Renaming shared secret to session key (#133)

This commit is contained in:
Kevin Lewi
2021-02-08 11:19:06 -08:00
committed by GitHub
parent 6307ea9eed
commit 160ac47ffa
7 changed files with 52 additions and 55 deletions
+3 -3
View File
@@ -184,13 +184,13 @@ fn open_locker(
// Server sends locker contents, encrypted under the session key, to the client
let encrypted_locker_contents =
encrypt(&server_login_finish_result.shared_secret, &locker.contents);
encrypt(&server_login_finish_result.session_key, &locker.contents);
// Client decrypts contents of locker, first under the shared secret, and then under the export key
// Client decrypts contents of locker, first under the session key, and then under the export key
let plaintext = decrypt(
&client_login_finish_result.export_key,
&decrypt(
&client_login_finish_result.shared_secret,
&client_login_finish_result.session_key,
&encrypted_locker_contents,
),
);
+1 -1
View File
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ fn account_login(
.finish(CredentialFinalization::deserialize(&credential_finalization_bytes[..]).unwrap())
.unwrap();
client_login_finish_result.shared_secret == server_login_finish_result.shared_secret
client_login_finish_result.session_key == server_login_finish_result.session_key
}
fn main() {
+13 -15
View File
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ static STR_HANDSHAKE_SECRET: &[u8] = b"handshake secret";
static STR_SERVER_MAC: &[u8] = b"server mac";
static STR_SERVER_ENC: &[u8] = b"handshake enc";
static STR_ENCRYPTION_PAD: &[u8] = b"encryption pad";
static STR_SESSION_SECRET: &[u8] = b"session secret";
static STR_SESSION_KEY: &[u8] = b"session secret";
static STR_OPAQUE: &[u8] = b"OPAQUE ";
/// The Triple Diffie-Hellman key exchange implementation
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ impl<D: Hash, G: Group> KeyExchange<D, G> for TripleDH {
GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&server_nonce_bytes)
};
let (session_secret, km2, ke2, km3) = derive_3dh_keys::<D, G>(
let (session_key, km2, ke2, km3) = derive_3dh_keys::<D, G>(
TripleDHComponents {
pk1: ke1_message.client_e_pk.clone(),
sk1: server_e_kp.private().clone(),
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ impl<D: Hash, G: Group> KeyExchange<D, G> for TripleDH {
KE2State {
km3,
hashed_transcript,
session_secret,
session_key,
},
KE2Message {
server_nonce,
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ impl<D: Hash, G: Group> KeyExchange<D, G> for TripleDH {
id_u: Vec<u8>,
id_s: Vec<u8>,
) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>, Self::KE3Message), ProtocolError> {
let (session_secret, km2, ke2, km3) = derive_3dh_keys::<D, G>(
let (session_key, km2, ke2, km3) = derive_3dh_keys::<D, G>(
TripleDHComponents {
pk1: ke2_message.server_e_pk.clone(),
sk1: ke1_state.client_e_sk.clone(),
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ impl<D: Hash, G: Group> KeyExchange<D, G> for TripleDH {
Ok((
plaintext,
session_secret.to_vec(),
session_key.to_vec(),
KE3Message {
mac: client_mac.finalize().into_bytes(),
},
@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ impl<D: Hash, G: Group> KeyExchange<D, G> for TripleDH {
));
}
Ok(ke2_state.session_secret.to_vec())
Ok(ke2_state.session_key.to_vec())
}
fn ke2_message_size() -> usize {
@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ impl TryFrom<&[u8]> for KE1Message {
pub struct KE2State<HashLen: ArrayLength<u8>> {
km3: GenericArray<u8, HashLen>,
hashed_transcript: GenericArray<u8, HashLen>,
session_secret: GenericArray<u8, HashLen>,
session_key: GenericArray<u8, HashLen>,
}
/// The second key exchange message
@@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ impl<HashLen: ArrayLength<u8>> ToBytes for KE2State<HashLen> {
[
&self.km3[..],
&self.hashed_transcript[..],
&self.session_secret[..],
&self.session_key[..],
]
.concat()
}
@@ -362,9 +362,7 @@ impl<HashLen: ArrayLength<u8>> TryFrom<&[u8]> for KE2State<HashLen> {
hashed_transcript: GenericArray::clone_from_slice(
&checked_bytes[hash_len..2 * hash_len],
),
session_secret: GenericArray::clone_from_slice(
&checked_bytes[2 * hash_len..3 * hash_len],
),
session_key: GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&checked_bytes[2 * hash_len..3 * hash_len]),
})
}
}
@@ -419,7 +417,7 @@ struct TripleDHComponents {
sk3: Key,
}
