||
choice: Choice,
|
||||
) -> FieldElement51 {
|
||||
let mut output = [0u64; 5];
|
||||
fiat_25519_selectznz(&mut output, choice.unwrap_u8() as fiat_25519_u1, &a.0, &b.0);
|
||||
FieldElement51(output)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn conditional_swap(a: &mut FieldElement51, b: &mut FieldElement51, choice: Choice) {
|
||||
u64::conditional_swap(&mut a.0[0], &mut b.0[0], choice);
|
||||
u64::conditional_swap(&mut a.0[1], &mut b.0[1], choice);
|
||||
u64::conditional_swap(&mut a.0[2], &mut b.0[2], choice);
|
||||
u64::conditional_swap(&mut a.0[3], &mut b.0[3], choice);
|
||||
u64::conditional_swap(&mut a.0[4], &mut b.0[4], choice);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn conditional_assign(&mut self, _rhs: &FieldElement51, choice: Choice) {
|
||||
let mut output = [0u64; 5];
|
||||
let choicebit = choice.unwrap_u8() as fiat_25519_u1;
|
||||
fiat_25519_cmovznz_u64(&mut output[0], choicebit, self.0[0], _rhs.0[0]);
|
||||
fiat_25519_cmovznz_u64(&mut output[1], choicebit, self.0[1], _rhs.0[1]);
|
||||
fiat_25519_cmovznz_u64(&mut output[2], choicebit, self.0[2], _rhs.0[2]);
|
||||
fiat_25519_cmovznz_u64(&mut output[3], choicebit, self.0[3], _rhs.0[3]);
|
||||
fiat_25519_cmovznz_u64(&mut output[4], choicebit, self.0[4], _rhs.0[4]);
|
||||
*self = FieldElement51(output);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl FieldElement51 {
|
||||
/// Construct zero.
|
||||
pub fn zero() -> FieldElement51 {
|
||||
FieldElement51([0, 0, 0, 0, 0])
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Construct one.
|
||||
pub fn one() -> FieldElement51 {
|
||||
FieldElement51([1, 0, 0, 0, 0])
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn is_negative(&self) -> Choice {
|
||||
let bytes = self.to_bytes();
|
||||
(bytes[0] & 1).into()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Raise this field element to the power (p-5)/8 = 2^252 -3.
|
||||
fn pow_p58(&self) -> FieldElement51 {
|
||||
// The bits of (p-5)/8 are 101111.....11.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// nonzero bits of exponent
|
||||
let (t19, _) = self.pow22501(); // 249..0
|
||||
let t20 = t19.pow2k(2); // 251..2
|
||||
let t21 = self * &t20; // 251..2,0
|
||||
|
||||
t21
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Given a nonzero field element, compute its inverse.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// The inverse is computed as self^(p-2), since
|
||||
/// x^(p-2)x = x^(p-1) = 1 (mod p).
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// This function returns zero on input zero.
|
||||
pub fn invert(&self) -> FieldElement51 {
|
||||
// The bits of p-2 = 2^255 -19 -2 are 11010111111...11.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// nonzero bits of exponent
|
||||
let (t19, t3) = self.pow22501(); // t19: 249..0 ; t3: 3,1,0
|
||||
let t20 = t19.pow2k(5); // 254..5
|
||||
let t21 = &t20 * &t3; // 254..5,3,1,0
|
||||
|
||||
t21
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Compute (self^(2^250-1), self^11), used as a helper function
|
||||
/// within invert() and pow22523().
|
||||
fn pow22501(&self) -> (FieldElement51, FieldElement51) {
|
||||
// Instead of managing which temporary variables are used
|
||||
// for what, we define as many as we need and leave stack
|
||||
// allocation to the compiler
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Each temporary variable t_i is of the form (self)^e_i.
|
||||
// Squaring t_i corresponds to multiplying e_i by 2,
|
||||
// so the pow2k function shifts e_i left by k places.
|
||||
// Multiplying t_i and t_j corresponds to adding e_i + e_j.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Temporary t_i Nonzero bits of e_i
|
||||
//
|
||||
let t0 = self.square(); // 1 e_0 = 2^1
|
||||
let t1 = t0.square().square(); // 3 e_1 = 2^3
|
||||
let t2 = self * &t1; // 3,0 e_2 = 2^3 + 2^0
|
||||
let t3 = &t0 * &t2; // 3,1,0
|
||||
let t4 = t3.square(); // 4,2,1
|
||||
let t5 = &t2 * &t4; // 4,3,2,1,0
|
||||
let t6 = t5.pow2k(5); // 9,8,7,6,5
|
||||
let t7 = &t6 * &t5; // 9,8,7,6,5,4,3,2,1,0
|
||||
let t8 = t7.pow2k(10); // 19..10
|
||||
let t9 = &t8 * &t7; // 19..0
|
||||
let t10 = t9.pow2k(20); // 39..20
|
||||
let t11 = &t10 * &t9; // 39..0
|
||||
let t12 = t11.pow2k(10); // 49..10
|
||||
let t13 = &t12 * &t7; // 49..0
|
||||
let t14 = t13.pow2k(50); // 99..50
|
||||
let t15 = &t14 * &t13; // 99..0
|
||||
let t16 = t15.pow2k(100); // 199..100
|
||||
let t17 = &t16 * &t15; // 199..0
|
||||
let t18 = t17.pow2k(50); // 249..50
|
||||
let t19 = &t18 * &t13; // 249..0
|
||||
|
||||
(t19, t3)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Load a `FieldElement51` from the low 255 bits of a 256-bit
|
||||
/// input.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Warning
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// This function does not check that the input used the canonical
|
||||
/// representative. It masks the high bit, but it will happily
|
||||
/// decode 2^255 - 18 to 1. Applications that require a canonical
|
||||
/// encoding of every field element should decode, re-encode to
|
||||
/// the canonical encoding, and check that the input was
|
||||
/// canonical.
|
||||
///
|
||||
pub fn from_bytes(bytes: &[u8; 32]) -> FieldElement51 {
|
||||
let mut temp = [0u8; 32];
|
||||
temp.copy_from_slice(bytes);
|
||||
temp[31] &= 127u8;
|
||||
let mut output = [0u64; 5];
|
||||
fiat_25519_from_bytes(&mut output, &temp);
|
||||
FieldElement51(output)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Serialize this `FieldElement51` to a 32-byte array. The
|
||||
/// encoding is canonical.
|
||||
pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
|
||||
let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
|
||||
fiat_25519_to_bytes(&mut bytes, &self.0);
|
||||
bytes
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Given `k > 0`, return `self^(2^k)`.
|
||||
pub fn pow2k(&self, mut k: u32) -> FieldElement51 {
|
||||
let mut output = *self;
|
||||
loop {
|
||||
let input = output.0;
|
||||
fiat_25519_carry_square(&mut output.0, &input);
|
||||
k -= 1;
|
||||
if k == 0 {
|
||||
return output;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Given `FieldElements` `u` and `v`, compute either `sqrt(u/v)`
|
||||
/// or `sqrt(i*u/v)` in constant time.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// This function always returns the nonnegative square root.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Return
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// - `(Choice(1), +sqrt(u/v)) ` if `v` is nonzero and `u/v` is square;
|
||||
/// - `(Choice(1), zero) ` if `u` is zero;
|
||||
/// - `(Choice(0), zero) ` if `v` is zero and `u` is nonzero;
|
||||
/// - `(Choice(0), +sqrt(i*u/v))` if `u/v` is nonsquare (so `i*u/v` is square).
|
||||
///
|
||||
pub fn sqrt_ratio_i(u: &FieldElement51, v: &FieldElement51) -> (Choice, FieldElement51) {
|
||||
// Using the same trick as in ed25519 decoding, we merge the
|
||||
// inversion, the square root, and the square test as follows.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// To compute sqrt(α), we can compute β = α^((p+3)/8).
|
||||
// Then β^2 = ±α, so multiplying β by sqrt(-1) if necessary
|
||||
// gives sqrt(α).
|
||||
//
|
||||
// To compute 1/sqrt(α), we observe that
|
||||
// 1/β = α^(p-1 - (p+3)/8) = α^((7p-11)/8)
|
||||
// = α^3 * (α^7)^((p-5)/8).
|
||||
//
|
||||
// We can therefore compute sqrt(u/v) = sqrt(u)/sqrt(v)
|
||||
// by first computing
|
||||
// r = u^((p+3)/8) v^(p-1-(p+3)/8)
|
||||
// = u u^((p-5)/8) v^3 (v^7)^((p-5)/8)
|
||||
// = (uv^3) (uv^7)^((p-5)/8).
|
||||
//
|
||||
// If v is nonzero and u/v is square, then r^2 = ±u/v,
|
||||
// so vr^2 = ±u.
|
||||
// If vr^2 = u, then sqrt(u/v) = r.
|
||||
// If vr^2 = -u, then sqrt(u/v) = r*sqrt(-1).
|
||||
//
|
||||
// If v is zero, r is also zero.
|
||||
|
||||
let v3 = &v.square() * v;
|
||||
let v7 = &v3.square() * v;
|
||||
let mut r = &(u * &v3) * &(u * &v7).pow_p58();
|
||||
let check = v * &r.square();
|
||||
|
||||
let i = &SQRT_M1;
|
||||
|
||||
let correct_sign_sqrt = check.ct_eq(u);
|
||||
let flipped_sign_sqrt = check.ct_eq(&(-u));
|
||||
let flipped_sign_sqrt_i = check.ct_eq(&(&(-u) * i));
|
||||
|
||||
let r_prime = &SQRT_M1 * &r;
|
||||
r.conditional_assign(&r_prime, flipped_sign_sqrt | flipped_sign_sqrt_i);
|
||||
|
||||
// Choose the nonnegative square root.
|
||||
let r_is_negative = r.is_negative();
|
||||
r.conditional_negate(r_is_negative);
|
||||
|
||||
let was_nonzero_square = correct_sign_sqrt | flipped_sign_sqrt;
|
||||
|
||||
(was_nonzero_square, r)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Returns the square of this field element.
|
||||
pub fn square(&self) -> FieldElement51 {
|
||||
let mut output = *self;
|
||||
fiat_25519_carry_square(&mut output.0, &self.0);
|
||||
output
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Returns 2 times the square of this field element.
|
||||
pub fn square2(&self) -> FieldElement51 {
|
||||
let mut output = *self;
|
||||
let mut temp = *self;
|
||||
// Void vs return type, measure cost of copying self
|
||||
fiat_25519_carry_square(&mut temp.0, &self.0);
|
||||
fiat_25519_add(&mut output.0, &temp.0, &temp.0);
|
||||
let input = output.0;
|
||||
fiat_25519_carry(&mut output.0, &input);
|
||||
output
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Precomputed value of one of the square roots of -1 (mod p)
|
||||
pub(crate) const SQRT_M1: FieldElement51 = FieldElement51([
|
||||
1718705420411056,
|
||||
234908883556509,
|
||||
2233514472574048,
|
||||
2117202627021982,
|
||||
765476049583133,
|
||||
]);
|
||||
@@ -1,177 +0,0 @@
|
||||
// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
|
||||
// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
|
||||
#![allow(non_snake_case)]
|
||||
|
||||
mod field;
|
||||
|
||||
use curve25519_dalek::{edwards::EdwardsPoint, montgomery::MontgomeryPoint};
|
||||
use field::FieldElement51;
|
||||
use sha2::Digest;
|
||||
use subtle::{ConditionallyNegatable, ConditionallySelectable};
|
||||
|
||||
const MONT_A: FieldElement51 = FieldElement51([486662, 0, 0, 0, 0]);
|
||||
|
||||
fn elligator_signal(r_0: &FieldElement51) -> MontgomeryPoint {
|
||||
let minus_a = -&MONT_A; /* A = 486662 */
|
||||
let one = FieldElement51::one();
|
||||
let d_1 = &one + &r_0.square2(); /* 2r^2 */
|
||||
|
||||
let d = &minus_a * &(d_1.invert()); /* A/(1+2r^2) */
|
||||
|
||||
let d_sq = &d.square();
|
||||
let au = &MONT_A * &d;
|
||||
|
||||
let inner = &(d_sq + &au) + &one;
|
||||
let eps = &d * &inner; /* eps = d^3 + Ad^2 + d */
|
||||
|
||||
let (eps_is_sq, _eps) = FieldElement51::sqrt_ratio_i(&eps, &one);
|
||||
|
||||
let zero = FieldElement51::zero();
|
||||
let Atemp = FieldElement51::conditional_select(&MONT_A, &zero, eps_is_sq); /* 0, or A if nonsquare*/
|
||||
let mut u = &d + &Atemp; /* d, or d+A if nonsquare */
|
||||
u.conditional_negate(!eps_is_sq); /* d, or -d-A if nonsquare */
|
||||
|
||||
MontgomeryPoint(u.to_bytes())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn hash_to_point(bytes: &[u8]) -> EdwardsPoint {
|
||||
let mut hash = sha2::Sha512::new();
|
||||
hash.update(bytes);
|
||||
let h = hash.finalize();
|
||||
let mut res = [0u8; 32];
|
||||
res.copy_from_slice(&h[..32]);
|
||||
|
||||
let sign_bit = (res[31] & 0x80) >> 7;
|
||||
|
||||
let fe = FieldElement51::from_bytes(&res);
|
||||
|
||||
let M1 = elligator_signal(&fe);
|
||||
let E1_opt = M1.to_edwards(sign_bit);
|
||||
|
||||
E1_opt
|
||||
.expect("Montgomery conversion to Edwards point in Elligator failed")
|
||||
.mul_by_cofactor()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
use std::convert::TryInto;
|
||||
|
||||
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
|
||||
// Signal tests from //
|
||||
// https://github.com/signalapp/libsignal-protocol-c/blob/master/src/curve25519/ed25519/tests/internal_fast_tests.c#L222-L282 //
|
||||
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
|
||||
|
||||
const ELLIGATOR_CORRECT_OUTPUT: [u8; 32] = [
|
||||
0x5f, 0x35, 0x20, 0x00, 0x1c, 0x6c, 0x99, 0x36, 0xa3, 0x12, 0x06, 0xaf, 0xe7, 0xc7, 0xac,
|
||||
0x22, 0x4e, 0x88, 0x61, 0x61, 0x9b, 0xf9, 0x88, 0x72, 0x44, 0x49, 0x15, 0x89, 0x9d, 0x95,
|
||||
0xf4, 0x6e,
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn elligator_correct() {
|
||||
let bytes: Vec<u8> = (0u8..32u8).collect();
|
||||
let bits_in: [u8; 32] = (&bytes[..]).try_into().expect("Range invariant broken");
|
||||
|
||||
let fe = FieldElement51::from_bytes(&bits_in);
|
||||
let eg = elligator_signal(&fe);
|
||||
assert_eq!(eg.to_bytes(), ELLIGATOR_CORRECT_OUTPUT);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn elligator_zero_zero() {
|
||||
let zero = [0u8; 32];
|
||||
let fe = FieldElement51::from_bytes(&zero);
|
||||
let eg = elligator_signal(&fe);
|
||||
assert_eq!(eg.to_bytes(), zero);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const HASHTOPOINT_CORRECT_OUTPUT1: [u8; 32] = [
|
||||
0xce, 0x89, 0x9f, 0xb2, 0x8f, 0xf7, 0x20, 0x91, 0x5e, 0x14, 0xf5, 0xb7, 0x99, 0x08, 0xab,
|
||||
0x17, 0xaa, 0x2e, 0xe2, 0x45, 0xb4, 0xfc, 0x2b, 0xf6, 0x06, 0x36, 0x29, 0x40, 0xed, 0x7d,
|
||||
0xe7, 0xed,
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
const HASHTOPOINT_CORRECT_OUTPUT2: [u8; 32] = [
|
||||
0xa0, 0x35, 0xbb, 0xa9, 0x4d, 0x30, 0x55, 0x33, 0x0d, 0xce, 0xc2, 0x7f, 0x83, 0xde, 0x79,
|
||||
0xd0, 0x89, 0x67, 0x72, 0x4c, 0x07, 0x8d, 0x68, 0x9d, 0x61, 0x52, 0x1d, 0xf9, 0x2c, 0x5c,
|
||||
0xba, 0x77,
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_hash_to_point_1() {
|
||||
let bits: Vec<u8> = (0u8..32u8).collect();
|
||||
let hashed = hash_to_point(&bits);
|
||||
assert_eq!(hashed.compress().to_bytes(), HASHTOPOINT_CORRECT_OUTPUT1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_hash_to_point_2() {
|
||||
let bits: Vec<u8> = (0u8..32u8).map(|u| u + 1).collect();
|
||||
let hashed = hash_to_point(&bits);
|
||||
assert_eq!(hashed.compress().to_bytes(), HASHTOPOINT_CORRECT_OUTPUT2);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/////////////////////////////////////////
|
||||
// Additional test vectors from Signal //
|
||||
/////////////////////////////////////////
|
||||
|
||||
fn test_vectors() -> Vec<Vec<&'static str>> {
|
||||
vec![
|
||||
vec![
|
||||
"214f306e1576f5a7577636fe303ca2c625b533319f52442b22a9fa3b7ede809f",
|
||||
"c95becf0f93595174633b9d4d6bbbeb88e16fa257176f877ce426e1424626052",
|
||||
],
|
||||
vec![
|
||||
"2eb10d432702ea7f79207da95d206f82d5a3b374f5f89f17a199531f78d3bea6",
|
||||
"d8f8b508edffbb8b6dab0f602f86a9dd759f800fe18f782fdcac47c234883e7f",
|
||||
],
|
||||
vec![
|
||||
"84cbe9accdd32b46f4a8ef51c85fd39d028711f77fb00e204a613fc235fd68b9",
|
||||
"93c73e0289afd1d1fc9e4e78a505d5d1b2642fbdf91a1eff7d281930654b1453",
|
||||
],
|
||||
vec![
|
||||
"c85165952490dc1839cb69012a3d9f2cc4b02343613263ab93a26dc89fd58267",
|
||||
"43cbe8685fd3c90665b91835debb89ff1477f906f5170f38a192f6a199556537",
|
||||
],
|
||||
vec![
|
||||
"26e7fc4a78d863b1a4ccb2ce0951fbcd021e106350730ee4157bacb4502e1b76",
|
||||
"b6fc3d738c2c40719479b2f23818180cdafa72a14254d4016bbed8f0b788a835",
|
||||
],
|
||||
vec![
|
||||
"1618c08ef0233f94f0f163f9435ec7457cd7a8cd4bb6b160315d15818c30f7a2",
|
||||
"da0b703593b29dbcd28ebd6e7baea17b6f61971f3641cae774f6a5137a12294c",
|
||||
],
|
||||
vec![
|
||||
"48b73039db6fcdcb6030c4a38e8be80b6390d8ae46890e77e623f87254ef149c",
|
||||
"ca11b25acbc80566603eabeb9364ebd50e0306424c61049e1ce9385d9f349966",
|
||||
],
|
||||
vec![
|
||||
"a744d582b3a34d14d311b7629da06d003045ae77cebceeb4e0e72734d63bd07d",
|
||||
"fad25a5ea15d4541258af8785acaf697a886c1b872c793790e60a6837b1adbc0",
|
||||
],
|
||||
vec![
|
||||
"80a6ff33494c471c5eff7efb9febfbcf30a946fe6535b3451cda79f2154a7095",
|
||||
"57ac03913309b3f8cd3c3d4c49d878bb21f4d97dc74a1eaccbe5c601f7f06f47",
|
||||
],
|
||||
vec![
|
||||
"f06fc939bc10551a0fd415aebf107ef0b9c4ee1ef9a164157bdd089127782617",
|
||||
"785b2a6a00a5579cc9da1ff997ce8339b6f9fb46c6f10cf7a12ff2986341a6e0",
|
||||
],
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn additional_signal_test_vectors() {
|
||||
for vector in test_vectors().iter() {
|
||||
let input = hex::decode(vector[0]).unwrap();
|
||||
let output = hex::decode(vector[1]).unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
let point = hash_to_point(&input);
|
||||
assert_eq!(point.compress().to_bytes(), output[..]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
+261
-116
@@ -3,26 +3,81 @@
|
||||
// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
|
||||
// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::errors::InternalPakeError;
|
||||
use crate::hash::Hash;
|
||||
use digest::Digest;
|
||||
use generic_array::{
|
||||
typenum::{Unsigned, U32},
|
||||
GenericArray,
|
||||
use crate::{
|
||||
ciphersuite::CipherSuite,
|
||||
errors::{utils::check_slice_size, InternalPakeError, PakeError, ProtocolError},
|
||||
group::Group,
|
||||
hash::Hash,
|
||||
keypair::{KeyPair, PrivateKey, PublicKey},
|
||||
map_to_curve::GroupWithMapToCurve,
|
||||
opaque::{bytestrings_from_identifiers, Identifiers},
|
||||
};
|
||||
use digest::Digest;
|
||||
use generic_array::{typenum::Unsigned, GenericArray};
|
||||
use generic_bytes::SizedBytes;
|
||||
use hkdf::Hkdf;
|
||||
use hmac::{Hmac, Mac, NewMac};
|
||||
use rand_core::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
|
||||
use rand::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
|
||||
use std::convert::TryFrom;
|
||||
use zeroize::Zeroize;
|
||||
|
||||
// Constant string used as salt for HKDF computation
|
||||
const STR_ENVU: &[u8] = b"EnvU";
|
||||
|
||||
/// The length of the "export key" output by the client registration
|
||||
/// and login finish steps
|
||||
pub(crate) type ExportKeySize = U32;
|
||||
const STR_AUTH_KEY: &[u8] = b"AuthKey";
|
||||
const STR_EXPORT_KEY: &[u8] = b"ExportKey";
|
||||
const STR_PRIVATE_KEY: &[u8] = b"PrivateKey";
|
||||
const STR_OPAQUE_HASH_TO_SCALAR: &[u8] = b"OPAQUE-HashToScalar";
|
||||
|
||||
const NONCE_LEN: usize = 32;
|
||||
|
||||
fn build_inner_envelope_internal<CS: CipherSuite>(
|
||||
random_pwd: &[u8],
|
||||
nonce: &[u8],
|
||||
) -> Result<PublicKey, InternalPakeError> {
|
||||
let h = Hkdf::<CS::Hash>::new(None, random_pwd);
|
||||
let mut keypair_seed = vec![0u8; <PrivateKey as SizedBytes>::Len::to_usize()];
|
||||
h.expand(&[nonce, STR_PRIVATE_KEY].concat(), &mut keypair_seed)
|
||||
.map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HkdfError)?;
|
||||
let client_static_keypair =
|
||||
KeyPair::<CS::Group>::from_private_key_slice(CS::Group::scalar_as_bytes(
|
||||
&CS::Group::hash_to_scalar::<CS::Hash>(&keypair_seed[..], STR_OPAQUE_HASH_TO_SCALAR)?,
|
||||
))?;
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(client_static_keypair.public().clone())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn recover_keys_internal<CS: CipherSuite>(
|
||||
random_pwd: &[u8],
|
||||
nonce: &[u8],
|
||||
) -> Result<KeyPair<CS::Group>, InternalPakeError> {
|
||||
let h = Hkdf::<CS::Hash>::new(None, random_pwd);
|
||||
let mut keypair_seed = vec![0u8; <PrivateKey as SizedBytes>::Len::to_usize()];
|
||||
h.expand(&[nonce, STR_PRIVATE_KEY].concat(), &mut keypair_seed)
|
||||
.map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HkdfError)?;
|
||||
let client_static_keypair =
|
||||
KeyPair::<CS::Group>::from_private_key_slice(CS::Group::scalar_as_bytes(
|
||||
&CS::Group::hash_to_scalar::<CS::Hash>(&keypair_seed[..], STR_OPAQUE_HASH_TO_SCALAR)?,
|
||||
))?;
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(client_static_keypair)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, Hash, PartialEq, Zeroize)]
|
||||
#[zeroize(drop)]
|
||||
pub(crate) enum InnerEnvelopeMode {
|
||||
Zero = 0,
|
||||
Internal = 1,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl TryFrom<u8> for InnerEnvelopeMode {
|
||||
type Error = PakeError;
|
||||
fn try_from(x: u8) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
|
||||
match x {
|
||||
1 => Ok(InnerEnvelopeMode::Internal),
|
||||
_ => Err(PakeError::SerializationError),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// This struct is an instantiation of the envelope as described in
|
||||
/// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-06#section-4
|
||||
///
|
||||
@@ -33,153 +88,243 @@ const NONCE_LEN: usize = 32;
|
||||
/// The specification update has simplified this assumption by taking
|
||||
/// an XOR-based approach without compromising on security, and to avoid
|
||||
/// the confusion around the implementation of an RKR-secure encryption.
|
||||
pub(crate) struct Envelope<D: Hash> {
|
||||
pub(crate) struct Envelope<CS: CipherSuite> {
|
||||
mode: InnerEnvelopeMode,
|
||||
nonce: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
hmac: GenericArray<u8, <D as Digest>::OutputSize>,
|
||||
hmac: GenericArray<u8, <CS::Hash as Digest>::OutputSize>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub(crate) struct OpenedEnvelope {
|
||||
pub(crate) plaintext: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub(crate) export_key: GenericArray<u8, ExportKeySize>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl<D: Hash> Envelope<D> {
|
||||
/// The additional number of bytes added to the plaintext
|
||||
pub(crate) fn additional_size() -> usize {
|
||||
NONCE_LEN + <D as Digest>::OutputSize::to_usize()
|
||||
// Cannot be derived because it would require for CS to be Clone.
|
||||
impl<CS: CipherSuite> Clone for Envelope<CS> {
|
||||
fn clone(&self) -> Self {
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
mode: self.mode.clone(),
|
||||
nonce: self.nonce.clone(),
|
||||
hmac: self.hmac.clone(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl_debug_eq_hash_for!(struct Envelope<CS: CipherSuite>, [mode, nonce, hmac]);
|
||||
|
||||
// Note that this struct represents an envelope that has been "opened" with the asssociated
|
||||
// key. This key is also used to derive the export_key parameter, which is technically
|
||||
// unrelated to the envelope's encrypted and authenticated contents.
|
||||
pub(crate) struct OpenedEnvelope<CS: CipherSuite> {
|
||||
pub(crate) client_static_keypair: KeyPair<CS::Group>,
|
||||
pub(crate) export_key: GenericArray<u8, <CS::Hash as Digest>::OutputSize>,
|
||||
pub(crate) id_u: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub(crate) id_s: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub(crate) struct OpenedInnerEnvelope<D: Hash> {
|
||||
pub(crate) export_key: GenericArray<u8, <D as Digest>::OutputSize>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl<CS: CipherSuite> Envelope<CS> {
|
||||
fn hmac_key_size() -> usize {
|
||||
<D as Digest>::OutputSize::to_usize()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn hmac_size() -> usize {
|
||||
<D as Digest>::OutputSize::to_usize()
|
||||
<CS::Hash as Digest>::OutputSize::to_usize()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn export_key_size() -> usize {
|
||||
ExportKeySize::to_usize()
|
||||
<CS::Hash as Digest>::OutputSize::to_usize()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub(crate) fn new(
|
||||
nonce: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
hmac: GenericArray<u8, <D as Digest>::OutputSize>,
|
||||
) -> Self {
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
pub(crate) fn len() -> usize {
|
||||
<CS::Hash as Digest>::OutputSize::to_usize() + NONCE_LEN
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub(crate) fn serialize(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
[&self.nonce[..], &self.hmac[..]].concat()
|
||||
}
|
||||
pub(crate) fn deserialize(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
|
||||
let mode = InnerEnvelopeMode::Internal; // Better way to hard-code this?
|
||||
|
||||
if bytes.len() < NONCE_LEN {
|
||||
return Err(ProtocolError::VerificationError(
|
||||
PakeError::SerializationError,
|
||||
));
|
||||
}
|
||||
let nonce = bytes[..NONCE_LEN].to_vec();
|
||||
|
||||
let remainder = match mode {
|
||||
InnerEnvelopeMode::Zero => {
|
||||
return Err(InternalPakeError::IncompatibleEnvelopeModeError.into())
|
||||
}
|
||||
InnerEnvelopeMode::Internal => bytes[NONCE_LEN..].to_vec(),
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let hmac_key_size = Self::hmac_key_size();
|
||||
let hmac = check_slice_size(&remainder, hmac_key_size, "hmac_key_size")?;
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(Self {
|
||||
mode,
|
||||
nonce,
|
||||
ciphertext,
|
||||
hmac,
|
||||
hmac: GenericArray::clone_from_slice(hmac),
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Creates a dummy envelope object that serializes to the all-zeros byte string
|
||||
pub(crate) fn dummy() -> Self {
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
mode: InnerEnvelopeMode::Zero,
|
||||
nonce: vec![0u8; NONCE_LEN],
|
||||
hmac: GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&vec![
|
||||
0u8;
|
||||
<CS::Hash as Digest>::OutputSize::to_usize()
|
||||
]),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The format of the output is:
|
||||
/// nonce | ciphertext | hmac
|
||||
/// nonce_size bytes | variable length | hmac_size bytes
|
||||
pub(crate) fn from_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, InternalPakeError> {
|
||||
let ciphertext_start = NONCE_LEN;
|
||||
let ciphertext_end = bytes.len() - Self::hmac_size();
|
||||
#[allow(clippy::type_complexity)]
|
||||
pub(crate) fn seal<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
|
||||
rng: &mut R,
|
||||
key: &[u8],
|
||||
server_s_pk: &[u8],
|
||||
optional_ids: Option<Identifiers>,
|
||||
) -> Result<
|
||||
(
|
||||
Self,
|
||||
PublicKey,
|
||||
GenericArray<u8, <CS::Hash as Digest>::OutputSize>,
|
||||
),
|
||||
InternalPakeError,
|
||||
> {
|
||||
let mut nonce = vec![0u8; NONCE_LEN];
|
||||
rng.fill_bytes(&mut nonce);
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(Self::new(
|
||||
bytes[..ciphertext_start].to_vec(),
|
||||
bytes[ciphertext_start..ciphertext_end].to_vec(),
|
||||
GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&bytes[ciphertext_end..]),
|
||||
))
|
||||
}
|
||||
let (mode, client_s_pk) = (
|
||||
InnerEnvelopeMode::Internal,
|
||||
build_inner_envelope_internal::<CS>(key, &nonce)?,
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
pub(crate) fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
[&self.nonce[..], &self.ciphertext[..], &self.hmac[..]].concat()
|
||||
let (id_u, id_s) =
|
||||
bytestrings_from_identifiers(&optional_ids, &client_s_pk.to_arr(), server_s_pk);
|
||||
let aad = construct_aad(&id_u, &id_s, server_s_pk);
|
||||
|
||||
let (envelope, export_key) = Self::seal_raw(key, &nonce, &aad, mode)?;
|
||||
Ok((envelope, client_s_pk, export_key))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Uses a key to convert the plaintext into an envelope, authenticated by the aad field.
|
||||
/// Note that a new nonce is sampled for each call to seal.
