feat: replace deprecated ExpandedKeyEncoding with seed serialization, derive ZeroizeOnDrop (#7)

- Add ZeroizeOnDrop bound to Hash trait
- Replace manual Drop impls on Ke2Builder and KemKe2Builder with derive_where
- Migrate KEM decapsulation key serialization from expanded form to 64-byte seed (KeyInit/KeyExport)
- Fix voprf deserialization to pass exact-length slices
- Bump voprf-vx to 1.0.0-rc.1
- Regenerate test vectors

Reviewed-on: #7
Co-authored-by: UneBaguette <[email protected]>
Co-committed-by: UneBaguette <[email protected]>

.cargo/license.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) VexaHub and contributors.
+// Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates.

.gitea/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+name: Rust CI
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches:
+      - master
+  pull_request:
+    types: [ opened, reopened, synchronize ]
+
+concurrency:
+  group: ci-${{ gitea.ref }}
+  cancel-in-progress: true
+
+jobs:
+  fmt:
+    name: cargo fmt
+    runs-on: linux_amd64
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
+      - uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@nightly
+        with:
+          components: rustfmt
+      - name: Run cargo fmt
+        run: cargo fmt --all -- --check
+
+  clippy:
+    name: cargo clippy
+    runs-on: linux_amd64
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
+      - uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
+        with:
+          components: clippy
+      - name: Cache cargo
+        uses: actions/cache@55cc8345863c7cc4c66a329aec7e433d2d1c52a9 # v6
+        with:
+          path: |
+            ~/.cargo/registry
+            ~/.cargo/git
+          key: cargo-registry-${{ hashFiles('**/Cargo.lock') }}
+          restore-keys: cargo-registry-
+      - name: Run cargo clippy
+        run: cargo clippy --all-targets --features argon2,std,curve25519,ecdsa,ed25519,kem -- -D warnings
+      - name: Run cargo doc
+        run: cargo doc --no-deps --document-private-items --features argon2,std,curve25519,ecdsa,ed25519,kem
+        env:
+          RUSTDOCFLAGS: -D warnings
+
+  test:
+    name: test (${{ matrix.toolchain }} / ${{ matrix.backend_feature || 'no backend' }} / ${{ matrix.frontend_feature || 'no frontend' }})
+    runs-on: linux_amd64
+    strategy:
+      fail-fast: false
+      matrix:
+        backend_feature:
+          - ""
+          - --features ristretto255
+          - --features ristretto255,kem
+          - --features curve25519
+          - --features ecdsa
+          - --features ed25519
+          - --features ristretto255,curve25519,ecdsa,ed25519
+        frontend_feature:
+          - ""
+          - --features argon2
+          - --features serde
+        toolchain:
+          - stable
+          - "1.90.0"
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
+      - uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@${{ matrix.toolchain }}
+      - name: Cache cargo
+        uses: actions/cache@55cc8345863c7cc4c66a329aec7e433d2d1c52a9 # v6
+        with:
+          path: |
+            ~/.cargo/registry
+            ~/.cargo/git
+          key: cargo-registry-${{ hashFiles('**/Cargo.lock') }}
+          restore-keys: cargo-registry-
+      - name: Run cargo test
+        run: cargo test --no-default-features ${{ matrix.backend_feature }} ${{ matrix.frontend_feature }}
+      - name: Run cargo test with std
+        run: cargo test --no-default-features --features std ${{ matrix.backend_feature }} ${{ matrix.frontend_feature }}
+
+  simple-login-test:
+    name: test simple_login example
+    runs-on: linux_amd64
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
+      - uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
+      - name: Run expect
+        run: expect -f scripts/simple_login.exp
+
+  digital-locker-test:
+    name: test digital_locker example
+    runs-on: linux_amd64
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
+      - uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
+      - name: Run expect
+        run: expect -f scripts/digital_locker.exp
+
+  build-no-std:
+    name: no-std (${{ matrix.target }} / ${{ matrix.backend_feature || 'no backend' }})
+    runs-on: linux_amd64
+    strategy:
+      fail-fast: false
+      matrix:
+        target:
+          - wasm32-unknown-unknown
+          - thumbv6m-none-eabi
+        backend_feature:
+          - ""
+          - ristretto255
+          - curve25519
+          - ecdsa
+          - ed25519
+          - ristretto255,curve25519,ecdsa,ed25519
+        frontend_feature:
+          - argon2
+          - serde
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
+      - uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
+        with:
+          targets: ${{ matrix.target }}
+      - name: Build no-std
+        run: cargo build --verbose --target=${{ matrix.target }} --no-default-features --features ${{ matrix.frontend_feature }},${{ matrix.backend_feature }}
+
+  benches:
+    name: cargo bench compilation
+    runs-on: linux_amd64
+    strategy:
+      fail-fast: false
+      matrix:
+        backend_feature:
+          - --features ristretto255
+          - --features ristretto255,kem
+          - ""
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
+      - uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
+      - name: Run cargo bench --no-run
+        run: cargo bench --no-default-features ${{ matrix.backend_feature }} --no-run
+
+  audit:
+    name: cargo audit
+    runs-on: linux_amd64
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
+      - uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
+      - name: Install cargo-audit
+        run: cargo install cargo-audit
+      - name: Run cargo audit
+        run: cargo audit -D warnings

.gitea/workflows/publish.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+name: Publish
+
+on:
+  release:
+    types: [ published ]
+
+jobs:
+  publish:
+    runs-on: linux_amd64
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
+
+      - uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
+
+      - name: Login to crates.io
+        run: cargo login $CRATES_IO_TOKEN
+        env:
+          CRATES_IO_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.CRATES_IO_TOKEN }}
+
+      - name: Dry run publish
+        run: cargo publish --dry-run --manifest-path Cargo.toml
+
+      - name: Publish
+        run: cargo publish --manifest-path Cargo.toml
+        env:
+          CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.CRATES_IO_TOKEN }}

.github/workflows/main.yml

@@ -1,182 +0,0 @@
-name: Rust CI
-on:
-  push:
-    branches:
-      - tls
-      - master
-  pull_request:
-    types: [opened, repoened, synchronize]
-
-jobs:
-  test:
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    strategy:
-      fail-fast: false
-      matrix:
-        backend_feature:
-          - u64_backend
-          - u32_backend
-    name: test
-    steps:
-      - name: Checkout sources
-        uses: actions/checkout@v2
-
-      - name: Install nightly toolchain
-        uses: actions-rs/toolchain@v1
-        with:
-          profile: minimal
-          toolchain: nightly
-          override: true
-          components: rustfmt, clippy
-
-      - name: Run cargo test
-        uses: actions-rs/cargo@v1
-        with:
-          command: test
-          args: --no-default-features --features ${{ matrix.backend_feature }}
-
-  cross-test:
-    name: Test on ${{ matrix.target }} (using cross)
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    strategy:
-      fail-fast: false
-      matrix:
-        target:
-          # 32-bit x86
-          - i686-unknown-linux-gnu
-        backend_feature:
-          - u64_backend
-          - u32_backend
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v2
-      - uses: hecrj/setup-rust-action@v1
-      - run: cargo install cross
-      # Note: just use `cross` as you would `cargo`, but always
-      # pass the `--target=${{ matrix.target }}` arg. (Yes, really).
-      - run: cross test --verbose --target=${{ matrix.target }} --no-default-features --features ${{ matrix.backend_feature }}
-
-
-  slow-hash-test:
-    name: Test on ${{ matrix.target }} with slow hash
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    strategy:
-      fail-fast: false
-      matrix:
-        backend_feature:
-          - u64_backend
-          - u32_backend
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v2
-      - uses: hecrj/setup-rust-action@v1
-      - run: cargo test --verbose --features slow-hash --no-default-features --features ${{ matrix.backend_feature }}
-
-
-  simple-login-test:
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    strategy:
-      fail-fast: false
-    name: test simple_login command-line example
-    steps:
-      - name: install expect
-        run: sudo apt-get install expect
-      - name: Checkout sources
-        uses: actions/checkout@v2
-      - name: install rust
-        uses: actions-rs/toolchain@v1
-        with:
-          profile: minimal
-          toolchain: nightly
-          override: true
-          components: rustfmt, clippy
-      - name: Run expect (which then runs cargo run)
-        run: expect -f scripts/simple_login.exp
-
-  digital-locker-test:
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    strategy:
-      fail-fast: false
-    name: test digital_locker command-line example
-    steps:
-      - name: install expect
-        run: sudo apt-get install expect
-      - name: Checkout sources
-        uses: actions/checkout@v2
-      - name: install rust
-        uses: actions-rs/toolchain@v1
-        with:
-          profile: minimal
-          toolchain: nightly
-          override: true
-          components: rustfmt, clippy
-      - name: Run expect (which then runs cargo run)
-        run: expect -f scripts/digital_locker.exp
-
-  benches:
-    name: cargo bench compilation
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    steps:
-      - name: Checkout sources
-        uses: actions/checkout@v2
-
-      - name: Install nightly toolchain
-        uses: actions-rs/toolchain@v1
-        with:
-          profile: minimal
-          toolchain: stable
-          override: true
-
-      - name: Run cargo bench --no-run
-        uses: actions-rs/cargo@v1
-        with:
-          command: bench
-          args: --features "bench" --no-run
-
-  clippy:
-    name: cargo clippy
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    steps:
-      - name: Checkout sources
-        uses: actions/checkout@v2
-
-      - name: Install nightly toolchain
-        uses: actions-rs/toolchain@v1
-        with:
-          profile: minimal
-          toolchain: nightly
-          override: true
-          components: rustfmt, clippy
-
-      - name: Run cargo clippy
-        uses: actions-rs/cargo@v1
-        with:
-          command: clippy
-          args: -- -D warnings
-
-
-  format:
-    name: cargo fmt
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    steps:
-      - name: Checkout sources
-        uses: actions/checkout@v2
-
-      - name: Install nightly toolchain
-        uses: actions-rs/toolchain@v1
-        with:
-          profile: minimal
-          toolchain: nightly
-          override: true
-          components: rustfmt, clippy
-
-      - name: Run cargo fmt
-        uses: actions-rs/cargo@v1
-        with:
-          command: fmt
-          args: --all -- --check
-
-  deny-check:
-    name: cargo-deny check
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v1
-      - uses: EmbarkStudios/cargo-deny-action@v1

.github/workflows/publish.yml

@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-name: Publish
-
-on:
-  release:
-    types: [published] # Only publish to crates.io when we formally publish a release
-  # For more on how to formally release on Github, read https://help.github.com/en/articles/creating-releases
-
-jobs:
-  publish:
-    runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
-    strategy:
-      matrix:
-        os: [ubuntu-latest]
-
-    steps:
-    - uses: hecrj/setup-rust-action@v1
-      with:
-        rust-version: ${{ matrix.rust }}
-    - uses: actions/checkout@master
-    - name: Login to crates.io
-      run: cargo login $CRATES_IO_TOKEN
-      env:
-        CRATES_IO_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.crates_io_token }} # https://help.github.com/en/actions/automating-your-workflow-with-github-actions/creating-and-using-encrypted-secrets
-    - name: Dry run publish opaque-ke
-      run: cargo publish --dry-run --manifest-path Cargo.toml
-    - name: Publish opaque-ke
-      run: cargo publish --manifest-path Cargo.toml
-      env:
-        CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.crates_io_token }}

.gitignore

@@ -2,4 +2,5 @@
 .vscode/
 src/.DS_Store
 /target
+Cargo.lock
 **/*.rs.bk

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,6 +1,210 @@
 # Changelog
 
-## 0.3.0 (February 8, 2020)
+## 1.0.0-rc.0 (July 3, 2026)
+
+* Fixed doc showing incorrect MSRV
+* Fixed readme incorrect doc link
+* Bump `ecdsa` to `0.17`
+* Bump `voprf-vx` to `1.0.0-rc.1`
+* Added `ZeroizeOnDrop` bound to `Hash` trait
+* Replaced manual `Drop` impls on `Ke2Builder` and `KemKe2Builder` with `#[derive_where(ZeroizeOnDrop)]`
+* Replaced deprecated `ExpandedKeyEncoding` with seed-based serialization (`KeyInit` / `KeyExport`) for KEM decapsulation keys
+* Fixed deserialization of `voprf` types to pass exact-length slices (compatibility with `voprf` trailing bytes rejection)
+* Regenerated test vectors
+
+## 1.0.0-pre.1 (July 2, 2026)
+
+* Fixed README package name
+* Implement `zeroize` feature on `argon2`, `ed25519-dalek`, `hmac`, `chacha20poly1305` and `sha2`
+* Removed `rand_core` dependency to use it through `rand` re-export
+
+## 1.0.0-pre.0 (July 1, 2026)
+
+Forked from [facebook/opaque-ke](https://github.com/facebook/opaque-ke/) at `4.1.0-pre.2`.
+
+* Upgraded dependencies:
+    * `ml-kem`: `0.3.0-rc.0` to `0.3`
+    * `digest`: `0.10` to `0.11`
+    * `elliptic-curve`: `0.13` to `0.14`
+    * `curve25519-dalek`: `4` to `5.0.0-rc`
+    * `ed25519-dalek`: `2` to `3.0.0-rc`
+    * `ecdsa`: `0.16` to `0.17.0-rc.23`
+    * `hkdf`: `0.12` to `0.13`
+    * `hmac`: `0.12` to `0.13`
+    * `rand`: `0.8` to `0.10`
+    * `rand_chacha`: `0.3` to `0.10`
+    * `rfc6979`: `0.4` to `0.6` (now internal to `ecdsa`)
+    * `sha2`: `0.10` to `0.11`
+    * `getrandom`: `0.2` to `0.4` (WASM target)
+    * `p256`/`p384`/`p521`: `0.13` to `0.14.0-rc.15` (dev-dependency)
+    * `cryptoki`: `0.9` to `0.12` (dev-dependency)
+    * `rustyline`: `17` to `18` (dev-dependency)
+    * `scrypt`: `0.11` to `0.12` (dev-dependency)
+    * `voprf` replaced by `voprf-vx 1.0.0-pre.0`
+* Bump `generic-array 0.14` to `generic-array 1.4` with `hybrid-array 0.4` interop
+* Added `hybrid-array 0.4` for interop
+* Added `ConcatExt` trait to disambiguate from `[T]::concat`
+* Added **`cryptography`** to `categories` in `Cargo.toml`
+* Replaced `Hmac` with `SimpleHmac` throughout for `digest 0.11` compatibility
+* Replaced `bincode` with `postcard` for `no_std` serialization
+* Replaced license appendix in files while keeping original copyright
+* Re-exported `hybrid_array` from crate root
+* Updated `Hash` trait to remove `BlockSizeUser` bounds incompatible with `digest 0.11`
+* Updated `GroupEncoding Repr` bound to `hybrid_array::Array`
+* Fixed `MaskedResponse::serialize` field ordering to match deserialization
+* Increased **MSRV** to **1.90**
+* Renamed crate to `opaque-vx`
+* Removed direct `rfc6979` dependency (handled by `ecdsa` internally)
+* Removed unstable `rustfmt` configurations for **Rust stable** compatibility
+* Removed Facebook-specific contributions (CLA, bounty program) from `CONTRIBUTING.md`
+* Removed `v3` to `v4` migration test (no longer relevant for fork)
+
+## 4.1.0-pre.2 (March 26, 2026)
+
+* Upgraded ml-kem from 0.2 to 0.3.0-rc.0
+* Increased MSRV to 1.87
+
+## 4.1.0-pre.1 (November 17, 2025)
+
+* Added ml-kem re-export behind the kem feature
+
+## 4.1.0-pre.0 (November 11, 2025)
+
+* Fixed dependency exporting for the rand crate
+* Added TripleDhKem key exchange protocol
+
+## 4.0.1 (October 30, 2025)
+
+* Fixing docs building issue
+
+## 4.0.0 (October 23, 2025)
+
+* Increased MSRV to 1.83
+* Synced implementation with RFC 9807 (no core protocol changes)
+* Added a SIGMA-I key exchange implementation
+* Removed KeGroup type from the Ciphersuite trait (now part of KeyExchange type)
+    * **Breaking: existing Ciphersuite trait definitions need to be updated**
+* Ensured that dummy record is always created to avoid timing attack issues
+* Modified the dummy registration file to only contain the public key
+  instead of the keypair
+    * **Breaking: existing `ServerSetup`s need to be updated**
+      ```rust
+      // Given `old` is a `ServerSetup` from `opaque-ke` v3.
+      let old_serialized = old.serialize();
+  
+      type OldSeedLen = <<<OldCipherSuite as opaque_ke_3::CipherSuite>::OprfCs as voprf::CipherSuite>::Hash as OutputSizeUser>::OutputSize;
+      type OldSkLen = <<OldCipherSuite as opaque_ke_3::CipherSuite>::KeGroup as opaque_ke_3::key_exchange::group::KeGroup>::SkLen;
+  
+      let (old_serialied_rest, old_fake_keypair_serialized): (
+          GenericArray<u8, Sum<OldSeedLen, OldSkLen>>,
+          _,
+      ) = old_serialized.split();
+  
+      let old_fake_keypair =
+          KeyPair::<<OldCipherSuite as opaque_ke_3::CipherSuite>::KeGroup>::from_private_key_slice(
+              &old_fake_keypair_serialized,
+          )
+          .unwrap();
+      let old_fake_pk_serialized = old_fake_keypair.public().serialize();
+  
+      let new_serialized = old_serialied_rest.concat(old_fake_pk_serialized);
+      // Given `NewCipherSuite` is a `CipherSuite` implementation equivalent to `OldCipherSuite`.
+      ServerSetup::<NewCipherSuite>::deserialize(&new_serialized).unwrap()
+      ```
+* Added remote OPRF seed support
+* Replace remote private key trait with a state machine, facilitating async support.
+* Serde de/serialization formats have been simplified
+    * **Breaking: existing `ServerRegistration`s may need to be updated**
+      ```rust
+      // Given `old` is a `ServerRegistration` from `opaque-ke` v3.
+      let old_serialized = old.serialize();
+      // Given `NewCipherSuite` is a `CipherSuite` implementation equivalent to the old cipher suite.
+      ServerRegistration::<NewCipherSuite>::deserialize(&old_serialized).unwrap()
+      ```
+
+## 3.0.0 (October 10, 2024)
+
+* Synced implementation with draft-irtf-cfrg-opaque-16
+    * **Breaking: protocol context string changed from `RFCXXXX` to `OPAQUEv1-`**
+* Dropped unmaintained json crate in favor of serde_json
+* Updated dependencies
+* Increased MSRV to 1.74
+* Adjusted curve25519 support logic
+* Adjusted key generation logic to be in line with commit 727b9ac of
+  https://github.com/cfrg/draft-irtf-cfrg-opaque
+* Updated VOPRF to draft 19
+    * **Breaking: backwards-incompatible changes introduced in OPRF protocol**
+* Added P384 testing support
+* Renaming of X25519 to Curve25519
+
+## 2.0.0 (September 21, 2022)
+
+* Synced implementation with draft-irtf-cfrg-opaque-10
+* Changed argon2 salt length to recommended value (16 bytes)
+* Fixed issue from 2.0.0-pre.2 not pinning voprf dependency correctly
+* Split out VOPRF implementation into its own crate
+* Added support for running the API without performing
+  allocations
+* Revamped the way the Group trait was used, so as to be more
+  easily extendable to other groups
+* Added support for p256 as the group and x25519 as the key exchange group
+* Added common traits for each public-facing struct, including serde support
+
+## 1.2.0 (October 7, 2021)
+
+* Added explicit support for the thumbv6m-none-eabi target (no-std)
+
+## 1.1.0 (August 18, 2021)
+
+* Updated dependencies and bumped MSRV to 1.51
+* Added no_std support
+
+## 1.0.0 (July 19, 2021)
+
+* Branched from v0.5.0
+* Various security improvements: non-zero scalars, zeroizing on drop,
+  constant-time operations, reflected value check, and adding an
+  i2osp error condition
+
+## 0.6.0 (June 30, 2021)
+
+* Synced implementation with draft-irtf-cfrg-opaque-05, which changes
+  the envelope structure and introduces a ServerSetup object to be
+  maintained by the server
+* Various security improvements: non-zero scalars, zeroizing on drop,
+  constant-time operations
+* Adding serde support behind a feature
+* Supporting common traits (eb59676)
+* Swapping out scrypt for argon2 (535b9b8) for the slow-hash feature
+* Adding support for common traits on public structs
+* Updated dependencies
+
+## 0.5.1 (July 16, 2021)
+
+* Various security improvements: non-zero scalars, zeroizing on drop,
+  constant-time operations, reflected value check, and adding an
+  i2osp error condition
+
+## 0.5.0 (March 1, 2021)
+
+* Removed dependency on generic-bytes-derive package
+
+## 0.4.0 (February 26, 2021)
+
+* Adherence to protocol format described in
+  https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-opaque-03
+* Renamed to_bytes() and try_from() to serialize() and deserialize() for
+  top-level structs
+* Conformed all message type parameters to be parameterized in the
+  Ciphersuite object
+
+## 0.3.1 (February 11, 2021)
+
+* Re-exporting the rand library (and including it as a dependency instead of
+  just rand_core)
+* Exposing a convenience function for converting from byte array to Key type
+
+## 0.3.0 (February 8, 2021)
 