// Consists of a shared secret, followed by two mac keys and an encryption key: (session_secret, km2, ke2, km3)
// Consists of a session key, followed by two mac keys and an encryption key: (session_key, km2, ke2, km3)
type TripleDHDerivationResult<D> = (
GenericArray<u8, <D as FixedOutput>::OutputSize>,
GenericArray<u8, <D as FixedOutput>::OutputSize>,
@@ -453,7 +451,7 @@ impl<HashLen: ArrayLength<u8>> TryFrom<&[u8]> for KE3Message<HashLen> {
// Helper functions
// Internal function which takes the public and private components of the client and server keypairs, along
// with some auxiliary metadata, to produce the shared secret and two MAC keys
// with some auxiliary metadata, to produce the session key and two MAC keys
fn derive_3dh_keys<D: Hash, G: Group>(
dh: TripleDHComponents,
client_nonce: &GenericArray<u8, NonceLen>,
@@ -479,7 +477,7 @@ fn derive_3dh_keys<D: Hash, G: Group>(
let extracted_ikm = Hkdf::<D>::new(None, &ikm);
let handshake_secret = derive_secrets::<D>(&extracted_ikm, &STR_HANDSHAKE_SECRET, &info)?;
let session_secret = derive_secrets::<D>(&extracted_ikm, &STR_SESSION_SECRET, &info)?;
let session_key = derive_secrets::<D>(&extracted_ikm, &STR_SESSION_KEY, &info)?;
let km2 = hkdf_expand_label::<D>(
&handshake_secret,
@@ -501,7 +499,7 @@ fn derive_3dh_keys<D: Hash, G: Group>(
)?;
Ok((
GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&session_secret),
GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&session_key),
GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&km2),
GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&ke2),
GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&km3),
+14 -15
View File
@@ -14,9 +14,8 @@
//! to be kept consistent throughout protocol execution. These include:
//! * a finite cyclic group along with a point representation,
//! * a key exchange protocol,
//! * a hashing function,
//! * a slow hashing function, and
//! * an authenticated encryption algorithm.
//! * a hashing function, and
//! * a slow hashing function.
//!
//! We will use the following choices in this example:
//! ```
@@ -293,7 +292,7 @@
//! In the third step of login, the client takes as input a [CredentialResponse] from the server.
//! The client runs [ClientLogin::finish] and produces an output consisting of
//! a [CredentialFinalization] to be sent to the server to complete the protocol,
//! the `shared_secret` sequence of bytes which will match the server's shared secret upon a successful login.
//! the `session_key` sequence of bytes which will match the server's session key upon a successful login.
//! ```
//! # use opaque_ke::{
//! # errors::ProtocolError,
@@ -340,7 +339,7 @@
//!
//! ### Server Login Finish
//! In the fourth step of login, the server takes as input a [CredentialFinalization] from the client and runs [ServerLogin::finish] to
//! produce an output consisting of the `shared_secret` sequence of bytes which will match the client's shared secret upon a successful login.
//! produce an output consisting of the `session_key` sequence of bytes which will match the client's session key upon a successful login.
//! ```
//! # use opaque_ke::{
//! # errors::ProtocolError,
@@ -387,13 +386,13 @@
//! )?;
//!
//! assert_eq!(
//! client_login_finish_result.shared_secret,
//! server_login_finish_result.shared_secret,
//! client_login_finish_result.session_key,
//! server_login_finish_result.session_key,
//! );
//! # Ok::<(), ProtocolError>(())
//! ```
//! If the protocol completes successfully, then the server obtains a `server_login_finish_result.shared_secret` which is guaranteed to
//! match `client_login_finish_result.shared_secret` (see the [Shared Secret](#shared-secret) section).
//! If the protocol completes successfully, then the server obtains a `server_login_finish_result.session_key` which is guaranteed to
//! match `client_login_finish_result.session_key` (see the [Session Key](#session-key) section).
//! Otherwise, on failure, the [ServerLogin::finish] algorithm outputs the error [InvalidLoginError](errors::PakeError::InvalidLoginError).
//!
//! # Advanced Usage
@@ -402,14 +401,14 @@
//! execution of the main protocol, but can provide additional security benefits which can be suitable for various applications that rely on
//! OPAQUE for authentication.
//!
//! ## Shared Secret
//! ## Session Key
//!