|
||||
pub(crate) fn seal<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
|
||||
#[allow(clippy::type_complexity)]
|
||||
pub(crate) fn seal_raw(
|
||||
key: &[u8],
|
||||
plaintext: &[u8],
|
||||
nonce: &[u8],
|
||||
aad: &[u8],
|
||||
rng: &mut R,
|
||||
) -> Result<(Self, GenericArray<u8, ExportKeySize>), InternalPakeError> {
|
||||
let mut nonce = vec![0u8; NONCE_LEN];
|
||||
rng.fill_bytes(&mut nonce);
|
||||
mode: InnerEnvelopeMode,
|
||||
) -> Result<(Self, GenericArray<u8, <CS::Hash as Digest>::OutputSize>), InternalPakeError> {
|
||||
let h = Hkdf::<CS::Hash>::new(None, key);
|
||||
let mut hmac_key = vec![0u8; Self::hmac_key_size()];
|
||||
let mut export_key = vec![0u8; Self::export_key_size()];
|
||||
|
||||
let h = Hkdf::<D>::new(Some(&nonce), &key);
|
||||
let mut okm = vec![0u8; plaintext.len() + Self::hmac_key_size() + Self::export_key_size()];
|
||||
h.expand(STR_ENVU, &mut okm)
|
||||
h.expand(&[nonce, STR_AUTH_KEY].concat(), &mut hmac_key)
|
||||
.map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HkdfError)?;
|
||||
h.expand(&[nonce, STR_EXPORT_KEY].concat(), &mut export_key)
|
||||
.map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HkdfError)?;
|
||||
let xor_key = &okm[..plaintext.len()];
|
||||
let hmac_key = &okm[plaintext.len()..plaintext.len() + Self::hmac_key_size()];
|
||||
let export_key = &okm[plaintext.len() + Self::hmac_key_size()..];
|
||||
|
||||
let ciphertext: Vec<u8> = xor_key
|
||||
.iter()
|
||||
.zip(plaintext.iter())
|
||||
.map(|(&x1, &x2)| x1 ^ x2)
|
||||
.collect();
|
||||
let mut hmac = Hmac::<CS::Hash>::new_from_slice(&hmac_key)
|
||||
.map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HmacError)?;
|
||||
hmac.update(nonce);
|
||||
hmac.update(aad);
|
||||
|
||||
let mut hmac =
|
||||
Hmac::<D>::new_varkey(&hmac_key).map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HmacError)?;
|
||||
hmac.update(&nonce);
|
||||
hmac.update(&ciphertext);
|
||||
hmac.update(&aad);
|
||||
let hmac_bytes = hmac.finalize().into_bytes();
|
||||
|
||||
Ok((
|
||||
Self::new(nonce, ciphertext.to_vec(), hmac.finalize().into_bytes()),
|
||||
*GenericArray::from_slice(&export_key),
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
mode,
|
||||
nonce: nonce.to_vec(),
|
||||
hmac: hmac_bytes,
|
||||
},
|
||||
GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&export_key),
|
||||
))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub(crate) fn open(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
key: &[u8],
|
||||
server_s_pk: &[u8],
|
||||
optional_ids: &Option<Identifiers>,
|
||||
) -> Result<OpenedEnvelope<CS>, InternalPakeError> {
|
||||
let client_static_keypair = match self.mode {
|
||||
InnerEnvelopeMode::Zero => {
|
||||
return Err(InternalPakeError::IncompatibleEnvelopeModeError)
|
||||
}
|
||||
InnerEnvelopeMode::Internal => recover_keys_internal::<CS>(key, &self.nonce)?,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let (id_u, id_s) = bytestrings_from_identifiers(
|
||||
optional_ids,
|
||||
&client_static_keypair.public().to_arr(),
|
||||
server_s_pk,
|
||||
);
|
||||
let aad = construct_aad(&id_u, &id_s, server_s_pk);
|
||||
|
||||
let opened = self.open_raw(key, &aad)?;
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(OpenedEnvelope {
|
||||
client_static_keypair,
|
||||
export_key: opened.export_key,
|
||||
id_u,
|
||||
id_s,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Attempts to decrypt the envelope using a key, which is successful only if the key and
|
||||
/// aad used to construct the envelope are the same.
|
||||
pub(crate) fn open(&self, key: &[u8], aad: &[u8]) -> Result<OpenedEnvelope, InternalPakeError> {
|
||||
let h = Hkdf::<D>::new(Some(&self.nonce), &key);
|
||||
let mut okm =
|
||||
vec![0u8; self.ciphertext.len() + Self::hmac_key_size() + Self::export_key_size()];
|
||||
h.expand(STR_ENVU, &mut okm)
|
||||
.map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HkdfError)?;
|
||||
let xor_key = &okm[..self.ciphertext.len()];
|
||||
let hmac_key = &okm[self.ciphertext.len()..self.ciphertext.len() + Self::hmac_key_size()];
|
||||
let export_key = &okm[self.ciphertext.len() + Self::hmac_key_size()..];
|
||||
pub(crate) fn open_raw(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
key: &[u8],
|
||||
aad: &[u8],
|
||||
) -> Result<OpenedInnerEnvelope<CS::Hash>, InternalPakeError> {
|
||||
let h = Hkdf::<CS::Hash>::new(None, key);
|
||||
let mut hmac_key = vec![0u8; Self::hmac_key_size()];
|
||||
let mut export_key = vec![0u8; Self::export_key_size()];
|
||||
|
||||
let mut hmac =
|
||||
Hmac::<D>::new_varkey(&hmac_key).map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HmacError)?;
|
||||
h.expand(&[&self.nonce, STR_AUTH_KEY].concat(), &mut hmac_key)
|
||||
.map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HkdfError)?;
|
||||
h.expand(&[&self.nonce, STR_EXPORT_KEY].concat(), &mut export_key)
|
||||
.map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HkdfError)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let mut hmac = Hmac::<CS::Hash>::new_from_slice(&hmac_key)
|
||||
.map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HmacError)?;
|
||||
hmac.update(&self.nonce);
|
||||
hmac.update(&self.ciphertext);
|
||||
hmac.update(aad);
|
||||
if hmac.verify(&self.hmac).is_err() {
|
||||
return Err(InternalPakeError::SealOpenHmacError);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let plaintext: Vec<u8> = xor_key
|
||||
.iter()
|
||||
.zip(self.ciphertext.iter())
|
||||
.map(|(&x1, &x2)| x1 ^ x2)
|
||||
.collect();
|
||||
Ok(OpenedEnvelope {
|
||||
plaintext,
|
||||
export_key: *GenericArray::from_slice(&export_key),
|
||||
Ok(OpenedInnerEnvelope {
|
||||
export_key: GenericArray::<u8, <CS::Hash as Digest>::OutputSize>::clone_from_slice(
|
||||
&export_key,
|
||||
),
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
use rand_core::OsRng;
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn seal_and_open() {
|
||||
let mut rng = OsRng;
|
||||
let mut key = [0u8; 32];
|
||||
rng.fill_bytes(&mut key);
|
||||
|
||||
let mut msg = [0u8; 100];
|
||||
rng.fill_bytes(&mut msg);
|
||||
|
||||
let (envelope, export_key_1) =
|
||||
Envelope::<sha2::Sha256>::seal(&key, &msg, b"aad", &mut rng).unwrap();
|
||||
let opened_envelope = envelope.open(&key, b"aad").unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(&msg.to_vec(), &opened_envelope.plaintext);
|
||||
assert_eq!(&export_key_1.to_vec(), &opened_envelope.export_key.to_vec());
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
pub fn as_byte_ptrs(&self) -> Vec<(*const u8, usize)> {
|
||||
vec![(self.hmac.as_ptr(), self.hmac.len())]
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// This can't be derived because of the use of a phantom parameter
|
||||
impl<CS: CipherSuite> Zeroize for Envelope<CS> {
|
||||
fn zeroize(&mut self) {
|
||||
self.mode.zeroize();
|
||||
self.nonce.zeroize();
|
||||
self.hmac.zeroize();
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl<CS: CipherSuite> Drop for Envelope<CS> {
|
||||
fn drop(&mut self) {
|
||||
self.zeroize();
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Helper functions
|
||||
|
||||
fn construct_aad(id_u: &[u8], id_s: &[u8], server_s_pk: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
[server_s_pk, id_s, id_u].concat()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+58
-3
@@ -8,8 +8,10 @@ use displaydoc::Display;
|
||||
use thiserror::Error;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Represents an error in the manipulation of internal cryptographic data
|
||||
#[derive(Debug, Display, Error)]
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Display, Error, Eq, Hash, PartialEq)]
|
||||
pub enum InternalPakeError {
|
||||
/// Deserializing from a byte sequence failed
|
||||
InvalidByteSequence,
|
||||
/// Invalid length for {name}: expected {len}, but is actually {actual_len}.
|
||||
SizeError {
|
||||
/// name
|
||||
@@ -25,6 +27,8 @@ pub enum InternalPakeError {
|
||||
SubGroupError,
|
||||
/// hashing to a key failed
|
||||
HashingFailure,
|
||||
/// Computing the hash-to-curve function failed
|
||||
HashToCurveError,
|
||||
/// Computing HKDF failed while deriving subkeys
|
||||
HkdfError,
|
||||
/// Computing HMAC failed while supplying a secret key
|
||||
@@ -40,10 +44,19 @@ pub enum InternalPakeError {
|
||||
/// This error occurs when the envelope seal open hmac check fails
|
||||
/// HMAC check in seal open failed.
|
||||
SealOpenHmacError,
|
||||
/// This error occurs when the envelope cannot be constructed properly
|
||||
/// based on the credentials that were specified to be required.
|
||||
InvalidEnvelopeStructureError,
|
||||
/// This error occurs when attempting to open an envelope of the wrong
|
||||
/// type (base mode, custom identifier)
|
||||
IncompatibleEnvelopeModeError,
|
||||
/// This error occurs when the envelope is opened and deserialization
|
||||
/// fails
|
||||
UnexpectedEnvelopeContentsError,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Represents an error in password checking
|
||||
#[derive(Debug, Display, Error)]
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Display, Error, Eq, Hash, PartialEq)]
|
||||
pub enum PakeError {
|
||||
/// This error results from an internal error during PRF construction
|
||||
///
|
||||
@@ -58,6 +71,10 @@ pub enum PakeError {
|
||||
KeyExchangeMacValidationError,
|
||||
/// Error in validating credentials
|
||||
InvalidLoginError,
|
||||
/// Error with serializing / deserializing protocol messages
|
||||
SerializationError,
|
||||
/// Identity group element was encountered during deserialization, which is invalid
|
||||
IdentityGroupElementError,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// This is meant to express future(ly) non-trivial ways of converting the
|
||||
@@ -69,15 +86,20 @@ impl From<InternalPakeError> for PakeError {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Represents an error in protocol handling
|
||||
#[derive(Debug, Display, Error)]
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Display, Error, Eq, Hash, PartialEq)]
|
||||
pub enum ProtocolError {
|
||||
/// This error results from an error during password verification
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Internal error during password verification: {0}
|
||||
VerificationError(PakeError),
|
||||
/// This error occurs when the inner envelope is malformed
|
||||
InvalidInnerEnvelopeError,
|
||||
/// This error occurs when the server answer cannot be handled
|
||||
/// Server response cannot be handled.
|
||||
ServerError,
|
||||
/// This error occurs when the server specifies an envelope credentials
|
||||
/// format that is invalid
|
||||
ServerInvalidEnvelopeCredentialsFormatError,
|
||||
/// This error occurs when the client request cannot be handled
|
||||
/// Client request cannot be handled.
|
||||
ClientError,
|
||||
@@ -108,6 +130,24 @@ impl From<::std::convert::Infallible> for ProtocolError {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl From<generic_bytes::TryFromSizedBytesError> for InternalPakeError {
|
||||
fn from(_: generic_bytes::TryFromSizedBytesError) -> Self {
|
||||
InternalPakeError::InvalidByteSequence
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl From<generic_bytes::TryFromSizedBytesError> for PakeError {
|
||||
fn from(e: generic_bytes::TryFromSizedBytesError) -> Self {
|
||||
PakeError::CryptoError(e.into())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl From<generic_bytes::TryFromSizedBytesError> for ProtocolError {
|
||||
fn from(e: generic_bytes::TryFromSizedBytesError) -> Self {
|
||||
PakeError::CryptoError(e.into()).into()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub(crate) mod utils {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -125,4 +165,19 @@ pub(crate) mod utils {
|
||||
}
|
||||
Ok(slice)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn check_slice_size_atleast<'a>(
|
||||
slice: &'a [u8],
|
||||
expected_len: usize,
|
||||
arg_name: &'static str,
|
||||
) -> Result<&'a [u8], InternalPakeError> {
|
||||
if slice.len() < expected_len {
|
||||
return Err(InternalPakeError::SizeError {
|
||||
name: arg_name,
|
||||
len: expected_len,
|
||||
actual_len: slice.len(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
Ok(slice)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+49
-110
@@ -6,35 +6,37 @@
|
||||
//! Defines the Group trait to specify the underlying prime order group used in
|
||||
//! OPAQUE's OPRF
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::elligator;
|
||||
use crate::errors::InternalPakeError;
|
||||
|
||||
use curve25519_dalek::{
|
||||
edwards::{CompressedEdwardsY, EdwardsPoint},
|
||||
constants::RISTRETTO_BASEPOINT_POINT,
|
||||
ristretto::{CompressedRistretto, RistrettoPoint},
|
||||
scalar::Scalar,
|
||||
traits::Identity,
|
||||
};
|
||||
use generic_array::{
|
||||
typenum::{U32, U64},
|
||||
ArrayLength, GenericArray,
|
||||
};
|
||||
use rand_core::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
|
||||
use std::convert::TryInto;
|
||||
|
||||
use rand::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
|
||||
use std::ops::Mul;
|
||||
use zeroize::Zeroize;
|
||||
|
||||
/// A prime-order subgroup of a base field (EC, prime-order field ...). This
|
||||
/// subgroup is noted additively — as in the draft RFC — in this trait.
|
||||
pub trait Group: Sized + for<'a> Mul<&'a <Self as Group>::Scalar, Output = Self> {
|
||||
pub trait Group: Copy + Sized + for<'a> Mul<&'a <Self as Group>::Scalar, Output = Self> {
|
||||
/// The type of base field scalars
|
||||
type Scalar: Zeroize;
|
||||
type Scalar: Zeroize + Clone;
|
||||
/// The byte length necessary to represent scalars
|
||||
type ScalarLen: ArrayLength<u8>;
|
||||
/// Return a scalat from its fixed-length bytes representation
|
||||
/// Return a scalar from its fixed-length bytes representation
|
||||
fn from_scalar_slice(
|
||||
scalar_bits: &GenericArray<u8, Self::ScalarLen>,
|
||||
) -> Result<Self::Scalar, InternalPakeError>;
|
||||
/// picks a scalar at random
|
||||
fn random_scalar<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(rng: &mut R) -> Self::Scalar;
|
||||
fn random_nonzero_scalar<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(rng: &mut R) -> Self::Scalar;
|
||||
/// Serializes a scalar to bytes
|
||||
fn scalar_as_bytes(scalar: &Self::Scalar) -> &GenericArray<u8, Self::ScalarLen>;
|
||||
/// The multiplicative inverse of this scalar
|
||||
@@ -57,6 +59,15 @@ pub trait Group: Sized + for<'a> Mul<&'a <Self as Group>::Scalar, Output = Self>
|
||||
|
||||
/// Hashes a slice of pseudo-random bytes of the correct length to a curve point
|
||||
fn hash_to_curve(uniform_bytes: &GenericArray<u8, Self::UniformBytesLen>) -> Self;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Get the base point for the group
|
||||
fn base_point() -> Self;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Multiply the point by a scalar, represented as a slice
|
||||
fn mult_by_slice(&self, scalar: &GenericArray<u8, Self::ScalarLen>) -> Self;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Returns if the group element is equal to the identity (1)
|
||||
fn is_identity(&self) -> bool;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The implementation of such a subgroup for Ristretto
|
||||
@@ -70,8 +81,29 @@ impl Group for RistrettoPoint {
|
||||
bits.copy_from_slice(scalar_bits);
|
||||
Ok(Scalar::from_bytes_mod_order(bits))
|
||||
}
|
||||
fn random_scalar<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(rng: &mut R) -> Self::Scalar {
|
||||
Scalar::random(rng)
|
||||
fn random_nonzero_scalar<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(rng: &mut R) -> Self::Scalar {
|
||||
loop {
|
||||
let scalar = {
|
||||
#[cfg(not(test))]
|
||||
{
|
||||
let mut scalar_bytes = [0u8; 64];
|
||||
rng.fill_bytes(&mut scalar_bytes);
|
||||
Scalar::from_bytes_mod_order_wide(&scalar_bytes)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Tests need an exact conversion from bytes to scalar, sampling only 32 bytes from rng
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
{
|
||||
let mut scalar_bytes = [0u8; 32];
|
||||
rng.fill_bytes(&mut scalar_bytes);
|
||||
Scalar::from_bytes_mod_order(scalar_bytes)
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
if scalar != Scalar::zero() {
|
||||
break scalar;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
fn scalar_as_bytes(scalar: &Self::Scalar) -> &GenericArray<u8, Self::ScalarLen> {
|
||||
GenericArray::from_slice(scalar.as_bytes())
|
||||
@@ -105,111 +137,18 @@ impl Group for RistrettoPoint {
|
||||
};
|
||||
RistrettoPoint::from_uniform_bytes(&bits)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The implementation of such a subgroup for points on the large Curve25519-subgroup
|
||||
impl Group for EdwardsPoint {
|
||||
type Scalar = Scalar;
|
||||
type ScalarLen = U32;
|
||||
fn from_scalar_slice(
|
||||
scalar_bits: &GenericArray<u8, Self::ScalarLen>,
|
||||
) -> Result<Self::Scalar, InternalPakeError> {
|
||||
let mut bits = [0u8; 32];
|
||||
bits.copy_from_slice(scalar_bits);
|
||||
Ok(Scalar::from_bytes_mod_order(bits))
|
||||
}
|
||||
fn random_scalar<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(rng: &mut R) -> Self::Scalar {
|
||||
Scalar::random(rng)
|
||||
}
|
||||
fn scalar_as_bytes(scalar: &Self::Scalar) -> &GenericArray<u8, Self::ScalarLen> {
|
||||
GenericArray::from_slice(scalar.as_bytes())
|
||||
}
|
||||
fn scalar_invert(scalar: &Self::Scalar) -> Self::Scalar {
|
||||
scalar.invert()
|
||||
fn base_point() -> Self {
|
||||
RISTRETTO_BASEPOINT_POINT
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The byte length necessary to represent group elements
|
||||
type ElemLen = U32;
|
||||
fn from_element_slice(
|
||||
element_bits: &GenericArray<u8, Self::ElemLen>,
|
||||
) -> Result<Self, InternalPakeError> {
|
||||
let point = CompressedEdwardsY::from_slice(element_bits)
|
||||
.decompress()
|
||||
.ok_or(InternalPakeError::PointError)?;
|
||||
|
||||
if point.is_small_order() {
|
||||
return Err(InternalPakeError::SubGroupError);
|
||||
}
|
||||
Ok(point)
|
||||
}
|
||||
// serialization of a group element
|
||||
fn to_arr(&self) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::ElemLen> {
|
||||
let c = self.compress();
|
||||
*GenericArray::from_slice(c.as_bytes())
|
||||
fn mult_by_slice(&self, scalar: &GenericArray<u8, Self::ScalarLen>) -> Self {
|
||||
let arr: [u8; 32] = scalar.as_slice().try_into().expect("Wrong length");
|
||||
self * Scalar::from_bits(arr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type UniformBytesLen = U32;
|
||||
fn hash_to_curve(uniform_bytes: &GenericArray<u8, Self::UniformBytesLen>) -> Self {
|
||||
elligator::hash_to_point(uniform_bytes)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
use anyhow::{anyhow, Result};
|
||||
use std::convert::TryInto;
|
||||
|
||||
const EIGHT_TORSION: [[u8; 32]; 8] = [
|
||||
[
|
||||
1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
|
||||
0, 0, 0,
|
||||
],
|
||||
[
|
||||
199, 23, 106, 112, 61, 77, 216, 79, 186, 60, 11, 118, 13, 16, 103, 15, 42, 32, 83, 250,
|
||||
44, 57, 204, 198, 78, 199, 253, 119, 146, 172, 3, 122,
|
||||
],
|
||||
[
|
||||
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
|
||||
0, 0, 128,
|
||||
],
|
||||
[
|
||||
38, 232, 149, 143, 194, 178, 39, 176, 69, 195, 244, 137, 242, 239, 152, 240, 213, 223,
|
||||
172, 5, 211, 198, 51, 57, 177, 56, 2, 136, 109, 83, 252, 5,
|
||||
],
|
||||
[
|
||||
236, 255, 255, 255, 255, 255, 255, 255, 255, 255, 255, 255, 255, 255, 255, 255, 255,
|
||||
255, 255, 255, 255, 255, 255, 255, 255, 255, 255, 255, 255, 255, 255, 127,
|
||||
],
|
||||
[
|
||||
38, 232, 149, 143, 194, 178, 39, 176, 69, 195, 244, 137, 242, 239, 152, 240, 213, 223,
|
||||
172, 5, 211, 198, 51, 57, 177, 56, 2, 136, 109, 83, 252, 133,
|
||||
],
|
||||
[
|
||||
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
|
||||
0, 0, 0,
|
||||
],
|
||||
[
|
||||
199, 23, 106, 112, 61, 77, 216, 79, 186, 60, 11, 118, 13, 16, 103, 15, 42, 32, 83, 250,
|
||||
44, 57, 204, 198, 78, 199, 253, 119, 146, 172, 3, 250,
|
||||
],
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
fn deserialize_point(pt: &[u8]) -> Result<EdwardsPoint> {
|
||||
let bytes: [u8; 32] = (&pt[..32])
|
||||
.try_into()
|
||||
.expect("Slice pattern invariant broken");
|
||||
|
||||
curve25519_dalek::edwards::CompressedEdwardsY(bytes)
|
||||
.decompress()
|
||||
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("Point decompression failed!"))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_small_subgroup_edwards() {
|
||||
for pt in &EIGHT_TORSION[..] {
|
||||
assert!(deserialize_point(&pt[..]).is_ok());
|
||||
assert!(EdwardsPoint::from_element_slice(GenericArray::from_slice(&pt[..])).is_err());
|
||||
}
|
||||
/// Returns if the group element is equal to the identity (1)
|
||||
fn is_identity(&self) -> bool {
|
||||
self == &Self::identity()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+102
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
|
||||
// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
|
||||
// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
|
||||
|
||||
macro_rules! impl_debug_eq_hash_for {
|
||||
(struct $name:ident$(<$($gen:ident$(: $bound:tt)?),+$(,)?>)?, [$field1:ident$(, $field2:ident)*$(,)?]$(, )?$([$($type:ty),+$(,)?]$(,)?)?) => {
|
||||
impl$(<$($gen$(: $bound)?),+>)? std::fmt::Debug for $name$(<$($gen),+>)?
|
||||
$(where $($type: std::fmt::Debug,)+)?
|
||||
{
|
||||
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
|
||||
f.debug_struct("$name")
|
||||
.field("$field1", &self.$field1)
|
||||
$(.field("$field2", &self.$field2))*
|
||||
.finish()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl$(<$($gen$(: $bound)?),+>)? Eq for $name$(<$($gen),+>)?
|
||||
$(where $($type: Eq,)+)?
|
||||
{}
|
||||
|
||||
impl$(<$($gen$(: $bound)?),+>)? PartialEq for $name$(<$($gen),+>)?
|
||||
$(where $($type: PartialEq,)+)?
|
||||
{
|
||||
fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
|
||||
PartialEq::eq(&self.$field1, &other.$field1)
|
||||
$(&& PartialEq::eq(&self.$field2, &other.$field2))*
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl$(<$($gen$(: $bound)?),+>)? std::hash::Hash for $name$(<$($gen),+>)?
|
||||
$(where $($type: std::hash::Hash,)+)?
|
||||
{
|
||||
fn hash<H: std::hash::Hasher>(&self, state: &mut H) {
|
||||
std::hash::Hash::hash(&self.$field1, state);
|
||||
$(std::hash::Hash::hash(&self.$field2, state);)*
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
(tuple $name:ident$(<$($gen:ident$(: $bound:tt)?),+$(,)?>)?, [$field1:tt$(, $field2:tt)*$(,)?]$(, )?$([$($type:ty),+$(,)?]$(,)?)?) => {
|
||||
impl$(<$($gen$(: $bound)?),+>)? std::fmt::Debug for $name$(<$($gen),+>)?
|
||||
$(where $($type: std::fmt::Debug,)+)?
|
||||
{
|
||||
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
|
||||
f.debug_tuple("$name")
|
||||
.field(&self.$field1)
|
||||
$(.field(&self.$field2))*
|
||||
.finish()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl$(<$($gen$(: $bound)?),+>)? Eq for $name$(<$($gen),+>)?
|
||||
$(where $($type: Eq,)+)?
|
||||
{}
|
||||
|
||||
impl$(<$($gen$(: $bound)?),+>)? PartialEq for $name$(<$($gen),+>)?
|
||||
$(where $($type: PartialEq,)+)?
|
||||
{
|
||||
fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
|
||||
PartialEq::eq(&self.$field1, &other.$field1)
|
||||
$(&& PartialEq::eq(&self.$field2, &other.$field2))*
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl$(<$($gen$(: $bound)?),+>)? std::hash::Hash for $name$(<$($gen),+>)?
|
||||
$(where $($type: std::hash::Hash,)+)?
|
||||
{
|
||||
fn hash<H: std::hash::Hasher>(&self, state: &mut H) {
|
||||
std::hash::Hash::hash(&self.$field1, state);
|
||||
$(std::hash::Hash::hash(&self.$field2, state);)*
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
macro_rules! impl_clone_for {
|
||||
(struct $name:ident$(<$($gen:ident$(: $bound:tt)?),+$(,)?>)?, [$field1:ident$(, $field2:ident)*$(,)?]$(, )?$([$($type:ty),+$(,)?]$(,)?)?) => {
|
||||
impl$(<$($gen$(: $bound)?),+>)? Clone for $name$(<$($gen),+>)?
|
||||
$(where $($type: Clone,)+)?
|
||||
{
|
||||
fn clone(&self) -> Self {
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
$field1: self.$field1.clone(),
|
||||
$($field2: self.$field2.clone(),)*
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
(tuple $name:ident$(<$($gen:ident$(: $bound:tt)?),+$(,)?>)?, [$field1:tt$(, $field2:tt)*$(,)?]$(, )?$([$($type:ty),+$(,)?]$(,)?)?) => {
|
||||
impl$(<$($gen$(: $bound)?),+>)? Clone for $name$(<$($gen),+>)?
|
||||
$(where $($type: Clone,)+)?
|
||||
{
|
||||
fn clone(&self) -> Self {
|
||||
Self(
|
||||
self.$field1.clone(),
|
||||
$(self.$field2.clone(),)*
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
+38
-18
@@ -4,53 +4,73 @@
|
||||
// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::{
|
||||
errors::{InternalPakeError, ProtocolError},
|
||||
ciphersuite::CipherSuite,
|
||||
errors::{PakeError, ProtocolError},
|
||||
group::Group,
|
||||
hash::Hash,
|
||||
keypair::KeyPair,
|
||||
keypair::{PrivateKey, PublicKey},
|
||||
};
|
||||
use rand_core::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
|
||||
use rand::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
|
||||
use zeroize::Zeroize;
|
||||
|
||||
use std::convert::TryFrom;
|
||||
|
||||
pub trait KeyExchange<D: Hash, KeyFormat: KeyPair> {
|
||||
type KE1State: for<'r> TryFrom<&'r [u8], Error = InternalPakeError> + ToBytes;
|
||||
type KE2State: for<'r> TryFrom<&'r [u8], Error = InternalPakeError> + ToBytes;
|
||||
type KE1Message: for<'r> TryFrom<&'r [u8], Error = InternalPakeError> + ToBytes;
|
||||
type KE2Message: for<'r> TryFrom<&'r [u8], Error = InternalPakeError> + ToBytes;
|
||||
type KE3Message: for<'r> TryFrom<&'r [u8], Error = InternalPakeError> + ToBytes;
|
||||
pub trait KeyExchange<D: Hash, G: Group> {
|
||||
type KE1State: FromBytes + ToBytesWithPointers + Zeroize + Clone;
|
||||
type KE2State: FromBytes + ToBytesWithPointers + Zeroize + Clone;
|
||||
type KE1Message: FromBytes + ToBytes + Clone;
|
||||
type KE2Message: FromBytes + ToBytes + Clone;
|
||||
type KE3Message: FromBytes + ToBytes + Clone;
|
||||
|
||||
fn generate_ke1<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
|
||||
l1_component: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
rng: &mut R,
|
||||
) -> Result<(Self::KE1State, Self::KE1Message), ProtocolError>;
|
||||
|
||||
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments, clippy::type_complexity)]
|
||||
fn generate_ke2<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
|
||||
rng: &mut R,
|
||||
l1_bytes: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
l2_bytes: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
ke1_message: Self::KE1Message,
|
||||
client_s_pk: KeyFormat::Repr,
|
||||
server_s_sk: KeyFormat::Repr,
|
||||
client_s_pk: PublicKey,
|
||||
server_s_sk: PrivateKey,
|
||||
id_u: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
id_s: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
context: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
) -> Result<(Self::KE2State, Self::KE2Message), ProtocolError>;
|
||||
|
||||
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments, clippy::type_complexity)]
|
||||
fn generate_ke3(
|
||||
l2_component: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
ke2_message: Self::KE2Message,
|
||||
ke1_state: &Self::KE1State,
|
||||
server_s_pk: KeyFormat::Repr,
|
||||
client_s_sk: KeyFormat::Repr,
|
||||
serialized_credential_request: &[u8],
|
||||
server_s_pk: PublicKey,
|
||||
client_s_sk: PrivateKey,
|
||||
id_u: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
id_s: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
context: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, Self::KE3Message), ProtocolError>;
|
||||
|
||||
#[allow(clippy::type_complexity)]
|
||||
fn finish_ke(
|
||||
ke3_message: Self::KE3Message,
|
||||
ke2_state: &Self::KE2State,
|
||||
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, ProtocolError>;
|
||||
|
||||
fn ke1_state_size() -> usize;
|
||||
|
||||
fn ke2_message_size() -> usize;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub trait FromBytes: Sized {
|
||||
fn from_bytes<CS: CipherSuite>(input: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, PakeError>;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub trait ToBytes {
|
||||
fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8>;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub trait ToBytesWithPointers {
|
||||
fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8>;
|
||||
|
||||
// Only used for tests to grab raw pointers to data
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
fn as_byte_ptrs(&self) -> Vec<(*const u8, usize)>;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+337
-236
@@ -5,426 +5,527 @@
|
||||
|
||||
//! An implementation of the Triple Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol
|
||||
use crate::{
|
||||
errors::{utils::check_slice_size, InternalPakeError, PakeError, ProtocolError},
|
||||
ciphersuite::CipherSuite,
|
||||
errors::{
|
||||
utils::{check_slice_size, check_slice_size_atleast},
|
||||
InternalPakeError, PakeError, ProtocolError,
|
||||
},
|
||||
group::Group,
|
||||
hash::Hash,
|
||||
key_exchange::traits::{KeyExchange, ToBytes},
|
||||
keypair::{KeyPair, SizedBytes},
|
||||
key_exchange::traits::{FromBytes, KeyExchange, ToBytes, ToBytesWithPointers},
|
||||
keypair::{KeyPair, PrivateKey, PublicKey, SizedBytesExt},
|
||||
serialization::serialize,
|
||||
};
|
||||
use digest::{Digest, FixedOutput};
|
||||
use generic_array::{
|
||||
typenum::{Unsigned, U32},
|
||||
ArrayLength, GenericArray,
|
||||
};
|
||||
use generic_bytes::SizedBytes;
|
||||
use hkdf::Hkdf;
|
||||
use hmac::{Hmac, Mac, NewMac};
|
||||
use rand_core::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
|
||||
|
||||
use rand::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
|
||||
use std::convert::TryFrom;
|
||||
use zeroize::Zeroize;
|
||||
|
||||
const KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
|
||||
pub(crate) const NONCE_LEN: usize = 32;
|
||||
pub(crate) type NonceLen = U32;
|
||||
const KE1_STATE_LEN: usize = KEY_LEN + KEY_LEN + NONCE_LEN;
|
||||
|
||||
static STR_3DH: &[u8] = b"3DH keys";
|
||||
static STR_RFC: &[u8] = b"RFCXXXX";
|
||||
static STR_CLIENT_MAC: &[u8] = b"ClientMAC";
|
||||
static STR_HANDSHAKE_SECRET: &[u8] = b"HandshakeSecret";
|
||||
static STR_SERVER_MAC: &[u8] = b"ServerMAC";
|
||||
static STR_SESSION_KEY: &[u8] = b"SessionKey";
|
||||
static STR_OPAQUE: &[u8] = b"OPAQUE-";
|
||||
|
||||
#[allow(clippy::upper_case_acronyms)]
|
||||
/// The Triple Diffie-Hellman key exchange implementation
|
||||
pub struct TripleDH;
|
||||
|
||||
impl<D: Hash, KeyFormat: KeyPair> KeyExchange<D, KeyFormat> for TripleDH {
|
||||
type KE1State = KE1State<<D as FixedOutput>::OutputSize, KeyFormat>;
|
||||
type KE2State = KE2State<<D as FixedOutput>::OutputSize>;
|
||||
type KE1Message = KE1Message<KeyFormat>;
|
||||
type KE2Message = KE2Message<<D as FixedOutput>::OutputSize, KeyFormat>;
|
||||
type KE3Message = KE3Message<<D as FixedOutput>::OutputSize>;
|
||||
impl<D: Hash, G: Group> KeyExchange<D, G> for TripleDH {
|
||||
type KE1State = Ke1State;
|
||||
type KE2State = Ke2State<<D as FixedOutput>::OutputSize>;
|
||||
type KE1Message = Ke1Message;
|
||||
type KE2Message = Ke2Message<<D as FixedOutput>::OutputSize>;
|
||||
type KE3Message = Ke3Message<<D as FixedOutput>::OutputSize>;
|
||||
|
||||
fn generate_ke1<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
|
||||
l1_component: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
rng: &mut R,
|
||||
) -> Result<(Self::KE1State, Self::KE1Message), ProtocolError> {
|
||||
let client_e_kp = KeyFormat::generate_random(rng)?;
|
||||
let client_nonce: GenericArray<u8, NonceLen> = {
|
||||
let mut client_nonce_bytes = [0u8; NONCE_LEN];
|
||||
rng.fill_bytes(&mut client_nonce_bytes);
|
||||
client_nonce_bytes.into()
|
||||
};
|
||||
let client_e_kp = KeyPair::<G>::generate_random(rng);
|
||||
let client_nonce = generate_nonce::<R>(rng);
|
||||
|
||||
let ke1_message = KE1Message {
|
||||
let ke1_message = Ke1Message {
|
||||
client_nonce,
|
||||
client_e_pk: client_e_kp.public().clone(),
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let l1_data: Vec<u8> = [&l1_component[..], &ke1_message.to_bytes()].concat();
|
||||
let mut hasher = D::new();
|
||||
hasher.update(&l1_data);
|
||||
let hashed_l1 = hasher.finalize();
|
||||
|
||||
Ok((
|
||||
KE1State {
|
||||
Ke1State {
|
||||
client_e_sk: client_e_kp.private().clone(),
|
||||
client_nonce,
|
||||
hashed_l1,
|
||||
},
|
||||
ke1_message,
|
||||
))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[allow(clippy::type_complexity)]
|
||||
fn generate_ke2<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
|
||||
rng: &mut R,
|
||||
l1_bytes: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
serialized_credential_request: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
l2_bytes: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
ke1_message: Self::KE1Message,
|
||||
client_s_pk: KeyFormat::Repr,
|
||||
server_s_sk: KeyFormat::Repr,
|
||||
client_s_pk: PublicKey,
|
||||
server_s_sk: PrivateKey,
|
||||
id_u: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
id_s: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
context: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
) -> Result<(Self::KE2State, Self::KE2Message), ProtocolError> {
|
||||
let server_e_kp = KeyFormat::generate_random(rng)?;
|
||||
let server_nonce: GenericArray<u8, NonceLen> = {
|
||||
let mut server_nonce_bytes = [0u8; NONCE_LEN];
|
||||
rng.fill_bytes(&mut server_nonce_bytes);
|
||||
server_nonce_bytes.into()
|
||||
};
|
||||
let server_e_kp = KeyPair::<G>::generate_random(rng);
|
||||
let server_nonce = generate_nonce::<R>(rng);
|
||||
|
||||
let (shared_secret, km2, km3) = derive_3dh_keys::<KeyFormat, D>(
|
||||
let mut transcript_hasher = D::new()
|
||||
.chain(STR_RFC)
|
||||
.chain(&serialize(&context, 2))
|
||||
.chain(&id_u)
|
||||
.chain(&serialized_credential_request[..])