 * General API and documentation improvements, including the support of custom
   identifiers, optional result parameters, and the use of the export key

CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md

@@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
-# Code of Conduct
-
-## Our Pledge
-
-In the interest of fostering an open and welcoming environment, we as
-contributors and maintainers pledge to make participation in our project and
-our community a harassment-free experience for everyone, regardless of age, body
-size, disability, ethnicity, sex characteristics, gender identity and expression,
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-
-## Our Standards
-
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-include:
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-
-## Our Responsibilities
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-that are not aligned to this Code of Conduct, or to ban temporarily or
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-## Scope
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-an individual is representing the project or its community in public spaces.
-Examples of representing a project or community include using an official
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-Further details of specific enforcement policies may be posted separately.
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-## Attribution
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-
-For answers to common questions about this code of conduct, see
-https://www.contributor-covenant.org/faq

CONTRIBUTING.md

@@ -2,29 +2,11 @@
 We want to make contributing to this project as easy and transparent as
 possible.
 
-## Pull Requests
-We actively welcome your pull requests.
-
-1. Fork the repo and create your branch from `master`.
-2. If you've added code that should be tested, add tests.
-3. If you've changed APIs, update the documentation.
-4. Ensure the test suite passes.
-5. If you haven't already, complete the Contributor License Agreement ("CLA").
-
-## Contributor License Agreement ("CLA")
-In order to accept your pull request, we need you to submit a CLA. You only need
-to do this once to work on any of Facebook's open source projects.
-
-Complete your CLA here: <https://code.facebook.com/cla>
-
 ## Issues
 We use GitHub issues to track public bugs. Please ensure your description is
 clear and has sufficient instructions to be able to reproduce the issue.
 
-Facebook has a [bounty program](https://www.facebook.com/whitehat/) for the safe
-disclosure of security bugs. In those cases, please go through the process
-outlined on that page and do not file a public issue.
-
 ## License
 By contributing to opaque-ke, you agree that your contributions will be
-licensed under the LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
+licensed under both the LICENSE-MIT and LICENSE-APACHE files in the root
+directory of this source tree.

Cargo.toml

@@ -1,50 +1,130 @@
 [package]
-name = "opaque-ke"
-version = "0.3.0"
-repository = "https://github.com/novifinancial/opaque-ke"
-keywords = ["cryptography", "crypto", "opaque", "passwords", "authentication"]
+authors = [
+    "VexaHub Developers",
+    "Kevin Lewi <[email protected]>",
+    "François Garillot <[email protected]>",
+]
+categories = ["no-std", "cryptography"]
 description = "An implementation of the OPAQUE password-authenticated key exchange protocol"
-authors = ["Kevin Lewi <[email protected]>", "François Garillot <[email protected]>"]
-license = "MIT"
-edition = "2018"
+edition = "2024"
+exclude = ["/src/tests/"]
+keywords = ["cryptography", "opaque", "passwords", "authentication", "pake"]
+license = "Apache-2.0 OR MIT"
+name = "opaque-vx"
 readme = "README.md"
+repository = "https://github.com/vexahub/opaque-vx"
+rust-version = "1.90"
+version = "1.0.0-rc.0"
 
 [features]
-default = ["u64_backend"]
-slow-hash = ["scrypt"]
-bench = []
-u64_backend = ["curve25519-dalek/u64_backend"]
-u32_backend = ["curve25519-dalek/u32_backend"]
+argon2 = ["dep:argon2"]
+curve25519 = ["dep:curve25519-dalek"]
+default = ["ristretto255", "serde"]
+ecdsa = ["dep:ecdsa"]
+ed25519 = ["dep:curve25519-dalek", "dep:ed25519-dalek"]
+kem = ["dep:ml-kem"]
+ristretto255 = ["dep:curve25519-dalek", "voprf/ristretto255-ciphersuite"]
+serde = [
+    "dep:serde",
+    "curve25519-dalek?/serde",
+    "ecdsa?/serde",
+    "ed25519-dalek?/serde",
+    "elliptic-curve/serde",
+    "generic-array/serde",
+    "hybrid-array/serde",
+    "voprf/serde",
+    "zeroize/serde",
+]
+std = ["dep:getrandom", "rand/std"]
 
 [dependencies]
-curve25519-dalek = { version = "3.0.0", default-features = false, features = ["std"] }
-digest = "0.9.0"
-displaydoc = "0.1.7"
-generic-array = "0.14.4"
-generic-bytes = { version = "0.1.0" }
-generic-bytes-derive = { version = "0.1.0" }
-hkdf = "0.10.0"
-hmac = "0.10.1"
-rand_core = { version = "0.6.0", features = ["getrandom"] }
-scrypt = { version = "0.5.0", optional = true }
-subtle = { version = "2.3.0", default-features = false }
-thiserror = "1.0.22"
-zeroize = "1.1.1"
+argon2 = { version = "0.6.0-rc.8", default-features = false, features = [
+    "zeroize",
+    "alloc",
+], optional = true }
+curve25519-dalek = { version = "5.0.0-rc.1", default-features = false, features = [
+    "zeroize",
+], optional = true }
+derive-where = { version = "1.6", features = ["zeroize-on-drop"] }
+digest = { version = "0.11", features = ["zeroize"] }
+displaydoc = { version = "0.2", default-features = false }
+ecdsa = { version = "0.17", default-features = false, features = [
+    "algorithm",
+], optional = true }
+ed25519-dalek = { version = "3.0.0-rc.1", default-features = false, features = [
+    "zeroize",
+    "digest",
+    "hazmat",
+], optional = true }
+elliptic-curve = { version = "0.14", features = ["sec1"] }
+generic-array = { version = "1.4", features = ["hybrid-array-0_4", "zeroize"] }
+hybrid-array = { version = "0.4", features = ["extra-sizes", "zeroize"] }
+hkdf = "0.13"
+hmac = { version = "0.13", features = ["zeroize"] }
+ml-kem = { version = "0.3", default-features = false, features = [
+    "zeroize",
+], optional = true }
+rand = { version = "0.10", default-features = false }
+serde = { version = "1", default-features = false, features = [
+    "derive",
+], optional = true }
+subtle = { version = "2.6", default-features = false }
+voprf = { package = "voprf-vx", version = "1.0.0-rc.1", default-features = false, features = [
+    "danger",
+] }
+zeroize = { version = "1.9", features = ["zeroize_derive"] }
+
+[target.'cfg(target_arch = "wasm32")'.dependencies]
+getrandom = { version = "0.4", features = ["wasm_js"], optional = true }
 
 [dev-dependencies]
-anyhow = "1.0.35"
-base64 = "0.13.0"
-chacha20poly1305 = "0.7.1"
-criterion = "0.3.3"
-hex = "0.4.2"
-lazy_static = "1.4.0"
-serde_json = "1.0.60"
-sha2 = "0.9.2"
-proptest = "0.10.1"
-rand = "0.8"
-rustyline = "7.0.0"
+anyhow = "1"
+bincode-next = { version = "3", features = ["serde", "alloc"] }
+chacha20poly1305 = { version = "0.11", features = ["zeroize"] }
+criterion = "0.8"
+cryptoki = "0.12"
+elliptic-curve = { version = "0.14", features = ["alloc", "pkcs8"] }
+hex = "0.4"
+p256 = { version = "0.14.0-rc.15", default-features = false, features = [
+    "ecdsa",
+    "hash2curve",
+    "pkcs8",
+    "oprf",
+] }
+p384 = { version = "0.14.0-rc.15", default-features = false, features = [
+    "hash2curve",
+    "pkcs8",
+    "oprf",
+] }
+p521 = { version = "0.14.0-rc.15", default-features = false, features = [
+    "hash2curve",
+    "pkcs8",
+    "oprf",
+] }
+pastey = "0.2"
+proptest = "1"
+rand = "0.10"
+rand_chacha = "0.10"
+regex = "1"
+sha2 = { version = "0.11", default-features = false, features = ["zeroize"] }
+thiserror = "2"
+# MSRV
+rustyline = "18"
+scrypt = "0.12"
+serde_json = "1"
 
 [[bench]]
-name = "oprf"
 harness = false
-required-features = ["bench"]
+name = "opaque"
+
+[package.metadata.docs.rs]
+all-features = true
+rustdoc-args = ["--cfg", "docsrs"]
+targets = []
+
+[[example]]
+name = "simple_login"
+required-features = ["argon2"]
+
+[lints.rust]
+unexpected_cfgs = { level = "warn", check-cfg = ['cfg(test_hsm)'] }

LICENSE

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-MIT License
-
-Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
-
-Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
-of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
-in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
-to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
-copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
-furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
-
-The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
-copies or substantial portions of the Software.
-
-THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
-IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
-FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
-AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
-LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
-OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
-SOFTWARE.

LICENSE-APACHE

@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
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+
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+END OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS

LICENSE-MIT

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any
+person obtaining a copy of this software and associated
+documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in the
+Software without restriction, including without
+limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge,
+publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of
+the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software
+is furnished to do so, subject to the following
+conditions:
+
+The above copyright notice and this permission notice
+shall be included in all copies or substantial portions
+of the Software.
+
+THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF
+ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED
+TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A
+PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT
+SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
+OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR
+IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER
+DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.

README.md

@@ -1,20 +1,28 @@
-##  The OPAQUE key exchange protocol ![Build Status](https://github.com/novifinancial/opaque-ke/workflows/Rust%20CI/badge.svg)
+## The OPAQUE key exchange protocol
 
-[OPAQUE](https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/163.pdf) is an asymmetric password-authenticated key exchange protocol. It allows a client to authenticate to a server using a password, without ever having to expose the plaintext password to the server.
+[OPAQUE](https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/163.pdf) is an augmented password-authenticated key exchange protocol. It allows a
+client to authenticate to a server using a password, without ever having to expose the plaintext password to the server.
 
-This implementation is based on the [Internet Draft for OPAQUE](https://github.com/cfrg/draft-irtf-cfrg-opaque).
+This implementation is based on [RFC 9807](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9807/).
+
+This is a fork of [facebook/opaque-ke](https://github.com/facebook/opaque-ke) maintained
+by [VexaHub](https://github.com/vexahub), targeting the latest **RustCrypto ecosystem**.
 
 Background
 ----------
 
-Asymmetric Password Authenticated Key Exchange (aPAKE) protocols are designed to provide password authentication and mutually authenticated key exchange without relying on PKI (except during user/password registration) and without disclosing passwords to servers or other entities other than the client machine.
+Augmented Password Authenticated Key Exchange (aPAKE) protocols are designed to provide password authentication and
+mutually authenticated key exchange without relying on PKI (except during user/password registration) and without
+disclosing passwords to servers or other entities other than the client machine.
 
 OPAQUE is a PKI-free aPAKE that is secure against pre-computation attacks and capable of using a secret salt.
 
 Documentation
 -------------
 
-The API can be found [here](https://docs.rs/opaque-ke/) along with an example for usage.
+The API can be found [here](https://docs.rs/opaque-vx/) along with an example for usage. More examples can be found
+in
+the [examples](./examples) directory.
 