//! Upon a successful completion of the OPAQUE protocol (the client runs login with the same password used during registration),
//! the client and server have access to a shared secret, which is a pseudorandomly distributed 32-byte string which only the client
//! and server know. Multiple login runs using the same password for the same client will produce different shared secrets, distributed
//! as uniformly random strings. Thus, the shared secret can be used as a session secret for a secure channel between the client and server.
//! the client and server have access to a session key, which is a pseudorandomly distributed 32-byte string which only the client
//! and server know. Multiple login runs using the same password for the same client will produce different session keys, distributed
//! as uniformly random strings. Thus, the session key can be used to establish a secure channel between the client and server.
//!
//! The shared secret can be accessed from the `shared_secret` field of [ClientLoginFinishResult] and [ServerLoginFinishResult]. See
//! The session key can be accessed from the `session_key` field of [ClientLoginFinishResult] and [ServerLoginFinishResult]. See
//! the combination of [Client Login Finish](#client-login-finish) and [Server Login Finish](#server-login-finish) for example usage.
//!
//! ## Checking Server Consistency
@@ -557,7 +556,7 @@
//! By default, neither of these public identifiers need to be supplied to the OPAQUE protocol.
//!
//! But, for applications that wish to cryptographically bind these identities to
//! the registered password file as well as the shared secret output by the login phase, these custom identifiers can be specified through
//! the registered password file as well as the session key output by the login phase, these custom identifiers can be specified through
//! [ClientRegistrationFinishParameters::WithIdentifiers] in [Client Registration Finish](#client-registration-finish):
//! ```
//! # use opaque_ke::{
+8 -8
View File
@@ -497,8 +497,8 @@ impl Default for ClientLoginFinishParameters {
pub struct ClientLoginFinishResult<CS: CipherSuite> {
/// The message to send to the server to complete the protocol
pub message: CredentialFinalization<CS>,
/// The shared session secret
pub shared_secret: Vec<u8>,
/// The session key
pub session_key: Vec<u8>,
/// The client-side export key
pub export_key: GenericArray<u8, <CS::Hash as Digest>::OutputSize>,
/// The server's static public key
@@ -631,7 +631,7 @@ impl<CS: CipherSuite> ClientLogin<CS> {
]
.concat();
let (confidential_info, shared_secret, ke3_message) = CS::KeyExchange::generate_ke3(
let (confidential_info, session_key, ke3_message) = CS::KeyExchange::generate_ke3(
l2_bytes,
l2.ke2_message,
&self.ke1_state,
@@ -645,7 +645,7 @@ impl<CS: CipherSuite> ClientLogin<CS> {
Ok(ClientLoginFinishResult {
confidential_info,
message: CredentialFinalization { ke3_message },
shared_secret,
session_key,
export_key: opened_envelope.export_key.clone(),
server_s_pk: l2.server_s_pk,
})
@@ -700,8 +700,8 @@ pub struct ServerLoginStartResult<CS: CipherSuite> {
/// Contains the fields that are returned by a server login finish
pub struct ServerLoginFinishResult {
/// The shared session secret between client and server
pub shared_secret: Vec<u8>,
/// The session key between client and server
pub session_key: Vec<u8>,
}
impl<CS: CipherSuite> ServerLogin<CS> {
@@ -854,7 +854,7 @@ impl<CS: CipherSuite> ServerLogin<CS> {
&self,
message: CredentialFinalization<CS>,
) -> Result<ServerLoginFinishResult, ProtocolError> {
let shared_secret = <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange<CS::Hash, CS::Group>>::finish_ke(
let session_key = <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange<CS::Hash, CS::Group>>::finish_ke(
message.ke3_message,
&self.ke2_state,
)
@@ -865,7 +865,7 @@ impl<CS: CipherSuite> ServerLogin<CS> {
err => err,
})?;
Ok(ServerLoginFinishResult { shared_secret })
Ok(ServerLoginFinishResult { session_key })
}
}
+11 -11
View File
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ pub struct TestVectorParameters {
server_login_state: Vec<u8>,
pub password_file: Vec<u8>,
pub export_key: Vec<u8>,
pub shared_secret: Vec<u8>,
pub session_key: Vec<u8>,
}