|
||||
.chain(&id_s)
|
||||
.chain(&l2_bytes[..])
|
||||
.chain(&server_nonce[..])
|
||||
.chain(&server_e_kp.public().to_arr());
|
||||
|
||||
let (session_key, km2, km3) = derive_3dh_keys::<D, G>(
|
||||
TripleDHComponents {
|
||||
pk1: ke1_message.client_e_pk.clone(),
|
||||
sk1: server_e_kp.private().clone(),
|
||||
pk2: ke1_message.client_e_pk,
|
||||
sk2: server_s_sk.clone(),
|
||||
pk3: client_s_pk.clone(),
|
||||
sk2: server_s_sk,
|
||||
pk3: client_s_pk,
|
||||
sk3: server_e_kp.private().clone(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
&ke1_message.client_nonce,
|
||||
&server_nonce,
|
||||
client_s_pk,
|
||||
KeyFormat::public_from_private(&server_s_sk),
|
||||
&transcript_hasher.clone().finalize(),
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let mut hasher = D::new();
|
||||
hasher.update(&l1_bytes);
|
||||
let hashed_l1 = hasher.finalize();
|
||||
let mut mac_hasher =
|
||||
Hmac::<D>::new_from_slice(&km2).map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HmacError)?;
|
||||
mac_hasher.update(&transcript_hasher.clone().finalize());
|
||||
let mac = mac_hasher.finalize().into_bytes();
|
||||
|
||||
let transcript2: Vec<u8> = [
|
||||
&hashed_l1[..],
|
||||
&l2_bytes[..],
|
||||
&server_nonce[..],
|
||||
&server_e_kp.public().to_arr(),
|
||||
]
|
||||
.concat();
|
||||
|
||||
let mut hasher2 = D::new();
|
||||
hasher2.update(&transcript2);
|
||||
let hashed_transcript = hasher2.finalize();
|
||||
|
||||
let mut mac = Hmac::<D>::new_varkey(&km2).map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HmacError)?;
|
||||
mac.update(&hashed_transcript);
|
||||
transcript_hasher.update(&mac);
|
||||
|
||||
Ok((
|
||||
KE2State {
|
||||
Ke2State {
|
||||
km3,
|
||||
hashed_transcript,
|
||||
shared_secret,
|
||||
hashed_transcript: transcript_hasher.finalize(),
|
||||
session_key,
|
||||
},
|
||||
KE2Message {
|
||||
Ke2Message {
|
||||
server_nonce,
|
||||
server_e_pk: server_e_kp.public().clone(),
|
||||
mac: mac.finalize().into_bytes(),
|
||||
mac,
|
||||
},
|
||||
))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[allow(clippy::type_complexity)]
|
||||
fn generate_ke3(
|
||||
l2_component: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
ke2_message: Self::KE2Message,
|
||||
ke1_state: &Self::KE1State,
|
||||
server_s_pk: KeyFormat::Repr,
|
||||
client_s_sk: KeyFormat::Repr,
|
||||
serialized_credential_request: &[u8],
|
||||
server_s_pk: PublicKey,
|
||||
client_s_sk: PrivateKey,
|
||||
id_u: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
id_s: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
context: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, Self::KE3Message), ProtocolError> {
|
||||
let (shared_secret, km2, km3) = derive_3dh_keys::<KeyFormat, D>(
|
||||
let mut transcript_hasher = D::new()
|
||||
.chain(STR_RFC)
|
||||
.chain(&serialize(&context, 2))
|
||||
.chain(&id_u)
|
||||
.chain(&serialized_credential_request)
|
||||
.chain(&id_s)
|
||||
.chain(&l2_component[..])
|
||||
.chain(&ke2_message.to_bytes_without_info_or_mac());
|
||||
|
||||
let (session_key, km2, km3) = derive_3dh_keys::<D, G>(
|
||||
TripleDHComponents {
|
||||
pk1: ke2_message.server_e_pk.clone(),
|
||||
sk1: ke1_state.client_e_sk.clone(),
|
||||
pk2: server_s_pk.clone(),
|
||||
pk2: server_s_pk,
|
||||
sk2: ke1_state.client_e_sk.clone(),
|
||||
pk3: ke2_message.server_e_pk.clone(),
|
||||
sk3: client_s_sk.clone(),
|
||||
sk3: client_s_sk,
|
||||
},
|
||||
&ke1_state.client_nonce,
|
||||
&ke2_message.server_nonce,
|
||||
KeyFormat::public_from_private(&client_s_sk),
|
||||
server_s_pk,
|
||||
&transcript_hasher.clone().finalize(),
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let transcript: Vec<u8> = [
|
||||
&ke1_state.hashed_l1[..],
|
||||
&l2_component[..],
|
||||
&ke2_message.server_nonce[..],
|
||||
&ke2_message.server_e_pk.to_arr(),
|
||||
]
|
||||
.concat();
|
||||
|
||||
let mut hasher = D::new();
|
||||
hasher.update(&transcript);
|
||||
let hashed_transcript = hasher.finalize();
|
||||
|
||||
let mut server_mac =
|
||||
Hmac::<D>::new_varkey(&km2).map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HmacError)?;
|
||||
server_mac.update(&hashed_transcript);
|
||||
Hmac::<D>::new_from_slice(&km2).map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HmacError)?;
|
||||
server_mac.update(&transcript_hasher.clone().finalize());
|
||||
|
||||
if ke2_message.mac != server_mac.finalize().into_bytes() {
|
||||
if server_mac.verify(&ke2_message.mac).is_err() {
|
||||
return Err(ProtocolError::VerificationError(
|
||||
PakeError::KeyExchangeMacValidationError,
|
||||
));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
transcript_hasher.update(ke2_message.mac);
|
||||
|
||||
let mut client_mac =
|
||||
Hmac::<D>::new_varkey(&km3).map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HmacError)?;
|
||||
client_mac.update(&hashed_transcript);
|
||||
Hmac::<D>::new_from_slice(&km3).map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HmacError)?;
|
||||
client_mac.update(&transcript_hasher.finalize());
|
||||
|
||||
Ok((
|
||||
shared_secret.to_vec(),
|
||||
KE3Message {
|
||||
session_key.to_vec(),
|
||||
Ke3Message {
|
||||
mac: client_mac.finalize().into_bytes(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[allow(clippy::type_complexity)]
|
||||
fn finish_ke(
|
||||
ke3_message: Self::KE3Message,
|
||||
ke2_state: &Self::KE2State,
|
||||
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, ProtocolError> {
|
||||
let mut client_mac =
|
||||
Hmac::<D>::new_varkey(&ke2_state.km3).map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HmacError)?;
|
||||
Hmac::<D>::new_from_slice(&ke2_state.km3).map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HmacError)?;
|
||||
client_mac.update(&ke2_state.hashed_transcript);
|
||||
|
||||
if ke3_message.mac != client_mac.finalize().into_bytes() {
|
||||
if client_mac.verify(&ke3_message.mac).is_err() {
|
||||
return Err(ProtocolError::VerificationError(
|
||||
PakeError::KeyExchangeMacValidationError,
|
||||
));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(ke2_state.shared_secret.to_vec())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn ke1_state_size() -> usize {
|
||||
KE1_STATE_LEN
|
||||
Ok(ke2_state.session_key.to_vec())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn ke2_message_size() -> usize {
|
||||
NONCE_LEN + KEY_LEN + <<D as FixedOutput>::OutputSize as Unsigned>::to_usize()
|
||||
NonceLen::to_usize() + KEY_LEN + <<D as FixedOutput>::OutputSize as Unsigned>::to_usize()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The client state produced after the first key exchange message
|
||||
#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
|
||||
pub struct KE1State<HashLen: ArrayLength<u8>, KeyFormat: KeyPair> {
|
||||
client_e_sk: KeyFormat::Repr,
|
||||
#[derive(PartialEq, Eq, Debug, Hash, Zeroize, Clone)]
|
||||
#[cfg_attr(feature = "serialize", derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize))]
|
||||
#[zeroize(drop)]
|
||||
pub struct Ke1State {
|
||||
client_e_sk: PrivateKey,
|
||||
client_nonce: GenericArray<u8, NonceLen>,
|
||||
hashed_l1: GenericArray<u8, HashLen>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The first key exchange message
|
||||
#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
|
||||
pub struct KE1Message<KeyFormat: KeyPair> {
|
||||
#[derive(PartialEq, Eq, Debug, Hash, Clone)]
|
||||
#[cfg_attr(feature = "serialize", derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize))]
|
||||
pub struct Ke1Message {
|
||||
pub(crate) client_nonce: GenericArray<u8, NonceLen>,
|
||||
pub(crate) client_e_pk: KeyFormat::Repr,
|
||||
pub(crate) client_e_pk: PublicKey,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl<HashLen: ArrayLength<u8>, KeyFormat: KeyPair> TryFrom<&[u8]> for KE1State<HashLen, KeyFormat> {
|
||||
type Error = InternalPakeError;
|
||||
|
||||
fn try_from(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
|
||||
let checked_bytes = check_slice_size(
|
||||
bytes,
|
||||
KEY_LEN + NONCE_LEN + HashLen::to_usize(),
|
||||
"ke1_state",
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
impl FromBytes for Ke1State {
|
||||
fn from_bytes<CS: CipherSuite>(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, PakeError> {
|
||||
let nonce_len = NonceLen::to_usize();
|
||||
let checked_bytes = check_slice_size_atleast(bytes, KEY_LEN + nonce_len, "ke1_state")?;
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(Self {
|
||||
client_e_sk: KeyFormat::Repr::from_bytes(&checked_bytes[..KEY_LEN])?,
|
||||
client_e_sk: PrivateKey::from_bytes(&checked_bytes[..KEY_LEN])?,
|
||||
client_nonce: GenericArray::clone_from_slice(
|
||||
&checked_bytes[KEY_LEN..KEY_LEN + NONCE_LEN],
|
||||
&checked_bytes[KEY_LEN..KEY_LEN + nonce_len],
|
||||
),
|
||||
hashed_l1: GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&checked_bytes[KEY_LEN + NONCE_LEN..]),
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl<HashLen: ArrayLength<u8>, KeyFormat: KeyPair> ToBytes for KE1State<HashLen, KeyFormat> {
|
||||
impl ToBytesWithPointers for Ke1State {
|
||||
fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
let output: Vec<u8> = [
|
||||
&self.client_e_sk.to_arr(),
|
||||
&self.client_nonce[..],
|
||||
&self.hashed_l1[..],
|
||||
]
|
||||
.concat();
|
||||
let output: Vec<u8> = [&self.client_e_sk.to_arr(), &self.client_nonce[..]].concat();
|
||||
output
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
fn as_byte_ptrs(&self) -> Vec<(*const u8, usize)> {
|
||||
vec![
|
||||
(
|
||||
self.client_e_sk.as_ptr(),
|
||||
<PrivateKey as SizedBytes>::Len::to_usize(),
|
||||
),
|
||||
(self.client_nonce.as_ptr(), NonceLen::to_usize()),
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl<KeyFormat: KeyPair> ToBytes for KE1Message<KeyFormat> {
|
||||
impl ToBytes for Ke1Message {
|
||||
fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
[&self.client_nonce[..], &self.client_e_pk.to_arr()].concat()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl<KeyFormat: KeyPair> TryFrom<&[u8]> for KE1Message<KeyFormat> {
|
||||
type Error = InternalPakeError;
|
||||
|
||||
fn try_from(ke1_message_bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
|
||||
let checked_bytes =
|
||||
check_slice_size(ke1_message_bytes, NONCE_LEN + KEY_LEN, "ke1_message")?;
|
||||
impl FromBytes for Ke1Message {
|
||||
fn from_bytes<CS: CipherSuite>(ke1_message_bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, PakeError> {
|
||||
let nonce_len = NonceLen::to_usize();
|
||||
let checked_nonce =
|
||||
check_slice_size(ke1_message_bytes, nonce_len + KEY_LEN, "ke1_message nonce")?;
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(Self {
|
||||
client_nonce: GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&checked_bytes[..NONCE_LEN]),
|
||||
client_e_pk: KeyFormat::Repr::from_bytes(&checked_bytes[NONCE_LEN..])?,
|
||||
client_nonce: GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&checked_nonce[..nonce_len]),
|
||||
client_e_pk: PublicKey::from_bytes(&checked_nonce[nonce_len..])?,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The server state produced after the second key exchange message
|
||||
pub struct KE2State<HashLen: ArrayLength<u8>> {
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, Hash, PartialEq)]
|
||||
#[cfg_attr(feature = "serialize", derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize))]
|
||||
#[cfg_attr(feature = "serialize", serde(bound = ""))]
|
||||
pub struct Ke2State<HashLen: ArrayLength<u8>> {
|
||||
km3: GenericArray<u8, HashLen>,
|
||||
hashed_transcript: GenericArray<u8, HashLen>,
|
||||
shared_secret: GenericArray<u8, HashLen>,
|
||||
session_key: GenericArray<u8, HashLen>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// This can't be derived because of the use of a phantom parameter
|
||||
impl<HashLen: ArrayLength<u8>> Zeroize for Ke2State<HashLen> {
|
||||
fn zeroize(&mut self) {
|
||||
self.km3.zeroize();
|
||||
self.hashed_transcript.zeroize();
|
||||
self.session_key.zeroize();
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl<HashLen: ArrayLength<u8>> Drop for Ke2State<HashLen> {
|
||||
fn drop(&mut self) {
|
||||
self.zeroize();
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl<HashLen: ArrayLength<u8>> ToBytesWithPointers for Ke2State<HashLen> {
|
||||
fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
[
|
||||
&self.km3[..],
|
||||
&self.hashed_transcript[..],
|
||||
&self.session_key[..],
|
||||
]
|
||||
.concat()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
fn as_byte_ptrs(&self) -> Vec<(*const u8, usize)> {
|
||||
vec![
|
||||
(self.km3.as_ptr(), HashLen::to_usize()),
|
||||
(self.hashed_transcript.as_ptr(), HashLen::to_usize()),
|
||||
(self.session_key.as_ptr(), HashLen::to_usize()),
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The second key exchange message
|
||||
pub struct KE2Message<HashLen: ArrayLength<u8>, KeyFormat: KeyPair> {
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, Hash, PartialEq)]
|
||||
#[cfg_attr(feature = "serialize", derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize))]
|
||||
#[cfg_attr(feature = "serialize", serde(bound = ""))]
|
||||
pub struct Ke2Message<HashLen: ArrayLength<u8>> {
|
||||
server_nonce: GenericArray<u8, NonceLen>,
|
||||
server_e_pk: KeyFormat::Repr,
|
||||
server_e_pk: PublicKey,
|
||||
mac: GenericArray<u8, HashLen>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl<HashLen: ArrayLength<u8>> ToBytes for KE2State<HashLen> {
|
||||
fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
let output: Vec<u8> = [
|
||||
&self.km3[..],
|
||||
&self.hashed_transcript[..],
|
||||
&self.shared_secret[..],
|
||||
]
|
||||
.concat();
|
||||
output
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl<HashLen: ArrayLength<u8>> TryFrom<&[u8]> for KE2State<HashLen> {
|
||||
type Error = InternalPakeError;
|
||||
|
||||
fn try_from(ke1_message_bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
|
||||
let checked_bytes = check_slice_size(ke1_message_bytes, 3 * KEY_LEN, "ke2_state")?;
|
||||
impl<HashLen: ArrayLength<u8>> FromBytes for Ke2State<HashLen> {
|
||||
fn from_bytes<CS: CipherSuite>(input: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, PakeError> {
|
||||
let hash_len = HashLen::to_usize();
|
||||
let checked_bytes = check_slice_size(input, 3 * hash_len, "ke2_state")?;
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(Self {
|
||||
km3: GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&checked_bytes[..KEY_LEN]),
|
||||
hashed_transcript: GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&checked_bytes[KEY_LEN..2 * KEY_LEN]),
|
||||
shared_secret: GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&checked_bytes[2 * KEY_LEN..]),
|
||||
km3: GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&checked_bytes[..hash_len]),
|
||||
hashed_transcript: GenericArray::clone_from_slice(
|
||||
&checked_bytes[hash_len..2 * hash_len],
|
||||
),
|
||||
session_key: GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&checked_bytes[2 * hash_len..3 * hash_len]),
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl<HashLen: ArrayLength<u8>, KeyFormat: KeyPair> ToBytes for KE2Message<HashLen, KeyFormat> {
|
||||
impl<HashLen: ArrayLength<u8>> ToBytes for Ke2Message<HashLen> {
|
||||
fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
let output: Vec<u8> = [
|
||||
&self.server_nonce[..],
|
||||
&self.server_e_pk.to_arr(),
|
||||
&self.mac[..],
|
||||
]
|
||||
.concat();
|
||||
output
|
||||
[&self.to_bytes_without_info_or_mac(), &self.mac[..]].concat()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl<HashLen: ArrayLength<u8>, KeyFormat: KeyPair> TryFrom<&[u8]>
|
||||
for KE2Message<HashLen, KeyFormat>
|
||||
{
|
||||
type Error = InternalPakeError;
|
||||
impl<HashLen: ArrayLength<u8>> Ke2Message<HashLen> {
|
||||
fn to_bytes_without_info_or_mac(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
[&self.server_nonce[..], &self.server_e_pk.to_arr()].concat()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn try_from(ke2_message_bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
|
||||
let ke2_message_len = NONCE_LEN + KEY_LEN + HashLen::to_usize();
|
||||
let checked_bytes = check_slice_size(ke2_message_bytes, ke2_message_len, "ke2_message")?;
|
||||
impl<HashLen: ArrayLength<u8>> FromBytes for Ke2Message<HashLen> {
|
||||
fn from_bytes<CS: CipherSuite>(input: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, PakeError> {
|
||||
let nonce_len = NonceLen::to_usize();
|
||||
let checked_nonce = check_slice_size_atleast(input, nonce_len, "ke2_message nonce")?;
|
||||
|
||||
let unchecked_server_e_pk = check_slice_size_atleast(
|
||||
&checked_nonce[nonce_len..],
|
||||
KEY_LEN,
|
||||
"ke2_message server_e_pk",
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
let checked_mac = check_slice_size(
|
||||
&unchecked_server_e_pk[KEY_LEN..],
|
||||
HashLen::to_usize(),
|
||||
"ke1_message mac",
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Check the public key bytes
|
||||
let server_e_pk = KeyPair::<CS::Group>::check_public_key(PublicKey::from_bytes(
|
||||
&unchecked_server_e_pk[..KEY_LEN],
|
||||
)?)?;
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(Self {
|
||||
server_nonce: GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&checked_bytes[..NONCE_LEN]),
|
||||
server_e_pk: KeyFormat::Repr::from_bytes(
|
||||
&checked_bytes[NONCE_LEN..NONCE_LEN + KEY_LEN],
|
||||
)?,
|
||||
mac: GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&checked_bytes[NONCE_LEN + KEY_LEN..]),
|
||||
server_nonce: GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&checked_nonce[..nonce_len]),
|
||||
server_e_pk: PublicKey::from_bytes(&server_e_pk)?,
|
||||
mac: GenericArray::clone_from_slice(checked_mac),
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[allow(clippy::upper_case_acronyms)]
|
||||
// The triple of public and private components used in the 3DH computation
|
||||
struct TripleDHComponents<KeyFormat: KeyPair> {
|
||||
pk1: KeyFormat::Repr,
|
||||
sk1: KeyFormat::Repr,
|
||||
pk2: KeyFormat::Repr,
|
||||
sk2: KeyFormat::Repr,
|
||||
pk3: KeyFormat::Repr,
|
||||
sk3: KeyFormat::Repr,
|
||||
struct TripleDHComponents {
|
||||
pk1: PublicKey,
|
||||
sk1: PrivateKey,
|
||||
pk2: PublicKey,
|
||||
sk2: PrivateKey,
|
||||
pk3: PublicKey,
|
||||
sk3: PrivateKey,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Consists of a shared secret, followed by two mac keys
|
||||
#[allow(clippy::upper_case_acronyms)]
|
||||
// Consists of a session key, followed by two mac keys: (session_key, km2, km3)
|
||||
type TripleDHDerivationResult<D> = (
|
||||
GenericArray<u8, <D as FixedOutput>::OutputSize>,
|
||||
GenericArray<u8, <D as FixedOutput>::OutputSize>,
|
||||
GenericArray<u8, <D as FixedOutput>::OutputSize>,
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
// Internal function which takes the public and private components of the client and server keypairs, along
|
||||
// with some auxiliary metadata, to produce the shared secret and two MAC keys
|
||||
fn derive_3dh_keys<KeyFormat: KeyPair, D: Hash>(
|
||||
dh: TripleDHComponents<KeyFormat>,
|
||||
client_nonce: &GenericArray<u8, NonceLen>,
|
||||
server_nonce: &GenericArray<u8, NonceLen>,
|
||||
client_s_pk: KeyFormat::Repr,
|
||||
server_s_pk: KeyFormat::Repr,
|
||||
) -> Result<TripleDHDerivationResult<D>, ProtocolError> {
|
||||
let ikm: Vec<u8> = [
|
||||
&KeyFormat::diffie_hellman(dh.pk1, dh.sk1)[..],
|
||||
&KeyFormat::diffie_hellman(dh.pk2, dh.sk2)[..],
|
||||
&KeyFormat::diffie_hellman(dh.pk3, dh.sk3)[..],
|
||||
]
|
||||
.concat();
|
||||
|
||||
let info: Vec<u8> = [
|
||||
STR_3DH,
|
||||
&client_nonce,
|
||||
&server_nonce,
|
||||
&client_s_pk.to_arr(),
|
||||
&server_s_pk.to_arr(),
|
||||
]
|
||||
.concat();
|
||||
|
||||
const OUTPUT_SIZE: usize = 32;
|
||||
let mut okm = [0u8; 3 * OUTPUT_SIZE];
|
||||
let h = Hkdf::<D>::new(None, &ikm);
|
||||
h.expand(&info, &mut okm)
|
||||
.map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HkdfError)?;
|
||||
Ok((
|
||||
GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&okm[..OUTPUT_SIZE]),
|
||||
GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&okm[OUTPUT_SIZE..2 * OUTPUT_SIZE]),
|
||||
GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&okm[2 * OUTPUT_SIZE..]),
|
||||
))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The third key exchange message
|
||||
pub struct KE3Message<HashLen: ArrayLength<u8>> {
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, Hash, PartialEq)]
|
||||
#[cfg_attr(feature = "serialize", derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize))]
|
||||
#[cfg_attr(feature = "serialize", serde(bound = ""))]
|
||||
pub struct Ke3Message<HashLen: ArrayLength<u8>> {
|
||||
mac: GenericArray<u8, HashLen>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl<HashLen: ArrayLength<u8>> ToBytes for KE3Message<HashLen> {
|
||||
impl<HashLen: ArrayLength<u8>> ToBytes for Ke3Message<HashLen> {
|
||||
fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
self.mac.to_vec()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl<HashLen: ArrayLength<u8>> TryFrom<&[u8]> for KE3Message<HashLen> {
|
||||
type Error = InternalPakeError;
|
||||
|
||||
fn try_from(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
|
||||
let checked_bytes = check_slice_size(bytes, KEY_LEN, "ke3_message")?;
|
||||
impl<HashLen: ArrayLength<u8>> FromBytes for Ke3Message<HashLen> {
|
||||
fn from_bytes<CS: CipherSuite>(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, PakeError> {
|
||||
let checked_bytes = check_slice_size(bytes, HashLen::to_usize(), "ke3_message")?;
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(Self {
|
||||
mac: GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&checked_bytes),
|
||||
mac: GenericArray::clone_from_slice(checked_bytes),
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Helper functions
|
||||
|
||||
// Internal function which takes the public and private components of the client and server keypairs, along
|
||||
// with some auxiliary metadata, to produce the session key and two MAC keys
|
||||
fn derive_3dh_keys<D: Hash, G: Group>(
|
||||
dh: TripleDHComponents,
|
||||
hashed_derivation_transcript: &[u8],
|
||||
) -> Result<TripleDHDerivationResult<D>, ProtocolError> {
|
||||
let ikm: Vec<u8> = [
|
||||
&KeyPair::<G>::diffie_hellman(dh.pk1, dh.sk1)?[..],
|
||||
&KeyPair::<G>::diffie_hellman(dh.pk2, dh.sk2)?[..],
|
||||
&KeyPair::<G>::diffie_hellman(dh.pk3, dh.sk3)?[..],
|
||||
]
|
||||
.concat();
|
||||
|
||||
let extracted_ikm = Hkdf::<D>::new(None, &ikm);
|
||||
let handshake_secret = derive_secrets::<D>(
|
||||
&extracted_ikm,
|
||||
STR_HANDSHAKE_SECRET,
|
||||
hashed_derivation_transcript,
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
let session_key = derive_secrets::<D>(
|
||||
&extracted_ikm,
|
||||
STR_SESSION_KEY,
|
||||
hashed_derivation_transcript,
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let km2 = hkdf_expand_label::<D>(
|
||||
&handshake_secret,
|
||||
STR_SERVER_MAC,
|
||||
b"",
|
||||
<D as Digest>::OutputSize::to_usize(),
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
let km3 = hkdf_expand_label::<D>(
|
||||
&handshake_secret,
|
||||
STR_CLIENT_MAC,
|
||||
b"",
|
||||
<D as Digest>::OutputSize::to_usize(),
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
Ok((
|
||||
GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&session_key),
|
||||
GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&km2),
|
||||
GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&km3),
|
||||
))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn hkdf_expand_label<D: Hash>(
|
||||
secret: &[u8],
|
||||
label: &[u8],
|
||||
context: &[u8],
|
||||
length: usize,
|
||||
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, ProtocolError> {
|
||||
let h = Hkdf::<D>::from_prk(secret).map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HkdfError)?;
|
||||
hkdf_expand_label_extracted(&h, label, context, length)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn hkdf_expand_label_extracted<D: Hash>(
|
||||
hkdf: &Hkdf<D>,
|
||||
label: &[u8],
|
||||
context: &[u8],
|
||||
length: usize,
|
||||
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, ProtocolError> {
|
||||
let mut okm = vec![0u8; length];
|
||||
|
||||
let mut hkdf_label: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
let length_u16: u16 = u16::try_from(length).map_err(|_| PakeError::SerializationError)?;
|
||||
hkdf_label.extend_from_slice(&length_u16.to_be_bytes());
|
||||
|
||||
let mut opaque_label: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
|
||||
opaque_label.extend_from_slice(STR_OPAQUE);
|
||||
opaque_label.extend_from_slice(label);
|
||||
hkdf_label.extend_from_slice(&serialize(&opaque_label, 1));
|
||||
|
||||
hkdf_label.extend_from_slice(&serialize(context, 1));
|
||||
|
||||
hkdf.expand(&hkdf_label, &mut okm)
|
||||
.map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HkdfError)?;
|
||||
Ok(okm)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn derive_secrets<D: Hash>(
|
||||
hkdf: &Hkdf<D>,
|
||||
label: &[u8],
|
||||
hashed_derivation_transcript: &[u8],
|
||||
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, ProtocolError> {
|
||||
hkdf_expand_label_extracted::<D>(
|
||||
hkdf,
|
||||
label,
|
||||
hashed_derivation_transcript,
|
||||
<D as Digest>::OutputSize::to_usize(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Generate a random nonce up to NonceLen::to_usize() bytes.
|
||||
fn generate_nonce<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(rng: &mut R) -> GenericArray<u8, NonceLen> {
|
||||
let mut nonce_bytes = vec![0u8; NonceLen::to_usize()];
|
||||
rng.fill_bytes(&mut nonce_bytes);
|
||||
GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&nonce_bytes)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+218
-179
@@ -5,149 +5,162 @@
|
||||
|
||||
//! Contains the keypair types that must be supplied for the OPAQUE API
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::errors::{utils::check_slice_size, InternalPakeError};
|
||||
use generic_array::{
|
||||
sequence::Concat,
|
||||
typenum::{Sum, Unsigned, U32},
|
||||
ArrayLength, GenericArray,
|
||||
};
|
||||
#![allow(unsafe_code)]
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::errors::InternalPakeError;
|
||||
use crate::group::Group;
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
use generic_array::typenum::Unsigned;
|
||||
use generic_array::{typenum::U32, GenericArray};
|
||||
use generic_bytes::{SizedBytes, TryFromSizedBytesError};
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
use proptest::prelude::*;
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
use rand::{rngs::StdRng, SeedableRng};
|
||||
use rand_core::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
|
||||
use std::convert::TryInto;
|
||||
use rand::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
|
||||
use std::fmt::Debug;
|
||||
use x25519_dalek::{PublicKey, StaticSecret};
|
||||
use std::marker::PhantomData;
|
||||
use std::ops::Deref;
|
||||
use zeroize::Zeroize;
|
||||
|
||||
use std::convert::TryFrom;
|
||||
|
||||
use std::ops::{Add, Deref};
|
||||
|
||||
/// A trait for sized key material that can be represented within a fixed byte
|
||||
/// array size, used to represent our DH key types
|
||||
pub trait SizedBytes: Sized + PartialEq {
|
||||
/// The typed representation of the byte length
|
||||
type Len: ArrayLength<u8>;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Converts this sized key material to a `GenericArray` of the same
|
||||
/// size. One can convert this to a `&[u8]` with `GenericArray::as_slice()`
|
||||
/// but the size information is then lost from the type.
|
||||
fn to_arr(&self) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::Len>;
|
||||
|
||||
/// How to parse such sized material from a byte slice.