 Installation
 ------------
@@ -22,30 +30,57 @@ Installation
 Add the following line to the dependencies of your `Cargo.toml`:
 
 ```
-opaque-ke = "0.3.0"
+opaque-vx = "1.0.0-rc.0"
 ```
 
+### Minimum Supported Rust Version
+
+Rust **1.90** or higher.
+
+Audit
+-----
+
+This library was audited by NCC Group in June of 2021. The audit was sponsored by WhatsApp for its use
+in [enabling end-to-end encrypted backups](https://engineering.fb.com/2021/09/10/security/whatsapp-e2ee-backups/).
+
+The audit found issues in release `v0.5.0`, and the fixes were subsequently incorporated into release `v1.2.0`. See
+the [full audit report here](https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/12/13/public-report-whatsapp-opaque-ke-cryptographic-implementation-review/).
+
 Resources
 ---------
 
-- [OPAQUE academic publication](https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/163.pdf), including formal definitions and a proof of security
-- [draft-irtf-cfrg-opaque-02](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-irtf-cfrg-opaque-02.html), containing a detailed (byte-level) specification for OPAQUE
-- ["Let's talk about PAKE"](https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2018/10/19/lets-talk-about-pake/), an introductory blog post written by Matthew Green that covers OPAQUE
+- [OPAQUE academic publication](https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/163.pdf), including formal definitions and a proof of
+  security
+- [RFC 9807](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9807/), containing a detailed (byte-level) specification for OPAQUE
+- ["Let's talk about PAKE"](https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2018/10/19/lets-talk-about-pake/), an introductory
+  blog post written by Matthew Green that covers OPAQUE
+- [@serenity-kit/opaque](https://github.com/serenity-kit/opaque), a WebAssembly package for this library
+- [opaque-wasm](https://github.com/marucjmar/opaque-wasm), a WebAssembly package for this library. A comparison between
+  `@serenity-kit/opaque` and `opaque-wasm` can be
+  found [here](https://opaque-documentation.netlify.app/docs/faq#how-does-it-compare-to-opaque-wasm)
+- [react-native-opaque](https://github.com/serenity-kit/react-native-opaque), a React Native package for this library
+  matching the API of `@serenity-kit/opaque`
 
 Contributors
 ------------
 
-The authors of this code are Kevin Lewi
-([@kevinlewi](https://github.com/kevinlewi)) and François Garillot ([@huitseeker](https://github.com/huitseeker)).
+This fork is maintained by [VexaHub](https://github.com/vexahub).
+
+The original authors are Kevin Lewi ([@kevinlewi](https://github.com/kevinlewi)) and François
+Garillot ([@huitseeker](https://github.com/huitseeker)).
 To learn more about contributing to this project, [see this document](./CONTRIBUTING.md).
 
 #### Acknowledgments
 
-Special thanks go to Hugo Krawczyk and Chris Wood for helping to clarify discrepancies and making suggestions for improving
-this implementation.
-
+Special thanks go to Hugo Krawczyk and Chris Wood for helping to clarify discrepancies and making suggestions for
+improving
+this implementation. Additional credit goes to @daxpedda for adding no_std support, p256 support, and making other
+general
+improvements to the library.
 
 License
 -------
 
-This project is [MIT licensed](./LICENSE).
+This project is dual-licensed under either the [MIT license](./LICENSE-MIT)
+or the [Apache License, Version 2.0](./LICENSE-APACHE).
+You may select, at your option, one of the above-listed licenses.

benches/opaque.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,334 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) VexaHub and contributors.
+// Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates.
+
+#[macro_use]
+extern crate criterion;
+
+use criterion::Criterion;
+use opaque_vx::*;
+use rand::rand_core::UnwrapErr;
+use rand::rngs::SysRng;
+
+#[cfg(feature = "ristretto255")]
+static SUFFIX: &str = "ristretto255";
+#[cfg(not(feature = "ristretto255"))]
+static SUFFIX: &str = "p256";
+
+struct Default;
+
+#[cfg(feature = "ristretto255")]
+impl CipherSuite for Default {
+    type OprfCs = Ristretto255;
+    type KeyExchange = TripleDh<Ristretto255, sha2::Sha512>;
+    type Ksf = ksf::Identity;
+}
+
+#[cfg(not(feature = "ristretto255"))]
+impl CipherSuite for Default {
+    type OprfCs = p256::NistP256;
+    type KeyExchange = TripleDh<p256::NistP256, sha2::Sha256>;
+    type Ksf = ksf::Identity;
+}
+
+fn server_setup(c: &mut Criterion) {
+    let mut rng = UnwrapErr(SysRng);
+
+    c.bench_function(&format!("server setup ({SUFFIX})"), move |b| {
+        b.iter(|| {
+            ServerSetup::<Default>::new(&mut rng);
+        })
+    });
+}
+
+fn client_registration_start(c: &mut Criterion) {
+    let mut rng = UnwrapErr(SysRng);
+    let password = b"password";
+
+    c.bench_function(&format!("client registration start ({SUFFIX})"), move |b| {
+        b.iter(|| {
+            ClientRegistration::<Default>::start(&mut rng, password).unwrap();
+        })
+    });
+}
+
+fn server_registration_start(c: &mut Criterion) {
+    let mut rng = UnwrapErr(SysRng);
+    let username = b"username";
+    let password = b"password";
+    let server_setup = ServerSetup::<Default>::new(&mut rng);
+    let client_registration_start_result =
+        ClientRegistration::<Default>::start(&mut rng, password).unwrap();
+
+    c.bench_function(&format!("server registration start ({SUFFIX})"), move |b| {
+        b.iter(|| {
+            ServerRegistration::<Default>::start(
+                &server_setup,
+                client_registration_start_result.message.clone(),
+                username,
+            )
+            .unwrap();
+        })
+    });
+}
+
+fn client_registration_finish(c: &mut Criterion) {
+    let mut rng = UnwrapErr(SysRng);
+    let username = b"username";
+    let password = b"password";
+    let server_setup = ServerSetup::<Default>::new(&mut rng);
+    let client_registration_start_result =
+        ClientRegistration::<Default>::start(&mut rng, password).unwrap();
+    let server_registration_start_result = ServerRegistration::<Default>::start(
+        &server_setup,
+        client_registration_start_result.message.clone(),
+        username,
+    )
+    .unwrap();
+
+    c.bench_function(
+        &format!("client registration finish ({SUFFIX})"),
+        move |b| {
+            b.iter(|| {
+                client_registration_start_result
+                    .clone()
+                    .state
+                    .finish(
+                        &mut rng,
+                        password,
+                        server_registration_start_result.message.clone(),
+                        ClientRegistrationFinishParameters::default(),
+                    )
+                    .unwrap();
+            })
+        },
+    );
+}
+
+fn server_registration_finish(c: &mut Criterion) {
+    let mut rng = UnwrapErr(SysRng);
+    let username = b"username";
+    let password = b"password";
+    let server_setup = ServerSetup::<Default>::new(&mut rng);
+    let client_registration_start_result =
+        ClientRegistration::<Default>::start(&mut rng, password).unwrap();
+    let server_registration_start_result = ServerRegistration::<Default>::start(
+        &server_setup,
+        client_registration_start_result.message.clone(),
+        username,
+    )
+    .unwrap();
+    let client_registration_finish_result = client_registration_start_result
+        .state
+        .finish(
+            &mut rng,
+            password,
+            server_registration_start_result.message,
+            ClientRegistrationFinishParameters::default(),
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+    c.bench_function(
+        &format!("server registration finish ({SUFFIX})"),
+        move |b| {
+            b.iter(|| {
+                ServerRegistration::finish(client_registration_finish_result.clone().message);
+            })
+        },
+    );
+}
+
+fn client_login_start(c: &mut Criterion) {
+    let mut rng = UnwrapErr(SysRng);
+    let password = b"password";
+
+    c.bench_function(&format!("client login start ({SUFFIX})"), move |b| {
+        b.iter(|| {
+            ClientLogin::<Default>::start(&mut rng, password).unwrap();
+        })
+    });
+}
+
+fn server_login_start_real(c: &mut Criterion) {
+    let mut rng = UnwrapErr(SysRng);
+    let username = b"username";
+    let password = b"password";
+    let server_setup = ServerSetup::<Default>::new(&mut rng);
+    let client_registration_start_result =
+        ClientRegistration::<Default>::start(&mut rng, password).unwrap();
+    let server_registration_start_result = ServerRegistration::<Default>::start(
+        &server_setup,
+        client_registration_start_result.message.clone(),
+        username,
+    )
+    .unwrap();
+    let client_registration_finish_result = client_registration_start_result
+        .state
+        .finish(
+            &mut rng,
+            password,
+            server_registration_start_result.message,
+            ClientRegistrationFinishParameters::default(),
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+    let password_file = ServerRegistration::finish(client_registration_finish_result.message);
+    let client_login_start_result = ClientLogin::<Default>::start(&mut rng, password).unwrap();
+
+    c.bench_function(&format!("server login start (real) ({SUFFIX})"), move |b| {
+        b.iter(|| {
+            ServerLogin::start(
+                &mut rng,
+                &server_setup,
+                Some(password_file.clone()),
+                client_login_start_result.clone().message,
+                username,
+                ServerLoginParameters::default(),
+            )
+            .unwrap();
+        })
+    });
+}
+
+fn server_login_start_fake(c: &mut Criterion) {
+    let mut rng = UnwrapErr(SysRng);
+    let username = b"username";
+    let password = b"password";
+    let server_setup = ServerSetup::<Default>::new(&mut rng);
+    let client_login_start_result = ClientLogin::<Default>::start(&mut rng, password).unwrap();
+
+    c.bench_function(&format!("server login start (fake) ({SUFFIX})"), move |b| {
+        b.iter(|| {
+            ServerLogin::start(
+                &mut rng,
+                &server_setup,
+                None,
+                client_login_start_result.clone().message,
+                username,
+                ServerLoginParameters::default(),
+            )
+            .unwrap();
+        })
+    });
+}
+
+fn client_login_finish(c: &mut Criterion) {
+    let mut rng = UnwrapErr(SysRng);
+    let username = b"username";
+    let password = b"password";
+    let server_setup = ServerSetup::<Default>::new(&mut rng);
+    let client_registration_start_result =
+        ClientRegistration::<Default>::start(&mut rng, password).unwrap();
+    let server_registration_start_result = ServerRegistration::<Default>::start(
+        &server_setup,
+        client_registration_start_result.message.clone(),
+        username,
+    )
+    .unwrap();
+    let client_registration_finish_result = client_registration_start_result
+        .state
+        .finish(
+            &mut rng,
+            password,
+            server_registration_start_result.message,
+            ClientRegistrationFinishParameters::default(),
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+    let password_file = ServerRegistration::finish(client_registration_finish_result.message);
+    let client_login_start_result = ClientLogin::<Default>::start(&mut rng, password).unwrap();
+    let server_login_start = ServerLogin::start(
+        &mut rng,
+        &server_setup,
+        Some(password_file),
+        client_login_start_result.clone().message,
+        username,
+        ServerLoginParameters::default(),
+    )
+    .unwrap();
+
+    c.bench_function(&format!("client login finish ({SUFFIX})"), move |b| {
+        b.iter(|| {
+            client_login_start_result
+                .clone()
+                .state
+                .finish(
+                    &mut rng,
+                    password,
+                    server_login_start.clone().message,
+                    ClientLoginFinishParameters::default(),
+                )
+                .unwrap();
+        })
+    });
+}
+
+fn server_login_finish(c: &mut Criterion) {
+    let mut rng = UnwrapErr(SysRng);
+    let username = b"username";
+    let password = b"password";
+    let server_setup = ServerSetup::<Default>::new(&mut rng);
+    let client_registration_start_result =
+        ClientRegistration::<Default>::start(&mut rng, password).unwrap();
+    let server_registration_start_result = ServerRegistration::<Default>::start(
+        &server_setup,
+        client_registration_start_result.message.clone(),
+        username,
+    )
+    .unwrap();
+    let client_registration_finish_result = client_registration_start_result
+        .state
+        .finish(
+            &mut rng,
+            password,
+            server_registration_start_result.message,
+            ClientRegistrationFinishParameters::default(),
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+    let password_file = ServerRegistration::finish(client_registration_finish_result.message);
+    let client_login_start_result = ClientLogin::<Default>::start(&mut rng, password).unwrap();
+    let server_login_start_result = ServerLogin::start(
+        &mut rng,
+        &server_setup,
+        Some(password_file),
+        client_login_start_result.clone().message,
+        username,
+        ServerLoginParameters::default(),
+    )
+    .unwrap();
+    let client_login_finish_result = client_login_start_result
+        .state
+        .finish(
+            &mut rng,
+            password,
+            server_login_start_result.clone().message,
+            ClientLoginFinishParameters::default(),
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+    c.bench_function(&format!("server login finish ({SUFFIX})"), move |b| {
+        b.iter(|| {
+            server_login_start_result
+                .clone()
+                .state
+                .finish(
+                    client_login_finish_result.clone().message,
+                    ServerLoginParameters::default(),
+                )
+                .unwrap();
+        })
+    });
+}
+
+criterion_group!(
+    opaque_benches,
+    server_setup,
+    client_registration_start,
+    server_registration_start,
+    client_registration_finish,
+    server_registration_finish,
+    client_login_start,
+    server_login_start_real,
+    server_login_start_fake,
+    client_login_finish,
+    server_login_finish,
+);
+criterion_main!(opaque_benches);

benches/oprf.rs

@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
-//
-// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
-// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
-
-#[macro_use]
-extern crate criterion;
-
-use criterion::Criterion;
-use curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoPoint;
-use generic_array::arr;
-use opaque_ke::{
-    group::Group,
-    oprf::{blind_shim, evaluate_shim, unblind_and_finalize_shim},
-};
-use rand::{prelude::ThreadRng, thread_rng};
-use sha2::Sha512;
-
-fn oprf1(c: &mut Criterion) {
-    let mut csprng: ThreadRng = thread_rng();
-    let input = b"hunter2";
-
-    c.bench_function("blind with Ristretto", move |b| {
-        b.iter(|| {
-            blind_shim::<_, RistrettoPoint, Sha512>(&input[..], &mut csprng).unwrap();
-        })
-    });
-}
-
-fn oprf2(c: &mut Criterion) {
-    let mut csprng: ThreadRng = thread_rng();
-    let input = b"hunter2";
-
-    let (_, alpha) = blind_shim::<_, RistrettoPoint, Sha512>(&input[..], &mut csprng).unwrap();
-    let salt_bytes = arr![
-        u8; 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23,
-        24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32,
-    ];
-    let salt = RistrettoPoint::from_scalar_slice(&salt_bytes).unwrap();
-
-    c.bench_function("evaluate with Ristretto", move |b| {
-        b.iter(|| {
-            let _beta = evaluate_shim::<RistrettoPoint>(alpha, &salt);
-        })
-    });
-}
-
-fn oprf3(c: &mut Criterion) {
-    let mut csprng: ThreadRng = thread_rng();
-    let input = b"hunter2";
-
-    let (token, alpha) = blind_shim::<_, RistrettoPoint, Sha512>(&input[..], &mut csprng).unwrap();
-    let salt_bytes = arr![
-        u8; 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23,
-        24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32,
-    ];
-    let salt = RistrettoPoint::from_scalar_slice(&salt_bytes).unwrap();
-    let beta = evaluate_shim::<RistrettoPoint>(alpha, &salt);
-
-    c.bench_function("unblind_and_finalize with Ristretto", move |b| {
-        b.iter(|| {
-            let _res = unblind_and_finalize_shim::<RistrettoPoint, Sha512>(&token, beta).unwrap();
-        })
-    });
-}
-
-criterion_group!(oprf_benches, oprf1, oprf2, oprf3);
-criterion_main!(oprf_benches);

clippy.toml

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+doc-valid-idents = ["HashEdDSA", "PureEdDSA", ".."]

deny.toml

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 # The values provided in this template are the default values that will be used
 # when any section or field is not specified in your own configuration
 
+[graph]
 # If 1 or more target triples (and optionally, target_features) are specified,
 # only the specified targets will be checked when running `cargo deny check`.
 # This means, if a particular package is only ever used as a target specific
@@ -17,14 +18,15 @@
 # this list would mean the nix crate, as well as any of its exclusive
 # dependencies not shared by any other crates, would be ignored, as the target
 # list here is effectively saying which targets you are building for.
+all-features = true
 targets = [
-    # The triple can be any string, but only the target triples built in to
-    # rustc (as of 1.40) can be checked against actual config expressions
-    #{ triple = "x86_64-unknown-linux-musl" },
-    # You can also specify which target_features you promise are enabled for a
-    # particular target. target_features are currently not validated against
-    # the actual valid features supported by the target architecture.
-    #{ triple = "wasm32-unknown-unknown", features = ["atomics"] },
+  # The triple can be any string, but only the target triples built in to
+  # rustc (as of 1.40) can be checked against actual config expressions
+  #{ triple = "x86_64-unknown-linux-musl" },
+  # You can also specify which target_features you promise are enabled for a
+  # particular target. target_features are currently not validated against
+  # the actual valid features supported by the target architecture.
+  #{ triple = "wasm32-unknown-unknown", features = ["atomics"] },
 ]
 