static TEST_VECTOR: &str = r#"
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ static TEST_VECTOR: &str = r#"
"server_login_state": "761333eea593c396021c3930fb36cf97aad7c7ea00f1ff983e4df9ca002885017161427303fddb4508c9136a67612e01b673ed88b1de49ed6628d0a77e43c590595f53bf0b0766c165b876173c509efc982868d3860df5dad3f0753477ec9bdd103b71dab9540537f2b10964da82032a6339da6d663a409f4e8e5dea03e3653bb6202f265ed814df39f446486197e1c6091ec6b74200f18df5eef59813ff7f245d69b34e8843be496630921601ab784b1f3ccbfe2ff014ea132199c5c76deda7",
"password_file": "f386e8710c12c870a0ec74f09364811142050a5266ca53d36c11e369343a5e092c3247e1d7fcf2bef09a0c6e771c44fe922f36deb5726998c89f7816323bc373022338be69855ad2a280ab5ed67fb04cd96691841241dbb4873ca776adc60d1c930022576b449b09abeb68d5f6c56082b0c2f560c636bff4f0af3b44b6377045201b545598d319af3122041f06e3ab86371bff6c0727557c77d20efeb9a0b9f24573e3646735eeebed45e741d11d0120741af27b04c2716eb6bdfe950daff937cfcae8569e",
"export_key": "96b95891f06c7f02ab9c508f30e1a82ddea25e2f4fc4ffdafeb199ee65e24e418b2648a201e889eaf84301a1a8d0c3b7fea0ec8d4611686e6daee12430f60c05",
"shared_secret": "b6202f265ed814df39f446486197e1c6091ec6b74200f18df5eef59813ff7f245d69b34e8843be496630921601ab784b1f3ccbfe2ff014ea132199c5c76deda7"
"session_key": "b6202f265ed814df39f446486197e1c6091ec6b74200f18df5eef59813ff7f245d69b34e8843be496630921601ab784b1f3ccbfe2ff014ea132199c5c76deda7"
}
"#;
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ fn populate_test_vectors(values: &Value) -> TestVectorParameters {
server_login_state: decode(&values, "server_login_state").unwrap(),
password_file: decode(&values, "password_file").unwrap(),
export_key: decode(&values, "export_key").unwrap(),
shared_secret: decode(&values, "shared_secret").unwrap(),
session_key: decode(&values, "session_key").unwrap(),
}
}
@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ fn stringify_test_vectors(p: &TestVectorParameters) -> String {
.as_str(),
);
s.push_str(format!("\"export_key\": \"{}\",\n", hex::encode(&p.export_key)).as_str());
s.push_str(format!("\"shared_secret\": \"{}\"\n", hex::encode(&p.shared_secret)).as_str());
s.push_str(format!("\"session_key\": \"{}\"\n", hex::encode(&p.session_key)).as_str());
s.push_str("}\n");
s
}
@@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ fn generate_parameters<CS: CipherSuite>() -> TestVectorParameters {
server_registration_state,
client_login_state,
server_login_state,
shared_secret: client_login_finish_result.shared_secret,
session_key: client_login_finish_result.session_key,
export_key: client_registration_finish_result.export_key.to_vec(),
}
}
@@ -595,8 +595,8 @@ fn test_credential_finalization() -> Result<(), ProtocolError> {
hex::encode(&client_login_finish_result.server_s_pk.to_arr().to_vec())
);
assert_eq!(
hex::encode(&parameters.shared_secret),
hex::encode(&client_login_finish_result.shared_secret)
hex::encode(&parameters.session_key),
hex::encode(&client_login_finish_result.session_key)
);
assert_eq!(
hex::encode(&parameters.credential_finalization),
@@ -621,8 +621,8 @@ fn test_server_login_finish() -> Result<(), ProtocolError> {
)?)?;
assert_eq!(
hex::encode(parameters.shared_secret),
hex::encode(server_login_result.shared_secret)
hex::encode(parameters.session_key),
hex::encode(server_login_result.session_key)
);
Ok(())
@@ -679,8 +679,8 @@ fn test_complete_flow(
.finish(client_login_finish_result.message)?;
assert_eq!(
hex::encode(server_login_finish_result.shared_secret),
hex::encode(client_login_finish_result.shared_secret)
hex::encode(server_login_finish_result.session_key),
hex::encode(client_login_finish_result.session_key)
);
assert_eq!(
hex::encode(client_registration_finish_result.export_key),
+2 -2
View File
@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ fn test_ke3() -> Result<(), ProtocolError> {
);
assert_eq!(
hex::encode(&parameters.session_key),
hex::encode(&client_login_finish_result.shared_secret)
hex::encode(&client_login_finish_result.session_key)
);
assert_eq!(
hex::encode(&parameters.KE3),
@@ -567,7 +567,7 @@ fn test_server_login_finish() -> Result<(), ProtocolError> {
assert_eq!(
hex::encode(parameters.session_key),
hex::encode(server_login_result.shared_secret)
hex::encode(server_login_result.session_key)
);
}
Ok(())