|
||||
fn from_bytes(key_bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, InternalPakeError>;
|
||||
/// Convenience extension trait of SizedBytes
|
||||
pub trait SizedBytesExt: SizedBytes {
|
||||
/// Convert from bytes
|
||||
fn from_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, TryFromSizedBytesError> {
|
||||
<Self as SizedBytes>::from_arr(GenericArray::from_slice(bytes))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// A Keypair trait with public-private verification
|
||||
pub trait KeyPair: Sized {
|
||||
/// The single key representation must have a specific byte size itself
|
||||
type Repr: SizedBytes + Clone;
|
||||
// blanket implementation
|
||||
impl<T> SizedBytesExt for T where T: SizedBytes {}
|
||||
|
||||
/// A Keypair trait with public-private verification
|
||||
#[cfg_attr(feature = "serialize", derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize))]
|
||||
pub struct KeyPair<G> {
|
||||
pk: PublicKey,
|
||||
sk: PrivateKey,
|
||||
_g: PhantomData<G>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl_clone_for!(
|
||||
struct KeyPair<G>,
|
||||
[pk, sk, _g],
|
||||
);
|
||||
impl_debug_eq_hash_for!(
|
||||
struct KeyPair<G>,
|
||||
[pk, sk, _g],
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
// This can't be derived because of the use of a phantom parameter
|
||||
impl<G> Zeroize for KeyPair<G> {
|
||||
fn zeroize(&mut self) {
|
||||
self.pk.zeroize();
|
||||
self.sk.zeroize();
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl<G> Drop for KeyPair<G> {
|
||||
fn drop(&mut self) {
|
||||
self.zeroize();
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl<G: Group> KeyPair<G> {
|
||||
/// The public key component
|
||||
fn public(&self) -> &Self::Repr;
|
||||
pub fn public(&self) -> &PublicKey {
|
||||
&self.pk
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The private key component
|
||||
fn private(&self) -> &Self::Repr;
|
||||
|
||||
/// A constructor that receives public and private key independently as
|
||||
/// bytes
|
||||
fn new(public: Self::Repr, private: Self::Repr) -> Result<Self, InternalPakeError>;
|
||||
pub fn private(&self) -> &PrivateKey {
|
||||
&self.sk
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Generating a random key pair given a cryptographic rng
|
||||
fn generate_random<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(rng: &mut R) -> Result<Self, InternalPakeError>;
|
||||
pub(crate) fn generate_random<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(rng: &mut R) -> Self {
|
||||
let sk = G::random_nonzero_scalar(rng);
|
||||
let sk_bytes = G::scalar_as_bytes(&sk);
|
||||
let pk = G::base_point().mult_by_slice(sk_bytes);
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
pk: PublicKey(Key(pk.to_arr().to_vec())),
|
||||
sk: PrivateKey(Key(sk_bytes.to_vec())),
|
||||
_g: PhantomData,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Obtaining a public key from secret bytes. At all times, we should have
|
||||
/// &public_from_private(self.private()) == self.public()
|
||||
fn public_from_private(secret: &Self::Repr) -> Self::Repr;
|
||||
pub(crate) fn public_from_private(bytes: &PrivateKey) -> PublicKey {
|
||||
let bytes_data = GenericArray::<u8, G::ScalarLen>::from_slice(&bytes.0[..]);
|
||||
PublicKey(Key(G::base_point()
|
||||
.mult_by_slice(bytes_data)
|
||||
.to_arr()
|
||||
.to_vec()))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Check whether a public key is valid. This is meant to be applied on
|
||||
/// material provided through the network which fits the key
|
||||
/// representation (i.e. can be mapped to a curve point), but presents
|
||||
/// some risk - e.g. small subgroup check
|
||||
fn check_public_key(key: Self::Repr) -> Result<Self::Repr, InternalPakeError>;
|
||||
pub(crate) fn check_public_key(key: PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, InternalPakeError> {
|
||||
G::from_element_slice(GenericArray::from_slice(&key.0)).map(|_| key)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Computes the diffie hellman function on a public key and private key
|
||||
fn diffie_hellman(pk: Self::Repr, sk: Self::Repr) -> Vec<u8>;
|
||||
pub(crate) fn diffie_hellman(
|
||||
pk: PublicKey,
|
||||
sk: PrivateKey,
|
||||
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, InternalPakeError> {
|
||||
let pk_data = GenericArray::<u8, G::ElemLen>::from_slice(&pk.0[..]);
|
||||
let point = G::from_element_slice(pk_data)?;
|
||||
let secret_data = GenericArray::<u8, G::ScalarLen>::from_slice(&sk.0[..]);
|
||||
Ok(G::mult_by_slice(&point, secret_data).to_arr().to_vec())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Obtains a KeyPair from a slice representing the private key
|
||||
pub fn from_private_key_slice(input: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, InternalPakeError> {
|
||||
let sk = PrivateKey(Key::from_arr(GenericArray::from_slice(input))?);
|
||||
let pk = Self::public_from_private(&sk);
|
||||
Ok(Self {
|
||||
pk,
|
||||
sk,
|
||||
_g: PhantomData,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
pub fn as_byte_ptrs(&self) -> Vec<(*const u8, usize)> {
|
||||
vec![
|
||||
(self.pk.as_ptr(), KeyLen::to_usize()),
|
||||
(self.sk.as_ptr(), KeyLen::to_usize()),
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
trait KeyPairExt: KeyPair + Debug {
|
||||
impl<G: Group + Debug> KeyPair<G> {
|
||||
/// Test-only strategy returning a proptest Strategy based on
|
||||
/// generate_random
|
||||
fn uniform_keypair_strategy() -> BoxedStrategy<Self> {
|
||||
// The no_shrink is because keypairs should be fixed -- shrinking would cause a different
|
||||
// keypair to be generated, which appears to not be very useful.
|
||||
any::<[u8; 32]>()
|
||||
.prop_filter_map("valid random keypair", |seed| {
|
||||
prop::array::uniform32(0_u8..)
|
||||
.prop_map(|seed| {
|
||||
let mut rng = StdRng::from_seed(seed);
|
||||
Self::generate_random(&mut rng).ok()
|
||||
Self::generate_random(&mut rng)
|
||||
})
|
||||
.no_shrink()
|
||||
.boxed()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// blanket implementation
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
impl<KP> KeyPairExt for KP where KP: KeyPair + Debug {}
|
||||
type KeyLen = U32;
|
||||
|
||||
/// This assumes you have defined a SizedBytes instance for a `T`, and defines:
|
||||
/// - an `impl TryFrom<&[u8b], Error = InternalPakeError>` for a non-generic `T`
|
||||
/// - an `fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8>` in an `impl T` block
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Because SizedBytes has a strong notion of size, and TryFrom/to_bytes does
|
||||
/// not, it's better to use this macro than the one above, where possible.
|
||||
macro_rules! try_from_and_to_bytes_using_sized_bytes {
|
||||
($sized_type: ident) => {
|
||||
impl TryFrom<&[u8]> for $sized_type {
|
||||
type Error = InternalPakeError;
|
||||
|
||||
fn try_from(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, InternalPakeError> {
|
||||
<$sized_type as SizedBytes>::from_bytes(bytes)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[allow(dead_code)]
|
||||
impl $sized_type {
|
||||
fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
self.to_arr().to_vec()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// This is a blanket implementation of SizedBytes for any instance of KeyPair
|
||||
/// with any length of keys. This encodes that we serialize the public key
|
||||
/// first, followed by the private key in binary formats (and expect it in this
|
||||
/// order upon decoding).
|
||||
impl<T, KP> SizedBytes for KP
|
||||
where
|
||||
T: SizedBytes + Clone,
|
||||
KP: KeyPair<Repr = T> + PartialEq,
|
||||
T::Len: Add<T::Len>,
|
||||
Sum<T::Len, T::Len>: ArrayLength<u8>,
|
||||
{
|
||||
type Len = Sum<T::Len, T::Len>;
|
||||
|
||||
fn to_arr(&self) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::Len> {
|
||||
let private = self.private().to_arr();
|
||||
let public = self.public().to_arr();
|
||||
public.concat(private)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn from_bytes(key_bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, InternalPakeError> {
|
||||
let checked_bytes =
|
||||
check_slice_size(key_bytes, <Self::Len as Unsigned>::to_usize(), "key_bytes")?;
|
||||
let single_key_len = <<KP::Repr as SizedBytes>::Len as Unsigned>::to_usize();
|
||||
let public = <T as SizedBytes>::from_bytes(&checked_bytes[..single_key_len])?;
|
||||
let private = <T as SizedBytes>::from_bytes(&checked_bytes[single_key_len..])?;
|
||||
KP::new(public, private)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// A minimalist key type built around [u8;32]
|
||||
#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Clone)]
|
||||
/// A minimalist key type built around a \[u8; 32\]
|
||||
#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Clone, Hash, Zeroize)]
|
||||
#[cfg_attr(feature = "serialize", derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize))]
|
||||
// Ensure Key material is zeroed after use.
|
||||
#[zeroize(drop)]
|
||||
#[repr(transparent)]
|
||||
pub struct Key(Vec<u8>);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -159,119 +172,145 @@ impl Deref for Key {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl SizedBytes for Key {
|
||||
type Len = U32;
|
||||
|
||||
fn to_arr(&self) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::Len> {
|
||||
// Don't make it implement SizedBytes so that it's not constructible outside of this module.
|
||||
impl Key {
|
||||
fn to_arr(&self) -> GenericArray<u8, KeyLen> {
|
||||
GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&self.0[..])
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn from_bytes(key_bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, InternalPakeError> {
|
||||
let checked_bytes =
|
||||
check_slice_size(key_bytes, <Self::Len as Unsigned>::to_usize(), "key_bytes")?;
|
||||
Ok(Key(checked_bytes.to_vec()))
|
||||
#[allow(clippy::unnecessary_wraps)]
|
||||
fn from_arr(key_bytes: &GenericArray<u8, KeyLen>) -> Result<Self, TryFromSizedBytesError> {
|
||||
Ok(Key(key_bytes.to_vec()))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
try_from_and_to_bytes_using_sized_bytes!(Key);
|
||||
/// Wrapper around a Key to enforce that it's a private one.
|
||||
#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Clone, Hash, Zeroize)]
|
||||
#[cfg_attr(feature = "serialize", derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize))]
|
||||
// Ensure Key material is zeroed after use.
|
||||
#[zeroize(drop)]
|
||||
#[repr(transparent)]
|
||||
pub struct PrivateKey(Key);
|
||||
|
||||
/// A representation of an X25519 keypair according to RFC7748
|
||||
#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
|
||||
pub struct X25519KeyPair {
|
||||
pk: Key,
|
||||
sk: Key,
|
||||
}
|
||||
impl Deref for PrivateKey {
|
||||
type Target = Key;
|
||||
|
||||
impl X25519KeyPair {
|
||||
fn gen<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(rng: &mut R) -> (Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>) {
|
||||
let sk = StaticSecret::new(rng);
|
||||
let pk = PublicKey::from(&sk);
|
||||
(pk.as_bytes().to_vec(), sk.to_bytes().to_vec())
|
||||
fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
|
||||
&self.0
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl KeyPair for X25519KeyPair {
|
||||
type Repr = Key;
|
||||
impl SizedBytes for PrivateKey {
|
||||
type Len = KeyLen;
|
||||
|
||||
fn public(&self) -> &Self::Repr {
|
||||
&self.pk
|
||||
fn to_arr(&self) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::Len> {
|
||||
self.0.to_arr()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn private(&self) -> &Self::Repr {
|
||||
&self.sk
|
||||
fn from_arr(key_bytes: &GenericArray<u8, Self::Len>) -> Result<Self, TryFromSizedBytesError> {
|
||||
Ok(PrivateKey(Key::from_arr(key_bytes)?))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Wrapper around a Key to enforce that it's a public one.
|
||||
#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Clone, Hash, Zeroize)]
|
||||
#[cfg_attr(feature = "serialize", derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize))]
|
||||
// Ensure Key material is zeroed after use.
|
||||
#[zeroize(drop)]
|
||||
#[repr(transparent)]
|
||||
pub struct PublicKey(Key);
|
||||
|
||||
impl Deref for PublicKey {
|
||||
type Target = Key;
|
||||
|
||||
fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
|
||||
&self.0
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl SizedBytes for PublicKey {
|
||||
type Len = KeyLen;
|
||||
|
||||
fn to_arr(&self) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::Len> {
|
||||
self.0.to_arr()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn new(public: Self::Repr, private: Self::Repr) -> Result<Self, InternalPakeError> {
|
||||
Ok(X25519KeyPair {
|
||||
pk: public,
|
||||
sk: private,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn generate_random<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(rng: &mut R) -> Result<Self, InternalPakeError> {
|
||||
let (public, private) = X25519KeyPair::gen(rng);
|
||||
Ok(X25519KeyPair {
|
||||
pk: Key(public),
|
||||
sk: Key(private),
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn public_from_private(secret: &Self::Repr) -> Self::Repr {
|
||||
let secret_data: [u8; 32] = (&secret.0[..])
|
||||
.try_into()
|
||||
.expect("Keypair::Repr invariant broken");
|
||||
let base_data = ::x25519_dalek::X25519_BASEPOINT_BYTES;
|
||||
Key(::x25519_dalek::x25519(secret_data, base_data).to_vec())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn check_public_key(key: Self::Repr) -> Result<Self::Repr, InternalPakeError> {
|
||||
let key_bytes: [u8; 32] = (&key[..]).try_into().expect("Key invariant broken");
|
||||
let point = ::curve25519_dalek::montgomery::MontgomeryPoint(key_bytes)
|
||||
.to_edwards(1)
|
||||
.ok_or(InternalPakeError::PointError)?;
|
||||
if !point.is_torsion_free() {
|
||||
Err(InternalPakeError::SubGroupError)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Ok(key)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn diffie_hellman(pk: Self::Repr, sk: Self::Repr) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
let mut pk_data = [0; 32];
|
||||
pk_data.copy_from_slice(&pk.0[..]);
|
||||
let mut sk_data = [0; 32];
|
||||
sk_data.copy_from_slice(&sk.0[..]);
|
||||
::x25519_dalek::x25519(sk_data, pk_data).to_vec()
|
||||
fn from_arr(key_bytes: &GenericArray<u8, Self::Len>) -> Result<Self, TryFromSizedBytesError> {
|
||||
Ok(PublicKey(Key::from_arr(key_bytes)?))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
use crate::errors::*;
|
||||
use curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoPoint;
|
||||
use generic_array::typenum::Unsigned;
|
||||
use rand::rngs::OsRng;
|
||||
use std::slice::from_raw_parts;
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_zeroize_key() -> Result<(), ProtocolError> {
|
||||
let key_len = KeyLen::to_usize();
|
||||
let mut key = Key(vec![1u8; key_len]);
|
||||
let ptr = key.as_ptr();
|
||||
|
||||
key.zeroize();
|
||||
|
||||
let bytes = unsafe { from_raw_parts(ptr, key_len) };
|
||||
assert!(bytes.iter().all(|&x| x == 0));
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_zeroize_keypair() -> Result<(), ProtocolError> {
|
||||
let mut rng = OsRng;
|
||||
let mut keypair = KeyPair::<RistrettoPoint>::generate_random(&mut rng);
|
||||
let ptrs = keypair.as_byte_ptrs();
|
||||
|
||||
keypair.zeroize();
|
||||
|
||||
for (ptr, len) in ptrs {
|
||||
let bytes = unsafe { from_raw_parts(ptr, len) };
|
||||
assert!(bytes.iter().all(|&x| x == 0));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
proptest! {
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_x25519_check(kp in X25519KeyPair::uniform_keypair_strategy()) {
|
||||
fn test_ristretto_check(ref kp in KeyPair::<RistrettoPoint>::uniform_keypair_strategy()) {
|
||||
let pk = kp.public();
|
||||
prop_assert!(X25519KeyPair::check_public_key(pk.clone()).is_ok());
|
||||
prop_assert!(KeyPair::<RistrettoPoint>::check_public_key(pk.clone()).is_ok());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_x25519_pub_from_priv(kp in X25519KeyPair::uniform_keypair_strategy()) {
|
||||
fn test_ristretto_pub_from_priv(ref kp in KeyPair::<RistrettoPoint>::uniform_keypair_strategy()) {
|
||||
let pk = kp.public();
|
||||
let sk = kp.private();
|
||||
prop_assert_eq!(&X25519KeyPair::public_from_private(sk), pk);
|
||||
prop_assert_eq!(&KeyPair::<RistrettoPoint>::public_from_private(sk), pk);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_ristretto_dh(ref kp1 in KeyPair::<RistrettoPoint>::uniform_keypair_strategy(),
|
||||
ref kp2 in KeyPair::<RistrettoPoint>::uniform_keypair_strategy()) {
|
||||
|
||||
let dh1 = KeyPair::<RistrettoPoint>::diffie_hellman(kp1.public().clone(), kp2.private().clone())?;
|
||||
let dh2 = KeyPair::<RistrettoPoint>::diffie_hellman(kp2.public().clone(), kp1.private().clone())?;
|
||||
|
||||
prop_assert_eq!(dh1, dh2);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_x25519_dh(kp1 in X25519KeyPair::uniform_keypair_strategy(),
|
||||
kp2 in X25519KeyPair::uniform_keypair_strategy()) {
|
||||
fn test_private_key_slice(ref kp in KeyPair::<RistrettoPoint>::uniform_keypair_strategy()) {
|
||||
let sk_bytes = kp.private().to_vec();
|
||||
|
||||
let dh1 = X25519KeyPair::diffie_hellman(kp1.public().clone(), kp2.private().clone());
|
||||
let dh2 = X25519KeyPair::diffie_hellman(kp2.public().clone(), kp1.private().clone());
|
||||
let kp2 = KeyPair::<RistrettoPoint>::from_private_key_slice(&sk_bytes)?;
|
||||
let kp2_private_bytes = kp2.private().to_vec();
|
||||
|
||||
prop_assert_eq!(dh1,dh2);
|
||||
prop_assert_eq!(sk_bytes, kp2_private_bytes);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+595
-219
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
+221
-13
@@ -6,28 +6,236 @@
|
||||
//! Defines the GroupWithMapToCurve trait to specify how to map a password to a
|
||||
//! curve point
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::errors::InternalPakeError;
|
||||
use crate::group::Group;
|
||||
use curve25519_dalek::{edwards::EdwardsPoint, ristretto::RistrettoPoint};
|
||||
|
||||
use hkdf::Hkdf;
|
||||
use sha2::{Sha256, Sha512};
|
||||
use crate::hash::Hash;
|
||||
use crate::serialization::i2osp;
|
||||
use curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoPoint;
|
||||
use digest::{BlockInput, Digest};
|
||||
use generic_array::typenum::Unsigned;
|
||||
use generic_array::GenericArray;
|
||||
|
||||
/// A subtrait of Group specifying how to hash a password into a point
|
||||
pub trait GroupWithMapToCurve: Group {
|
||||
/// transforms a password and optional pepper into a curve point
|
||||
fn map_to_curve(password: &[u8], pepper: Option<&[u8]>) -> Self;
|
||||
/// The ciphersuite identifier as dictated by
|
||||
/// <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-irtf-cfrg-voprf-05.txt>
|
||||
const SUITE_ID: usize;
|
||||
|
||||
/// transforms a password and domain separation tag (DST) into a curve point
|
||||
fn map_to_curve<H: Hash>(msg: &[u8], dst: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, InternalPakeError>;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Hashes a slice of pseudo-random bytes to a scalar
|
||||
fn hash_to_scalar<H: Hash>(input: &[u8], dst: &[u8])
|
||||
-> Result<Self::Scalar, InternalPakeError>;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Generates the contextString parameter as defined in
|
||||
/// <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-irtf-cfrg-voprf-05.txt>
|
||||
fn get_context_string(mode: u8) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
[i2osp(mode as usize, 1), i2osp(Self::SUITE_ID, 2)].concat()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl GroupWithMapToCurve for RistrettoPoint {
|
||||
fn map_to_curve(password: &[u8], pepper: Option<&[u8]>) -> Self {
|
||||
let (hashed_input, _) = Hkdf::<Sha512>::extract(pepper, password);
|
||||
<Self as Group>::hash_to_curve(&hashed_input)
|
||||
const SUITE_ID: usize = 0x0001;
|
||||
|
||||
// Implements the hash_to_ristretto255() function from
|
||||
// https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-10.txt
|
||||
fn map_to_curve<H: Hash>(msg: &[u8], dst: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, InternalPakeError> {
|
||||
let uniform_bytes =
|
||||
expand_message_xmd::<H>(msg, dst, <H as Digest>::OutputSize::to_usize())?;
|
||||
Ok(<Self as Group>::hash_to_curve(
|
||||
&GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&uniform_bytes[..]),
|
||||
))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn hash_to_scalar<H: Hash>(
|
||||
input: &[u8],
|
||||
dst: &[u8],
|
||||
) -> Result<Self::Scalar, InternalPakeError> {
|
||||
const LEN_IN_BYTES: usize = 64;
|
||||
let uniform_bytes = expand_message_xmd::<H>(input, dst, LEN_IN_BYTES)?;
|
||||
let mut bits = [0u8; LEN_IN_BYTES];
|
||||
bits.copy_from_slice(&uniform_bytes[..]);
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(Self::Scalar::from_bytes_mod_order_wide(&bits))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl GroupWithMapToCurve for EdwardsPoint {
|
||||
fn map_to_curve(password: &[u8], pepper: Option<&[u8]>) -> Self {
|
||||
let (hashed_input, _) = Hkdf::<Sha256>::extract(pepper, password);
|
||||
<Self as Group>::hash_to_curve(&hashed_input)
|
||||
// Computes ceil(x / y)
|
||||
fn div_ceil(x: usize, y: usize) -> usize {
|
||||
let additive = (x % y != 0) as usize;
|
||||
x / y + additive
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn xor(x: &[u8], y: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, InternalPakeError> {
|
||||
if x.len() != y.len() {
|
||||
return Err(InternalPakeError::HashToCurveError);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(x.iter().zip(y).map(|(&x1, &x2)| x1 ^ x2).collect())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Corresponds to the expand_message_xmd() function defined in
|
||||
// https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-10.txt
|
||||
pub(crate) fn expand_message_xmd<H: Hash>(
|
||||
msg: &[u8],
|
||||
dst: &[u8],
|
||||
len_in_bytes: usize,
|
||||
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, InternalPakeError> {
|
||||
let b_in_bytes = <H as Digest>::OutputSize::to_usize();
|
||||
let r_in_bytes = <H as BlockInput>::BlockSize::to_usize();
|
||||
|
||||
let ell = div_ceil(len_in_bytes, b_in_bytes);
|
||||
if ell > 255 {
|
||||
return Err(InternalPakeError::HashToCurveError);
|
||||
}
|
||||
let dst_prime = [dst, &i2osp(dst.len(), 1)].concat();
|
||||
let z_pad = i2osp(0, r_in_bytes);
|
||||
let l_i_b_str = i2osp(len_in_bytes, 2);
|
||||
let msg_prime = [&z_pad, msg, &l_i_b_str, &i2osp(0, 1), &dst_prime].concat();
|
||||
|
||||
let mut b: Vec<Vec<u8>> = vec![H::digest(&msg_prime).to_vec()]; // b[0]
|
||||
|
||||
let mut h = H::new();
|
||||
h.update(&b[0]);
|
||||
h.update(&i2osp(1, 1));
|
||||
h.update(&dst_prime);
|
||||
b.push(h.finalize_reset().to_vec()); // b[1]
|
||||
|
||||
let mut uniform_bytes: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
|
||||
uniform_bytes.extend_from_slice(&b[1]);
|
||||
|
||||
for i in 2..(ell + 1) {
|
||||
h.update(xor(&b[0], &b[i - 1])?);
|
||||
h.update(&i2osp(i, 1));
|
||||
h.update(&dst_prime);
|
||||
b.push(h.finalize_reset().to_vec()); // b[i]
|
||||
uniform_bytes.extend_from_slice(&b[i]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(uniform_bytes[..len_in_bytes].to_vec())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
|
||||
struct Params {
|
||||
msg: &'static str,
|
||||
len_in_bytes: usize,
|
||||
uniform_bytes: &'static str,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_expand_message_xmd() {
|
||||
// Test vectors taken from Section K.1 of https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-10.txt
|
||||
let test_vectors: Vec<Params> = vec![
|
||||
Params {
|
||||
msg: "",
|
||||
len_in_bytes: 0x20,
|
||||
uniform_bytes: "f659819a6473c1835b25ea59e3d38914c98b374f0970b7e4c\
|
||||
92181df928fca88",
|
||||
},
|
||||
Params {
|
||||
msg: "abc",
|
||||
len_in_bytes: 0x20,
|
||||
uniform_bytes: "1c38f7c211ef233367b2420d04798fa4698080a8901021a79\
|
||||
5a1151775fe4da7",
|
||||
},
|
||||
Params {
|
||||
msg: "abcdef0123456789",
|
||||
len_in_bytes: 0x20,
|
||||
uniform_bytes: "8f7e7b66791f0da0dbb5ec7c22ec637f79758c0a48170bfb7c4611bd304ece89",
|
||||
},
|
||||
Params {
|
||||
msg: "q128_qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq\
|
||||
qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq\
|
||||
qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq",
|
||||
len_in_bytes: 0x20,
|
||||
uniform_bytes: "72d5aa5ec810370d1f0013c0df2f1d65699494ee2a39f72e\
|
||||
1716b1b964e1c642",
|
||||
},
|
||||
Params {
|
||||
msg: "a512_aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\
|
||||
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\
|
||||
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\
|
||||
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\
|
||||
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\
|
||||
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\
|
||||
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\
|
||||
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\
|
||||
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\
|
||||
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa",
|
||||
len_in_bytes: 0x20,
|
||||
uniform_bytes: "3b8e704fc48336aca4c2a12195b720882f2162a4b7b13a9c\
|
||||
350db46f429b771b",
|
||||
},
|
||||
Params {
|
||||
msg: "",
|
||||
len_in_bytes: 0x80,
|
||||
uniform_bytes: "8bcffd1a3cae24cf9cd7ab85628fd111bb17e3739d3b53f8\
|
||||
9580d217aa79526f1708354a76a402d3569d6a9d19ef3de4d0b991\
|
||||
e4f54b9f20dcde9b95a66824cbdf6c1a963a1913d43fd7ac443a02\
|
||||
fc5d9d8d77e2071b86ab114a9f34150954a7531da568a1ea8c7608\
|
||||
61c0cde2005afc2c114042ee7b5848f5303f0611cf297f",
|
||||
},
|
||||
Params {
|
||||
msg: "abc",
|
||||
len_in_bytes: 0x80,
|
||||
uniform_bytes: "fe994ec51bdaa821598047b3121c149b364b178606d5e72b\
|
||||
fbb713933acc29c186f316baecf7ea22212f2496ef3f785a27e84a\
|
||||
40d8b299cec56032763eceeff4c61bd1fe65ed81decafff4a31d01\
|
||||
98619c0aa0c6c51fca15520789925e813dcfd318b542f879944127\
|
||||
1f4db9ee3b8092a7a2e8d5b75b73e28fb1ab6b4573c192",
|
||||
},
|
||||
Params {
|
||||
msg: "abcdef0123456789",
|
||||
len_in_bytes: 0x80,
|
||||
uniform_bytes: "c9ec7941811b1e19ce98e21db28d22259354d4d0643e3011\
|
||||
75e2f474e030d32694e9dd5520dde93f3600d8edad94e5c3649030\
|
||||
88a7228cc9eff685d7eaac50d5a5a8229d083b51de4ccc3733917f\
|
||||
4b9535a819b445814890b7029b5de805bf62b33a4dc7e24acdf2c9\
|
||||
24e9fe50d55a6b832c8c84c7f82474b34e48c6d43867be",
|
||||
},
|
||||
Params {
|
||||
msg: "q128_qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq\
|
||||
qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq\
|
||||
qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq",
|
||||
len_in_bytes: 0x80,
|
||||
uniform_bytes: "48e256ddba722053ba462b2b93351fc966026e6d6db49318\
|
||||
9798181c5f3feea377b5a6f1d8368d7453faef715f9aecb078cd40\
|
||||
2cbd548c0e179c4ed1e4c7e5b048e0a39d31817b5b24f50db58bb3\
|
||||
720fe96ba53db947842120a068816ac05c159bb5266c63658b4f00\
|
||||
0cbf87b1209a225def8ef1dca917bcda79a1e42acd8069",
|
||||
},
|
||||
Params {
|
||||
msg: "a512_aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\
|
||||
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\
|
||||
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\
|
||||
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\
|
||||
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\
|
||||
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\
|
||||
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\
|
||||
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\
|
||||
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\
|
||||
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa",
|
||||
len_in_bytes: 0x80,
|
||||
uniform_bytes: "396962db47f749ec3b5042ce2452b619607f27fd3939ece2\
|
||||
746a7614fb83a1d097f554df3927b084e55de92c7871430d6b95c2\
|
||||
a13896d8a33bc48587b1f66d21b128a1a8240d5b0c26dfe795a1a8\
|
||||
42a0807bb148b77c2ef82ed4b6c9f7fcb732e7f94466c8b51e52bf\
|
||||
378fba044a31f5cb44583a892f5969dcd73b3fa128816e",
|
||||
},
|
||||
];
|
||||
let dst = "QUUX-V01-CS02-with-expander";
|
||||
|
||||
for tv in test_vectors {
|
||||
let uniform_bytes = super::expand_message_xmd::<sha2::Sha256>(
|
||||
tv.msg.as_bytes(),
|
||||
dst.as_bytes(),
|
||||
tv.len_in_bytes,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(tv.uniform_bytes, hex::encode(uniform_bytes));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+386
@@ -0,0 +1,386 @@
|
||||
// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
|
||||
// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
|
||||
|
||||
//! Contains the messages used for OPAQUE
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::{
|
||||
ciphersuite::CipherSuite,
|
||||
envelope::Envelope,
|
||||
errors::{
|
||||
utils::{check_slice_size, check_slice_size_atleast},
|
||||
PakeError, ProtocolError,
|
||||
},
|
||||
group::Group,
|
||||
key_exchange::traits::{FromBytes, KeyExchange, ToBytes},
|
||||
keypair::{KeyPair, PublicKey, SizedBytesExt},
|
||||
opaque::ServerSetup,
|
||||
};
|
||||
use digest::Digest;
|
||||
use generic_array::{typenum::Unsigned, GenericArray};
|
||||
use generic_bytes::SizedBytes;
|
||||
use rand::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
|
||||
|
||||
// Messages
|
||||
// =========
|
||||
|
||||
/// The message sent by the client to the server, to initiate registration
|
||||
pub struct RegistrationRequest<CS: CipherSuite> {
|
||||
/// blinded password information
|
||||
pub(crate) alpha: CS::Group,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl<CS: CipherSuite> RegistrationRequest<CS> {
|
||||
/// Only used for testing purposes
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
pub fn get_alpha_for_testing(&self) -> CS::Group {
|
||||
self.alpha
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Cannot be derived because it would require for CS to be Clone.
|
||||
impl<CS: CipherSuite> Clone for RegistrationRequest<CS> {
|
||||
fn clone(&self) -> Self {
|
||||
Self { alpha: self.alpha }
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl_debug_eq_hash_for!(struct RegistrationRequest<CS: CipherSuite>, [alpha], [CS::Group]);
|
||||
|
||||
impl<CS: CipherSuite> RegistrationRequest<CS> {
|
||||
/// Serialization into bytes
|
||||
pub fn serialize(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
self.alpha.to_arr().to_vec()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Deserialization from bytes
|
||||
pub fn deserialize(input: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
|
||||
let elem_len = <CS::Group as Group>::ElemLen::to_usize();
|
||||
let checked_slice = check_slice_size(input, elem_len, "first_message_bytes")?;
|
||||
// Check that the message is actually containing an element of the
|
||||
// correct subgroup
|
||||
let arr = GenericArray::from_slice(checked_slice);
|
||||
let alpha = CS::Group::from_element_slice(arr)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Throw an error if the identity group element is encountered
|
||||
if alpha.is_identity() {
|
||||
return Err(PakeError::IdentityGroupElementError.into());
|
||||
}
|
||||
Ok(Self { alpha })
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl_serialize_and_deserialize_for!(RegistrationRequest);
|
||||
|
||||
/// The answer sent by the server to the user, upon reception of the
|
||||
/// registration attempt
|
||||
pub struct RegistrationResponse<CS: CipherSuite> {
|
||||
/// The server's oprf output
|
||||
pub(crate) beta: CS::Group,
|
||||
/// Server's static public key
|
||||
pub(crate) server_s_pk: PublicKey,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Cannot be derived because it would require for CS to be Clone.