 # This section is considered when running `cargo deny check advisories`
@@ -34,21 +36,16 @@ targets = [
 # The path where the advisory database is cloned/fetched into
 db-path = "~/.cargo/advisory-db"
 # The url of the advisory database to use
-db-url = "https://github.com/rustsec/advisory-db"
-# The lint level for security vulnerabilities
-vulnerability = "deny"
-# The lint level for unmaintained crates
-unmaintained = "warn"
+db-urls = ["https://github.com/rustsec/advisory-db"]
 # The lint level for crates that have been yanked from their source registry
 yanked = "warn"
-# The lint level for crates with security notices. Note that as of
-# 2019-12-17 there are no security notice advisories in
-# https://github.com/rustsec/advisory-db
-notice = "warn"
 # A list of advisory IDs to ignore. Note that ignored advisories will still
 # output a note when they are encountered.
 ignore = [
-    #"RUSTSEC-0000-0000",
+  # dev-dependency
+  "RUSTSEC-2024-0436",
+  # bincode is unmaintained but only used as dev-dependency for tests
+  "RUSTSEC-2025-0141",
 ]
 # Threshold for security vulnerabilities, any vulnerability with a CVSS score
 # lower than the range specified will be ignored. Note that ignored advisories
@@ -64,47 +61,26 @@ ignore = [
 # More documentation for the licenses section can be found here:
 # https://embarkstudios.github.io/cargo-deny/checks/licenses/cfg.html
 [licenses]
-# The lint level for crates which do not have a detectable license
-unlicensed = "deny"
 # List of explictly allowed licenses
 # See https://spdx.org/licenses/ for list of possible licenses
 # [possible values: any SPDX 3.7 short identifier (+ optional exception)].
 allow = [
-    #"MIT",
-    #"Apache-2.0",
-    #"Apache-2.0 WITH LLVM-exception",
+  "MIT",
+  "BSD-3-Clause",
+  "Apache-2.0",
+  #"Apache-2.0 WITH LLVM-exception",
 ]
-# List of explictly disallowed licenses
-# See https://spdx.org/licenses/ for list of possible licenses
-# [possible values: any SPDX 3.7 short identifier (+ optional exception)].
-deny = [
-    #"Nokia",
-]
-# Lint level for licenses considered copyleft
-copyleft = "warn"
-# Blanket approval or denial for OSI-approved or FSF Free/Libre licenses
-# * both - The license will be approved if it is both OSI-approved *AND* FSF
-# * either - The license will be approved if it is either OSI-approved *OR* FSF
-# * osi-only - The license will be approved if is OSI-approved *AND NOT* FSF
-# * fsf-only - The license will be approved if is FSF *AND NOT* OSI-approved
-# * neither - This predicate is ignored and the default lint level is used
-allow-osi-fsf-free = "neither"
-# Lint level used when no other predicates are matched
-# 1. License isn't in the allow or deny lists
-# 2. License isn't copyleft
-# 3. License isn't OSI/FSF, or allow-osi-fsf-free = "neither"
-default = "allow"
 # The confidence threshold for detecting a license from license text.
 # The higher the value, the more closely the license text must be to the
 # canonical license text of a valid SPDX license file.
 # [possible values: any between 0.0 and 1.0].
-confidence-threshold = 0.8
+confidence-threshold = 0.95
 # Allow 1 or more licenses on a per-crate basis, so that particular licenses
 # aren't accepted for every possible crate as with the normal allow list
 exceptions = [
-    # Each entry is the crate and version constraint, and its specific allow
-    # list
-    #{ allow = ["Zlib"], name = "adler32", version = "*" },
+  # Each entry is the crate and version constraint, and its specific allow
+  # list
+  { allow = ["Unicode-3.0"], name = "unicode-ident", version = "*" },
 ]
 
 # Some crates don't have (easily) machine readable licensing information,
@@ -123,8 +99,8 @@ exceptions = [
 # and the crate will be checked normally, which may produce warnings or errors
 # depending on the rest of your configuration
 #license-files = [
-    # Each entry is a crate relative path, and the (opaque) hash of its contents
-    #{ path = "LICENSE", hash = 0xbd0eed23 }
+# Each entry is a crate relative path, and the (opaque) hash of its contents
+#{ path = "LICENSE", hash = 0xbd0eed23 }
 #]
 
 [licenses.private]
@@ -135,7 +111,7 @@ ignore = false
 # is only published to private registries, and ignore is true, the crate will
 # not have its license(s) checked
 registries = [
-    #"https://sekretz.com/registry
+  #"https://sekretz.com/registry
 ]
 
 # This section is considered when running `cargo deny check bans`.
@@ -152,24 +128,24 @@ multiple-versions = "warn"
 highlight = "all"
 # List of crates that are allowed. Use with care!
 allow = [
-    #{ name = "ansi_term", version = "=0.11.0" },
+  #{ name = "ansi_term", version = "=0.11.0" },
 ]
 # List of crates to deny
 deny = [
-    # Each entry the name of a crate and a version range. If version is
-    # not specified, all versions will be matched.
-    #{ name = "ansi_term", version = "=0.11.0" },
+  # Each entry the name of a crate and a version range. If version is
+  # not specified, all versions will be matched.
+  #{ name = "ansi_term", version = "=0.11.0" },
 ]
 # Certain crates/versions that will be skipped when doing duplicate detection.
 skip = [
-    #{ name = "ansi_term", version = "=0.11.0" },
+  #{ name = "ansi_term", version = "=0.11.0" },
 ]
 # Similarly to `skip` allows you to skip certain crates during duplicate
 # detection. Unlike skip, it also includes the entire tree of transitive
 # dependencies starting at the specified crate, up to a certain depth, which is
 # by default infinite
 skip-tree = [
-    #{ name = "ansi_term", version = "=0.11.0", depth = 20 },
+  #{ name = "ansi_term", version = "=0.11.0", depth = 20 },
 ]
 
 # This section is considered when running `cargo deny check sources`.

examples/digital_locker.rs

@@ -1,53 +1,62 @@
-// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
-//
-// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
-// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) VexaHub and contributors.
+// Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates.
 
 //! Demonstrates an implementation of a server-side secured digital locker using
 //! the client's OPAQUE export key, over a command-line interface
 //!
-//! A client can password-protect a secret message to be stored in a digital locker,
-//! controlled by the server. The locker's contents are only revealed to the holder
-//! of the password when attempting to open the locker.
+//! A client can password-protect a secret message to be stored in a digital
+//! locker, controlled by the server. The locker's contents are only revealed to
+//! the holder of the password when attempting to open the locker.
 //!
-//! The client-server interactions are executed in a three-step protocol
-//! within the account_registration (for password registration) and
-//! account_login (for password login) functions. These steps
-//! must be performed in the specific sequence outlined in each of these
-//! functions.
+//! The client-server interactions are executed in a three-step protocol within
+//! the account_registration (for password registration) and account_login (for
+//! password login) functions. These steps must be performed in the specific
+//! sequence outlined in each of these functions.
 //!
-//! The CipherSuite trait allows the application to configure the
-//! primitives used by OPAQUE, but must be kept consistent across the steps
-//! of the protocol.
+//! The CipherSuite trait allows the application to configure the primitives
+//! used by OPAQUE, but must be kept consistent across the steps of the
+//! protocol.
 //!
-//! In a more realistic client-server interaction, the client must send
-//! messages over "the wire" to the server. These bytes are serialized
-//! and explicitly annotated in the below functions.
+//! In a more realistic client-server interaction, the client must send messages
+//! over "the wire" to the server. These bytes are serialized and explicitly
+//! annotated in the below functions.
 
-use chacha20poly1305::aead::{Aead, NewAead};
-use chacha20poly1305::{ChaCha20Poly1305, Key, Nonce};
-use rand_core::{OsRng, RngCore};
-use rustyline::error::ReadlineError;
-use rustyline::Editor;
-use std::convert::TryFrom;
 use std::process::exit;
 
-use opaque_ke::{
-    ciphersuite::CipherSuite, ClientLogin, ClientLoginFinishParameters, ClientLoginStartParameters,
-    ClientRegistration, ClientRegistrationFinishParameters, CredentialFinalization,
-    CredentialRequest, CredentialResponse, RegistrationRequest, RegistrationResponse,
-    RegistrationUpload, ServerLogin, ServerLoginStartParameters, ServerRegistration,
+use chacha20poly1305::aead::{Aead, KeyInit};
+use chacha20poly1305::{ChaCha20Poly1305, Key, Nonce};
+use opaque_vx::ciphersuite::CipherSuite;
+use opaque_vx::rand::Rng;
+use opaque_vx::rand::rngs::SysRng;
+use opaque_vx::{
+    ClientLogin, ClientLoginFinishParameters, ClientRegistration,
+    ClientRegistrationFinishParameters, CredentialFinalization, CredentialRequest,
+    CredentialResponse, RegistrationRequest, RegistrationResponse, RegistrationUpload, ServerLogin,
+    ServerLoginParameters, ServerRegistration, ServerSetup,
 };
+use rand::rand_core::UnwrapErr;
+use rustyline::Editor;
+use rustyline::error::ReadlineError;
+use rustyline::history::DefaultHistory;
 
-// The ciphersuite trait allows to specify the underlying primitives
-// that will be used in the OPAQUE protocol
+// The ciphersuite trait allows to specify the underlying primitives that will
+// be used in the OPAQUE protocol
 #[allow(dead_code)]
-struct Default;
-impl CipherSuite for Default {
-    type Group = curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoPoint;
-    type KeyExchange = opaque_ke::key_exchange::tripledh::TripleDH;
-    type Hash = sha2::Sha512;
-    type SlowHash = opaque_ke::slow_hash::NoOpHash;
+struct DefaultCipherSuite;
+
+#[cfg(feature = "ristretto255")]
+impl CipherSuite for DefaultCipherSuite {
+    type OprfCs = opaque_vx::Ristretto255;
+    type KeyExchange = opaque_vx::TripleDh<opaque_vx::Ristretto255, sha2::Sha512>;
+    type Ksf = opaque_vx::ksf::Identity;
+}
+
+#[cfg(not(feature = "ristretto255"))]
+impl CipherSuite for DefaultCipherSuite {
+    type OprfCs = p256::NistP256;
+    type KeyExchange = opaque_vx::TripleDh<p256::NistP256, sha2::Sha256>;
+    type Ksf = opaque_vx::ksf::Identity;
 }
 
 struct Locker {
@@ -57,46 +66,48 @@ struct Locker {
 
 // Given a key and plaintext, produce an AEAD ciphertext along with a nonce
 fn encrypt(key: &[u8], plaintext: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
-    let cipher = ChaCha20Poly1305::new(Key::from_slice(&key[..32]));
+    let cipher = ChaCha20Poly1305::new(&Key::try_from(&key[..32]).unwrap());
 
-    let mut rng = OsRng;
+    let mut rng = UnwrapErr(SysRng);
     let mut nonce_bytes = [0u8; 12];
     rng.fill_bytes(&mut nonce_bytes);
-    let nonce = Nonce::from_slice(&nonce_bytes);
+    let nonce = Nonce::try_from(&nonce_bytes[..]).unwrap();
 
-    let ciphertext = cipher.encrypt(nonce, plaintext.as_ref()).unwrap();
+    let ciphertext = cipher.encrypt(&nonce, plaintext.as_ref()).unwrap();
     [nonce_bytes.to_vec(), ciphertext].concat()
 }
 
-// Decrypt using a key and a ciphertext (nonce included) to recover the original plaintext
+// Decrypt using a key and a ciphertext (nonce included) to recover the original
+// plaintext
 fn decrypt(key: &[u8], ciphertext: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
-    let cipher = ChaCha20Poly1305::new(Key::from_slice(&key[..32]));
+    let cipher = ChaCha20Poly1305::new(&Key::try_from(&key[..32]).unwrap());
     cipher
         .decrypt(
-            Nonce::from_slice(&ciphertext[..12]),
+            &Nonce::try_from(&ciphertext[..12]).unwrap(),
             ciphertext[12..].as_ref(),
         )
         .unwrap()
 }
 
-// Password-based registration and encryption of client secret message between a client and server
+// Password-based registration and encryption of client secret message between a
+// client and server
 fn register_locker(
-    server_kp: &opaque_ke::keypair::KeyPair<curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoPoint>,
+    server_setup: &ServerSetup<DefaultCipherSuite>,
+    locker_id: usize,
     password: String,
     secret_message: String,
 ) -> Locker {
-    let mut client_rng = OsRng;
+    let mut client_rng = UnwrapErr(SysRng);
     let client_registration_start_result =
-        ClientRegistration::<Default>::start(&mut client_rng, password.as_bytes()).unwrap();
+        ClientRegistration::<DefaultCipherSuite>::start(&mut client_rng, password.as_bytes())
+            .unwrap();
     let registration_request_bytes = client_registration_start_result.message.serialize();
 
     // Client sends registration_request_bytes to server
-
-    let mut server_rng = OsRng;
-    let server_registration_start_result = ServerRegistration::<Default>::start(
-        &mut server_rng,
-        RegistrationRequest::deserialize(&registration_request_bytes[..]).unwrap(),
-        server_kp.public(),
+    let server_registration_start_result = ServerRegistration::<DefaultCipherSuite>::start(
+        server_setup,
+        RegistrationRequest::deserialize(&registration_request_bytes).unwrap(),
+        &locker_id.to_be_bytes(),
     )
     .unwrap();
     let registration_response_bytes = server_registration_start_result.message.serialize();
@@ -107,7 +118,8 @@ fn register_locker(
         .state
         .finish(
             &mut client_rng,
-            RegistrationResponse::deserialize(&registration_response_bytes[..]).unwrap(),
+            password.as_bytes(),
+            RegistrationResponse::deserialize(&registration_response_bytes).unwrap(),
             ClientRegistrationFinishParameters::default(),
         )
         .unwrap();
@@ -121,42 +133,40 @@ fn register_locker(
 
     // Client sends message_bytes to server
 
-    let password_file = server_registration_start_result
-        .state
-        .finish(RegistrationUpload::deserialize(&message_bytes[..]).unwrap())
-        .unwrap();
+    let password_file = ServerRegistration::finish(
+        RegistrationUpload::<DefaultCipherSuite>::deserialize(&message_bytes).unwrap(),
+    );
 
     Locker {
         contents: ciphertext,
-        password_file: password_file.to_bytes(),
+        password_file: password_file.serialize().to_vec(),
     }
 }
 
 // Open the contents of a locker with a password between a client and server
 fn open_locker(
-    server_kp: &opaque_ke::keypair::KeyPair<curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoPoint>,
+    server_setup: &ServerSetup<DefaultCipherSuite>,
+    locker_id: usize,
     password: String,
     locker: &Locker,
 ) -> Result<String, String> {
-    let mut client_rng = OsRng;
-    let client_login_start_result = ClientLogin::<Default>::start(
-        &mut client_rng,
-        password.as_bytes(),
-        ClientLoginStartParameters::default(),
-    )
-    .unwrap();
+    let mut client_rng = UnwrapErr(SysRng);
+    let client_login_start_result =
+        ClientLogin::<DefaultCipherSuite>::start(&mut client_rng, password.as_bytes()).unwrap();
     let credential_request_bytes = client_login_start_result.message.serialize();
 
     // Client sends credential_request_bytes to server
 
-    let password_file = ServerRegistration::<Default>::try_from(&locker.password_file[..]).unwrap();
-    let mut server_rng = OsRng;
+    let password_file =
+        ServerRegistration::<DefaultCipherSuite>::deserialize(&locker.password_file).unwrap();
+    let mut server_rng = UnwrapErr(SysRng);
     let server_login_start_result = ServerLogin::start(
         &mut server_rng,
-        password_file,
-        &server_kp.private(),
-        CredentialRequest::deserialize(&credential_request_bytes[..]).unwrap(),
-        ServerLoginStartParameters::default(),
+        server_setup,
+        Some(password_file),
+        CredentialRequest::deserialize(&credential_request_bytes).unwrap(),
+        &locker_id.to_be_bytes(),
+        ServerLoginParameters::default(),
     )
     .unwrap();
     let credential_response_bytes = server_login_start_result.message.serialize();
@@ -164,7 +174,9 @@ fn open_locker(
     // Server sends credential_response_bytes to client
 
     let result = client_login_start_result.state.finish(
-        CredentialResponse::deserialize(&credential_response_bytes[..]).unwrap(),
+        &mut client_rng,
+        password.as_bytes(),
+        CredentialResponse::deserialize(&credential_response_bytes).unwrap(),
         ClientLoginFinishParameters::default(),
     );
 