|
||||
impl<CS: CipherSuite> Clone for RegistrationResponse<CS> {
|
||||
fn clone(&self) -> Self {
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
beta: self.beta,
|
||||
server_s_pk: self.server_s_pk.clone(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl_debug_eq_hash_for!(
|
||||
struct RegistrationResponse<CS: CipherSuite>,
|
||||
[beta, server_s_pk],
|
||||
[CS::Group],
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
impl<CS: CipherSuite> RegistrationResponse<CS> {
|
||||
/// Serialization into bytes
|
||||
pub fn serialize(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
[self.beta.to_arr().to_vec(), self.server_s_pk.to_vec()].concat()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Deserialization from bytes
|
||||
pub fn deserialize(input: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
|
||||
let elem_len = <CS::Group as Group>::ElemLen::to_usize();
|
||||
let key_len = <PublicKey as SizedBytes>::Len::to_usize();
|
||||
let checked_slice =
|
||||
check_slice_size(input, elem_len + key_len, "registration_response_bytes")?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Check that the message is actually containing an element of the
|
||||
// correct subgroup
|
||||
let arr = GenericArray::from_slice(&checked_slice[..elem_len]);
|
||||
let beta = CS::Group::from_element_slice(arr)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Throw an error if the identity group element is encountered
|
||||
if beta.is_identity() {
|
||||
return Err(PakeError::IdentityGroupElementError.into());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Ensure that public key is valid
|
||||
let server_s_pk = KeyPair::<CS::Group>::check_public_key(PublicKey::from_bytes(
|
||||
&checked_slice[elem_len..],
|
||||
)?)?;
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(Self { server_s_pk, beta })
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl_serialize_and_deserialize_for!(RegistrationResponse);
|
||||
|
||||
/// The final message from the client, containing sealed cryptographic
|
||||
/// identifiers
|
||||
pub struct RegistrationUpload<CS: CipherSuite> {
|
||||
/// The "envelope" generated by the user, containing sealed
|
||||
/// cryptographic identifiers
|
||||
pub(crate) envelope: Envelope<CS>,
|
||||
/// The masking key used to mask the envelope
|
||||
pub(crate) masking_key: GenericArray<u8, <CS::Hash as Digest>::OutputSize>,
|
||||
/// The user's public key
|
||||
pub(crate) client_s_pk: PublicKey,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl_clone_for!(
|
||||
struct RegistrationUpload<CS: CipherSuite>,
|
||||
[envelope, masking_key, client_s_pk],
|
||||
);
|
||||
impl_debug_eq_hash_for!(
|
||||
struct RegistrationUpload<CS: CipherSuite>,
|
||||
[envelope, masking_key, client_s_pk],
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
impl<CS: CipherSuite> RegistrationUpload<CS> {
|
||||
/// Serialization into bytes
|
||||
pub fn serialize(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
[
|
||||
self.client_s_pk.to_arr().to_vec(),
|
||||
self.masking_key.to_vec(),
|
||||
self.envelope.serialize(),
|
||||
]
|
||||
.concat()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Deserialization from bytes
|
||||
pub fn deserialize(input: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
|
||||
let key_len = <PublicKey as SizedBytes>::Len::to_usize();
|
||||
let hash_len = <CS::Hash as Digest>::OutputSize::to_usize();
|
||||
let checked_slice =
|
||||
check_slice_size_atleast(input, key_len + hash_len, "registration_upload_bytes")?;
|
||||
let envelope = Envelope::<CS>::deserialize(&checked_slice[key_len + hash_len..])?;
|
||||
Ok(Self {
|
||||
envelope,
|
||||
masking_key: GenericArray::clone_from_slice(
|
||||
&checked_slice[key_len..key_len + hash_len],
|
||||
),
|
||||
client_s_pk: KeyPair::<CS::Group>::check_public_key(PublicKey::from_bytes(
|
||||
&checked_slice[..key_len],
|
||||
)?)?,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Creates a dummy instance used for faking a [CredentialResponse]
|
||||
pub(crate) fn dummy<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
|
||||
rng: &mut R,
|
||||
server_setup: &ServerSetup<CS>,
|
||||
) -> Self {
|
||||
let mut masking_key = vec![0u8; <CS::Hash as Digest>::OutputSize::to_usize()];
|
||||
rng.fill_bytes(&mut masking_key);
|
||||
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
envelope: Envelope::<CS>::dummy(),
|
||||
masking_key: GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&masking_key),
|
||||
client_s_pk: server_setup.fake_keypair.public().clone(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl_serialize_and_deserialize_for!(RegistrationUpload);
|
||||
|
||||
/// The message sent by the user to the server, to initiate registration
|
||||
pub struct CredentialRequest<CS: CipherSuite> {
|
||||
/// blinded password information
|
||||
pub(crate) alpha: CS::Group,
|
||||
pub(crate) ke1_message: <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange<CS::Hash, CS::Group>>::KE1Message,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Cannot be derived because it would require for CS to be Clone.
|
||||
impl<CS: CipherSuite> Clone for CredentialRequest<CS> {
|
||||
fn clone(&self) -> Self {
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
alpha: self.alpha,
|
||||
ke1_message: self.ke1_message.clone(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl_debug_eq_hash_for!(
|
||||
struct CredentialRequest<CS: CipherSuite>,
|
||||
[alpha, ke1_message],
|
||||
[
|
||||
CS::Group,
|
||||
<CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange<CS::Hash, CS::Group>>::KE1Message
|
||||
],
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
impl<CS: CipherSuite> CredentialRequest<CS> {
|
||||
/// Serialization into bytes
|
||||
pub fn serialize(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
[self.alpha.to_arr().to_vec(), self.ke1_message.to_bytes()].concat()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Deserialization from bytes
|
||||
pub fn deserialize(input: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
|
||||
let elem_len = <CS::Group as Group>::ElemLen::to_usize();
|
||||
|
||||
let checked_slice = check_slice_size_atleast(input, elem_len, "login_first_message_bytes")?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Check that the message is actually containing an element of the
|
||||
// correct subgroup
|
||||
let arr = GenericArray::from_slice(&checked_slice[..elem_len]);
|
||||
let alpha = CS::Group::from_element_slice(arr)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Throw an error if the identity group element is encountered
|
||||
if alpha.is_identity() {
|
||||
return Err(PakeError::IdentityGroupElementError.into());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let ke1_message =
|
||||
<CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange<CS::Hash, CS::Group>>::KE1Message::from_bytes::<CS>(
|
||||
&checked_slice[elem_len..],
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(Self { alpha, ke1_message })
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl_serialize_and_deserialize_for!(CredentialRequest);
|
||||
|
||||
/// The answer sent by the server to the user, upon reception of the
|
||||
/// login attempt
|
||||
pub struct CredentialResponse<CS: CipherSuite> {
|
||||
/// the server's oprf output
|
||||
pub(crate) beta: CS::Group,
|
||||
pub(crate) masking_nonce: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub(crate) masked_response: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub(crate) ke2_message: <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange<CS::Hash, CS::Group>>::KE2Message,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Cannot be derived because it would require for CS to be Clone.
|
||||
impl<CS: CipherSuite> Clone for CredentialResponse<CS> {
|
||||
fn clone(&self) -> Self {
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
beta: self.beta,
|
||||
masking_nonce: self.masking_nonce.clone(),
|
||||
masked_response: self.masked_response.clone(),
|
||||
ke2_message: self.ke2_message.clone(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl_debug_eq_hash_for!(
|
||||
struct CredentialResponse<CS: CipherSuite>,
|
||||
[beta, masking_nonce, masked_response, ke2_message],
|
||||
[
|
||||
CS::Group,
|
||||
<CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange<CS::Hash, CS::Group>>::KE2Message,
|
||||
],
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
impl<CS: CipherSuite> CredentialResponse<CS> {
|
||||
/// Serialization into bytes
|
||||
pub fn serialize(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
[
|
||||
Self::serialize_without_ke(&self.beta, &self.masking_nonce, &self.masked_response),
|
||||
self.ke2_message.to_bytes(),
|
||||
]
|
||||
.concat()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub(crate) fn serialize_without_ke(
|
||||
beta: &CS::Group,
|
||||
masking_nonce: &[u8],
|
||||
masked_response: &[u8],
|
||||
) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
[&beta.to_arr(), masking_nonce, masked_response].concat()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Deserialization from bytes
|
||||
pub fn deserialize(input: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
|
||||
let elem_len = <CS::Group as Group>::ElemLen::to_usize();
|
||||
let key_len = <PublicKey as SizedBytes>::Len::to_usize();
|
||||
let nonce_len: usize = 32;
|
||||
let envelope_len = Envelope::<CS>::len();
|
||||
let masked_response_len = key_len + envelope_len;
|
||||
let ke2_message_len = CS::KeyExchange::ke2_message_size();
|
||||
|
||||
let checked_slice = check_slice_size_atleast(
|
||||
input,
|
||||
elem_len + nonce_len + masked_response_len + ke2_message_len,
|
||||
"credential_response_bytes",
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Check that the message is actually containing an element of the
|
||||
// correct subgroup
|
||||
let beta_bytes = &checked_slice[..elem_len];
|
||||
let arr = GenericArray::from_slice(beta_bytes);
|
||||
let beta = CS::Group::from_element_slice(arr)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Throw an error if the identity group element is encountered
|
||||
if beta.is_identity() {
|
||||
return Err(PakeError::IdentityGroupElementError.into());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let masking_nonce = checked_slice[elem_len..elem_len + nonce_len].to_vec();
|
||||
let masked_response = checked_slice
|
||||
[elem_len + nonce_len..elem_len + nonce_len + masked_response_len]
|
||||
.to_vec();
|
||||
let ke2_message =
|
||||
<CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange<CS::Hash, CS::Group>>::KE2Message::from_bytes::<CS>(
|
||||
&checked_slice[elem_len + nonce_len + masked_response_len..],
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(Self {
|
||||
beta,
|
||||
masking_nonce,
|
||||
masked_response,
|
||||
ke2_message,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl_serialize_and_deserialize_for!(CredentialResponse);
|
||||
|
||||
/// The answer sent by the client to the server, upon reception of the
|
||||
/// sealed envelope
|
||||
pub struct CredentialFinalization<CS: CipherSuite> {
|
||||
pub(crate) ke3_message: <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange<CS::Hash, CS::Group>>::KE3Message,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl_clone_for!(struct CredentialFinalization<CS: CipherSuite>, [ke3_message]);
|
||||
impl_debug_eq_hash_for!(
|
||||
struct CredentialFinalization<CS: CipherSuite>,
|
||||
[ke3_message],
|
||||
[<CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange<CS::Hash, CS::Group>>::KE3Message],
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
impl<CS: CipherSuite> CredentialFinalization<CS> {
|
||||
/// Serialization into bytes
|
||||
pub fn serialize(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
self.ke3_message.to_bytes()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Deserialization from bytes
|
||||
pub fn deserialize(input: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
|
||||
let ke3_message =
|
||||
<CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange<CS::Hash, CS::Group>>::KE3Message::from_bytes::<CS>(
|
||||
input,
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
Ok(Self { ke3_message })
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl_serialize_and_deserialize_for!(CredentialFinalization);
|
||||
+856
-842
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
+89
-83
@@ -5,89 +5,114 @@
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::{
|
||||
errors::InternalPakeError, group::Group, hash::Hash, map_to_curve::GroupWithMapToCurve,
|
||||
serialization::serialize,
|
||||
};
|
||||
use digest::Digest;
|
||||
use generic_array::GenericArray;
|
||||
use hkdf::Hkdf;
|
||||
use rand_core::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
|
||||
use rand::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
|
||||
|
||||
pub struct OprfClientBytes<Grp: Group> {
|
||||
pub alpha: Grp,
|
||||
pub blinding_factor: Grp::Scalar,
|
||||
/// Used to store the OPRF input and blinding factor
|
||||
#[cfg_attr(feature = "serialize", derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize))]
|
||||
pub struct Token<Grp: Group> {
|
||||
pub(crate) data: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub(crate) blind: Grp::Scalar,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl_clone_for!(struct Token<Grp: Group>, [data, blind]);
|
||||
impl_debug_eq_hash_for!(struct Token<Grp: Group>, [data, blind], [Grp::Scalar]);
|
||||
|
||||
static STR_VOPRF: &[u8] = b"VOPRF06-HashToGroup-";
|
||||
static STR_VOPRF_FINALIZE: &[u8] = b"VOPRF06-Finalize-";
|
||||
static MODE_BASE: u8 = 0x00;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Computes the first step for the multiplicative blinding version of DH-OPRF. This
|
||||
/// message is sent from the client (who holds the input) to the server (who holds the OPRF key).
|
||||
/// The client can also pass in an optional "pepper" string to be mixed in with the input through
|
||||
/// an HKDF computation.
|
||||
pub(crate) fn generate_oprf1<R: RngCore + CryptoRng, G: GroupWithMapToCurve>(
|
||||
pub(crate) fn blind<R: RngCore + CryptoRng, G: GroupWithMapToCurve, H: Hash>(
|
||||
input: &[u8],
|
||||
pepper: Option<&[u8]>,
|
||||
blinding_factor_rng: &mut R,
|
||||
) -> Result<OprfClientBytes<G>, InternalPakeError> {
|
||||
let mapped_point = G::map_to_curve(input, pepper);
|
||||
let blinding_factor = G::random_scalar(blinding_factor_rng);
|
||||
let alpha = mapped_point * &blinding_factor;
|
||||
Ok(OprfClientBytes {
|
||||
alpha,
|
||||
blinding_factor,
|
||||
})
|
||||
) -> Result<(Token<G>, G), InternalPakeError> {
|
||||
// Choose a random scalar that must be non-zero
|
||||
let blind = G::random_nonzero_scalar(blinding_factor_rng);
|
||||
let dst = [STR_VOPRF, &G::get_context_string(MODE_BASE)].concat();
|
||||
let mapped_point = G::map_to_curve::<H>(input, &dst)?;
|
||||
let blind_token = mapped_point * &blind;
|
||||
Ok((
|
||||
Token {
|
||||
data: input.to_vec(),
|
||||
blind,
|
||||
},
|
||||
blind_token,
|
||||
))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Computes the second step for the multiplicative blinding version of DH-OPRF. This
|
||||
/// message is sent from the server (who holds the OPRF key) to the client.
|
||||
pub(crate) fn generate_oprf2<G: Group>(
|
||||
point: G,
|
||||
oprf_key: &G::Scalar,
|
||||
) -> Result<G, InternalPakeError> {
|
||||
Ok(point * oprf_key)
|
||||
pub(crate) fn evaluate<G: Group>(point: G, oprf_key: &G::Scalar) -> G {
|
||||
point * oprf_key
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Computes the third step for the multiplicative blinding version of DH-OPRF, in which
|
||||
/// the client unblinds the server's message.
|
||||
pub(crate) fn generate_oprf3<G: Group, H: Hash>(
|
||||
pub(crate) fn finalize<G: GroupWithMapToCurve, H: Hash>(
|
||||
input: &[u8],
|
||||
point: G,
|
||||
blinding_factor: &G::Scalar,
|
||||
) -> Result<GenericArray<u8, <H as Digest>::OutputSize>, InternalPakeError> {
|
||||
let unblinded = point * &G::scalar_invert(&blinding_factor);
|
||||
let ikm: Vec<u8> = [&unblinded.to_arr()[..], input].concat();
|
||||
let (prk, _) = Hkdf::<H>::extract(None, &ikm);
|
||||
Ok(prk)
|
||||
blind: &G::Scalar,
|
||||
evaluated_element: G,
|
||||
) -> GenericArray<u8, <H as Digest>::OutputSize> {
|
||||
let unblinded_element = evaluated_element * &G::scalar_invert(blind);
|
||||
finalize_after_unblind::<G, H>(input, unblinded_element)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Benchmarking shims
|
||||
#[cfg(feature = "bench")]
|
||||
#[inline]
|
||||
pub fn generate_oprf1_shim<R: RngCore + CryptoRng, G: GroupWithMapToCurve>(
|
||||
fn finalize_after_unblind<G: GroupWithMapToCurve, H: Hash>(
|
||||
input: &[u8],
|
||||
unblinded_element: G,
|
||||
) -> GenericArray<u8, <H as Digest>::OutputSize> {
|
||||
let finalize_dst = [STR_VOPRF_FINALIZE, &G::get_context_string(MODE_BASE)].concat();
|
||||
let hash_input = [
|
||||
serialize(input, 2),
|
||||
serialize(&unblinded_element.to_arr().to_vec(), 2),
|
||||
serialize(&finalize_dst, 2),
|
||||
]
|
||||
.concat();
|
||||
<H as Digest>::digest(&hash_input)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
////////////////////////
|
||||
// Benchmarking shims //
|
||||
////////////////////////
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(feature = "bench")]
|
||||
#[doc(hidden)]
|
||||
#[inline]
|
||||
pub fn blind_shim<R: RngCore + CryptoRng, G: GroupWithMapToCurve, H: Hash>(
|
||||
input: &[u8],
|
||||
pepper: Option<&[u8]>,
|
||||
blinding_factor_rng: &mut R,
|
||||
) -> Result<OprfClientBytes<G>, InternalPakeError> {
|
||||
generate_oprf1(input, pepper, blinding_factor_rng)
|
||||
) -> Result<(Token<G>, G), InternalPakeError> {
|
||||
blind::<R, G, H>(input, blinding_factor_rng)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(feature = "bench")]
|
||||
#[doc(hidden)]
|
||||
#[inline]
|
||||
pub fn generate_oprf2_shim<G: Group>(
|
||||
point: G,
|
||||
oprf_key: &G::Scalar,
|
||||
) -> Result<G, InternalPakeError> {
|
||||
generate_oprf2(point, oprf_key)
|
||||
pub fn evaluate_shim<G: Group>(point: G, oprf_key: &G::Scalar) -> G {
|
||||
evaluate(point, oprf_key)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(feature = "bench")]
|
||||
#[doc(hidden)]
|
||||
#[inline]
|
||||
pub fn generate_oprf3_shim<G: Group, H: Hash>(
|
||||
input: &[u8],
|
||||
pub fn finalize_shim<G: GroupWithMapToCurve, H: Hash>(
|
||||
token: &Token<G>,
|
||||
point: G,
|
||||
blinding_factor: &G::Scalar,
|
||||
) -> Result<GenericArray<u8, <H as Digest>::OutputSize>, InternalPakeError> {
|
||||
generate_oprf3::<G, H>(input, point, blinding_factor)
|
||||
Ok(finalize::<G, H>(&token.data, &token.blind, point))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Tests
|
||||
// =====
|
||||
///////////
|
||||
// Tests //
|
||||
// ===== //
|
||||
///////////
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
@@ -95,41 +120,32 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
use crate::group::Group;
|
||||
use curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoPoint;
|
||||
use generic_array::{arr, GenericArray};
|
||||
use hkdf::Hkdf;
|
||||
use rand_core::OsRng;
|
||||
use sha2::{Sha256, Sha512};
|
||||
use rand::rngs::OsRng;
|
||||
use sha2::Sha512;
|
||||
|
||||
fn prf(
|
||||
input: &[u8],
|
||||
oprf_key: &[u8; 32],
|
||||
) -> GenericArray<u8, <RistrettoPoint as Group>::ElemLen> {
|
||||
let (hashed_input, _) = Hkdf::<Sha512>::extract(None, &input);
|
||||
let point = RistrettoPoint::hash_to_curve(GenericArray::from_slice(&hashed_input));
|
||||
fn prf(input: &[u8], oprf_key: &[u8; 32]) -> GenericArray<u8, <Sha512 as Digest>::OutputSize> {
|
||||
let dst = [STR_VOPRF, &RistrettoPoint::get_context_string(MODE_BASE)].concat();
|
||||
let point = RistrettoPoint::map_to_curve::<Sha512>(input, &dst).unwrap();
|
||||
let scalar =
|
||||
RistrettoPoint::from_scalar_slice(GenericArray::from_slice(&oprf_key[..])).unwrap();
|
||||
let res = point * scalar;
|
||||
let ikm: Vec<u8> = [&res.to_arr()[..], &input].concat();
|
||||
|
||||
let (prk, _) = Hkdf::<Sha256>::extract(None, &ikm);
|
||||
prk
|
||||
finalize_after_unblind::<RistrettoPoint, sha2::Sha512>(&input, res)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn oprf_retrieval() -> Result<(), InternalPakeError> {
|
||||
let input = b"hunter2";
|
||||
let mut rng = OsRng;
|
||||
let OprfClientBytes {
|
||||
alpha,
|
||||
blinding_factor,
|
||||
} = generate_oprf1::<_, RistrettoPoint>(&input[..], None, &mut rng)?;
|
||||
let salt_bytes = arr![
|
||||
let (token, alpha) = blind::<_, RistrettoPoint, Sha512>(&input[..], &mut rng)?;
|
||||
let oprf_key_bytes = arr![
|
||||
u8; 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23,
|
||||
24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32,
|
||||
];
|
||||
let salt = RistrettoPoint::from_scalar_slice(&salt_bytes)?;
|
||||
let beta = generate_oprf2::<RistrettoPoint>(alpha, &salt)?;
|
||||
let res = generate_oprf3::<RistrettoPoint, sha2::Sha256>(input, beta, &blinding_factor)?;
|
||||
let res2 = prf(&input[..], &salt.as_bytes());
|
||||
let oprf_key = RistrettoPoint::from_scalar_slice(&oprf_key_bytes)?;
|
||||
let beta = evaluate::<RistrettoPoint>(alpha, &oprf_key);
|
||||
let res = finalize::<RistrettoPoint, sha2::Sha512>(&token.data, &token.blind, beta);
|
||||
let res2 = prf(&input[..], &oprf_key.as_bytes());
|
||||
assert_eq!(res, res2);
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -139,23 +155,13 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
let mut rng = OsRng;
|
||||
let mut input = vec![0u8; 64];
|
||||
rng.fill_bytes(&mut input);
|
||||
let OprfClientBytes {
|
||||
alpha,
|
||||
blinding_factor,
|
||||
} = generate_oprf1::<_, RistrettoPoint>(&input, None, &mut rng).unwrap();
|
||||
let res = generate_oprf3::<RistrettoPoint, sha2::Sha256>(&input, alpha, &blinding_factor)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
let (token, alpha) = blind::<_, RistrettoPoint, sha2::Sha512>(&input, &mut rng).unwrap();
|
||||
let res = finalize::<RistrettoPoint, sha2::Sha512>(&token.data, &token.blind, alpha);
|
||||
|
||||
let (hashed_input, _) = Hkdf::<Sha512>::extract(None, &input);
|
||||
let mut bits = [0u8; 64];
|
||||
bits.copy_from_slice(&hashed_input);
|
||||
let dst = [STR_VOPRF, &RistrettoPoint::get_context_string(MODE_BASE)].concat();
|
||||
let point = RistrettoPoint::map_to_curve::<Sha512>(&input, &dst).unwrap();
|
||||
let res2 = finalize_after_unblind::<RistrettoPoint, sha2::Sha512>(&input, point);
|
||||
|
||||
let point = RistrettoPoint::from_uniform_bytes(&bits);
|
||||
let mut ikm: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
|
||||
ikm.extend_from_slice(&point.to_arr());
|
||||
ikm.extend_from_slice(&input);
|
||||
let (prk, _) = Hkdf::<Sha256>::extract(None, &ikm);
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(res, prk);
|
||||
assert_eq!(res, res2);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
|
||||
// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
|
||||
// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::errors::PakeError;
|
||||
|
||||
// Corresponds to the I2OSP() function from RFC8017
|
||||
pub(crate) fn i2osp(input: usize, length: usize) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
if length <= std::mem::size_of::<usize>() {
|
||||
return (&input.to_be_bytes()[std::mem::size_of::<usize>() - length..]).to_vec();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let mut output = vec![0u8; length];
|
||||
output.splice(
|
||||
length - std::mem::size_of::<usize>()..length,
|
||||
input.to_be_bytes().iter().cloned(),
|
||||
);
|
||||
output
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Corresponds to the OS2IP() function from RFC8017
|
||||
pub(crate) fn os2ip(input: &[u8]) -> Result<usize, PakeError> {
|
||||
if input.len() > std::mem::size_of::<usize>() {
|
||||
return Err(PakeError::SerializationError);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let mut output_array = [0u8; std::mem::size_of::<usize>()];
|
||||
output_array[std::mem::size_of::<usize>() - input.len()..].copy_from_slice(input);
|
||||
Ok(usize::from_be_bytes(output_array))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Computes I2OSP(len(input), max_bytes) || input
|
||||
pub(crate) fn serialize(input: &[u8], max_bytes: usize) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
[&i2osp(input.len(), max_bytes), input].concat()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Tokenizes an input of the format I2OSP(len(input), max_bytes) || input, outputting
|
||||
// (input, remainder)
|
||||
pub(crate) fn tokenize(input: &[u8], size_bytes: usize) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>), PakeError> {
|
||||
if size_bytes > std::mem::size_of::<usize>() || input.len() < size_bytes {
|
||||
return Err(PakeError::SerializationError);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let size = os2ip(&input[..size_bytes])?;
|
||||
if size_bytes + size > input.len() {
|
||||
return Err(PakeError::SerializationError);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Ok((
|
||||
input[size_bytes..size_bytes + size].to_vec(),
|
||||
input[size_bytes + size..].to_vec(),
|
||||
))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Inner macro used for deriving `serde`'s `Serialize` and `Deserialize` traits.
|
||||
macro_rules! impl_serialize_and_deserialize_for {
|
||||
($t:ident) => {
|
||||
#[cfg(feature = "serialize")]
|
||||
impl<CS: CipherSuite> serde::Serialize for $t<CS> {
|
||||
fn serialize<S>(&self, serializer: S) -> Result<S::Ok, S::Error>
|
||||
where
|
||||
S: serde::Serializer,
|
||||
{
|
||||
if serializer.is_human_readable() {
|
||||
serializer.serialize_str(&base64::encode(&self.serialize()))
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
serializer.serialize_bytes(&self.serialize())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(feature = "serialize")]
|
||||
impl<'de, CS: CipherSuite> serde::Deserialize<'de> for $t<CS> {
|
||||
fn deserialize<D>(deserializer: D) -> Result<Self, D::Error>
|
||||
where
|
||||
D: serde::Deserializer<'de>,
|
||||
{
|
||||
if deserializer.is_human_readable() {
|
||||
let s = <&str>::deserialize(deserializer)?;
|
||||
$t::<CS>::deserialize(&base64::decode(s).map_err(serde::de::Error::custom)?)