@@ -179,14 +191,17 @@ fn open_locker(
 
     let server_login_finish_result = server_login_start_result
         .state
-        .finish(CredentialFinalization::deserialize(&credential_finalization_bytes[..]).unwrap())
+        .finish(
+            CredentialFinalization::deserialize(&credential_finalization_bytes).unwrap(),
+            ServerLoginParameters::default(),
+        )
         .unwrap();
 
     // Server sends locker contents, encrypted under the session key, to the client
     let encrypted_locker_contents =
         encrypt(&server_login_finish_result.session_key, &locker.contents);
 
-    // Client decrypts contents of locker, first under the session key, and then under the export key
+    // Client decrypts contents of locker, first under the session key, and then
     let plaintext = decrypt(
         &client_login_finish_result.export_key,
         &decrypt(
@@ -198,10 +213,10 @@ fn open_locker(
 }
 
 fn main() {
-    let mut rng = OsRng;
-    let server_kp = Default::generate_random_keypair(&mut rng);
+    let mut rng = UnwrapErr(SysRng);
+    let server_setup = ServerSetup::<DefaultCipherSuite>::new(&mut rng);
 
-    let mut rl = Editor::<()>::new();
+    let mut rl = Editor::<(), _>::new().unwrap();
     let mut registered_lockers: Vec<Locker> = vec![];
     loop {
         display_lockers(&registered_lockers);
@@ -224,8 +239,10 @@ fn main() {
                             &mut rl,
                             None,
                         );
+                        let locker_id = registered_lockers.len();
                         registered_lockers.push(register_locker(
-                            &server_kp,
+                            &server_setup,
+                            locker_id,
                             password,
                             secret_message,
                         ));
@@ -251,15 +268,17 @@ fn main() {
                             continue;
                         }
 
-                        match open_locker(&server_kp, password, &registered_lockers[locker_index]) {
+                        match open_locker(
+                            &server_setup,
+                            locker_index,
+                            password,
+                            &registered_lockers[locker_index],
+                        ) {
                             Ok(contents) => {
-                                println!("\n\nSuccess! Contents: {}\n\n", contents);
+                                println!("\n\nSuccess! Contents: {contents}\n\n");
                             }
                             Err(err) => {
-                                println!(
-                                    "\n\nError encountered, could not open locker: {}\n\n",
-                                    err
-                                );
+                                println!("\n\nError encountered, could not open locker: {err}\n\n");
                             }
                         }
                     }
@@ -276,16 +295,13 @@ fn main() {
 
 // Helper functions
 
-fn display_lockers(lockers: &Vec<Locker>) {
+fn display_lockers(lockers: &[Locker]) {
     let mut locker_numbers = vec![];
     for (i, _) in lockers.iter().enumerate() {
         locker_numbers.push(i);
     }
 
-    println!(
-        "\nCurrently registered locker numbers: {:?}\n",
-        locker_numbers
-    );
+    println!("\nCurrently registered locker numbers: {locker_numbers:?}\n");
 }
 
 // Handle readline errors
@@ -298,7 +314,7 @@ fn handle_error(err: ReadlineError) {
             println!("CTRL-D");
         }
         err => {
-            println!("Error: {:?}", err);
+            println!("Error: {err:?}");
         }
     }
 }
@@ -307,11 +323,11 @@ fn handle_error(err: ReadlineError) {
 fn get_two_strings(
     s1: &str,
     s2: &str,
-    rl: &mut Editor<()>,
+    rl: &mut Editor<(), DefaultHistory>,
     string1: Option<String>,
 ) -> (String, String) {
     let query = if string1.is_none() { s1 } else { s2 };
-    let readline = rl.readline(&format!("{}: ", query));
+    let readline = rl.readline(&format!("{query}: "));
     match readline {
         Ok(line) => match string1 {
             Some(x) => (x, line),

examples/simple_login.rs

@@ -1,67 +1,79 @@
-// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
-//
-// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
-// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) VexaHub and contributors.
+// Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates.
 
-//! Demonstrates a simple client-server password-based login protocol
-//! using OPAQUE, over a command-line interface
+//! Demonstrates a simple client-server password-based login protocol using
+//! OPAQUE, over a command-line interface
 //!
-//! The client-server interactions are executed in a three-step protocol
-//! within the account_registration (for password registration) and
-//! account_login (for password login) functions. These steps
-//! must be performed in the specific sequence outlined in each of these
-//! functions.
+//! The client-server interactions are executed in a three-step protocol within
+//! the account_registration (for password registration) and account_login (for
+//! password login) functions. These steps must be performed in the specific
+//! sequence outlined in each of these functions.
 //!
-//! The CipherSuite trait allows the application to configure the
-//! primitives used by OPAQUE, but must be kept consistent across the steps
-//! of the protocol.
+//! The CipherSuite trait allows the application to configure the primitives
+//! used by OPAQUE, but must be kept consistent across the steps of the
+//! protocol.
 //!
-//! In a more realistic client-server interaction, the client must send
-//! messages over "the wire" to the server. These bytes are serialized
-//! and explicitly annotated in the below functions.
+//! In a more realistic client-server interaction, the client must send messages
+//! over "the wire" to the server. These bytes are serialized and explicitly
+//! annotated in the below functions.
 
-use rand_core::OsRng;
-use rustyline::error::ReadlineError;
+use opaque_vx::argon2::Argon2;
+use opaque_vx::ciphersuite::CipherSuite;
+use opaque_vx::hybrid_array::Array;
+use opaque_vx::rand::rngs::SysRng;
+use opaque_vx::{
+    ClientLogin, ClientLoginFinishParameters, ClientRegistration,
+    ClientRegistrationFinishParameters, CredentialFinalization, CredentialRequest,
+    CredentialResponse, RegistrationRequest, RegistrationResponse, RegistrationUpload, ServerLogin,
+    ServerLoginParameters, ServerRegistration, ServerRegistrationLen, ServerSetup,
+};
+use rand::rand_core::UnwrapErr;
 use rustyline::Editor;
+use rustyline::error::ReadlineError;
+use rustyline::history::DefaultHistory;
 use std::collections::HashMap;
-use std::convert::TryFrom;
 use std::process::exit;
 
-use opaque_ke::{
-    ciphersuite::CipherSuite, ClientLogin, ClientLoginFinishParameters, ClientLoginStartParameters,
-    ClientRegistration, ClientRegistrationFinishParameters, CredentialFinalization,
-    CredentialRequest, CredentialResponse, RegistrationRequest, RegistrationResponse,
-    RegistrationUpload, ServerLogin, ServerLoginStartParameters, ServerRegistration,
-};
-
-// The ciphersuite trait allows to specify the underlying primitives
-// that will be used in the OPAQUE protocol
+// The ciphersuite trait allows to specify the underlying primitives that will
+// be used in the OPAQUE protocol
 #[allow(dead_code)]
-struct Default;
-impl CipherSuite for Default {
-    type Group = curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoPoint;
-    type KeyExchange = opaque_ke::key_exchange::tripledh::TripleDH;
-    type Hash = sha2::Sha512;
-    type SlowHash = opaque_ke::slow_hash::NoOpHash;
+struct DefaultCipherSuite;
+
+#[cfg(feature = "ristretto255")]
+impl CipherSuite for DefaultCipherSuite {
+    type OprfCs = opaque_vx::Ristretto255;
+    type KeyExchange = opaque_vx::TripleDh<opaque_vx::Ristretto255, sha2::Sha512>;
+
+    type Ksf = Argon2<'static>;
+}
+
+#[cfg(not(feature = "ristretto255"))]
+impl CipherSuite for DefaultCipherSuite {
+    type OprfCs = p256::NistP256;
+    type KeyExchange = opaque_vx::TripleDh<p256::NistP256, sha2::Sha256>;
+
+    type Ksf = Argon2<'static>;
 }
 
 // Password-based registration between a client and server
 fn account_registration(
-    server_kp: &opaque_ke::keypair::KeyPair<curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoPoint>,
+    server_setup: &ServerSetup<DefaultCipherSuite>,
+    username: String,
     password: String,
-) -> Vec<u8> {
-    let mut client_rng = OsRng;
+) -> Array<u8, ServerRegistrationLen<DefaultCipherSuite>> {
+    let mut client_rng = UnwrapErr(SysRng);
     let client_registration_start_result =
-        ClientRegistration::<Default>::start(&mut client_rng, password.as_bytes()).unwrap();
+        ClientRegistration::<DefaultCipherSuite>::start(&mut client_rng, password.as_bytes())
+            .unwrap();
     let registration_request_bytes = client_registration_start_result.message.serialize();
 
     // Client sends registration_request_bytes to server
 
-    let mut server_rng = OsRng;
-    let server_registration_start_result = ServerRegistration::<Default>::start(
-        &mut server_rng,
-        RegistrationRequest::deserialize(&registration_request_bytes[..]).unwrap(),
-        server_kp.public(),
+    let server_registration_start_result = ServerRegistration::<DefaultCipherSuite>::start(
+        server_setup,
+        RegistrationRequest::deserialize(&registration_request_bytes).unwrap(),
+        username.as_bytes(),
     )
     .unwrap();
     let registration_response_bytes = server_registration_start_result.message.serialize();
@@ -72,7 +84,8 @@ fn account_registration(
         .state
         .finish(
             &mut client_rng,
-            RegistrationResponse::deserialize(&registration_response_bytes[..]).unwrap(),
+            password.as_bytes(),
+            RegistrationResponse::deserialize(&registration_response_bytes).unwrap(),
             ClientRegistrationFinishParameters::default(),
         )
         .unwrap();
@@ -80,38 +93,36 @@ fn account_registration(
 
     // Client sends message_bytes to server
 
-    let password_file = server_registration_start_result
-        .state
-        .finish(RegistrationUpload::deserialize(&message_bytes[..]).unwrap())
-        .unwrap();
-    password_file.to_bytes()
+    let password_file = ServerRegistration::finish(
+        RegistrationUpload::<DefaultCipherSuite>::deserialize(&message_bytes).unwrap(),
+    );
+    password_file.serialize().into_ha0_4()
 }
 
 // Password-based login between a client and server
 fn account_login(
-    server_kp: &opaque_ke::keypair::KeyPair<curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoPoint>,
+    server_setup: &ServerSetup<DefaultCipherSuite>,
+    username: String,
     password: String,
     password_file_bytes: &[u8],
 ) -> bool {
-    let mut client_rng = OsRng;
-    let client_login_start_result = ClientLogin::<Default>::start(
-        &mut client_rng,
-        password.as_bytes(),
-        ClientLoginStartParameters::default(),
-    )
-    .unwrap();
+    let mut client_rng = UnwrapErr(SysRng);
+    let client_login_start_result =
+        ClientLogin::<DefaultCipherSuite>::start(&mut client_rng, password.as_bytes()).unwrap();
     let credential_request_bytes = client_login_start_result.message.serialize();
 
     // Client sends credential_request_bytes to server
 
-    let password_file = ServerRegistration::<Default>::try_from(password_file_bytes).unwrap();
-    let mut server_rng = OsRng;
+    let password_file =
+        ServerRegistration::<DefaultCipherSuite>::deserialize(password_file_bytes).unwrap();
+    let mut server_rng = UnwrapErr(SysRng);
     let server_login_start_result = ServerLogin::start(
         &mut server_rng,
-        password_file,
-        &server_kp.private(),
-        CredentialRequest::deserialize(&credential_request_bytes[..]).unwrap(),
-        ServerLoginStartParameters::default(),
+        server_setup,
+        Some(password_file),
+        CredentialRequest::deserialize(&credential_request_bytes).unwrap(),
+        username.as_bytes(),
+        ServerLoginParameters::default(),
     )
     .unwrap();
     let credential_response_bytes = server_login_start_result.message.serialize();
@@ -119,7 +130,9 @@ fn account_login(
     // Server sends credential_response_bytes to client
 
     let result = client_login_start_result.state.finish(
-        CredentialResponse::deserialize(&credential_response_bytes[..]).unwrap(),
+        &mut client_rng,
+        password.as_bytes(),
+        CredentialResponse::deserialize(&credential_response_bytes).unwrap(),
         ClientLoginFinishParameters::default(),
     );
 
@@ -134,18 +147,22 @@ fn account_login(
 
     let server_login_finish_result = server_login_start_result
         .state
-        .finish(CredentialFinalization::deserialize(&credential_finalization_bytes[..]).unwrap())
+        .finish(
+            CredentialFinalization::deserialize(&credential_finalization_bytes).unwrap(),
+            ServerLoginParameters::default(),
+        )
         .unwrap();
 
     client_login_finish_result.session_key == server_login_finish_result.session_key
 }
 
 fn main() {
-    let mut rng = OsRng;
-    let server_kp = Default::generate_random_keypair(&mut rng);
+    let mut rng = UnwrapErr(SysRng);
+    let server_setup = ServerSetup::<DefaultCipherSuite>::new(&mut rng);
 
-    let mut rl = Editor::<()>::new();
-    let mut registered_users = HashMap::<String, Vec<u8>>::new();
+    let mut rl = Editor::<(), _>::new().unwrap();
+    let mut registered_users =
+        HashMap::<String, Array<u8, ServerRegistrationLen<DefaultCipherSuite>>>::new();
     loop {
         println!(
             "\nCurrently registered usernames: {:?}\n",
@@ -165,20 +182,24 @@ fn main() {
                 let (username, password) = get_two_strings("Username", "Password", &mut rl, None);
                 match line.as_ref() {
                     "1" => {
-                        registered_users
-                            .insert(username, account_registration(&server_kp, password));
+                        registered_users.insert(
+                            username.clone(),
+                            account_registration(&server_setup, username, password),
+                        );
                         continue;
                     }
                     "2" => match registered_users.get(&username) {
                         Some(password_file_bytes) => {
-                            if account_login(&server_kp, password, password_file_bytes) {
+                            if account_login(&server_setup, username, password, password_file_bytes)
+                            {
                                 println!("\nLogin success!");
                             } else {
-                                // Note that at this point, the client knows whether or not the login
-                                // succeeded. In this example, we simply rely on client-reported result
-                                // of login, but in a real client-server implementation, the server may not
-                                // know the outcome of login yet, and extra care must be taken to ensure
-                                // that the server can learn the outcome as well.
+                                // Note that at this point, the client knows whether or not the
+                                // login succeeded. In this example, we simply rely on
+                                // client-reported result of login, but in a real client-server
+                                // implementation, the server may not know the outcome of login yet,
+                                // and extra care must be taken to ensure that the server can learn
+                                // the outcome as well.
                                 println!("\nIncorrect password, please try again.");
                             }
                         }
@@ -207,7 +228,7 @@ fn handle_error(err: ReadlineError) {
             println!("CTRL-D");
         }
         err => {
-            println!("Error: {:?}", err);
+            println!("Error: {err:?}");
         }
     }
 }
@@ -216,11 +237,11 @@ fn handle_error(err: ReadlineError) {
 fn get_two_strings(
     s1: &str,
     s2: &str,
-    rl: &mut Editor<()>,
+    rl: &mut Editor<(), DefaultHistory>,
     string1: Option<String>,
 ) -> (String, String) {
     let query = if string1.is_none() { s1 } else { s2 };
-    let readline = rl.readline(&format!("{}: ", query));
+    let readline = rl.readline(&format!("{query}: "));
     match readline {
         Ok(line) => match string1 {
             Some(x) => (x, line),

renovate.json

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://docs.renovatebot.com/renovate-schema.json",
+  "extends": [
+    "config:recommended"
+  ],
+  "dependencyDashboard": true,
+  "osvVulnerabilityAlerts": true,
+  "rangeStrategy": "auto",
+  "packageRules": [
+    {
+      "matchManagers": [
+        "cargo"
+      ],
+      "groupName": "rust deps"
+    },
+    {
+      "matchManagers": [
+        "cargo"
+      ],
+      "matchUpdateTypes": [
+        "major"
+      ],
+      "automerge": false
+    }
+  ],
+  "lockFileMaintenance": {
+    "enabled": true
+  },
+  "configMigration": true
+}

rustfmt.toml

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+newline_style = "Unix"

scripts/digital_locker.exp

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 #!/bin/expect -f
-# Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
-#
-# This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
-# LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
+
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
+# Copyright (c) VexaHub and contributors.
+# Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates.
 
 set timeout 1
 spawn cargo run --example digital_locker

scripts/simple_login.exp

@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
 #!/bin/expect -f
-# Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
-#
-# This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
-# LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
+
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
+# Copyright (c) VexaHub and contributors.
+# Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates.
 
 set timeout 1
-spawn cargo run --example simple_login
+spawn cargo run --example simple_login --features argon2
 match_max 100000
 sleep 1
 expect "*

src/ciphersuite.rs

@@ -1,41 +1,55 @@
-// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
-//
-// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
-// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) VexaHub and contributors.
+// Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates.
 
-//! Defines the CipherSuite trait to specify the underlying primitives for OPAQUE
+//! Defines the [`CipherSuite`] trait to specify the underlying primitives for
+//! OPAQUE
 
-use crate::{
-    hash::Hash, key_exchange::traits::KeyExchange, keypair::KeyPair,
-    map_to_curve::GroupWithMapToCurve, slow_hash::SlowHash,
-};
-use digest::Digest;
+use core::ops::Add;
 
-use rand_core::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
+use digest::block_api::{CoreProxy, EagerHash, SmallBlockSizeUser};
+use generic_array::ArrayLength;
+use generic_array::typenum::{IsLess, Le, NonZero, Sum, U256};
+
+use crate::envelope::NonceLen;
+use crate::hash::{Hash, OutputSize, ProxyHash};
+use crate::key_exchange::KeyExchange;
+use crate::key_exchange::group::Group;
+use crate::ksf::Ksf;
+use crate::opaque::MaskedResponseLen;
 
 /// Configures the underlying primitives used in OPAQUE
-/// * `Group`: a finite cyclic group along with a point representation, along
-///   with an extension trait PasswordToCurve that allows some customization on
-///   how to hash a password to a curve point. See `group::Group` and
-///   `map_to_curve::GroupWithMapToCurve`.
+/// * `OprfCs`: A VOPRF ciphersuite, see [`voprf::CipherSuite`].
+/// * `KeGroup`: A `Group` used for the `KeyExchange`.
 /// * `KeyExchange`: The key exchange protocol to use in the login step
 /// * `Hash`: The main hashing function to use
-/// * `SlowHash`: A slow hashing function, typically used for password hashing
-pub trait CipherSuite {
-    /// A finite cyclic group along with a point representation along with
-    /// an extension trait PasswordToCurve that allows some customization on
-    /// how to hash a password to a curve point. See `group::Group` and
-    /// `map_to_curve::GroupWithMapToCurve`.
-    type Group: GroupWithMapToCurve<UniformBytesLen = <Self::Hash as Digest>::OutputSize>;
+/// * `Ksf`: A key stretching function, typically used for password hashing
+pub trait CipherSuite
+where
+    OprfHash<Self>: Hash + EagerHash,
+    <OprfHash<Self> as CoreProxy>::Core: ProxyHash,
+    <<OprfHash<Self> as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: IsLess<U256>,
+    Le<<<OprfHash<Self> as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize, U256>: NonZero,
+    // Envelope: Nonce + Hash
+    // MaskedResponse: (Nonce + Hash) + KePk
+    // TODO: migrate fully to after hybrid-array v0.5 releases
+    // https://github.com/RustCrypto/hybrid-array/issues/66
+    OutputSize<OprfHash<Self>>: Add<NonceLen> + ArrayLength,
+    Sum<OutputSize<OprfHash<Self>>, NonceLen>: ArrayLength + Add<<KeGroup<Self> as Group>::PkLen>,
+    MaskedResponseLen<Self>: ArrayLength,
+    // hybrid-array interop bounds
+    <OprfGroup<Self> as voprf::Group>::ScalarLen: ArrayLength,
+    <OprfGroup<Self> as voprf::Group>::ElemLen: ArrayLength,
+{
+    /// A VOPRF ciphersuite, see [`voprf::CipherSuite`].
+    type OprfCs: voprf::CipherSuite;
     /// A key exchange protocol
-    type KeyExchange: KeyExchange<Self::Hash, Self::Group>;
-    /// The main hash function use (for HKDF computations and hashing transcripts)
-    type Hash: Hash;
-    /// A slow hashing function, typically used for password hashing
-    type SlowHash: SlowHash<Self::Hash>;
-
-    /// Generating a random key pair given a cryptographic rng
-    fn generate_random_keypair<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(rng: &mut R) -> KeyPair<Self::Group> {
-        KeyPair::<Self::Group>::generate_random(rng)
-    }
+    type KeyExchange: KeyExchange;
+    /// A key stretching function, typically used for password hashing
+    type Ksf: Ksf;
 }
+
+pub(crate) type OprfGroup<CS: CipherSuite> = <CS::OprfCs as voprf::CipherSuite>::Group;
+pub(crate) type OprfHash<CS: CipherSuite> = <CS::OprfCs as voprf::CipherSuite>::Hash;
+pub(crate) type KeGroup<CS: CipherSuite> = <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::Group;
+pub(crate) type KeHash<CS: CipherSuite> = <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::Hash;

src/envelope.rs

@@ -1,344 +1,310 @@
-// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
-//
-// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
-// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) VexaHub and contributors.
+// Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates.
 
-use crate::{
-    errors::{utils::check_slice_size_atleast, InternalPakeError, PakeError, ProtocolError},
-    hash::Hash,
-    serialization::{serialize, tokenize},
-};
-use digest::Digest;
-use generic_array::{typenum::Unsigned, GenericArray};
-use hkdf::Hkdf;
-use hmac::{Hmac, Mac, NewMac};
-use rand_core::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
-use std::convert::TryFrom;
+use core::convert::TryFrom;
+
+use derive_where::derive_where;
+use digest::Output;
+use generic_array::GenericArray;
+use generic_array::typenum::{Sum, U32};
+use hkdf::SimpleHkdf as Hkdf;
+use hmac::{KeyInit, Mac, SimpleHmac};
+use rand::{CryptoRng, Rng};
+use zeroize::Zeroize;
+
+use crate::ciphersuite::{CipherSuite, KeGroup, OprfHash};
+use crate::errors::{InternalError, ProtocolError};
+use crate::hash::OutputSize;
+use crate::key_exchange::SerializedIdentifiers;
+use crate::key_exchange::group::Group;
+use crate::keypair::{KeyPair, PrivateKey, PublicKey};
+use crate::opaque::Identifiers;
+use crate::serialization::{GenericArrayExt, SliceExt, UpdateExt};
 
 // Constant string used as salt for HKDF computation
-const STR_PAD: &[u8] = b"Pad";
-const STR_AUTH_KEY: &[u8] = b"AuthKey";
-const STR_EXPORT_KEY: &[u8] = b"ExportKey";
+const STR_AUTH_KEY: [u8; 7] = *b"AuthKey";
+const STR_EXPORT_KEY: [u8; 9] = *b"ExportKey";
+const STR_PRIVATE_KEY: [u8; 10] = *b"PrivateKey";
+pub(crate) type NonceLen = U32;
 
-const NONCE_LEN: usize = 32;
-
-#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
+#[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize))]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, Hash, Ord, PartialEq, PartialOrd)]
 pub(crate) enum InnerEnvelopeMode {
-    Base = 1,
-    CustomIdentifier = 2,
+    Zero = 0,
+    Internal = 1,
+}
+
+impl Zeroize for InnerEnvelopeMode {
+    fn zeroize(&mut self) {
+        *self = Self::Zero
+    }
 }
 
 impl TryFrom<u8> for InnerEnvelopeMode {
-    type Error = PakeError;
+    type Error = ProtocolError;
     fn try_from(x: u8) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
         match x {
-            1 => Ok(InnerEnvelopeMode::Base),
-            2 => Ok(InnerEnvelopeMode::CustomIdentifier),
-            _ => Err(PakeError::SerializationError),
+            1 => Ok(InnerEnvelopeMode::Internal),
+            _ => Err(ProtocolError::SerializationError),
         }
     }
 }
 
-pub(crate) struct InnerEnvelope {
-    mode: InnerEnvelopeMode,
-    nonce: Vec<u8>,
-    ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
-}
-
-impl InnerEnvelope {
-    pub(crate) fn serialize(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        [
-            &[self.mode as u8],
-            &self.nonce[..],
-            &serialize(&self.ciphertext, 2)[..],
-        ]
-        .concat()
-    }
-
-    pub(crate) fn deserialize(input: &[u8]) -> Result<(Self, Vec<u8>), ProtocolError> {
-        if input.is_empty() {
-            return Err(ProtocolError::VerificationError(
-                PakeError::SerializationError,
-            ));
-        }
-        let mode = InnerEnvelopeMode::try_from(input[0])?;
-
-        let bytes = &input[1..];
-        if bytes.len() < NONCE_LEN {
-            return Err(ProtocolError::VerificationError(
-                PakeError::SerializationError,
-            ));
-        }
-
-        let nonce = &bytes[..NONCE_LEN];
-        let (ciphertext, remainder) = tokenize(&bytes[NONCE_LEN..], 2)?;
-
-        Ok((
-            Self {
-                mode,
-                nonce: nonce.to_vec(),
-                ciphertext,
-            },
-            remainder,
-        ))
-    }
-}
-
-/// This struct is an instantiation of the envelope as described in
-/// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-06#section-4
+/// This struct is an instantiation of the envelope.
 ///
-/// Note that earlier versions of this specification described an
-/// implementation of this envelope using an encryption scheme that
-/// satisfied random-key robustness
-/// (https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-05#section-4).
-/// The specification update has simplified this assumption by taking
-/// an XOR-based approach without compromising on security, and to avoid
-/// the confusion around the implementation of an RKR-secure encryption.
-pub(crate) struct Envelope<D: Hash> {
-    inner_envelope: InnerEnvelope,
-    hmac: GenericArray<u8, <D as Digest>::OutputSize>,
+/// Note that earlier versions of this specification described an implementation
+/// of this envelope using an encryption scheme that satisfied random-key
+/// robustness.
+/// The specification update has simplified this assumption by taking an
+/// XOR-based approach without compromising on security, and to avoid the
+/// confusion around the implementation of an RKR-secure encryption.
+#[cfg_attr(
+    feature = "serde",
+    derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize),
+    serde(bound = "")
+)]
+#[derive_where(Clone, Debug, Eq, Hash, Ord, PartialEq, PartialOrd, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
+pub(crate) struct Envelope<CS: CipherSuite> {
+    pub(crate) mode: InnerEnvelopeMode,
+    nonce: GenericArray<u8, NonceLen>,
+    hmac: Output<OprfHash<CS>>,
 }
 
-// Note that this struct represents an envelope that has been "opened" with the asssociated
-// key. This key is also used to derive the export_key parameter, which is technically
-// unrelated to the envelope's encrypted and authenticated contents.
-pub(crate) struct OpenedEnvelope<D: Hash> {
-    pub(crate) client_s_sk: Vec<u8>,
-    pub(crate) export_key: GenericArray<u8, <D as Digest>::OutputSize>,
+// Note that this struct represents an envelope that has been "opened" with the
+// asssociated key. This key is also used to derive the export_key parameter,
+// which is technically unrelated to the envelope's encrypted and authenticated
+// contents.
+pub(crate) struct OpenedEnvelope<'a, CS: CipherSuite> {
+    pub(crate) client_static_keypair: KeyPair<KeGroup<CS>>,
+    pub(crate) export_key: Output<OprfHash<CS>>,
+    pub(crate) identifiers: SerializedIdentifiers<'a, KeGroup<CS>>,
 }
 
-pub(crate) struct OpenedInnerEnvelope<D: Hash> {
-    pub(crate) plaintext: Vec<u8>,
-    pub(crate) export_key: GenericArray<u8, <D as Digest>::OutputSize>,
+pub(crate) struct OpenedInnerEnvelope<CS: CipherSuite> {
+    pub(crate) export_key: Output<OprfHash<CS>>,
 }
 
-impl<D: Hash> Envelope<D> {
-    /// The additional number of bytes added to the plaintext
-    pub(crate) fn additional_size() -> usize {
-        NONCE_LEN + <D as Digest>::OutputSize::to_usize()
-    }
+#[cfg(not(test))]
+type SealRawResult<CS: CipherSuite> = (Envelope<CS>, Output<OprfHash<CS>>);
+#[cfg(test)]
+type SealRawResult<CS: CipherSuite> = (Envelope<CS>, Output<OprfHash<CS>>, Output<OprfHash<CS>>);
+#[cfg(not(test))]
+type SealResult<CS: CipherSuite> = (Envelope<CS>, PublicKey<KeGroup<CS>>, Output<OprfHash<CS>>);
+#[cfg(test)]
+type SealResult<CS: CipherSuite> = (
+    Envelope<CS>,
+    PublicKey<KeGroup<CS>>,
+    Output<OprfHash<CS>>,
+    Output<OprfHash<CS>>,
+);
 
-    fn hmac_key_size() -> usize {
-        <D as Digest>::OutputSize::to_usize()
-    }
+pub(crate) type EnvelopeLen<CS: CipherSuite> = Sum<OutputSize<OprfHash<CS>>, NonceLen>;
 
-    fn export_key_size() -> usize {
-        <D as Digest>::OutputSize::to_usize()
-    }
-
-    pub(crate) fn get_mode(&self) -> InnerEnvelopeMode {
-        self.inner_envelope.mode
-    }
-
-    /// The format of the output is:
-    /// mode | nonce             | ciphertext       | hmac
-    /// u8   | nonce_size bytes  | variable length  | hmac_size bytes
-    pub(crate) fn from_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, InternalPakeError> {
-        let (result, remainder) = Self::deserialize(bytes)
-            .map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::InvalidEnvelopeStructureError)?;
-        if !remainder.is_empty() {
-            return Err(InternalPakeError::InvalidEnvelopeStructureError);
-        }
-        Ok(result)
-    }
-
-    pub(crate) fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        self.serialize()
-    }
-
-    pub(crate) fn serialize(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        [&self.inner_envelope.serialize(), &self.hmac[..]].concat()
-    }
-
-    pub(crate) fn deserialize(input: &[u8]) -> Result<(Self, Vec<u8>), ProtocolError> {
-        let (inner_envelope, remainder) = InnerEnvelope::deserialize(input)?;
-
-        let hmac_key_size = Self::hmac_key_size();
-        let hmac_and_remainder =
-            check_slice_size_atleast(&remainder, hmac_key_size, "hmac_key_size")?;
-
-        Ok((
-            Self {
-                inner_envelope,
-                hmac: GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&hmac_and_remainder[..hmac_key_size]),
-            },
-            hmac_and_remainder[hmac_key_size..].to_vec(),
-        ))
-    }
-
-    pub(crate) fn seal<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
+impl<CS: CipherSuite> Envelope<CS> {
+    #[allow(clippy::type_complexity)]
+    pub(crate) fn seal<R: Rng + CryptoRng>(
         rng: &mut R,
-        key: &[u8],
-        client_s_sk: &[u8],
-        server_s_pk: &[u8],
-        optional_ids: Option<(Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>)>,
-    ) -> Result<(Self, GenericArray<u8, <D as Digest>::OutputSize>), InternalPakeError> {
-        let plaintext = serialize(&client_s_sk, 2);
-        let aad = construct_aad(server_s_pk, &optional_ids);
-        Self::seal_raw(rng, key, &plaintext, &aad, mode_from_ids(&optional_ids))
-    }
-
-    /// Uses a key to convert the plaintext into an envelope, authenticated by the aad field.
-    /// Note that a new nonce is sampled for each call to seal.
-    pub(crate) fn seal_raw<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
-        rng: &mut R,
-        key: &[u8],
-        plaintext: &[u8],
-        aad: &[u8],
-        mode: InnerEnvelopeMode,
-    ) -> Result<(Self, GenericArray<u8, <D as Digest>::OutputSize>), InternalPakeError> {
-        let mut nonce = vec![0u8; NONCE_LEN];
+        randomized_pwd_hasher: &Hkdf<OprfHash<CS>>,
+        server_s_pk: &PublicKey<KeGroup<CS>>,
+        ids: Identifiers,
+    ) -> Result<SealResult<CS>, ProtocolError> {
+        let mut nonce = GenericArray::default();
         rng.fill_bytes(&mut nonce);
 
-        let h = Hkdf::<D>::new(Some(&nonce), &key);
-        let mut xor_key = vec![0u8; plaintext.len()];
-        let mut hmac_key = vec![0u8; Self::hmac_key_size()];
-        let mut export_key = vec![0u8; Self::export_key_size()];
+        let (mode, client_s_pk) = (
+            InnerEnvelopeMode::Internal,
+            build_inner_envelope_internal::<CS>(randomized_pwd_hasher, nonce)?,
+        );
 