|
||||
.map_err(serde::de::Error::custom)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
struct ByteVisitor<CS: CipherSuite> {
|
||||
marker: std::marker::PhantomData<CS>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
impl<'de, CS: CipherSuite> serde::de::Visitor<'de> for ByteVisitor<CS> {
|
||||
type Value = $t<CS>;
|
||||
fn expecting(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
formatter: &mut std::fmt::Formatter,
|
||||
) -> std::fmt::Result {
|
||||
formatter.write_str(std::concat!(
|
||||
"the byte representation of a ",
|
||||
std::stringify!($t)
|
||||
))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn visit_bytes<E>(self, value: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Value, E>
|
||||
where
|
||||
E: serde::de::Error,
|
||||
{
|
||||
$t::<CS>::deserialize(value).map_err(|_| {
|
||||
serde::de::Error::invalid_value(
|
||||
serde::de::Unexpected::Bytes(value),
|
||||
&std::concat!(
|
||||
"invalid byte sequence for ",
|
||||
std::stringify!($t)
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
deserializer.deserialize_bytes(ByteVisitor::<CS> {
|
||||
marker: std::marker::PhantomData,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests;
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,403 @@
|
||||
// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
|
||||
// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::{
|
||||
ciphersuite::CipherSuite,
|
||||
envelope::{Envelope, InnerEnvelopeMode},
|
||||
errors::*,
|
||||
group::Group,
|
||||
key_exchange::{
|
||||
traits::{FromBytes, KeyExchange, ToBytes},
|
||||
tripledh::{NonceLen, TripleDH},
|
||||
},
|
||||
keypair::{KeyPair, PublicKey},
|
||||
serialization::{i2osp, os2ip, serialize},
|
||||
*,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
use curve25519_dalek::{ristretto::RistrettoPoint, traits::Identity};
|
||||
use generic_array::typenum::Unsigned;
|
||||
use generic_bytes::SizedBytes;
|
||||
use proptest::{collection::vec, prelude::*};
|
||||
use rand::{rngs::OsRng, RngCore};
|
||||
|
||||
use sha2::Digest;
|
||||
|
||||
struct Default;
|
||||
impl CipherSuite for Default {
|
||||
type Group = RistrettoPoint;
|
||||
type KeyExchange = TripleDH;
|
||||
type Hash = sha2::Sha512;
|
||||
type SlowHash = crate::slow_hash::NoOpHash;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const HASH_SIZE: usize = 64; // Because of SHA512
|
||||
const MAC_SIZE: usize = 64; // Because of SHA512
|
||||
|
||||
fn random_ristretto_point() -> RistrettoPoint {
|
||||
let mut rng = OsRng;
|
||||
let mut random_bits = [0u8; 64];
|
||||
rng.fill_bytes(&mut random_bits);
|
||||
|
||||
// This is because RistrettoPoint is on an obsolete sha2 version
|
||||
let mut bits = [0u8; 64];
|
||||
let mut hasher = sha2::Sha512::new();
|
||||
hasher.update(&random_bits[..]);
|
||||
bits.copy_from_slice(&hasher.finalize());
|
||||
|
||||
RistrettoPoint::from_uniform_bytes(&bits)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn client_registration_roundtrip() {
|
||||
let pw = b"hunter2";
|
||||
let mut rng = OsRng;
|
||||
let sc = <RistrettoPoint as Group>::random_nonzero_scalar(&mut rng);
|
||||
|
||||
// serialization order: scalar, password
|
||||
let bytes: Vec<u8> = [&sc.as_bytes()[..], &pw[..]].concat();
|
||||
let reg = ClientRegistration::<Default>::deserialize(&bytes[..]).unwrap();
|
||||
let reg_bytes = reg.serialize();
|
||||
assert_eq!(reg_bytes, bytes);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn server_registration_roundtrip() {
|
||||
// If we don't have envelope and client_pk, the server registration just
|
||||
// contains the prf key
|
||||
let mut rng = OsRng;
|
||||
let mut masking_key = [0u8; HASH_SIZE];
|
||||
rng.fill_bytes(&mut masking_key);
|
||||
|
||||
// Construct a mock envelope
|
||||
let mut mock_envelope_bytes = Vec::new();
|
||||
mock_envelope_bytes.extend_from_slice(&vec![0; NonceLen::to_usize()]); // empty nonce
|
||||
// mock_envelope_bytes.extend_from_slice(&ciphertext); // ciphertext which is an encrypted private key
|
||||
mock_envelope_bytes.extend_from_slice(&[0; MAC_SIZE]); // length-MAC_SIZE hmac
|
||||
|
||||
let mock_client_kp = KeyPair::<<Default as CipherSuite>::Group>::generate_random(&mut rng);
|
||||
// serialization order: oprf_key, public key, envelope
|
||||
let mut bytes = Vec::<u8>::new();
|
||||
bytes.extend_from_slice(&mock_client_kp.public().to_arr());
|
||||
bytes.extend_from_slice(&masking_key);
|
||||
bytes.extend_from_slice(&mock_envelope_bytes);
|
||||
let reg = ServerRegistration::<Default>::deserialize(&bytes[..]).unwrap();
|
||||
let reg_bytes = reg.serialize();
|
||||
assert_eq!(reg_bytes, bytes);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn registration_request_roundtrip() {
|
||||
let pt = random_ristretto_point();
|
||||
let pt_bytes = pt.to_arr().to_vec();
|
||||
|
||||
let mut input = Vec::new();
|
||||
input.extend_from_slice(pt_bytes.as_slice());
|
||||
|
||||
let r1 = RegistrationRequest::<Default>::deserialize(input.as_slice()).unwrap();
|
||||
let r1_bytes = r1.serialize();
|
||||
assert_eq!(input, r1_bytes);
|
||||
|
||||
// Assert that identity group element is rejected
|
||||
let identity = RistrettoPoint::identity();
|
||||
let identity_bytes = identity.to_arr().to_vec();
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
match RegistrationRequest::<Default>::deserialize(identity_bytes.as_slice()) {
|
||||
Err(ProtocolError::VerificationError(PakeError::IdentityGroupElementError)) => true,
|
||||
_ => false,
|
||||
}
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn registration_response_roundtrip() {
|
||||
let pt = random_ristretto_point();
|
||||
let beta_bytes = pt.to_arr();
|
||||
let mut rng = OsRng;
|
||||
let skp = KeyPair::<<Default as CipherSuite>::Group>::generate_random(&mut rng);
|
||||
let pubkey_bytes = skp.public().to_arr();
|
||||
|
||||
let mut input = Vec::new();
|
||||
input.extend_from_slice(beta_bytes.as_slice());
|
||||
input.extend_from_slice(&pubkey_bytes.as_slice());
|
||||
|
||||
let r2 = RegistrationResponse::<Default>::deserialize(input.as_slice()).unwrap();
|
||||
let r2_bytes = r2.serialize();
|
||||
assert_eq!(input, r2_bytes);
|
||||
|
||||
// Assert that identity group element is rejected
|
||||
let identity = RistrettoPoint::identity();
|
||||
let identity_bytes = identity.to_arr().to_vec();
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(match RegistrationResponse::<Default>::deserialize(
|
||||
&[identity_bytes, pubkey_bytes.to_vec()].concat()
|
||||
) {
|
||||
Err(ProtocolError::VerificationError(PakeError::IdentityGroupElementError)) => true,
|
||||
_ => false,
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn registration_upload_roundtrip() {
|
||||
let mut rng = OsRng;
|
||||
let skp = KeyPair::<<Default as CipherSuite>::Group>::generate_random(&mut rng);
|
||||
let pubkey_bytes = skp.public().to_arr();
|
||||
|
||||
let mut key = [0u8; 32];
|
||||
rng.fill_bytes(&mut key);
|
||||
let mut nonce = [0u8; 32];
|
||||
rng.fill_bytes(&mut nonce);
|
||||
|
||||
let mut masking_key = vec![0u8; <sha2::Sha512 as Digest>::OutputSize::to_usize()];
|
||||
rng.fill_bytes(&mut masking_key);
|
||||
|
||||
let (envelope, _) =
|
||||
Envelope::<Default>::seal_raw(&key, &nonce, &pubkey_bytes, InnerEnvelopeMode::Internal)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
let envelope_bytes = envelope.serialize();
|
||||
|
||||
let mut input = Vec::new();
|
||||
input.extend_from_slice(&pubkey_bytes[..]);
|
||||
input.extend_from_slice(&masking_key[..]);
|
||||
input.extend_from_slice(&envelope_bytes);
|
||||
|
||||
let r3 = RegistrationUpload::<Default>::deserialize(&input[..]).unwrap();
|
||||
let r3_bytes = r3.serialize();
|
||||
assert_eq!(input, r3_bytes);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn credential_request_roundtrip() {
|
||||
let mut rng = OsRng;
|
||||
let alpha = random_ristretto_point();
|
||||
let alpha_bytes = alpha.to_arr().to_vec();
|
||||
|
||||
let client_e_kp = KeyPair::<<Default as CipherSuite>::Group>::generate_random(&mut rng);
|
||||
let mut client_nonce = vec![0u8; NonceLen::to_usize()];
|
||||
rng.fill_bytes(&mut client_nonce);
|
||||
|
||||
let ke1m: Vec<u8> = [&client_nonce[..], &client_e_kp.public()].concat();
|
||||
|
||||
let mut input = Vec::new();
|
||||
input.extend_from_slice(&alpha_bytes);
|
||||
input.extend_from_slice(&ke1m[..]);
|
||||
|
||||
let l1 = CredentialRequest::<Default>::deserialize(input.as_slice()).unwrap();
|
||||
let l1_bytes = l1.serialize();
|
||||
assert_eq!(input, l1_bytes);
|
||||
|
||||
// Assert that identity group element is rejected
|
||||
let identity = RistrettoPoint::identity();
|
||||
let identity_bytes = identity.to_arr().to_vec();
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(match CredentialRequest::<Default>::deserialize(
|
||||
&[identity_bytes, ke1m.to_vec()].concat()
|
||||
) {
|
||||
Err(ProtocolError::VerificationError(PakeError::IdentityGroupElementError)) => true,
|
||||
_ => false,
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn credential_response_roundtrip() {
|
||||
let pt = random_ristretto_point();
|
||||
let pt_bytes = pt.to_arr().to_vec();
|
||||
|
||||
let mut rng = OsRng;
|
||||
|
||||
let mut masking_nonce = vec![0u8; 32];
|
||||
rng.fill_bytes(&mut masking_nonce);
|
||||
|
||||
let mut masked_response =
|
||||
vec![0u8; <PublicKey as SizedBytes>::Len::to_usize() + Envelope::<Default>::len()];
|
||||
rng.fill_bytes(&mut masked_response);
|
||||
|
||||
let server_e_kp = KeyPair::<<Default as CipherSuite>::Group>::generate_random(&mut rng);
|
||||
let mut mac = [0u8; MAC_SIZE];
|
||||
rng.fill_bytes(&mut mac);
|
||||
let mut server_nonce = vec![0u8; NonceLen::to_usize()];
|
||||
rng.fill_bytes(&mut server_nonce);
|
||||
|
||||
let ke2m: Vec<u8> = [&server_nonce[..], &server_e_kp.public(), &mac[..]].concat();
|
||||
|
||||
let mut input = Vec::new();
|
||||
input.extend_from_slice(pt_bytes.as_slice());
|
||||
input.extend_from_slice(&masking_nonce);
|
||||
input.extend_from_slice(&masked_response);
|
||||
input.extend_from_slice(&ke2m[..]);
|
||||
|
||||
let l2 = CredentialResponse::<Default>::deserialize(&input).unwrap();
|
||||
let l2_bytes = l2.serialize();
|
||||
assert_eq!(input, l2_bytes);
|
||||
|
||||
// Assert that identity group element is rejected
|
||||
let identity = RistrettoPoint::identity();
|
||||
let identity_bytes = identity.to_arr().to_vec();
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(match CredentialResponse::<Default>::deserialize(
|
||||
&[
|
||||
identity_bytes,
|
||||
masking_nonce.to_vec(),
|
||||
masked_response,
|
||||
ke2m.to_vec()
|
||||
]
|
||||
.concat()
|
||||
) {
|
||||
Err(ProtocolError::VerificationError(PakeError::IdentityGroupElementError)) => true,
|
||||
_ => false,
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn login_third_message_roundtrip() {
|
||||
let mut rng = OsRng;
|
||||
let mut mac = [0u8; MAC_SIZE];
|
||||
rng.fill_bytes(&mut mac);
|
||||
|
||||
let input: Vec<u8> = [&mac[..]].concat();
|
||||
|
||||
let l3 = CredentialFinalization::<Default>::deserialize(&input).unwrap();
|
||||
let l3_bytes = l3.serialize();
|
||||
assert_eq!(input, l3_bytes);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn client_login_roundtrip() {
|
||||
let pw = b"hunter2";
|
||||
let mut rng = OsRng;
|
||||
let sc = <RistrettoPoint as Group>::random_nonzero_scalar(&mut rng);
|
||||
|
||||
let client_e_kp = KeyPair::<<Default as CipherSuite>::Group>::generate_random(&mut rng);
|
||||
let mut client_nonce = vec![0u8; NonceLen::to_usize()];
|
||||
rng.fill_bytes(&mut client_nonce);
|
||||
|
||||
let serialized_credential_request = b"serialized credential_request".to_vec();
|
||||
let l1_data = [client_e_kp.private().to_arr().to_vec(), client_nonce].concat();
|
||||
|
||||
// serialization order: scalar, credential_request, ke1_state, password
|
||||
let bytes: Vec<u8> = [
|
||||
&sc.as_bytes()[..],
|
||||
&serialize(&serialized_credential_request, 2),
|
||||
&serialize(&l1_data, 2),
|
||||
&pw[..],
|
||||
]
|
||||
.concat();
|
||||
let reg = ClientLogin::<Default>::deserialize(&bytes[..]).unwrap();
|
||||
let reg_bytes = reg.serialize();
|
||||
assert_eq!(reg_bytes, bytes);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn ke1_message_roundtrip() {
|
||||
let mut rng = OsRng;
|
||||
|
||||
let client_e_kp = KeyPair::<<Default as CipherSuite>::Group>::generate_random(&mut rng);
|
||||
let mut client_nonce = vec![0u8; NonceLen::to_usize()];
|
||||
rng.fill_bytes(&mut client_nonce);
|
||||
|
||||
let ke1m: Vec<u8> = [&client_nonce[..], &client_e_kp.public()].concat();
|
||||
let reg = <TripleDH as KeyExchange<sha2::Sha512, RistrettoPoint>>::KE1Message::from_bytes::<
|
||||
Default,
|
||||
>(&ke1m[..])
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
let reg_bytes = reg.to_bytes();
|
||||
assert_eq!(reg_bytes, ke1m);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn ke2_message_roundtrip() {
|
||||
let mut rng = OsRng;
|
||||
|
||||
let server_e_kp = KeyPair::<<Default as CipherSuite>::Group>::generate_random(&mut rng);
|
||||
let mut mac = [0u8; MAC_SIZE];
|
||||
rng.fill_bytes(&mut mac);
|
||||
let mut server_nonce = vec![0u8; NonceLen::to_usize()];
|
||||
rng.fill_bytes(&mut server_nonce);
|
||||
|
||||
let ke2m: Vec<u8> = [&server_nonce[..], &server_e_kp.public(), &mac[..]].concat();
|
||||
|
||||
let reg = <TripleDH as KeyExchange<sha2::Sha512, RistrettoPoint>>::KE2Message::from_bytes::<
|
||||
Default,
|
||||
>(&ke2m[..])
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
let reg_bytes = reg.to_bytes();
|
||||
assert_eq!(reg_bytes, ke2m);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn ke3_message_roundtrip() {
|
||||
let mut rng = OsRng;
|
||||
let mut mac = [0u8; MAC_SIZE];
|
||||
rng.fill_bytes(&mut mac);
|
||||
|
||||
let ke3m: Vec<u8> = [&mac[..]].concat();
|
||||
|
||||
let reg = <TripleDH as KeyExchange<sha2::Sha512, RistrettoPoint>>::KE3Message::from_bytes::<
|
||||
Default,
|
||||
>(&ke3m[..])
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
let reg_bytes = reg.to_bytes();
|
||||
assert_eq!(reg_bytes, ke3m);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
proptest! {
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_i2osp_os2ip(ref bytes in vec(prop::num::u8::ANY, 0..std::mem::size_of::<usize>())) {
|
||||
assert_eq!(&i2osp(os2ip(&bytes)?, bytes.len()), bytes);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_nocrash_registration_request(ref bytes in vec(prop::num::u8::ANY, 0..200)) {
|
||||
RegistrationRequest::<Default>::deserialize(&bytes[..]).map_or(true, |_| true);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_nocrash_registration_response(ref bytes in vec(prop::num::u8::ANY, 0..200)) {
|
||||
RegistrationResponse::<Default>::deserialize(&bytes[..]).map_or(true, |_| true);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_nocrash_registration_upload(ref bytes in vec(prop::num::u8::ANY, 0..200)) {
|
||||
RegistrationUpload::<Default>::deserialize(&bytes[..]).map_or(true, |_| true);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_nocrash_credential_request(ref bytes in vec(prop::num::u8::ANY, 0..500)) {
|
||||
CredentialRequest::<Default>::deserialize(&bytes[..]).map_or(true, |_| true);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_nocrash_credential_response(ref bytes in vec(prop::num::u8::ANY, 0..500)) {
|
||||
CredentialResponse::<Default>::deserialize(&bytes[..]).map_or(true, |_| true);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_nocrash_credential_finalization(ref bytes in vec(prop::num::u8::ANY, 0..500)) {
|
||||
CredentialFinalization::<Default>::deserialize(&bytes[..]).map_or(true, |_| true);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_nocrash_client_registration(ref bytes in vec(prop::num::u8::ANY, 0..700)) {
|
||||
ClientRegistration::<Default>::deserialize(&bytes[..]).map_or(true, |_| true);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_nocrash_server_registration(ref bytes in vec(prop::num::u8::ANY, 0..700)) {
|
||||
ServerRegistration::<Default>::deserialize(&bytes[..]).map_or(true, |_| true);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_nocrash_client_login(ref bytes in vec(prop::num::u8::ANY, 0..700)) {
|
||||
ClientLogin::<Default>::deserialize(&bytes[..]).map_or(true, |_| true);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_nocrash_server_login(ref bytes in vec(prop::num::u8::ANY, 0..700)) {
|
||||
ServerLogin::<Default>::deserialize(&bytes[..]).map_or(true, |_| true);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
+15
-7
@@ -5,9 +5,10 @@
|
||||
|
||||
//! Trait specifying a slow hashing function
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::errors::InternalPakeError;
|
||||
use crate::hash::Hash;
|
||||
use crate::{errors::InternalPakeError, hash::Hash};
|
||||
use digest::Digest;
|
||||
#[cfg(feature = "slow-hash")]
|
||||
use generic_array::typenum::Unsigned;
|
||||
use generic_array::GenericArray;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Used for the slow hashing function in OPAQUE
|
||||
@@ -30,14 +31,21 @@ impl<D: Hash> SlowHash<D> for NoOpHash {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(feature = "slow-hash")]
|
||||
impl<D: Hash> SlowHash<D> for scrypt::ScryptParams {
|
||||
impl<D: Hash> SlowHash<D> for argon2::Argon2<'_> {
|
||||
fn hash(
|
||||
input: GenericArray<u8, <D as Digest>::OutputSize>,
|
||||
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, InternalPakeError> {
|
||||
let params = scrypt::ScryptParams::new(15, 8, 1).unwrap();
|
||||
let mut output = [0u8; <D as Digest>::OutputSize::to_usize()];
|
||||
scrypt::scrypt(&input, &[], ¶ms, &mut output)
|
||||
let params = argon2::Argon2::default();
|
||||
let mut output = vec![0u8; <D as Digest>::OutputSize::to_usize()];
|
||||
params
|
||||
.hash_password_into(
|
||||
argon2::Algorithm::Argon2id,
|
||||
&input,
|
||||
&[0; argon2::MIN_SALT_LENGTH],
|
||||
&[],
|
||||
&mut output,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::SlowHashError)?;
|
||||
Ok(output.to_vec())
|
||||
Ok(output)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
|
||||
// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
|
||||
// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
|
||||
|
||||
use rand_core::{CryptoRng, Error, RngCore};
|
||||
use rand::{CryptoRng, Error, RngCore};
|
||||
use std::cmp::min;
|
||||
|
||||
/// A simple implementation of `RngCore` for testing purposes.
|
||||
|
||||
+3
-2
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
|
||||
// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
|
||||
// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
|
||||
|
||||
mod full_test;
|
||||
pub mod mock_rng;
|
||||
mod opaque_ke_test;
|
||||
mod serialization;
|
||||
mod opaque_test_vectors;
|
||||
mod voprf_test_vectors;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,588 +0,0 @@
|
||||
// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
|
||||
// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::{
|
||||
ciphersuite::CipherSuite,
|
||||
errors::*,
|
||||
group::Group,
|
||||
key_exchange::tripledh::{TripleDH, NONCE_LEN},
|
||||
keypair::{Key, KeyPair, SizedBytes, X25519KeyPair},
|
||||
opaque::*,
|
||||
slow_hash::NoOpHash,
|
||||
tests::mock_rng::CycleRng,
|
||||
};
|
||||
use curve25519_dalek::edwards::EdwardsPoint;
|
||||
use rand_core::{OsRng, RngCore};
|
||||
use serde_json::Value;
|
||||
use std::convert::TryFrom;
|
||||
|
||||
// Tests
|
||||
// =====
|
||||
|
||||
struct X255193dhNoSlowHash;
|
||||
impl CipherSuite for X255193dhNoSlowHash {
|
||||
type Group = EdwardsPoint;
|
||||
type KeyFormat = X25519KeyPair;
|
||||
type KeyExchange = TripleDH;
|
||||
type Hash = sha2::Sha256;
|
||||
type SlowHash = NoOpHash;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub struct TestVectorParameters {
|
||||
pub client_s_pk: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub client_s_sk: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub client_e_pk: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub client_e_sk: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub server_s_pk: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub server_s_sk: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub server_e_pk: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub server_e_sk: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub password: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub blinding_factor_raw: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub blinding_factor: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub pepper: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub oprf_key: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub envelope_nonce: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub client_nonce: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub server_nonce: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub r1: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub r2: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub r3: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub l1: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub l2: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub l3: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
client_registration_state: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
server_registration_state: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
client_login_state: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
server_login_state: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub password_file: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub export_key: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub shared_secret: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static TEST_VECTOR: &str = r#"
|
||||
{
|
||||
"client_s_pk": "b2341df425f90244c72d8e19b249ca0d6d1a3a3dfe6ee1773e1b782a81efef29",
|
||||
"client_s_sk": "701e8cd1263abd2f2a22d4dc94b1d5fe3c9cb14030e7e7c154745825b059fd7f",
|
||||
"client_e_pk": "97cb1eb93a69542597517b110ccca457d5ce8d8bfcbfb2a9258bb7b4bd7f716e",
|
||||
"client_e_sk": "80616968ed8daae02c02d3ba41a70104ed0deecd2276e058994d601a1351b359",
|
||||
"server_s_pk": "e12d737e520eaf8504fbf302c2945011bff360bdf02ee102f2ebd6a883c80e02",
|
||||
"server_s_sk": "9075d3d3c5b6bc2f6218e7672c0532c619ce09dddf196006c5ffdaf628a3d760",
|
||||
"server_e_pk": "f73d27d7ca78ded52209bc3bae000f9d95b147360edac1e97c148a3a7396a279",
|
||||
"server_e_sk": "a0e59a07908fc793c590fd83343003a54330e24af908ed31c921e6e6504c3248",
|
||||
"password": "70617373776f7264",
|
||||
"blinding_factor_raw": "ca2d8ae51794579bd0f46044d7daccf222b4590053536b48575bc169f7478fd0a0b580fb0aae948c26ba403a2e7b98f563e434a0aad93f4105419c474453c34e",
|
||||
"blinding_factor": "5a9a073b1a1efedebdb404bc073ae74b316920d68ab628bed0c500cae95d6e02",
|
||||
"pepper": "706570706572",
|
||||
"oprf_key": "203fabe2af9c8dc668b81db1ece9c2412c94c276495f33202479886de1b12907",
|
||||
"envelope_nonce": "b0076712e01fecdb12301d5d7da92236e47f20494e68defb32084f1ab6c3d4f8",
|
||||
"client_nonce": "b9f09e9b0606fa88c4194011d5c204861b73c43cbf1ea0d08c03ec2fd6d05572",
|
||||
"server_nonce": "a213c02274e7f20fc3b571d25e98854c5dae2cfde6c9bf228a66bf3eff3e2a97",
|
||||
"r1": "7e2c67a156ab27490f20008fcae9e9f722d8a9f4eeac373a711259981ca05dd5",
|
||||
"r2": "710fdd19883e869e784c84f2864fa0bfc227662404b77cc8a54d79ae7fb931ea",
|
||||
"r3": "b0076712e01fecdb12301d5d7da92236e47f20494e68defb32084f1ab6c3d4f8923b1d26cac4e3d91cec445b3322f4cc69a727f184353cb4dfe6d55a4c7d2bb4b77fbd41eacb8434f102c8c29cd4831e708046d38615df566675421ae8eb4933b2341df425f90244c72d8e19b249ca0d6d1a3a3dfe6ee1773e1b782a81efef29",
|
||||
"l1": "7e2c67a156ab27490f20008fcae9e9f722d8a9f4eeac373a711259981ca05dd5b9f09e9b0606fa88c4194011d5c204861b73c43cbf1ea0d08c03ec2fd6d0557297cb1eb93a69542597517b110ccca457d5ce8d8bfcbfb2a9258bb7b4bd7f716e",
|
||||
"l2": "710fdd19883e869e784c84f2864fa0bfc227662404b77cc8a54d79ae7fb931eab0076712e01fecdb12301d5d7da92236e47f20494e68defb32084f1ab6c3d4f8923b1d26cac4e3d91cec445b3322f4cc69a727f184353cb4dfe6d55a4c7d2bb4b77fbd41eacb8434f102c8c29cd4831e708046d38615df566675421ae8eb4933a0e59a07908fc793c590fd83343003a54330e24af908ed31c921e6e6504c3248f73d27d7ca78ded52209bc3bae000f9d95b147360edac1e97c148a3a7396a27939ccf2a17a5b281068665b4865e6c6331533461a8e10a4ceffc4c6a6609c326a",
|
||||
"l3": "127144e6469e001d56237a58c8c869a8173e042bf2ff19d8331441d36ada9c3f",
|
||||
"client_registration_state": "5a9a073b1a1efedebdb404bc073ae74b316920d68ab628bed0c500cae95d6e0270617373776f7264",
|
||||
"client_login_state": "5a9a073b1a1efedebdb404bc073ae74b316920d68ab628bed0c500cae95d6e0280616968ed8daae02c02d3ba41a70104ed0deecd2276e058994d601a1351b359b9f09e9b0606fa88c4194011d5c204861b73c43cbf1ea0d08c03ec2fd6d05572f258311568d792d6ebecee225c0fde4512139e29a435e9f9a0b82dc3809a83ab70617373776f7264",
|
||||
"server_registration_state": "203fabe2af9c8dc668b81db1ece9c2412c94c276495f33202479886de1b12907",
|
||||
"server_login_state": "ebc0953924d55ad66aa801a7c85f47f35889b90002451a04fb7134b8a2a5a33cd69098c0a81ce06f58cbe4fd6ba23c9c1404ad6f639ba64d5f0f7bf0a041fc5872b17f13bd41cbfbdfa8d74bc94ec1abcc77b9a3da8fbad918ca0a5f84a81443",
|
||||
"password_file": "203fabe2af9c8dc668b81db1ece9c2412c94c276495f33202479886de1b12907b2341df425f90244c72d8e19b249ca0d6d1a3a3dfe6ee1773e1b782a81efef29b0076712e01fecdb12301d5d7da92236e47f20494e68defb32084f1ab6c3d4f8923b1d26cac4e3d91cec445b3322f4cc69a727f184353cb4dfe6d55a4c7d2bb4b77fbd41eacb8434f102c8c29cd4831e708046d38615df566675421ae8eb4933",
|
||||
"export_key": "da3a52148a58168c9f804df5e216e3d3f16e935d4d70a5eb249433d88e02ae4c",
|
||||
"shared_secret": "72b17f13bd41cbfbdfa8d74bc94ec1abcc77b9a3da8fbad918ca0a5f84a81443"
|
||||
}
|
||||
"#;
|
||||
|
||||
fn decode(values: &Value, key: &str) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
|
||||
values[key]
|
||||
.as_str()
|
||||
.and_then(|s| hex::decode(&s.to_string()).ok())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn populate_test_vectors(values: &Value) -> TestVectorParameters {
|
||||
TestVectorParameters {
|
||||
client_s_pk: decode(&values, "client_s_pk").unwrap(),
|
||||
client_s_sk: decode(&values, "client_s_sk").unwrap(),
|
||||
client_e_pk: decode(&values, "client_e_pk").unwrap(),
|
||||
client_e_sk: decode(&values, "client_e_sk").unwrap(),
|
||||
server_s_pk: decode(&values, "server_s_pk").unwrap(),
|
||||
server_s_sk: decode(&values, "server_s_sk").unwrap(),
|
||||
server_e_pk: decode(&values, "server_e_pk").unwrap(),
|
||||
server_e_sk: decode(&values, "server_e_sk").unwrap(),
|
||||
password: decode(&values, "password").unwrap(),
|
||||
blinding_factor_raw: decode(&values, "blinding_factor_raw").unwrap(),
|
||||
blinding_factor: decode(&values, "blinding_factor").unwrap(),
|
||||
pepper: decode(&values, "pepper").unwrap(),
|
||||
oprf_key: decode(&values, "oprf_key").unwrap(),
|
||||
envelope_nonce: decode(&values, "envelope_nonce").unwrap(),
|
||||
client_nonce: decode(&values, "client_nonce").unwrap(),
|
||||
server_nonce: decode(&values, "server_nonce").unwrap(),
|
||||
r1: decode(&values, "r1").unwrap(),
|
||||
r2: decode(&values, "r2").unwrap(),
|
||||
r3: decode(&values, "r3").unwrap(),
|
||||
l1: decode(&values, "l1").unwrap(),
|
||||
l2: decode(&values, "l2").unwrap(),
|
||||
l3: decode(&values, "l3").unwrap(),
|
||||
client_registration_state: decode(&values, "client_registration_state").unwrap(),
|
||||
client_login_state: decode(&values, "client_login_state").unwrap(),
|
||||
server_registration_state: decode(&values, "server_registration_state").unwrap(),
|
||||
server_login_state: decode(&values, "server_login_state").unwrap(),
|
||||
password_file: decode(&values, "password_file").unwrap(),
|
||||
export_key: decode(&values, "export_key").unwrap(),
|
||||
shared_secret: decode(&values, "shared_secret").unwrap(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn stringify_test_vectors(p: &TestVectorParameters) -> String {
|
||||
let mut s = String::new();
|
||||
s.push_str("{\n");
|
||||
s.push_str(format!("\"client_s_pk\": \"{}\",\n", hex::encode(&p.client_s_pk)).as_str());
|
||||
s.push_str(format!("\"client_s_sk\": \"{}\",\n", hex::encode(&p.client_s_sk)).as_str());
|
||||
s.push_str(format!("\"client_e_pk\": \"{}\",\n", hex::encode(&p.client_e_pk)).as_str());
|
||||
s.push_str(format!("\"client_e_sk\": \"{}\",\n", hex::encode(&p.client_e_sk)).as_str());
|
||||
s.push_str(format!("\"server_s_pk\": \"{}\",\n", hex::encode(&p.server_s_pk)).as_str());
|
||||
s.push_str(format!("\"server_s_sk\": \"{}\",\n", hex::encode(&p.server_s_sk)).as_str());
|
||||
s.push_str(format!("\"server_e_pk\": \"{}\",\n", hex::encode(&p.server_e_pk)).as_str());
|
||||
s.push_str(format!("\"server_e_sk\": \"{}\",\n", hex::encode(&p.server_e_sk)).as_str());
|
||||
s.push_str(format!("\"password\": \"{}\",\n", hex::encode(&p.password)).as_str());
|
||||
s.push_str(
|
||||
format!(
|
||||
"\"blinding_factor_raw\": \"{}\",\n",
|
||||
hex::encode(&p.blinding_factor_raw)
|
||||
)
|
||||
.as_str(),
|
||||
);
|
||||
s.push_str(
|
||||
format!(
|
||||
"\"blinding_factor\": \"{}\",\n",
|
||||
hex::encode(&p.blinding_factor)
|
||||
)
|
||||
.as_str(),
|
||||
);
|
||||
s.push_str(format!("\"pepper\": \"{}\",\n", hex::encode(&p.pepper)).as_str());
|
||||
s.push_str(format!("\"oprf_key\": \"{}\",\n", hex::encode(&p.oprf_key)).as_str());
|
||||
s.push_str(
|
||||
format!(
|
||||
"\"envelope_nonce\": \"{}\",\n",
|
||||
hex::encode(&p.envelope_nonce)
|
||||
)
|
||||
.as_str(),
|
||||
);
|
||||
s.push_str(format!("\"client_nonce\": \"{}\",\n", hex::encode(&p.client_nonce)).as_str());
|
||||
s.push_str(format!("\"server_nonce\": \"{}\",\n", hex::encode(&p.server_nonce)).as_str());
|
||||
s.push_str(format!("\"r1\": \"{}\",\n", hex::encode(&p.r1)).as_str());
|
||||
s.push_str(format!("\"r2\": \"{}\",\n", hex::encode(&p.r2)).as_str());
|
||||
s.push_str(format!("\"r3\": \"{}\",\n", hex::encode(&p.r3)).as_str());
|
||||
s.push_str(format!("\"l1\": \"{}\",\n", hex::encode(&p.l1)).as_str());
|
||||
s.push_str(format!("\"l2\": \"{}\",\n", hex::encode(&p.l2)).as_str());
|
||||
s.push_str(format!("\"l3\": \"{}\",\n", hex::encode(&p.l3)).as_str());
|
||||
s.push_str(
|
||||
format!(
|
||||
"\"client_registration_state\": \"{}\",\n",
|
||||
hex::encode(&p.client_registration_state)
|
||||
)
|
||||
.as_str(),
|
||||
);
|
||||
s.push_str(
|
||||
format!(
|
||||
"\"client_login_state\": \"{}\",\n",
|
||||
hex::encode(&p.client_login_state)
|
||||
)
|
||||
.as_str(),
|
||||
);
|
||||
s.push_str(
|
||||
format!(
|
||||
"\"server_registration_state\": \"{}\",\n",
|
||||
hex::encode(&p.server_registration_state)
|
||||
)
|
||||
.as_str(),
|
||||
);
|
||||
s.push_str(
|
||||
format!(
|
||||
"\"server_login_state\": \"{}\",\n",
|
||||
hex::encode(&p.server_login_state)
|
||||
)
|
||||
.as_str(),
|
||||
);
|
||||
s.push_str(
|
||||
format!(
|
||||
"\"password_file\": \"{}\",\n",
|
||||
hex::encode(&p.password_file)
|
||||
)
|
||||
.as_str(),
|
||||
);
|
||||
s.push_str(format!("\"export_key\": \"{}\",\n", hex::encode(&p.export_key)).as_str());
|
||||
s.push_str(format!("\"shared_secret\": \"{}\"\n", hex::encode(&p.shared_secret)).as_str());
|
||||
s.push_str("}\n");
|
||||
s
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn generate_parameters<CS: CipherSuite>() -> TestVectorParameters
|
||||
where
|
||||
// Unsightly constraints due to the (required) use of the SizedBytes
|
||||
// instance for KP in ServerRegistration::start. See also the impl
|
||||
// Tryfrom<&[u8]> for ServerRegistration (those are the same constraints).