-        h.expand(STR_PAD, &mut xor_key)
-            .map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HkdfError)?;
-        h.expand(STR_AUTH_KEY, &mut hmac_key)
-            .map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HkdfError)?;
-        h.expand(STR_EXPORT_KEY, &mut export_key)
-            .map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HkdfError)?;
+        let server_s_pk_bytes = server_s_pk.serialize();
+        let identifiers = SerializedIdentifiers::<KeGroup<CS>>::from_identifiers(
+            ids,
+            client_s_pk.serialize(),
+            server_s_pk_bytes.clone(),
+        )?;
+        let aad = construct_aad(
+            identifiers.client.iter(),
+            identifiers.server.iter(),
+            &server_s_pk_bytes,
+        );
 
-        let ciphertext: Vec<u8> = xor_key
-            .iter()
-            .zip(plaintext.iter())
-            .map(|(&x1, &x2)| x1 ^ x2)
-            .collect();
+        let result = Self::seal_raw(randomized_pwd_hasher, nonce, aad, mode)?;
+        Ok((
+            result.0,
+            client_s_pk,
+            result.1,
+            #[cfg(test)]
+            result.2,
+        ))
+    }
 
-        let inner_envelope = InnerEnvelope {
-            mode,
-            nonce,
-            ciphertext,
-        };
+    /// Uses a key to convert the plaintext into an envelope, authenticated by
+    /// the aad field. Note that a new nonce is sampled for each call to seal.
+    #[allow(clippy::type_complexity)]
+    pub(crate) fn seal_raw<'a>(
+        randomized_pwd_hasher: &Hkdf<OprfHash<CS>>,
+        nonce: GenericArray<u8, NonceLen>,
+        aad: impl Iterator<Item = &'a [u8]>,
+        mode: InnerEnvelopeMode,
+    ) -> Result<SealRawResult<CS>, InternalError> {
+        let mut hmac_key = Output::<OprfHash<CS>>::default();
+        let mut export_key = Output::<OprfHash<CS>>::default();
 
-        let mut hmac =
-            Hmac::<D>::new_varkey(&hmac_key).map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HmacError)?;
-        hmac.update(&inner_envelope.serialize());
-        hmac.update(&aad);
+        randomized_pwd_hasher
+            .expand_multi_info(&[&nonce, &STR_AUTH_KEY], &mut hmac_key)
+            .map_err(|_| InternalError::HkdfError)?;
+        randomized_pwd_hasher
+            .expand_multi_info(&[&nonce, &STR_EXPORT_KEY], &mut export_key)
+            .map_err(|_| InternalError::HkdfError)?;
+
+        let mut hmac = SimpleHmac::<OprfHash<CS>>::new_from_slice(&hmac_key)
+            .map_err(|_| InternalError::HmacError)?;
+        hmac.update(&nonce);
+        hmac.update_iter(aad);
 
         let hmac_bytes = hmac.finalize().into_bytes();
 
         Ok((
             Self {
-                inner_envelope,
+                mode,
+                nonce,
                 hmac: hmac_bytes,
             },
-            GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&export_key),
+            export_key,
+            #[cfg(test)]
+            hmac_key,
         ))
     }
 
-    pub(crate) fn open(
+    pub(crate) fn open<'a>(
         &self,
-        key: &[u8],
-        server_s_pk: &[u8],
-        optional_ids: &Option<(Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>)>,
-    ) -> Result<OpenedEnvelope<D>, InternalPakeError> {
-        // First, check that mode matches
-        if self.inner_envelope.mode != mode_from_ids(optional_ids) {
-            return Err(InternalPakeError::IncompatibleEnvelopeModeError);
-        }
+        randomized_pwd_hasher: &Hkdf<OprfHash<CS>>,
+        server_s_pk: PublicKey<KeGroup<CS>>,
+        optional_ids: Identifiers<'a>,
+    ) -> Result<OpenedEnvelope<'a, CS>, ProtocolError> {
+        let client_static_keypair = match self.mode {
+            InnerEnvelopeMode::Zero => {
+                return Err(InternalError::IncompatibleEnvelopeModeError.into());
+            }
+            InnerEnvelopeMode::Internal => {
+                recover_keys_internal::<CS>(randomized_pwd_hasher, self.nonce)?
+            }
+        };
 
-        let aad = construct_aad(server_s_pk, optional_ids);
-        let opened = self.open_raw(key, &aad)?;
+        let server_s_pk_bytes = server_s_pk.serialize();
+        let identifiers = SerializedIdentifiers::<KeGroup<CS>>::from_identifiers(
+            optional_ids,
+            client_static_keypair.public().serialize(),
+            server_s_pk_bytes.clone(),
+        )?;
+        let aad = construct_aad(
+            identifiers.client.iter(),
+            identifiers.server.iter(),
+            &server_s_pk_bytes,
+        );
 
-        let (client_s_sk, remainder) = tokenize(&opened.plaintext, 2)
-            .map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::UnexpectedEnvelopeContentsError)?;
-        if !remainder.is_empty() {
-            // Should not have anything else in plaintext
-            return Err(InternalPakeError::UnexpectedEnvelopeContentsError);
-        }
+        let opened = self.open_raw(randomized_pwd_hasher, aad)?;
 
         Ok(OpenedEnvelope {
-            client_s_sk,
+            client_static_keypair,
             export_key: opened.export_key,
+            identifiers,
         })
     }
 
-    /// Attempts to decrypt the envelope using a key, which is successful only if the key and
-    /// aad used to construct the envelope are the same.
-    pub(crate) fn open_raw(
+    /// Attempts to decrypt the envelope using a key, which is successful only
+    /// if the key and aad used to construct the envelope are the same.
+    pub(crate) fn open_raw<'a>(
         &self,
-        key: &[u8],
-        aad: &[u8],
-    ) -> Result<OpenedInnerEnvelope<D>, InternalPakeError> {
-        let h = Hkdf::<D>::new(Some(&self.inner_envelope.nonce), &key);
-        let mut xor_key = vec![0u8; self.inner_envelope.ciphertext.len()];
-        let mut hmac_key = vec![0u8; Self::hmac_key_size()];
-        let mut export_key = vec![0u8; Self::export_key_size()];
+        randomized_pwd_hasher: &Hkdf<OprfHash<CS>>,
+        aad: impl Iterator<Item = &'a [u8]>,
+    ) -> Result<OpenedInnerEnvelope<CS>, InternalError> {
+        let mut hmac_key = Output::<OprfHash<CS>>::default();
+        let mut export_key = Output::<OprfHash<CS>>::default();
 
-        h.expand(STR_PAD, &mut xor_key)
-            .map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HkdfError)?;
-        h.expand(STR_AUTH_KEY, &mut hmac_key)
-            .map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HkdfError)?;
-        h.expand(STR_EXPORT_KEY, &mut export_key)
-            .map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HkdfError)?;
+        randomized_pwd_hasher
+            .expand_multi_info(&[&self.nonce, &STR_AUTH_KEY], &mut hmac_key)
+            .map_err(|_| InternalError::HkdfError)?;
+        randomized_pwd_hasher
+            .expand_multi_info(&[&self.nonce, &STR_EXPORT_KEY], &mut export_key)
+            .map_err(|_| InternalError::HkdfError)?;
 
-        let mut hmac =
-            Hmac::<D>::new_varkey(&hmac_key).map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HmacError)?;
-        hmac.update(&self.inner_envelope.serialize());
-        hmac.update(aad);
-        if hmac.verify(&self.hmac).is_err() {
-            return Err(InternalPakeError::SealOpenHmacError);
+        let mut hmac = SimpleHmac::<OprfHash<CS>>::new_from_slice(&hmac_key)
+            .map_err(|_| InternalError::HmacError)?;
+        hmac.update(&self.nonce);
+        hmac.update_iter(aad);
+        hmac.verify(&self.hmac)
+            .map_err(|_| InternalError::SealOpenHmacError)?;
+
+        Ok(OpenedInnerEnvelope { export_key })
+    }
+
+    // Creates a dummy envelope object that serializes to the all-zeros byte string
+    pub(crate) fn dummy() -> Self {
+        Self {
+            mode: InnerEnvelopeMode::Zero,
+            nonce: GenericArray::default(),
+            hmac: GenericArray::default().into_ha0_4(),
         }
+    }
 
-        let plaintext: Vec<u8> = xor_key
-            .iter()
-            .zip(self.inner_envelope.ciphertext.iter())
-            .map(|(&x1, &x2)| x1 ^ x2)
-            .collect();
-        Ok(OpenedInnerEnvelope {
-            plaintext,
-            export_key: GenericArray::<u8, <D as Digest>::OutputSize>::clone_from_slice(
-                &export_key,
-            ),
+    #[cfg(test)]
+    pub(crate) fn len() -> usize {
+        use generic_array::typenum::Unsigned;
+
+        OutputSize::<OprfHash<CS>>::USIZE + NonceLen::USIZE
+    }
+
+    pub(crate) fn serialize(&self) -> GenericArray<u8, EnvelopeLen<CS>> {
+        self.nonce
+            .concat_ext(&GenericArray::from_ha0_4(self.hmac.clone()))
+    }
+
+    pub(crate) fn deserialize_take(bytes: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
+        Ok(Self {
+            mode: InnerEnvelopeMode::Internal,
+            nonce: bytes.take_array("nonce")?,
+            hmac: bytes
+                .take_array::<OutputSize<OprfHash<CS>>>("hmac")?
+                .into_ha0_4(),
         })
     }
 }
 
 // Helper functions
 
-fn construct_aad(server_s_pk: &[u8], optional_ids: &Option<(Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>)>) -> Vec<u8> {
-    let ids = optional_ids
-        .iter()
-        .flat_map(|(l, r)| [serialize(l, 2), serialize(r, 2)].concat())
-        .collect();
-    [serialize(server_s_pk, 2), ids].concat()
+fn build_inner_envelope_internal<CS: CipherSuite>(
+    randomized_pwd_hasher: &Hkdf<OprfHash<CS>>,
+    nonce: GenericArray<u8, NonceLen>,
+) -> Result<PublicKey<KeGroup<CS>>, ProtocolError> {
+    let mut keypair_seed = GenericArray::<_, <KeGroup<CS> as Group>::SkLen>::default();
+    randomized_pwd_hasher
+        .expand_multi_info(&[&nonce, &STR_PRIVATE_KEY], &mut keypair_seed)
+        .map_err(|_| InternalError::HkdfError)?;
+    let client_s_sk = PrivateKey::new(KeGroup::<CS>::derive_scalar(keypair_seed)?);
+
+    Ok(client_s_sk.public_key())
 }
 
-pub(crate) fn mode_from_ids(optional_ids: &Option<(Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>)>) -> InnerEnvelopeMode {
-    match optional_ids {
-        Some(_) => InnerEnvelopeMode::CustomIdentifier,
-        None => InnerEnvelopeMode::Base,
-    }
+fn recover_keys_internal<CS: CipherSuite>(
+    randomized_pwd_hasher: &Hkdf<OprfHash<CS>>,
+    nonce: GenericArray<u8, NonceLen>,
+) -> Result<KeyPair<KeGroup<CS>>, ProtocolError> {
+    let mut keypair_seed = GenericArray::<_, <KeGroup<CS> as Group>::SkLen>::default();
+    randomized_pwd_hasher
+        .expand_multi_info(&[&nonce, &STR_PRIVATE_KEY], &mut keypair_seed)
+        .map_err(|_| InternalError::HkdfError)?;
+    let client_s_sk = PrivateKey::new(KeGroup::<CS>::derive_scalar(keypair_seed)?);
+    let client_s_pk = client_s_sk.public_key();
+
+    Ok(KeyPair::new(client_s_sk, client_s_pk))
 }
 
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-    use rand_core::OsRng;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn seal_and_open() {
-        let mut rng = OsRng;
-        let mut key = [0u8; 32];
-        rng.fill_bytes(&mut key);
-
-        let mut msg = [0u8; 100];
-        rng.fill_bytes(&mut msg);
-
-        let (envelope, export_key_1) = Envelope::<sha2::Sha256>::seal_raw(
-            &mut rng,
-            &key,
-            &msg,
-            b"aad",
-            InnerEnvelopeMode::Base,
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-        let opened_envelope = envelope.open_raw(&key, b"aad").unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(&msg.to_vec(), &opened_envelope.plaintext);
-        assert_eq!(&export_key_1.to_vec(), &opened_envelope.export_key.to_vec());
-    }
+fn construct_aad<'a>(
+    id_u: impl Iterator<Item = &'a [u8]>,
+    id_s: impl Iterator<Item = &'a [u8]>,
+    server_s_pk: &'a [u8],
+) -> impl Iterator<Item = &'a [u8]> {
+    [server_s_pk].into_iter().chain(id_s).chain(id_u)
 }

src/errors.rs

@@ -1,18 +1,90 @@
-// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
-//
-// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
-// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) VexaHub and contributors.
+// Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates.
 
 //! A list of error types which are produced during an execution of the protocol
+use core::convert::Infallible;
+use core::error::Error;
+use core::fmt::Debug;
+
 use displaydoc::Display;
-use thiserror::Error;
 
 /// Represents an error in the manipulation of internal cryptographic data
-#[derive(Debug, Display, Error)]
-pub enum InternalPakeError {
-    /// Deserializing from a byte sequence failed
-    InvalidByteSequence,
-    /// Invalid length for {name}: expected {len}, but is actually {actual_len}.
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Display, Eq, Hash, Ord, PartialEq, PartialOrd)]
+pub enum InternalError {
+    /// Size of input is empty or longer then [`u16::MAX`].
+    HashToScalar,
+    /// Computing HKDF failed while deriving subkeys
+    HkdfError,
+    /// Computing HMAC failed while supplying a secret key
+    HmacError,
+    /// Computing the key stretching function failed
+    KsfError,
+    /// Error while performing a KEM operation
+    KemError,
+    /** This error occurs when the envelope seal open hmac check fails
+    HMAC check in seal open failed. */
+    SealOpenHmacError,
+    /** This error occurs when attempting to open an envelope of the wrong
+    type (base mode, custom identifier) */
+    IncompatibleEnvelopeModeError,
+    /// Error from the OPRF evaluation
+    OprfError(voprf::Error),
+    /// Error from the OPRF evaluation
+    OprfInternalError(voprf::InternalError),
+}
+
+impl Debug for InternalError {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> core::fmt::Result {
+        match self {
+            Self::HashToScalar => f.debug_tuple("HashToScalar").finish(),
+            Self::HkdfError => f.debug_tuple("HkdfError").finish(),
+            Self::HmacError => f.debug_tuple("HmacError").finish(),
+            Self::KsfError => f.debug_tuple("KsfError").finish(),
+            Self::KemError => f.debug_tuple("KemError").finish(),
+            Self::SealOpenHmacError => f.debug_tuple("SealOpenHmacError").finish(),
+            Self::IncompatibleEnvelopeModeError => {
+                f.debug_tuple("IncompatibleEnvelopeModeError").finish()
+            }
+            Self::OprfError(error) => f.debug_tuple("OprfError").field(error).finish(),
+            Self::OprfInternalError(error) => {
+                f.debug_tuple("OprfInternalError").field(error).finish()
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl Error for InternalError {}
+
+impl From<voprf::Error> for InternalError {
+    fn from(voprf_error: voprf::Error) -> Self {
+        Self::OprfError(voprf_error)
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<voprf::Error> for ProtocolError {
+    fn from(voprf_error: voprf::Error) -> Self {
+        Self::LibraryError(InternalError::OprfError(voprf_error))
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<voprf::InternalError> for ProtocolError {
+    fn from(voprf_error: voprf::InternalError) -> Self {
+        Self::LibraryError(InternalError::OprfInternalError(voprf_error))
+    }
+}
+
+/// Represents an error in protocol handling
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Display, Eq, Hash, Ord, PartialEq, PartialOrd)]
+pub enum ProtocolError<T = Infallible> {
+    /// Internal error encountered
+    LibraryError(InternalError),
+    /// Error in validating credentials
+    InvalidLoginError,
+    /// Error with serializing / deserializing protocol messages
+    SerializationError,
+    /** Invalid length for `{name}`: expected {len}, actual {actual_len} */
+    #[allow(clippy::doc_markdown, unused_assignments)]
     SizeError {
         /// name
         name: &'static str,
@@ -21,159 +93,74 @@ pub enum InternalPakeError {
         /// actual
         actual_len: usize,
     },
-    /// Could not decompress point.
-    PointError,
-    /// Key belongs to a small subgroup!
-    SubGroupError,
-    /// hashing to a key failed
-    HashingFailure,
-    /// Computing the hash-to-curve function failed
-    HashToCurveError,
-    /// Computing HKDF failed while deriving subkeys
-    HkdfError,
-    /// Computing HMAC failed while supplying a secret key
-    HmacError,
-    /// Computing the slow hashing function failed
-    SlowHashError,
-    /// This error occurs when the envelope seal fails
-    /// Constructing the envelope seal failed.
-    SealError,
-    /// This error occurs when the envelope seal open fails
-    /// Opening the envelope seal failed.
-    SealOpenError,
-    /// This error occurs when the envelope seal open hmac check fails
-    /// HMAC check in seal open failed.
-    SealOpenHmacError,
-    /// This error occurs when the envelope cannot be constructed properly
-    /// based on the credentials that were specified to be required.
-    InvalidEnvelopeStructureError,
-    /// This error occurs when attempting to open an envelope of the wrong
-    /// type (base mode, custom identifier)
-    IncompatibleEnvelopeModeError,
-    /// This error occurs when the envelope is opened and deserialization
-    /// fails
-    UnexpectedEnvelopeContentsError,
+    /** This error occurs when the client detects that the server has
+    reflected the OPRF value (beta == alpha) */
+    ReflectedValueError,
+    /// Custom [`SecretKey`](crate::keypair::PrivateKeySerialization) error type
+    Custom(T),
 }
 