|
||||
<<CS::KeyFormat as KeyPair>::Repr as SizedBytes>::Len:
|
||||
std::ops::Add<<<CS::KeyFormat as KeyPair>::Repr as SizedBytes>::Len>,
|
||||
generic_array::typenum::Sum<
|
||||
<<CS::KeyFormat as KeyPair>::Repr as SizedBytes>::Len,
|
||||
<<CS::KeyFormat as KeyPair>::Repr as SizedBytes>::Len,
|
||||
>: generic_array::ArrayLength<u8>,
|
||||
{
|
||||
let mut rng = OsRng;
|
||||
|
||||
// Inputs
|
||||
let server_s_kp = CS::generate_random_keypair(&mut rng).unwrap();
|
||||
let server_e_kp = CS::generate_random_keypair(&mut rng).unwrap();
|
||||
let client_s_kp = CS::generate_random_keypair(&mut rng).unwrap();
|
||||
let client_e_kp = CS::generate_random_keypair(&mut rng).unwrap();
|
||||
let password = b"password";
|
||||
let pepper = b"pepper";
|
||||
let mut blinding_factor_raw = [0u8; 64];
|
||||
rng.fill_bytes(&mut blinding_factor_raw);
|
||||
let mut oprf_key_raw = [0u8; 32];
|
||||
rng.fill_bytes(&mut oprf_key_raw);
|
||||
let mut envelope_nonce = [0u8; 32];
|
||||
rng.fill_bytes(&mut envelope_nonce);
|
||||
let mut client_nonce = [0u8; NONCE_LEN];
|
||||
rng.fill_bytes(&mut client_nonce);
|
||||
let mut server_nonce = [0u8; NONCE_LEN];
|
||||
rng.fill_bytes(&mut server_nonce);
|
||||
|
||||
let mut blinding_factor_registration_rng = CycleRng::new(blinding_factor_raw.to_vec());
|
||||
let (r1, client_registration) = ClientRegistration::<CS>::start(
|
||||
password,
|
||||
Some(pepper),
|
||||
&mut blinding_factor_registration_rng,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
let r1_bytes = r1.to_bytes().to_vec();
|
||||
let blinding_factor_bytes =
|
||||
CS::Group::scalar_as_bytes(&client_registration.blinding_factor).clone();
|
||||
let client_registration_state = client_registration.to_bytes().to_vec();
|
||||
|
||||
let mut oprf_key_rng = CycleRng::new(oprf_key_raw.to_vec());
|
||||
let (r2, server_registration) = ServerRegistration::<CS>::start(r1, &mut oprf_key_rng).unwrap();
|
||||
let r2_bytes = r2.to_bytes().to_vec();
|
||||
let oprf_key_bytes = CS::Group::scalar_as_bytes(&server_registration.oprf_key).clone();
|
||||
let server_registration_state = server_registration.to_bytes().to_vec();
|
||||
|
||||
let mut client_s_sk_and_nonce: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
|
||||
client_s_sk_and_nonce.extend_from_slice(&client_s_kp.private().to_arr());
|
||||
client_s_sk_and_nonce.extend_from_slice(&envelope_nonce);
|
||||
|
||||
let mut finish_registration_rng = CycleRng::new(client_s_sk_and_nonce);
|
||||
let (r3, export_key_registration) = client_registration
|
||||
.finish(r2, server_s_kp.public(), &mut finish_registration_rng)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
let r3_bytes = r3.to_bytes().to_vec();
|
||||
|
||||
let password_file = server_registration.finish(r3).unwrap();
|
||||
let password_file_bytes = password_file.to_bytes();
|
||||
|
||||
let mut client_login_start: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
|
||||
client_login_start.extend_from_slice(&blinding_factor_raw);
|
||||
client_login_start.extend_from_slice(&client_e_kp.private().to_arr());
|
||||
client_login_start.extend_from_slice(&client_nonce);
|
||||
|
||||
let mut client_login_start_rng = CycleRng::new(client_login_start);
|
||||
let (l1, client_login) =
|
||||
ClientLogin::<CS>::start(password, Some(pepper), &mut client_login_start_rng).unwrap();
|
||||
let l1_bytes = l1.to_bytes().to_vec();
|
||||
let client_login_state = client_login.to_bytes().to_vec();
|
||||
|
||||
let mut server_e_sk_rng = CycleRng::new(server_e_kp.private().to_arr().to_vec());
|
||||
let (l2, server_login) = ServerLogin::<CS>::start(
|
||||
password_file,
|
||||
server_s_kp.private(),
|
||||
l1,
|
||||
&mut server_e_sk_rng,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
let l2_bytes = l2.to_bytes().to_vec();
|
||||
let server_login_state = server_login.to_bytes().to_vec();
|
||||
|
||||
let mut client_e_sk_rng = CycleRng::new(client_e_kp.private().to_arr().to_vec());
|
||||
let (l3, client_shared_secret, _export_key_login) = client_login
|
||||
.finish(l2, server_s_kp.public(), &mut client_e_sk_rng)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
let l3_bytes = l3.to_bytes().to_vec();
|
||||
|
||||
TestVectorParameters {
|
||||
client_s_pk: client_s_kp.public().to_arr().to_vec(),
|
||||
client_s_sk: client_s_kp.private().to_arr().to_vec(),
|
||||
client_e_pk: client_e_kp.public().to_arr().to_vec(),
|
||||
client_e_sk: client_e_kp.private().to_arr().to_vec(),
|
||||
server_s_pk: server_s_kp.public().to_arr().to_vec(),
|
||||
server_s_sk: server_s_kp.private().to_arr().to_vec(),
|
||||
server_e_pk: server_e_kp.public().to_arr().to_vec(),
|
||||
server_e_sk: server_e_kp.private().to_arr().to_vec(),
|
||||
password: password.to_vec(),
|
||||
blinding_factor_raw: blinding_factor_raw.to_vec(),
|
||||
blinding_factor: blinding_factor_bytes.to_vec(),
|
||||
pepper: pepper.to_vec(),
|
||||
oprf_key: oprf_key_bytes.to_vec(),
|
||||
envelope_nonce: envelope_nonce.to_vec(),
|
||||
client_nonce: client_nonce.to_vec(),
|
||||
server_nonce: server_nonce.to_vec(),
|
||||
r1: r1_bytes,
|
||||
r2: r2_bytes,
|
||||
r3: r3_bytes,
|
||||
l1: l1_bytes,
|
||||
l2: l2_bytes,
|
||||
l3: l3_bytes,
|
||||
password_file: password_file_bytes,
|
||||
client_registration_state,
|
||||
server_registration_state,
|
||||
client_login_state,
|
||||
server_login_state,
|
||||
shared_secret: client_shared_secret,
|
||||
export_key: export_key_registration.to_vec(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn generate_test_vectors() {
|
||||
let parameters = generate_parameters::<X255193dhNoSlowHash>();
|
||||
println!("{}", stringify_test_vectors(¶meters));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_r1() -> Result<(), PakeError> {
|
||||
let parameters = populate_test_vectors(&serde_json::from_str(TEST_VECTOR).unwrap());
|
||||
let mut blinding_factor_rng = CycleRng::new(parameters.blinding_factor_raw);
|
||||
let (r1, client_registration) = ClientRegistration::<X255193dhNoSlowHash>::start(
|
||||
¶meters.password,
|
||||
Some(¶meters.pepper),
|
||||
&mut blinding_factor_rng,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(hex::encode(¶meters.r1), hex::encode(r1.to_bytes()));
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
hex::encode(¶meters.client_registration_state),
|
||||
hex::encode(client_registration.to_bytes())
|
||||
);
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_r2() -> Result<(), PakeError> {
|
||||
let parameters = populate_test_vectors(&serde_json::from_str(TEST_VECTOR).unwrap());
|
||||
let mut oprf_key_rng = CycleRng::new(parameters.oprf_key);
|
||||
let (r2, server_registration) = ServerRegistration::<X255193dhNoSlowHash>::start(
|
||||
RegisterFirstMessage::try_from(¶meters.r1[..]).unwrap(),
|
||||
&mut oprf_key_rng,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(hex::encode(parameters.r2), hex::encode(r2.to_bytes()));
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
hex::encode(¶meters.server_registration_state),
|
||||
hex::encode(server_registration.to_bytes())
|
||||
);
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_r3() -> Result<(), PakeError> {
|
||||
let parameters = populate_test_vectors(&serde_json::from_str(TEST_VECTOR).unwrap());
|
||||
|
||||
let client_s_sk_and_nonce: Vec<u8> =
|
||||
[parameters.client_s_sk, parameters.envelope_nonce].concat();
|
||||
let mut finish_registration_rng = CycleRng::new(client_s_sk_and_nonce);
|
||||
let (r3, export_key_registration) = ClientRegistration::<X255193dhNoSlowHash>::try_from(
|
||||
¶meters.client_registration_state[..],
|
||||
)
|
||||
.unwrap()
|
||||
.finish(
|
||||
RegisterSecondMessage::try_from(¶meters.r2[..]).unwrap(),
|
||||
&Key::try_from(¶meters.server_s_pk[..]).unwrap(),
|
||||
&mut finish_registration_rng,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(hex::encode(parameters.r3), hex::encode(r3.to_bytes()));
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
hex::encode(parameters.export_key),
|
||||
hex::encode(export_key_registration.to_vec())
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_password_file() -> Result<(), PakeError> {
|
||||
let parameters = populate_test_vectors(&serde_json::from_str(TEST_VECTOR).unwrap());
|
||||
|
||||
let server_registration = ServerRegistration::<X255193dhNoSlowHash>::try_from(
|
||||
¶meters.server_registration_state[..],
|
||||
)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
let password_file = server_registration
|
||||
.finish(RegisterThirdMessage::try_from(¶meters.r3[..]).unwrap())
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
hex::encode(parameters.password_file),
|
||||
hex::encode(password_file.to_bytes())
|
||||
);
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_l1() -> Result<(), PakeError> {
|
||||
let parameters = populate_test_vectors(&serde_json::from_str(TEST_VECTOR).unwrap());
|
||||
|
||||
let client_login_start = [
|
||||
parameters.blinding_factor_raw,
|
||||
parameters.client_e_sk,
|
||||
parameters.client_nonce,
|
||||
]
|
||||
.concat();
|
||||
let mut client_login_start_rng = CycleRng::new(client_login_start);
|
||||
let (l1, client_login) = ClientLogin::<X255193dhNoSlowHash>::start(
|
||||
¶meters.password,
|
||||
Some(¶meters.pepper),
|
||||
&mut client_login_start_rng,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(hex::encode(¶meters.l1), hex::encode(l1.to_bytes()));
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
hex::encode(¶meters.client_login_state),
|
||||
hex::encode(client_login.to_bytes())
|
||||
);
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_l2() -> Result<(), PakeError> {
|
||||
let parameters = populate_test_vectors(&serde_json::from_str(TEST_VECTOR).unwrap());
|
||||
|
||||
let mut server_e_sk_rng = CycleRng::new(parameters.server_e_sk);
|
||||
let (l2, server_login) = ServerLogin::<X255193dhNoSlowHash>::start(
|
||||
ServerRegistration::try_from(¶meters.password_file[..]).unwrap(),
|
||||
&Key::try_from(¶meters.server_s_sk[..]).unwrap(),
|
||||
LoginFirstMessage::<X255193dhNoSlowHash>::try_from(¶meters.l1[..]).unwrap(),
|
||||
&mut server_e_sk_rng,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(hex::encode(¶meters.l2), hex::encode(l2.to_bytes()));
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
hex::encode(¶meters.server_login_state),
|
||||
hex::encode(server_login.to_bytes())
|
||||
);
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_l3() -> Result<(), PakeError> {
|
||||
let parameters = populate_test_vectors(&serde_json::from_str(TEST_VECTOR).unwrap());
|
||||
|
||||
let mut client_e_sk_rng = CycleRng::new(parameters.client_e_sk.to_vec());
|
||||
let (l3, shared_secret, export_key_login) =
|
||||
ClientLogin::<X255193dhNoSlowHash>::try_from(¶meters.client_login_state[..])
|
||||
.unwrap()
|
||||
.finish(
|
||||
LoginSecondMessage::<X255193dhNoSlowHash>::try_from(¶meters.l2[..]).unwrap(),
|
||||
&Key::try_from(¶meters.server_s_pk[..])?,
|
||||
&mut client_e_sk_rng,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
hex::encode(¶meters.shared_secret),
|
||||
hex::encode(&shared_secret)
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert_eq!(hex::encode(¶meters.l3), hex::encode(l3.to_bytes()));
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
hex::encode(¶meters.export_key),
|
||||
hex::encode(export_key_login)
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_server_login_finish() -> Result<(), ProtocolError> {
|
||||
let parameters = populate_test_vectors(&serde_json::from_str(TEST_VECTOR).unwrap());
|
||||
|
||||
let shared_secret =
|
||||
ServerLogin::<X255193dhNoSlowHash>::try_from(¶meters.server_login_state[..])
|
||||
.unwrap()
|
||||
.finish(LoginThirdMessage::try_from(¶meters.l3[..])?)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
hex::encode(parameters.shared_secret),
|
||||
hex::encode(shared_secret)
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn test_complete_flow(
|
||||
registration_password: &[u8],
|
||||
login_password: &[u8],
|
||||
) -> Result<(), ProtocolError> {
|
||||
let mut client_rng = OsRng;
|
||||
let mut server_rng = OsRng;
|
||||
let server_kp = X255193dhNoSlowHash::generate_random_keypair(&mut server_rng)?;
|
||||
let (register_m1, client_state) = ClientRegistration::<X255193dhNoSlowHash>::start(
|
||||
registration_password,
|
||||
None,
|
||||
&mut client_rng,
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
let (register_m2, server_state) =
|
||||
ServerRegistration::<X255193dhNoSlowHash>::start(register_m1, &mut server_rng)?;
|
||||
let (register_m3, registration_export_key) =
|
||||
client_state.finish(register_m2, server_kp.public(), &mut client_rng)?;
|
||||
let p_file = server_state.finish(register_m3)?;
|
||||
let (login_m1, client_login_state) =
|
||||
ClientLogin::<X255193dhNoSlowHash>::start(login_password, None, &mut client_rng)?;
|
||||
let (login_m2, server_login_state) = ServerLogin::<X255193dhNoSlowHash>::start(
|
||||
p_file,
|
||||
&server_kp.private(),
|
||||
login_m1,
|
||||
&mut server_rng,
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let client_login_result =
|
||||
client_login_state.finish(login_m2, &server_kp.public(), &mut client_rng);
|
||||
|
||||
if hex::encode(registration_password) == hex::encode(login_password) {
|
||||
let (login_m3, client_shared_secret, login_export_key) = client_login_result?;
|
||||
let server_shared_secret = server_login_state.finish(login_m3)?;
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
hex::encode(server_shared_secret),
|
||||
hex::encode(client_shared_secret)
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
hex::encode(registration_export_key),
|
||||
hex::encode(login_export_key)
|
||||
);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
let res = matches!(
|
||||
client_login_result,
|
||||
Err(ProtocolError::VerificationError(
|
||||
PakeError::InvalidLoginError
|
||||
))
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert!(res);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_complete_flow_success() -> Result<(), ProtocolError> {
|
||||
test_complete_flow(b"good password", b"good password")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_complete_flow_fail() -> Result<(), ProtocolError> {
|
||||
test_complete_flow(b"good password", b"bad password")
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,787 @@
|
||||
// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
|
||||
// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::{
|
||||
ciphersuite::CipherSuite, errors::*, key_exchange::tripledh::TripleDH, keypair::PrivateKey,
|
||||
opaque::*, slow_hash::NoOpHash, tests::mock_rng::CycleRng, *,
|
||||
};
|
||||
use curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoPoint;
|
||||
use generic_array::typenum::Unsigned;
|
||||
use generic_bytes::SizedBytes;
|
||||
use serde_json::Value;
|
||||
|
||||
// Tests
|
||||
// =====
|
||||
|
||||
struct Ristretto255Sha512NoSlowHash;
|
||||
impl CipherSuite for Ristretto255Sha512NoSlowHash {
|
||||
type Group = RistrettoPoint;
|
||||
type KeyExchange = TripleDH;
|
||||
type Hash = sha2::Sha512;
|
||||
type SlowHash = NoOpHash;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(PartialEq)]
|
||||
pub enum EnvelopeMode {
|
||||
Base,
|
||||
CustomIdentifier,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[allow(non_snake_case)]
|
||||
pub struct TestVectorParameters {
|
||||
pub dummy_private_key: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub dummy_masking_key: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub context: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub envelope_mode: EnvelopeMode,
|
||||
pub client_private_key: Option<Vec<u8>>,
|
||||
pub client_keyshare: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub client_private_keyshare: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub server_public_key: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub server_private_key: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub server_keyshare: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub server_private_keyshare: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub client_identity: Option<Vec<u8>>,
|
||||
pub server_identity: Option<Vec<u8>>,
|
||||
pub credential_identifier: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub password: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub blind_registration: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub oprf_seed: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub masking_nonce: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub envelope_nonce: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub client_nonce: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub server_nonce: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub client_info: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub server_info: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub registration_request: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub registration_response: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub registration_upload: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub KE1: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub blind_login: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub KE2: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub KE3: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub export_key: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub session_key: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Pulled from "OPAQUE-3DH Test Vector 1" and "OPAQUE-3DH Test Vector 6"
|
||||
// of https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-opaque/
|
||||
static TEST_VECTORS: &[&str] = &[
|
||||
r#"
|
||||
## OPAQUE-3DH Test Vector 1
|
||||
|
||||
### Configuration
|
||||
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
OPRF: 0001
|
||||
Hash: SHA512
|
||||
MHF: Identity
|
||||
KDF: HKDF-SHA512
|
||||
MAC: HMAC-SHA512
|
||||
EnvelopeMode: 01
|
||||
Group: ristretto255
|
||||
Context: 4f50415155452d504f43
|
||||
Nh: 64
|
||||
Npk: 32
|
||||
Nsk: 32
|
||||
Nm: 64
|
||||
Nx: 64
|
||||
Nok: 32
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
|
||||
### Input Values
|
||||
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
oprf_seed: 5c4f99877d253be5817b4b03f37b6da680b0d5671d1ec5351fa61c5d82
|
||||
eab28b9de4c4e170f27e433ba377c71c49aa62ad26391ee1cac17011d8a7e9406657c
|
||||
8
|
||||
credential_identifier: 31323334
|
||||
password: 436f7272656374486f72736542617474657279537461706c65
|
||||
envelope_nonce: 71b8f14b7a1059cdadc414c409064a22cf9e970b0ffc6f1fc6fdd
|
||||
539c4676775
|
||||
masking_nonce: 54f9341ca183700f6b6acf28dbfe4a86afad788805de49f2d680ab
|
||||
86ff39ed7f
|
||||
server_private_key: 16eb9dc74a3df2033cd738bf2cfb7a3670c569d7749f284b2
|
||||
b241cb237e7d10f
|
||||
server_public_key: 18d5035fd0a9c1d6412226df037125901a43f4dff660c0549d
|
||||
402f672bcc0933
|
||||
server_nonce: f9c5ec75a8cd571370add249e99cb8a8c43f6ef05610ac6e354642b
|
||||
f4fedbf69
|
||||
client_nonce: 804133133e7ee6836c8515752e24bb44d323fef4ead34cde967798f
|
||||
2e9784f69
|
||||
server_keyshare: 6e77d4749eb304c4d74be9457c597546bc22aed699225499910f
|
||||
c913b3e90712
|
||||
client_keyshare: f67926bd036c5dc4971816b9376e9f64737f361ef8269c18f69f
|
||||
1ab555e96d4a
|
||||
server_private_keyshare: f8e3e31543dd6fc86833296726773d51158291ab9afd
|
||||
666bb55dce83474c1101
|
||||
client_private_keyshare: 4230d62ea740b13e178185fc517cf2c313e6908c4cd9
|
||||
fb42154870ff3490c608
|
||||
blind_registration: c62937d17dc9aa213c9038f84fe8c5bf3d953356db01c4d48
|
||||
acb7cae48e6a504
|
||||
blind_login: b5f458822ea11c900ad776e38e29d7be361f75b4d79b55ad74923299
|
||||
bf8d6503
|
||||
oprf_key: 23d431bab39aea4d2737ac391a50076300210730971788e3a6a8c29ad3c
|
||||
5930e
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
|
||||
### Intermediate Values
|
||||
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
client_public_key: f692d6b738b4e240d5f59d534371363b47817c00c7058d4a33
|
||||
439911e66c3c27
|
||||
auth_key: 27972f9b1cf2ce524d50a7afa40a2ee6957904e2bef29976bdbda452a84
|
||||
fcf01023f3ddd8182e64ea5287f99765dd39b83fa89fe189db227212a144134684783
|
||||
randomized_pwd: 750ef06299c2fb102242fd84e59613616338f83e69c09c1dc3f91
|
||||
c57ac0642876ccbe785e94aa094262efdc6aed08b3faff7c1bddfa14c434c5a908ad6
|
||||
c5f9d5
|
||||
envelope: 71b8f14b7a1059cdadc414c409064a22cf9e970b0ffc6f1fc6fdd539c46
|
||||
76775455739db882585a7c8b3e9ae7955da7135900d85ab832aa83a34b3ce481efc9e
|
||||
43d4c2276220c8bcb9d27b5a827a5a2d655700321f3b32d21f578c21316195d8
|
||||
handshake_secret: 02fb23a668b7138b029c95d21f1e0eec9e10377be933bdbf3e5
|
||||
33ea39073d3ce9d1ef16b55a8a8464f3bf6a991cc645d14c1fa3d9d6cfe36c6c0dcc2
|
||||
691d7109
|
||||
server_mac_key: e75ce46beeebd26f22540d7988de9809a69cf34fec6c050750708
|
||||
e91232297fdbb51e875cd37167d5ce661ebccf0004dbbf96311daf64ddec7faae04c4
|
||||
8bbd89
|
||||
client_mac_key: 4bce132daa031fff2a6e5ac29287c4641e3b9dc2560394b8c73f3
|
||||
b748f1e51e577b932a960b236981217b33bee220b0bce2696638cfb7791f427ade292
|
||||
d60f55
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
|
||||
### Output Values
|
||||
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
registration_request: 80576bce33c6ce89f9e1a06d8595cd9d09d9aef46b20dad
|
||||
d57a845dc50e7c074
|
||||
registration_response: 1a80fdb4f4eb1985587b5b95661d2cff1ef2493cdcdd88
|
||||
b5699f39048f0d6c2618d5035fd0a9c1d6412226df037125901a43f4dff660c0549d4
|
||||
02f672bcc0933
|
||||
registration_upload: f692d6b738b4e240d5f59d534371363b47817c00c7058d4a
|
||||
33439911e66c3c2795014d8fc0c710bd763c981c5b9329c95e149c6717af91bad2cec
|
||||
daf87f2c3c9c11914cb6d44aaee5679e3e61e1b65241fda74902cca908a065495c0b2
|
||||
8b799e71b8f14b7a1059cdadc414c409064a22cf9e970b0ffc6f1fc6fdd539c467677
|
||||
5455739db882585a7c8b3e9ae7955da7135900d85ab832aa83a34b3ce481efc9e43d4
|
||||
c2276220c8bcb9d27b5a827a5a2d655700321f3b32d21f578c21316195d8
|
||||
KE1: 60d71c9f5d2a14568807b869e2c251a8e5f7ad8951cd8386c7e32c0634b26b16
|
||||
804133133e7ee6836c8515752e24bb44d323fef4ead34cde967798f2e9784f69f6792
|
||||
6bd036c5dc4971816b9376e9f64737f361ef8269c18f69f1ab555e96d4a
|
||||
KE2: 78a428204f552d3532bad040c961324edb22c738d98f1dd770d65caba0bd8966
|
||||
54f9341ca183700f6b6acf28dbfe4a86afad788805de49f2d680ab86ff39ed7fbcbbb
|
||||
84a18810b8eb1dc898d9af686f5901a21d0768720b325279fde4931ee52f0d4a0d0d9
|
||||
cd1cd7c424d4622b1588ba554cd9241352a59ef52bbe85e0f865021404b115ba954f5
|
||||
540cf2d811a6566a93876cac1239b1f75f39b070250af5a84a819e08b13e9e437a80f
|
||||
c25cc130f8475dde43efe6d900c664e9bac300298bb0f9c5ec75a8cd571370add249e
|
||||
99cb8a8c43f6ef05610ac6e354642bf4fedbf696e77d4749eb304c4d74be9457c5975
|
||||
46bc22aed699225499910fc913b3e907120485942e3e077f71c1dd2d87053b39f0d31
|
||||
bfe5d5f90df0e85ad9ce771e4f4d1ab697a10a02002cd73916051b887da9554465d58
|
||||
68811fd8b22b8f457ed5a4b0
|
||||
KE3: b4f8aece9fb4f6b7b5ffe1c98747a91f4ec7bf5481fe5719ba4baad668e3fd4e
|
||||
8aba4fa227bd4c688ed9e17f6c6d28ab5e5617a883207d80979dc4797ca89304
|
||||
export_key: 045f61f4baa0a945c2e85dfb7a85fe4df8a49e6c31344920e863c286b
|
||||
c8a17fe25fc16c84836335b4b5ecc9743c5d3a221101ab004aa99ce65026b6953ad6c
|
||||
c0
|
||||
session_key: 91187690e5ea0da3110a1dd7d5ffd7c4c3111950c587d9fcf3b9f34b
|
||||
f73b86dbeafed42a05024fa875a32415c6143d20c39cd732eb0e31db5e60ea3fb2551
|
||||
cf7
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
"#,
|
||||
r#"
|
||||
## OPAQUE-3DH Test Vector 2
|
||||
|
||||
### Configuration
|
||||
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
OPRF: 0001
|
||||
Hash: SHA512
|
||||
MHF: Identity
|
||||
KDF: HKDF-SHA512
|
||||
MAC: HMAC-SHA512
|
||||
EnvelopeMode: 01
|
||||
Group: ristretto255
|
||||
Context: 4f50415155452d504f43
|
||||
Nh: 64
|
||||
Npk: 32
|
||||
Nsk: 32
|
||||
Nm: 64
|
||||
Nx: 64
|
||||
Nok: 32
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
|
||||
### Input Values
|
||||
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
client_identity: 616c696365
|
||||
server_identity: 626f62
|
||||
oprf_seed: db5c1c16e264b8933d5da56439e7cfed23ab7287b474fe3cdcd58df089
|
||||
a365a426ea849258d9f4bc13573601f2e727c90ecc19d448cf3145a662e0065f157ba
|
||||
5
|
||||
credential_identifier: 31323334
|
||||
password: 436f7272656374486f72736542617474657279537461706c65
|
||||
envelope_nonce: d0c7b0f0047682bd87a87e0c3553b9bcdce7e1ae3348570df20bf
|
||||
2747829b2d2
|
||||
masking_nonce: 30635396b708ddb7fc10fb73c4e3a9258cd9c3f6f761b2c227853b
|
||||
5def228c85
|
||||
server_private_key: eeb2fcc794f98501b16139771720a0713a2750b9e528adfd3
|
||||
662ad56a7e19b04
|
||||
server_public_key: 8aa90cb321a38759fc253c444f317782962ca18d33101eab2c
|
||||
8cda04405a181f
|
||||
server_nonce: 3fa57f7ef652185f89114109f5a61cc8c9216fdd7398246bb7a0c20
|
||||
e2fbca2d8
|
||||
client_nonce: a6bcd29b5aecc3507fc1f8f7631af3d2f5105155222e48099e5e608
|
||||
5d8c1187a
|
||||
server_keyshare: ae070cdffe5bb4b1c373e71be8e7d8f356ee5de37881533f1039
|
||||
7bcd84d35445
|
||||
client_keyshare: 642e7eecf19b804a62817486663d6c6c239396f709b663a4350c
|
||||
da67d025687a
|
||||
server_private_keyshare: 0974010a8528b813f5b33ae0d791df88516c8839c152
|
||||
b030697637878b2d8b0a
|
||||
client_private_keyshare: 03b52f066898929f4aca48014b2b97365205ce691ee3
|
||||
444b0a7cecec3c7efb01
|
||||
blind_registration: a66ffb41ccf1194a8d7dda900f8b6b0652e4c7fac4610066f
|
||||
e0489a804d3bb05
|
||||
blind_login: e6f161ac189e6873a19a54efca4baa0719e801e336d929d35ca28b5b
|
||||
4f60560e
|
||||
oprf_key: 1e0550d2dbb9ce5dd9bdbb5f808afbb724c573dc03306dcfc7217796465
|
||||
ce607
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
|
||||
### Intermediate Values
|
||||
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
client_public_key: ba6cb41f1870e9db7e858440a664e6559d01fdbfb638bbf7e1
|
||||
c9004f20d5db71
|
||||
auth_key: 5142ae6f6bd80686039656fd7a03cdd7e39cc6e869aa637220d4b5fb64f
|
||||
afee2f284a1581fff95ad3a5261b413c5e5b91115f78a3c35486fa56023c300d1726b
|
||||
randomized_pwd: cea240b632b9c1d704034920cc3dc3c664ed8cd82cf5c0339af76
|
||||
4d6350d2ee9ba1f675ce8df7b6cf8692d1efb158bafa3c2695ac03a2d92346c19810c
|
||||
1a698b
|
||||
envelope: d0c7b0f0047682bd87a87e0c3553b9bcdce7e1ae3348570df20bf274782
|
||||
9b2d26e18240c0cbad3b4cdbd7d9d86512f87e43fac39e3785a17504aaa8508f81e3c
|
||||
1517b150259be478720935e175b1e34bbe625d0828a62ca9983f9a27aed27f5e
|
||||
handshake_secret: 7925c12d7bf3050e62fe5c8caaece3c85737754c5df79bc59a6
|
||||
0fa87929ab1f4a4730f903b87be8b7d89ded8ec97aaec97bc8e7d53a555fd4ad74c4f
|
||||
33b9bc83
|
||||
server_mac_key: 27d6036335c5654132fb08cc81d95b3067ef7fe795f017531231a
|
||||
e3fa03cd3ab72f1f5e81473318f9c01f990263d885dfce4b6ac8630fdc8ee8abc6a36
|
||||
7c2339
|
||||
client_mac_key: ebb3693bac6310075a89922c7a40599d14d03d9104b7a331106e8
|
||||
a578a32a4944751f9d3c230a6690a5747137388a86159cf587969d13dadc0a3830218
|
||||
dfbca5
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
|
||||
### Output Values
|
||||
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
registration_request: f841cbb85844967568c7405f3831a58c4f5f37ccddb0baa
|
||||
4972ea912c960ae66
|
||||
registration_response: 0256257cc6e2b04444edc076b9ad44d8b31593e050bea8
|
||||
06485707a818f8a93f8aa90cb321a38759fc253c444f317782962ca18d33101eab2c8
|
||||
cda04405a181f
|
||||
registration_upload: ba6cb41f1870e9db7e858440a664e6559d01fdbfb638bbf7
|
||||
e1c9004f20d5db71146e42585d25fa19913876edce4b5ee99b638eb37b1d8a8a76607
|
||||
efaa12299e828641ba4fbf1c46fc2c3776e0a0c9791f88a15b9ddfb5495d63ce92d8f
|
||||
58823bd0c7b0f0047682bd87a87e0c3553b9bcdce7e1ae3348570df20bf2747829b2d
|
||||
26e18240c0cbad3b4cdbd7d9d86512f87e43fac39e3785a17504aaa8508f81e3c1517
|
||||
b150259be478720935e175b1e34bbe625d0828a62ca9983f9a27aed27f5e
|
||||
KE1: 14cc586d982b6db9846c78e0b3c543591e95fbf2fc877fa0e5eff89897dd3050
|
||||
a6bcd29b5aecc3507fc1f8f7631af3d2f5105155222e48099e5e6085d8c1187a642e7
|
||||
eecf19b804a62817486663d6c6c239396f709b663a4350cda67d025687a
|
||||
KE2: 8ab71c17547f376ae787741c367142790087090cdde6327dabb2581197bffa59
|
||||
30635396b708ddb7fc10fb73c4e3a9258cd9c3f6f761b2c227853b5def228c85dd973
|
||||
a1ac59244f674da4a1c057961886661bd29e0c1346f0fcf75bf1c78d4781815c2f9f6
|
||||
f2f9fe0e370b256f6e82fb2e14c7ffc374d42caf26abf13dca169a6faafd5cff8baa9
|
||||
717090bc1fc5e1ba56acb93492d1a8b789f33ff29b6004c4be9a755ff590d7d00d6e8
|
||||
893e7e54e639aebf69d18f2182a9bb0f2e1c27c81ba73fa57f7ef652185f89114109f
|
||||
5a61cc8c9216fdd7398246bb7a0c20e2fbca2d8ae070cdffe5bb4b1c373e71be8e7d8
|
||||
f356ee5de37881533f10397bcd84d35445401c619d464ab3a134c71da4d9874f2f736
|
||||
189b8bbb659c28f8db25a58b9f089272132e3091efa87d6b07d10321ba464047be011
|
||||
3e91514aba299fd1553bcebb
|
||||
KE3: c4a0d5b8148f3ac0f8611b38de38bda085d4eb00d561397ae59676f36dc705be
|
||||
1c939e7bfdd7301103af5eb164bdfb70298aab889bd2ac797e419a82bfb442e6
|
||||
export_key: 6b50ae4dba956930c0465b4a26c3cee58e05afcab623c1c254ae34acc
|
||||
38babf954530a53475672ff46a1cf7fd53ef9e808f85b08793d021bb5c6d2a1bb9204
|
||||
f6
|
||||
session_key: c9bc2b7e2237f6fbeccd92dc6ec6d51faeb886492f8d23f21743a967
|
||||
597025215df02a4afb75349acbafeef9dfd4f19e6d38da8bea4912f7b691b70849b0d
|
||||
78e
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
"#,
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
static FAKE_TEST_VECTORS: &[&str] = &[r#"
|
||||
### OPAQUE-3DH Fake Test Vector 1
|
||||
|
||||
#### Configuration
|
||||
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
OPRF: 0001
|
||||
Hash: SHA512
|
||||
MHF: Identity
|
||||
KDF: HKDF-SHA512
|
||||
MAC: HMAC-SHA512
|
||||
EnvelopeMode: 01
|
||||
Group: ristretto255
|
||||
Context: 4f50415155452d504f43
|
||||
Nh: 64
|
||||
Npk: 32
|
||||
Nsk: 32
|
||||
Nm: 64
|
||||
Nx: 64
|
||||
Nok: 32
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
|
||||
#### Input Values
|
||||
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
client_identity: 616c696365
|
||||
server_identity: 626f62
|
||||
oprf_seed: d3cb00535339fe4063c7ba5506a990c243a2b5c77b06848a0be9a0568c
|
||||
252fb0d7425382babd267deeed669e56d1d5654c036211f49b42f4489f96f37100779
|
||||
f
|
||||
credential_identifier: 31323334
|
||||
masking_nonce: 3058799f42516228746821dc8c8530d0e8273ebde81941591d69ca
|
||||
5aea773090
|
||||
client_private_key: 83c9bcc31a9da0ffa4489900d3d1f85bb65c27f26e9ae4e3b
|
||||
66f6e02e098c503
|
||||
client_public_key: 56717b74a5e1770edb14c65f22cee0487046bd96e122ba97da
|
||||
ffed06c4bf4052
|
||||
server_private_key: 8d3a9355f9757e7071b3f836e3fb1461a6436e92971625b17
|
||||
cd7e580dd27c009
|
||||
server_public_key: 7a464761cb19c8b6e832fdfcfd18779b0edc246fe808f5de6c
|
||||
e7bdb54df41b67
|
||||
server_nonce: 4e2a8098173efa2968036f1762f2e5df41ab976fb1bfb91dae29950
|
||||
f8526de4c
|
||||
server_keyshare: 0e247410004d83d7cbe3af89c62ff03f942127aec4b0084c9eb5
|
||||
88e74ce6dd06
|
||||
server_private_keyshare: 326345820acc8aacf4948fce775a1fd265e4e93fd579
|
||||
cec8177d6389ee379b0a
|
||||
masking_key: e968bfe56ad934c3e1088115bcbf1af8b405fd0de94cdf301f9192cc
|
||||
2781de00617e568b14b7235cc1189265811ea354031ea39b62e31a104f181c01d3dae
|
||||
4b8
|
||||
KE1: 480b6c0066c9320c50dce20f8b6b63e4ded7681defd9da3f70ecdc15770f9e68
|
||||
05603c1acb64ea417c0dabaab858a5f9da046d4a0cdbf092034c00451ccdc6e1ee835
|
||||
5c91d5ed7aa5ea75b8a730ba8dc45f6b41ae9713e6aa7126211346e8754
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
|
||||
#### Output Values
|
||||
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
KE2: 04013bca360b4b9ba95b2f494927375e0f234dac23053822e466a9738f781522
|
||||
3058799f42516228746821dc8c8530d0e8273ebde81941591d69ca5aea77309078577
|
||||
13efdc95f69166737cd7a80ead60e1a1f805c1da9cccbc0d29120f34be291518798c7
|
||||
00793f232374e66182495b76b388d9e11f479580cc2297da02fecee88a99cea6bc411
|
||||
b9467e8bfa9a4006aba7f21b74b4ce3bccd686785878b0ec9b3fc4200228014d5d073
|
||||
69d42d1d1b1669ecd2ad8905734ca0a641d8f16667ca4e2a8098173efa2968036f176
|
||||
2f2e5df41ab976fb1bfb91dae29950f8526de4c0e247410004d83d7cbe3af89c62ff0
|
||||
3f942127aec4b0084c9eb588e74ce6dd06fb1a0fd81da51bc1d87c740c186d881ed79
|
||||
71fdba5ad1d5cfc94ffe6a731241c78ea7ea5dae503e987edc37355b7348883dc65cd
|
||||
b57aec04e64593007f98a405
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
"#];
|
||||
|
||||
macro_rules! parse {
|
||||
( $v:ident, $s:expr ) => {
|
||||
parse_default!($v, $s, vec![])
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
macro_rules! parse_default {
|
||||
( $v:ident, $s:expr, $d:expr ) => {
|
||||
match decode(&$v, $s) {
|
||||
Some(x) => x,
|
||||
None => $d,
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
macro_rules! rfc_to_params {
|
||||
( $v:ident ) => {
|
||||
$v.iter()
|
||||
.map(|x| populate_test_vectors(&serde_json::from_str(rfc_to_json(x).as_str()).unwrap()))
|
||||
.collect::<Vec<TestVectorParameters>>()
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn rfc_to_json(input: &str) -> String {
|
||||
let mut json = vec![];
|
||||
for line in input.lines() {
|
||||
// If line contains colon, then
|
||||
if line.contains(':') {
|
||||
if !json.is_empty() {
|
||||
// Adding closing quote for previous line, comma, and newline
|
||||
json.push("\",\n".to_string());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let mut iter = line.split(':');
|
||||
let key = iter.next().unwrap().split_whitespace().next().unwrap();
|
||||
let val = iter.next().unwrap().split_whitespace().next().unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
json.push(format!(" \"{}\": \"{}", key, val));
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
let s = line.trim().to_string();
|
||||
if s.contains("~") || s.contains("#") {
|
||||
// Ignore comment lines
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if s.len() > 0 {
|
||||
json.push(s);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
format!("{{\n{}\"\n}}", json.join(""))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn decode(values: &Value, key: &str) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
|
||||
values[key]
|
||||
.as_str()
|
||||
.and_then(|s| hex::decode(&s.to_string()).ok())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn populate_test_vectors(values: &Value) -> TestVectorParameters {
|
||||
TestVectorParameters {
|
||||
dummy_private_key: parse_default!(
|
||||
values,
|
||||
"client_private_key",
|
||||
vec![0u8; <PrivateKey as SizedBytes>::Len::to_usize()]
|
||||
),
|
||||
dummy_masking_key: parse_default!(values, "masking_key", vec![0u8; 64]),
|
||||
context: parse!(values, "Context"),
|
||||
envelope_mode: match values["EnvelopeMode"].as_str() {
|
||||
Some("01") => EnvelopeMode::Base,
|
||||
Some("02") => EnvelopeMode::CustomIdentifier,
|
||||
_ => panic!("Could not match envelope mode"),
|
||||
},
|
||||
client_private_key: decode(values, "client_private_key"),
|
||||
client_keyshare: parse!(values, "client_keyshare"),
|
||||
client_private_keyshare: parse!(values, "client_private_keyshare"),
|
||||
server_public_key: parse!(values, "server_public_key"),
|
||||
server_private_key: parse!(values, "server_private_key"),
|
||||
server_keyshare: parse!(values, "server_keyshare"),
|
||||
server_private_keyshare: parse!(values, "server_private_keyshare"),
|
||||
client_identity: decode(values, "client_identity"),
|
||||
server_identity: decode(values, "server_identity"),
|
||||
credential_identifier: parse!(values, "credential_identifier"),
|
||||
password: parse!(values, "password"),
|
||||
blind_registration: parse!(values, "blind_registration"),
|
||||
oprf_seed: parse!(values, "oprf_seed"),
|
||||
masking_nonce: parse!(values, "masking_nonce"),
|
||||
envelope_nonce: parse!(values, "envelope_nonce"),
|
||||
client_nonce: parse!(values, "client_nonce"),
|
||||
server_nonce: parse!(values, "server_nonce"),
|
||||
client_info: parse!(values, "client_info"),
|
||||
server_info: parse!(values, "server_info"),
|
||||
registration_request: parse!(values, "registration_request"),
|
||||
registration_response: parse!(values, "registration_response"),
|
||||
registration_upload: parse!(values, "registration_upload"),
|
||||
KE1: parse!(values, "KE1"),
|
||||
KE2: parse!(values, "KE2"),
|
||||
KE3: parse!(values, "KE3"),
|
||||
blind_login: parse!(values, "blind_login"),
|
||||
export_key: parse!(values, "export_key"),
|
||||
session_key: parse!(values, "session_key"),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn get_password_file_bytes(parameters: &TestVectorParameters) -> Result<Vec<u8>, ProtocolError> {
|
||||
let password_file = ServerRegistration::<Ristretto255Sha512NoSlowHash>::finish(
|
||||
RegistrationUpload::deserialize(¶meters.registration_upload[..]).unwrap(),
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(password_file.serialize())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn parse_identifiers(
|
||||
client_identity: Option<Vec<u8>>,
|
||||
server_identity: Option<Vec<u8>>,
|
||||
) -> Option<Identifiers> {
|
||||
match (client_identity, server_identity) {
|
||||
(None, None) => None,
|
||||
(Some(x), None) => Some(Identifiers::ClientIdentifier(x)),
|
||||
(None, Some(y)) => Some(Identifiers::ServerIdentifier(y)),
|
||||
(Some(x), Some(y)) => Some(Identifiers::ClientAndServerIdentifiers(x, y)),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_registration_request() -> Result<(), ProtocolError> {
|
||||
for parameters in rfc_to_params!(TEST_VECTORS) {
|
||||
let mut rng = CycleRng::new(parameters.blind_registration.to_vec());
|
||||
let client_registration_start_result =
|
||||
ClientRegistration::<Ristretto255Sha512NoSlowHash>::start(
|
||||
&mut rng,
|
||||
¶meters.password,
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
hex::encode(¶meters.registration_request),
|
||||
hex::encode(client_registration_start_result.message.serialize())
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_registration_response() -> Result<(), ProtocolError> {
|
||||
for parameters in rfc_to_params!(TEST_VECTORS) {
|
||||
let server_setup = ServerSetup::<Ristretto255Sha512NoSlowHash>::deserialize(
|
||||
&[
|
||||
¶meters.oprf_seed[..],
|
||||
¶meters.server_private_key[..],
|
||||
¶meters.dummy_private_key[..],
|
||||
]
|
||||
.concat(),
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
let server_registration_start_result =
|
||||
ServerRegistration::<Ristretto255Sha512NoSlowHash>::start(
|
||||
&server_setup,
|
||||
RegistrationRequest::deserialize(¶meters.registration_request[..]).unwrap(),
|
||||
¶meters.credential_identifier,
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
hex::encode(parameters.registration_response),
|
||||
hex::encode(server_registration_start_result.message.serialize())
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_registration_upload() -> Result<(), ProtocolError> {
|
||||
for parameters in rfc_to_params!(TEST_VECTORS) {
|
||||
let mut rng = CycleRng::new(parameters.blind_registration.to_vec());
|
||||
let client_registration_start_result =
|
||||
ClientRegistration::<Ristretto255Sha512NoSlowHash>::start(
|
||||
&mut rng,
|
||||
¶meters.password,
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let mut finish_registration_rng = CycleRng::new(parameters.envelope_nonce);
|
||||
let result = client_registration_start_result.state.finish(
|
||||
&mut finish_registration_rng,
|
||||
RegistrationResponse::deserialize(¶meters.registration_response[..]).unwrap(),
|
||||
match parse_identifiers(parameters.client_identity, parameters.server_identity) {
|
||||
None => ClientRegistrationFinishParameters::Default,
|
||||
Some(ids) => ClientRegistrationFinishParameters::WithIdentifiers(ids),
|
||||
},
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
hex::encode(parameters.registration_upload),
|
||||
hex::encode(result.message.serialize())
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
hex::encode(parameters.export_key),
|
||||
hex::encode(result.export_key.to_vec())
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_ke1() -> Result<(), ProtocolError> {
|
||||
for parameters in rfc_to_params!(TEST_VECTORS) {
|
||||
let client_login_start = [
|
||||
parameters.blind_login,
|
||||
parameters.client_private_keyshare,
|
||||
parameters.client_nonce,
|
||||
]
|
||||
.concat();
|
||||
let mut client_login_start_rng = CycleRng::new(client_login_start);
|
||||
let client_login_start_result = ClientLogin::<Ristretto255Sha512NoSlowHash>::start(
|
||||
&mut client_login_start_rng,
|
||||
¶meters.password,
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
hex::encode(¶meters.KE1),
|
||||
hex::encode(client_login_start_result.message.serialize())
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_ke2() -> Result<(), ProtocolError> {
|
||||
for parameters in rfc_to_params!(TEST_VECTORS) {
|
||||
let server_setup = ServerSetup::<Ristretto255Sha512NoSlowHash>::deserialize(
|
||||
&[
|
||||
¶meters.oprf_seed[..],
|
||||
¶meters.server_private_key[..],
|
||||
¶meters.dummy_private_key[..],
|
||||
]
|
||||
.concat(),
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let record = ServerRegistration::<Ristretto255Sha512NoSlowHash>::deserialize(
|
||||
&get_password_file_bytes(¶meters)?[..],
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let mut server_private_keyshare_and_nonce_rng = CycleRng::new(
|
||||
[
|
||||
parameters.masking_nonce,
|
||||
parameters.server_private_keyshare,
|
||||
parameters.server_nonce,
|
||||
]
|
||||
.concat(),
|
||||
);
|
||||
let server_login_start_result = ServerLogin::<Ristretto255Sha512NoSlowHash>::start(
|
||||
&mut server_private_keyshare_and_nonce_rng,
|
||||
&server_setup,
|
||||
Some(record),
|
||||
CredentialRequest::<Ristretto255Sha512NoSlowHash>::deserialize(¶meters.KE1[..])
|
||||
.unwrap(),
|
||||
¶meters.credential_identifier,
|
||||
match parse_identifiers(parameters.client_identity, parameters.server_identity) {
|
||||
None => ServerLoginStartParameters::WithContext(parameters.context.to_vec()),
|
||||
Some(ids) => ServerLoginStartParameters::WithContextAndIdentifiers(
|
||||
parameters.context.to_vec(),
|
||||
ids,
|
||||
),
|
||||
},
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
hex::encode(¶meters.KE2),
|
||||
hex::encode(server_login_start_result.message.serialize())
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_ke3() -> Result<(), ProtocolError> {
|
||||
for parameters in rfc_to_params!(TEST_VECTORS) {
|
||||
let client_login_start = [
|
||||
parameters.blind_login,
|
||||
parameters.client_private_keyshare,
|
||||
parameters.client_nonce,
|
||||
]
|
||||
.concat();
|
||||
let mut client_login_start_rng = CycleRng::new(client_login_start);
|
||||
let client_login_start_result = ClientLogin::<Ristretto255Sha512NoSlowHash>::start(
|
||||
&mut client_login_start_rng,
|
||||
¶meters.password,
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let client_login_finish_result = client_login_start_result.state.finish(
|
||||
CredentialResponse::<Ristretto255Sha512NoSlowHash>::deserialize(¶meters.KE2[..])?,
|
||||
match parse_identifiers(parameters.client_identity, parameters.server_identity) {
|
||||
None => ClientLoginFinishParameters::WithContext(parameters.context),
|
||||
Some(ids) => {
|
||||
ClientLoginFinishParameters::WithContextAndIdentifiers(parameters.context, ids)
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
hex::encode(¶meters.session_key),
|
||||
hex::encode(&client_login_finish_result.session_key)
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
hex::encode(¶meters.KE3),
|
||||
hex::encode(client_login_finish_result.message.serialize())
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
hex::encode(¶meters.export_key),
|
||||
hex::encode(client_login_finish_result.export_key)
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_server_login_finish() -> Result<(), ProtocolError> {
|
||||
for parameters in rfc_to_params!(TEST_VECTORS) {
|
||||
let server_setup = ServerSetup::<Ristretto255Sha512NoSlowHash>::deserialize(
|
||||
&[
|
||||
¶meters.oprf_seed[..],
|
||||
¶meters.server_private_key[..],
|
||||
¶meters.dummy_private_key[..],
|
||||
]
|
||||
.concat(),
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let record = ServerRegistration::<Ristretto255Sha512NoSlowHash>::deserialize(
|
||||
&get_password_file_bytes(¶meters)?[..],
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let mut server_private_keyshare_and_nonce_rng = CycleRng::new(
|
||||
[
|
||||
parameters.masking_nonce,
|
||||
parameters.server_private_keyshare,
|
||||
parameters.server_nonce,
|
||||
]
|
||||
.concat(),
|
||||
);
|
||||
let server_login_start_result = ServerLogin::<Ristretto255Sha512NoSlowHash>::start(
|
||||
&mut server_private_keyshare_and_nonce_rng,
|
||||
&server_setup,
|
||||
Some(record),
|
||||
CredentialRequest::<Ristretto255Sha512NoSlowHash>::deserialize(¶meters.KE1[..])
|
||||
.unwrap(),
|
||||
¶meters.credential_identifier,
|
||||
match parse_identifiers(parameters.client_identity, parameters.server_identity) {
|
||||
None => ServerLoginStartParameters::WithContext(parameters.context.to_vec()),
|
||||
Some(ids) => ServerLoginStartParameters::WithContextAndIdentifiers(
|
||||
parameters.context.to_vec(),
|
||||
ids,
|
||||
),
|
||||
},
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let server_login_result = server_login_start_result
|
||||
.state
|
||||
.finish(CredentialFinalization::deserialize(¶meters.KE3[..])?)?;
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
hex::encode(parameters.session_key),
|
||||
hex::encode(&server_login_result.session_key)
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_fake_vectors() -> Result<(), ProtocolError> {
|
||||
for parameters in rfc_to_params!(FAKE_TEST_VECTORS) {
|
||||
let server_setup = ServerSetup::<Ristretto255Sha512NoSlowHash>::deserialize(
|
||||
&[
|
||||
¶meters.oprf_seed[..],
|
||||
¶meters.server_private_key[..],
|
||||
¶meters.dummy_private_key[..],
|
||||
]
|
||||
.concat(),
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let mut server_private_keyshare_and_nonce_rng = CycleRng::new(
|
||||
[
|
||||
parameters.dummy_masking_key,
|
||||
parameters.masking_nonce,
|
||||
parameters.server_private_keyshare,
|
||||
parameters.server_nonce,
|
||||
]
|
||||
.concat(),
|
||||
);
|
||||
let server_login_start_result = ServerLogin::<Ristretto255Sha512NoSlowHash>::start(
|
||||
&mut server_private_keyshare_and_nonce_rng,
|
||||
&server_setup,
|
||||
None,
|
||||
CredentialRequest::<Ristretto255Sha512NoSlowHash>::deserialize(¶meters.KE1[..])
|
||||
.unwrap(),
|
||||
¶meters.credential_identifier,
|
||||
match parse_identifiers(parameters.client_identity, parameters.server_identity) {
|
||||
None => ServerLoginStartParameters::WithContext(parameters.context.to_vec()),
|
||||
Some(ids) => ServerLoginStartParameters::WithContextAndIdentifiers(
|
||||
parameters.context.to_vec(),
|
||||
ids,
|
||||
),
|
||||
},
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
hex::encode(¶meters.KE2),
|
||||
hex::encode(server_login_start_result.message.serialize())
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,230 +0,0 @@
|
||||
// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
|
||||
// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::{
|
||||
ciphersuite::CipherSuite,
|
||||
envelope::Envelope,
|
||||
group::Group,
|
||||
key_exchange::{
|
||||
traits::{KeyExchange, ToBytes},
|
||||
tripledh::{TripleDH, NONCE_LEN},
|
||||
},
|
||||
keypair::{KeyPair, SizedBytes, X25519KeyPair},
|
||||
opaque::*,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
use curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoPoint;
|
||||
use generic_array::typenum::Unsigned;
|
||||
use proptest::{collection::vec, prelude::*};
|
||||
use rand_core::{OsRng, RngCore};
|
||||
|
||||
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
|
||||
use std::convert::TryFrom;
|
||||
|
||||
struct Default;
|
||||
impl CipherSuite for Default {
|
||||
type Group = RistrettoPoint;
|
||||
type KeyFormat = crate::keypair::X25519KeyPair;
|
||||
type KeyExchange = TripleDH;
|
||||
type Hash = sha2::Sha256;
|
||||
type SlowHash = crate::slow_hash::NoOpHash;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn random_ristretto_point() -> RistrettoPoint {
|
||||
let mut rng = OsRng;
|
||||
let mut random_bits = [0u8; 64];
|
||||
rng.fill_bytes(&mut random_bits);
|
||||
|
||||
// This is because RistrettoPoint is on an obsolete sha2 version
|
||||
let mut bits = [0u8; 64];
|
||||
let mut hasher = sha2::Sha512::new();
|
||||
hasher.update(&random_bits[..]);
|
||||
bits.copy_from_slice(&hasher.finalize());
|
||||
|
||||
RistrettoPoint::from_uniform_bytes(&bits)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn client_registration_roundtrip() {
|
||||
let pw = b"hunter2";
|
||||
let mut rng = OsRng;
|
||||
let sc = <RistrettoPoint as Group>::random_scalar(&mut rng);
|
||||
// serialization order: scalar, password
|
||||
let bytes: Vec<u8> = [&sc.as_bytes()[..], &pw[..]].concat();
|
||||
let reg = ClientRegistration::<Default>::try_from(&bytes[..]).unwrap();
|
||||
let reg_bytes = reg.to_bytes();
|
||||
assert_eq!(reg_bytes, bytes);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn server_registration_roundtrip() {
|
||||
// If we don't have envelope and client_pk, the server registration just
|
||||
// contains the prf key
|
||||
let mut rng = OsRng;
|
||||
let sc = <RistrettoPoint as Group>::random_scalar(&mut rng);
|
||||
let mut oprf_bytes: Vec<u8> = vec![];
|
||||
oprf_bytes.extend_from_slice(sc.as_bytes());
|
||||
let reg = ServerRegistration::<Default>::try_from(&oprf_bytes[..]).unwrap();
|
||||
let reg_bytes = reg.to_bytes();
|
||||
assert_eq!(reg_bytes, oprf_bytes);
|
||||
// If we do have envelope and client pk, the server registration contains
|
||||
// the whole kit
|
||||
let key_len =
|
||||
<<<Default as CipherSuite>::KeyFormat as KeyPair>::Repr as SizedBytes>::Len::to_usize();
|
||||
let envelope_size = key_len + Envelope::<sha2::Sha256>::additional_size();
|
||||
let mut mock_envelope_bytes = vec![0u8; envelope_size];
|
||||
rng.fill_bytes(&mut mock_envelope_bytes);
|
||||
println!("{}", mock_envelope_bytes.len());
|
||||
let mock_client_kp = Default::generate_random_keypair(&mut rng).unwrap();
|
||||
// serialization order: scalar, public key, envelope
|
||||
let mut bytes = Vec::<u8>::new();
|
||||
bytes.extend_from_slice(sc.as_bytes());
|
||||
bytes.extend_from_slice(&mock_client_kp.public().to_arr());
|
||||
bytes.extend_from_slice(&mock_envelope_bytes);
|
||||
let reg = ServerRegistration::<Default>::try_from(&bytes[..]).unwrap();
|
||||
let reg_bytes = reg.to_bytes();
|
||||
assert_eq!(reg_bytes, bytes);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn register_first_message_roundtrip() {
|
||||
let pt = random_ristretto_point();
|
||||
let pt_bytes = pt.to_arr();
|
||||
let r1 = RegisterFirstMessage::<RistrettoPoint>::try_from(pt_bytes.as_slice()).unwrap();
|
||||
let r1_bytes = r1.to_bytes();
|
||||
assert_eq!(pt_bytes, r1_bytes);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn register_second_message_roundtrip() {
|
||||
let pt = random_ristretto_point();
|
||||
let pt_bytes = pt.to_arr();
|
||||
|
||||
let message = pt_bytes.to_vec();
|
||||
let r2 = RegisterSecondMessage::<RistrettoPoint>::try_from(&message[..]).unwrap();
|
||||
let r2_bytes = r2.to_bytes();
|
||||
assert_eq!(message, r2_bytes);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn register_third_message_roundtrip() {
|
||||
let mut rng = OsRng;
|
||||
let skp = Default::generate_random_keypair(&mut rng).unwrap();
|
||||
let pubkey_bytes = skp.public().to_arr();
|
||||
|
||||
let mut key = [0u8; 32];
|
||||
rng.fill_bytes(&mut key);
|
||||
|
||||
let mut msg = [0u8; 32];
|
||||
rng.fill_bytes(&mut msg);
|
||||
|
||||
let (ciphertext, _) =
|
||||
Envelope::<sha2::Sha256>::seal(&key, &msg, &pubkey_bytes, &mut rng).unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
let message: Vec<u8> = [&ciphertext.to_bytes(), &pubkey_bytes[..]].concat();
|
||||
let r3 = RegisterThirdMessage::<X25519KeyPair, sha2::Sha256>::try_from(&message[..]).unwrap();
|
||||
let r3_bytes = r3.to_bytes();
|
||||
assert_eq!(message, r3_bytes);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn client_login_roundtrip() {
|
||||
let pw = b"hunter2";
|
||||
let mut rng = OsRng;
|
||||
let sc = <RistrettoPoint as Group>::random_scalar(&mut rng);
|
||||
|
||||
let client_e_kp = Default::generate_random_keypair(&mut rng).unwrap();
|
||||
let mut client_nonce = [0u8; NONCE_LEN];
|
||||
rng.fill_bytes(&mut client_nonce);
|
||||
|
||||
let l1_data = [&sc.to_bytes()[..], &client_nonce, client_e_kp.public()].concat();
|
||||
let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
|
||||
hasher.update(l1_data);
|
||||
let hashed_l1 = hasher.finalize();
|
||||
|
||||
// serialization order: scalar, password, ke1_state
|
||||
let bytes: Vec<u8> = [
|
||||
&sc.as_bytes()[..],
|
||||
&pw[..],
|
||||
client_e_kp.public(),
|
||||
&client_nonce,
|
||||
hashed_l1.as_slice(),
|
||||
]
|
||||
.concat();
|
||||
let reg = ClientLogin::<Default>::try_from(&bytes[..]).unwrap();
|
||||
let reg_bytes = reg.to_bytes();
|
||||
assert_eq!(reg_bytes, bytes);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn login_first_message_roundtrip() {
|
||||
let mut rng = OsRng;
|
||||
|
||||
let client_e_kp = Default::generate_random_keypair(&mut rng).unwrap();
|
||||
let mut client_nonce = [0u8; NONCE_LEN];
|
||||
rng.fill_bytes(&mut client_nonce);
|
||||
|
||||
let ke1m: Vec<u8> = [&client_nonce[..], &client_e_kp.public()].concat();
|
||||
let reg = <TripleDH as KeyExchange<sha2::Sha256, crate::keypair::X25519KeyPair>>::KE1Message::try_from(
|
||||
&ke1m[..],
|
||||
)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
let reg_bytes = reg.to_bytes();
|
||||
assert_eq!(reg_bytes, ke1m);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
proptest! {
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_nocrash_register_first_message(bytes in vec(any::<u8>(), 0..200)) {
|
||||
RegisterFirstMessage::<RistrettoPoint>::try_from(&bytes[..]).map_or(true, |_| true);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_nocrash_register_second_message(bytes in vec(any::<u8>(), 0..200)) {
|
||||
RegisterSecondMessage::<RistrettoPoint>::try_from(&bytes[..]).map_or(true, |_| true);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_nocrash_register_third_message(bytes in vec(any::<u8>(), 0..200)) {
|
||||
RegisterThirdMessage::<crate::keypair::X25519KeyPair, sha2::Sha512>::try_from(&bytes[..]).map_or(true, |_| true);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_nocrash_login_first_message(bytes in vec(any::<u8>(), 0..500)) {
|
||||
LoginFirstMessage::<Default>::try_from(&bytes[..]).map_or(true, |_| true);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_nocrash_login_second_message(bytes in vec(any::<u8>(), 0..500)) {
|
||||
LoginSecondMessage::<Default>::try_from(&bytes[..]).map_or(true, |_| true);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_nocrash_login_third_message(bytes in vec(any::<u8>(), 0..500)) {
|
||||
LoginThirdMessage::<Default>::try_from(&bytes[..]).map_or(true, |_| true);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_nocrash_client_registration(bytes in vec(any::<u8>(), 0..700)) {
|
||||
ClientRegistration::<Default>::try_from(&bytes[..]).map_or(true, |_| true);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_nocrash_server_registration(bytes in vec(any::<u8>(), 0..700)) {
|
||||
ServerRegistration::<Default>::try_from(&bytes[..]).map_or(true, |_| true);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_nocrash_client_login(bytes in vec(any::<u8>(), 0..700)) {
|
||||
ClientLogin::<Default>::try_from(&bytes[..]).map_or(true, |_| true);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_nocrash_server_login(bytes in vec(any::<u8>(), 0..700)) {
|
||||
ServerLogin::<Default>::try_from(&bytes[..]).map_or(true, |_| true);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
|
||||
// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
|
||||
// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::tests::mock_rng::CycleRng;
|
||||
use crate::{errors::*, group::Group, oprf};
|
||||
use curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoPoint;
|
||||
use generic_array::GenericArray;
|
||||
use serde_json::Value;
|
||||
use sha2::Sha512;
|
||||
|
||||
struct VOPRFTestVectorParameters {
|
||||
sksm: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
input: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
blind: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
blinded_element: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
evaluation_element: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
output: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Taken from https://github.com/cfrg/draft-irtf-cfrg-voprf/blob/master/draft-irtf-cfrg-voprf.md
|
||||
// in base mode
|
||||
static OPRF_RISTRETTO255_SHA512: &[&str] = &[
|
||||
r#"
|
||||
{
|
||||
"sksm": "758cbac0e1eb4265d80f6e6489d9a74d788f7ddeda67d7fb3c08b08f44bda30a",
|
||||
"input": "00",
|
||||
"blind": "c604c785ada70d77a5256ae21767de8c3304115237d262134f5e46e512cf8e03",
|
||||
"blinded_element": "3c7f2d901c0d4f245503a186086fbdf5d8b4408432b25c5163e8b5a19c258348",
|
||||
"evaluation_element": "fc6c2b854553bf1ed6674072ed0bde1a9911e02b4bd64aa02cfb428f30251e77",
|
||||
"output": "d8ed12382086c74564ae19b7a2b5ed9bdc52656d1fc151faaae51aaba86291e8df0b2143a92f24d44d5efd0892e2e26721d27d88745343493634a66d3a925e3a"
|
||||
}
|
||||
"#,
|
||||
r#"
|
||||
{
|
||||
"sksm": "758cbac0e1eb4265d80f6e6489d9a74d788f7ddeda67d7fb3c08b08f44bda30a",
|
||||
"input": "5a5a5a5a5a5a5a5a5a5a5a5a5a5a5a5a5a",
|
||||
"blind": "5ed895206bfc53316d307b23e46ecc6623afb3086da74189a416012be037e50b",
|
||||
"blinded_element": "28a5e797b710f76d20a52507145fbf320a574ec2c8ab0e33e65dd2c277d0ee56",
|
||||
"evaluation_element": "345e140b707257ae83d4911f7ead3177891e7a62c54097732802c4c7a98ab25a",
|
||||
"output": "4d5f4221b5ebfd4d1a9dd54830e1ed0bce5a8f30a792723a6fddfe6cfe9f86bb1d95a3725818aeb725eb0b1b52e01ee9a72f47042372ef66c307770054d674fc"
|
||||
}
|
||||
"#,
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
fn decode(values: &Value, key: &str) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
|
||||
values[key]
|
||||
.as_str()
|
||||
.and_then(|s| hex::decode(&s.to_string()).ok())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn populate_test_vectors(values: &Value) -> VOPRFTestVectorParameters {
|
||||
VOPRFTestVectorParameters {
|
||||
sksm: decode(&values, "sksm").unwrap(),
|
||||
input: decode(&values, "input").unwrap(),
|
||||
blind: decode(&values, "blind").unwrap(),
|
||||
blinded_element: decode(&values, "blinded_element").unwrap(),
|
||||
evaluation_element: decode(&values, "evaluation_element").unwrap(),
|
||||
output: decode(&values, "output").unwrap(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Tests input -> blind, blinded_element
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_blind() -> Result<(), PakeError> {
|
||||
for tv in OPRF_RISTRETTO255_SHA512 {
|
||||
let parameters = populate_test_vectors(&serde_json::from_str(tv).unwrap());
|
||||
let mut rng = CycleRng::new(parameters.blind.to_vec());
|
||||
|
||||
let (token, blinded_element) =
|
||||
oprf::blind::<_, RistrettoPoint, Sha512>(¶meters.input, &mut rng)?;
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
¶meters.blind,
|
||||
&RistrettoPoint::scalar_as_bytes(&token.blind).to_vec()
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
¶meters.blinded_element,
|
||||
&blinded_element.to_arr().to_vec()
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Tests sksm, blinded_element -> evaluation_element
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_evaluate() -> Result<(), PakeError> {
|
||||
for tv in OPRF_RISTRETTO255_SHA512 {
|
||||
let parameters = populate_test_vectors(&serde_json::from_str(tv).unwrap());
|
||||
let evaluation_element = oprf::evaluate::<RistrettoPoint>(
|
||||
RistrettoPoint::from_element_slice(GenericArray::from_slice(
|
||||
¶meters.blinded_element,
|
||||
))
|
||||
.unwrap(),
|
||||
&RistrettoPoint::from_scalar_slice(GenericArray::from_slice(¶meters.sksm)).unwrap(),
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
¶meters.evaluation_element,
|
||||
&evaluation_element.to_arr().to_vec()
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Tests input, blind, evaluation_element -> output
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_finalize() -> Result<(), PakeError> {
|
||||
for tv in OPRF_RISTRETTO255_SHA512 {
|
||||
let parameters = populate_test_vectors(&serde_json::from_str(tv).unwrap());
|
||||
|
||||
let output = oprf::finalize::<RistrettoPoint, Sha512>(
|
||||
¶meters.input,
|
||||
&RistrettoPoint::from_scalar_slice(GenericArray::from_slice(¶meters.blind))?,
|
||||
RistrettoPoint::from_element_slice(GenericArray::from_slice(
|
||||
¶meters.evaluation_element,
|
||||
))?,
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(¶meters.output, &output.to_vec());
|
||||
}
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user