-/// Represents an error in password checking
-#[derive(Debug, Display, Error)]
-pub enum PakeError {
-    /// This error results from an internal error during PRF construction
-    ///
-    /// Internal error during PRF verification: {0}
-    CryptoError(InternalPakeError),
-    /// This error occurs when the server object that is being called finish() on is malformed
-    /// Incomplete set of keys passed into finish() function
-    IncompleteKeysError,
-    /// The provided server public key doesn't match the sealed one
-    IncompatibleServerStaticPublicKeyError,
-    /// Error in key exchange protocol when attempting to validate MACs
-    KeyExchangeMacValidationError,
-    /// Error in validating credentials
-    InvalidLoginError,
-    /// Error with serializing / deserializing protocol messages
-    SerializationError,
-}
-
-// This is meant to express future(ly) non-trivial ways of converting the
-// internal error into a PakeError
-impl From<InternalPakeError> for PakeError {
-    fn from(e: InternalPakeError) -> PakeError {
-        PakeError::CryptoError(e)
+impl<T: Debug> Debug for ProtocolError<T> {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> core::fmt::Result {
+        match self {
+            Self::LibraryError(pake_error) => {
+                f.debug_tuple("LibraryError").field(pake_error).finish()
+            }
+            Self::InvalidLoginError => f.debug_tuple("InvalidLoginError").finish(),
+            Self::SerializationError => f.debug_tuple("SerializationError").finish(),
+            Self::SizeError {
+                name,
+                len,
+                actual_len,
+            } => f
+                .debug_struct("SizeError")
+                .field("name", name)
+                .field("len", len)
+                .field("actual_len", actual_len)
+                .finish(),
+            Self::ReflectedValueError => f.debug_tuple("ReflectedValueError").finish(),
+            Self::Custom(custom) => f.debug_tuple("Custom").field(custom).finish(),
+        }
     }
 }
 
-/// Represents an error in protocol handling
-#[derive(Debug, Display, Error)]
-pub enum ProtocolError {
-    /// This error results from an error during password verification
-    ///
-    /// Internal error during password verification: {0}
-    VerificationError(PakeError),
-    /// This error occurs when the server answer cannot be handled
-    /// Server response cannot be handled.
-    ServerError,
-    /// This error occurs when the server specifies an envelope credentials
-    /// format that is invalid
-    ServerInvalidEnvelopeCredentialsFormatError,
-    /// This error occurs when the client request cannot be handled
-    /// Client request cannot be handled.
-    ClientError,
-}
-
-// This is meant to express future(ly) non-trivial ways of converting the
-// Pake error into a ProtocolError
-impl From<PakeError> for ProtocolError {
-    fn from(e: PakeError) -> ProtocolError {
-        ProtocolError::VerificationError(e)
-    }
-}
+impl<T: Error> Error for ProtocolError<T> {}
 
 // This is meant to express future(ly) non-trivial ways of converting the
 // internal error into a ProtocolError
-impl From<InternalPakeError> for ProtocolError {
-    fn from(e: InternalPakeError) -> ProtocolError {
-        ProtocolError::VerificationError(e.into())
+impl<T> From<InternalError> for ProtocolError<T> {
+    fn from(e: InternalError) -> ProtocolError<T> {
+        Self::LibraryError(e)
     }
 }
 
-// See https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/64715 and remove this when
-// merged, and https://github.com/dtolnay/thiserror/issues/62 for why this
-// comes up in our doc tests.
-impl From<::std::convert::Infallible> for ProtocolError {
-    fn from(_: ::std::convert::Infallible) -> Self {
+// See https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/64715 and remove this when merged,
+// and https://github.com/dtolnay/thiserror/issues/62 for why this comes up in our
+// doc tests.
+impl<T> From<Infallible> for ProtocolError<T> {
+    fn from(_: Infallible) -> Self {
         unreachable!()
     }
 }
 
-impl From<generic_bytes::TryFromSizedBytesError> for InternalPakeError {
-    fn from(_: generic_bytes::TryFromSizedBytesError) -> Self {
-        InternalPakeError::InvalidByteSequence
-    }
-}
-
-impl From<generic_bytes::TryFromSizedBytesError> for PakeError {
-    fn from(e: generic_bytes::TryFromSizedBytesError) -> Self {
-        PakeError::CryptoError(e.into())
-    }
-}
-
-impl From<generic_bytes::TryFromSizedBytesError> for ProtocolError {
-    fn from(e: generic_bytes::TryFromSizedBytesError) -> Self {
-        PakeError::CryptoError(e.into()).into()
-    }
-}
-
-pub(crate) mod utils {
-    use super::*;
-
-    pub fn check_slice_size<'a>(
-        slice: &'a [u8],
-        expected_len: usize,
-        arg_name: &'static str,
-    ) -> Result<&'a [u8], InternalPakeError> {
-        if slice.len() != expected_len {
-            return Err(InternalPakeError::SizeError {
-                name: arg_name,
-                len: expected_len,
-                actual_len: slice.len(),
-            });
+impl ProtocolError {
+    /// Convert `ProtocolError<Infallible>` into `ProtocolError<T>`
+    pub fn into_custom<T>(self) -> ProtocolError<T> {
+        match self {
+            Self::LibraryError(internal_error) => ProtocolError::LibraryError(internal_error),
+            Self::InvalidLoginError => ProtocolError::InvalidLoginError,
+            Self::SerializationError => ProtocolError::SerializationError,
+            Self::SizeError {
+                name,
+                len,
+                actual_len,
+            } => ProtocolError::SizeError {
+                name,
+                len,
+                actual_len,
+            },
+            Self::ReflectedValueError => ProtocolError::ReflectedValueError,
+            Self::Custom(infallible) => match infallible {},
         }
-        Ok(slice)
-    }
-
-    pub fn check_slice_size_atleast<'a>(
-        slice: &'a [u8],
-        expected_len: usize,
-        arg_name: &'static str,
-    ) -> Result<&'a [u8], InternalPakeError> {
-        if slice.len() < expected_len {
-            return Err(InternalPakeError::SizeError {
-                name: arg_name,
-                len: expected_len,
-                actual_len: slice.len(),
-            });
-        }
-        Ok(slice)
     }
 }

src/group.rs

@@ -1,137 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
-//
-// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
-// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
-
-//! Defines the Group trait to specify the underlying prime order group used in
-//! OPAQUE's OPRF
-
-use crate::errors::InternalPakeError;
-
-use curve25519_dalek::{
-    constants::RISTRETTO_BASEPOINT_POINT,
-    ristretto::{CompressedRistretto, RistrettoPoint},
-    scalar::Scalar,
-};
-use generic_array::{
-    typenum::{U32, U64},
-    ArrayLength, GenericArray,
-};
-use std::convert::TryInto;
-
-use rand_core::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
-use std::ops::Mul;
-use zeroize::Zeroize;
-
-/// A prime-order subgroup of a base field (EC, prime-order field ...). This
-/// subgroup is noted additively — as in the draft RFC — in this trait.
-pub trait Group: Sized + for<'a> Mul<&'a <Self as Group>::Scalar, Output = Self> {
-    /// The type of base field scalars
-    type Scalar: Zeroize + Clone;
-    /// The byte length necessary to represent scalars
-    type ScalarLen: ArrayLength<u8>;
-    /// Return a scalar from its fixed-length bytes representation
-    fn from_scalar_slice(
-        scalar_bits: &GenericArray<u8, Self::ScalarLen>,
-    ) -> Result<Self::Scalar, InternalPakeError>;
-    /// picks a scalar at random
-    fn random_scalar<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(rng: &mut R) -> Self::Scalar;
-    /// Serializes a scalar to bytes
-    fn scalar_as_bytes(scalar: &Self::Scalar) -> &GenericArray<u8, Self::ScalarLen>;
-    /// The multiplicative inverse of this scalar
-    fn scalar_invert(scalar: &Self::Scalar) -> Self::Scalar;
-
-    /// The byte length necessary to represent group elements
-    type ElemLen: ArrayLength<u8>;
-    /// Return an element from its fixed-length bytes representation
-    fn from_element_slice(
-        element_bits: &GenericArray<u8, Self::ElemLen>,
-    ) -> Result<Self, InternalPakeError>;
-    /// Serializes the `self` group element
-    fn to_arr(&self) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::ElemLen>;
-
-    /// Hashes points presumed to be uniformly random to the curve. The
-    /// impl is allowed to perform additional hashes if it needs to, but this
-    /// may not be necessary as this function is going to be called with the
-    /// output of a kdf.
-    type UniformBytesLen: ArrayLength<u8>;
-
-    /// Hashes a slice of pseudo-random bytes of the correct length to a curve point
-    fn hash_to_curve(uniform_bytes: &GenericArray<u8, Self::UniformBytesLen>) -> Self;
-
-    /// Get the base point for the group
-    fn base_point() -> Self;
-
-    /// Multiply the point by a scalar, represented as a slice
-    fn mult_by_slice(&self, scalar: &GenericArray<u8, Self::ScalarLen>) -> Self;
-}
-
-/// The implementation of such a subgroup for Ristretto
-impl Group for RistrettoPoint {
-    type Scalar = Scalar;
-    type ScalarLen = U32;
-    fn from_scalar_slice(
-        scalar_bits: &GenericArray<u8, Self::ScalarLen>,
-    ) -> Result<Self::Scalar, InternalPakeError> {
-        let mut bits = [0u8; 32];
-        bits.copy_from_slice(scalar_bits);
-        Ok(Scalar::from_bytes_mod_order(bits))
-    }
-    fn random_scalar<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(rng: &mut R) -> Self::Scalar {
-        #[cfg(not(test))]
-        {
-            let mut scalar_bytes = [0u8; 64];
-            rng.fill_bytes(&mut scalar_bytes);
-            Scalar::from_bytes_mod_order_wide(&scalar_bytes)
-        }
-
-        // Tests need an exact conversion from bytes to scalar, sampling only 32 bytes from rng
-        #[cfg(test)]
-        {
-            let mut scalar_bytes = [0u8; 32];
-            rng.fill_bytes(&mut scalar_bytes);
-            Scalar::from_bytes_mod_order(scalar_bytes)
-        }
-    }
-    fn scalar_as_bytes(scalar: &Self::Scalar) -> &GenericArray<u8, Self::ScalarLen> {
-        GenericArray::from_slice(scalar.as_bytes())
-    }
-    fn scalar_invert(scalar: &Self::Scalar) -> Self::Scalar {
-        scalar.invert()
-    }
-
-    // The byte length necessary to represent group elements
-    type ElemLen = U32;
-    fn from_element_slice(
-        element_bits: &GenericArray<u8, Self::ElemLen>,
-    ) -> Result<Self, InternalPakeError> {
-        CompressedRistretto::from_slice(element_bits)
-            .decompress()
-            .ok_or(InternalPakeError::PointError)
-    }
-    // serialization of a group element
-    fn to_arr(&self) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::ElemLen> {
-        let c = self.compress();
-        *GenericArray::from_slice(c.as_bytes())
-    }
-
-    type UniformBytesLen = U64;
-    fn hash_to_curve(uniform_bytes: &GenericArray<u8, Self::UniformBytesLen>) -> Self {
-        // https://caniuse.rs/features/array_gt_32_impls
-        let bits: [u8; 64] = {
-            let mut bytes = [0u8; 64];
-            bytes.copy_from_slice(uniform_bytes);
-            bytes
-        };
-        RistrettoPoint::from_uniform_bytes(&bits)
-    }
-
-    fn base_point() -> Self {
-        RISTRETTO_BASEPOINT_POINT
-    }
-
-    fn mult_by_slice(&self, scalar: &GenericArray<u8, Self::ScalarLen>) -> Self {
-        let arr: [u8; 32] = scalar.as_slice().try_into().expect("Wrong length");
-        self * Scalar::from_bits(arr)
-    }
-}

src/hash.rs

@@ -1,15 +1,77 @@
-// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
-//
-// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
-// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) VexaHub and contributors.
+// Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates.
 
 //! A convenience trait for digest bounds used throughout the library
 
-use digest::{BlockInput, FixedOutput, Reset, Update};
+use digest::block_api::{
+    BlockSizeUser, BufferKindUser, CoreProxy, FixedOutputCore, SmallBlockSizeUser,
+};
+use digest::block_buffer::Eager;
+use digest::{Digest, FixedOutputReset, HashMarker, OutputSizeUser};
+use generic_array::typenum::{IsLess, Le, NonZero, U256};
 
-/// Trait inheriting the requirements from digest::Digest for compatibility with HKDF and HMAC
-// Associated types could be simplified when they are made as defaults:
-// https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/29661
-pub trait Hash: Update + BlockInput + FixedOutput + Reset + Default + Clone {}
+pub(crate) type OutputSize<H> = <<H as CoreProxy>::Core as OutputSizeUser>::OutputSize;
 
-impl<T: Update + BlockInput + FixedOutput + Reset + Default + Clone> Hash for T {}
+/// Trait to simplify requirements for [`Hash`].
+pub trait ProxyHash:
+    HashMarker + FixedOutputCore + BufferKindUser<BufferKind = Eager> + OutputSizeUser + Default + Clone
+where
+    <Self as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: IsLess<U256>,
+    Le<<Self as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize, U256>: NonZero,
+{
+}
+
+impl<
+    T: HashMarker
+        + FixedOutputCore
+        + BufferKindUser<BufferKind = Eager>
+        + OutputSizeUser
+        + Default
+        + Clone,
+> ProxyHash for T
+where
+    <T as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: IsLess<U256>,
+    Le<<T as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize, U256>: NonZero,
+{
+}
+
+/// Trait inheriting the requirements from [`Digest`] for compatibility
+/// with HKDF and HMAC Associated types could be simplified when they are made
+/// as defaults: <https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/29661>
+pub trait Hash:
+    Default
+    + HashMarker
+    + Digest
+    + OutputSizeUser<OutputSize = OutputSize<Self>>
+    + BlockSizeUser
+    + FixedOutputReset
+    + CoreProxy
+    + Clone
+    + zeroize::ZeroizeOnDrop
+where
+    <Self as CoreProxy>::Core: ProxyHash,
+    <<Self as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: IsLess<U256>,
+    Le<<<Self as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize, U256>: NonZero,
+    OutputSize<Self>: generic_array::ArrayLength,
+{
+}
+
+impl<
+    T: Default
+        + HashMarker
+        + Digest
+        + OutputSizeUser<OutputSize = OutputSize<Self>>
+        + BlockSizeUser
+        + FixedOutputReset
+        + CoreProxy
+        + Clone
+        + zeroize::ZeroizeOnDrop,
+> Hash for T
+where
+    <T as CoreProxy>::Core: ProxyHash,
+    <<T as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: IsLess<U256>,
+    Le<<<T as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize, U256>: NonZero,
+    OutputSize<T>: generic_array::ArrayLength,
+{
+}

src/key_exchange/group/curve25519.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) VexaHub and contributors.
+// Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates.
+
+//! Key Exchange group implementation for Curve25519
+
+pub use curve25519_dalek;
+use curve25519_dalek::montgomery::MontgomeryPoint;
+use curve25519_dalek::scalar;
+use curve25519_dalek::traits::IsIdentity;
+use generic_array::GenericArray;
+use generic_array::typenum::U32;
+use rand::{CryptoRng, Rng};
+use subtle::ConstantTimeEq;
+use zeroize::ZeroizeOnDrop;
+
+use super::Group;
+use crate::errors::{InternalError, ProtocolError};
+use crate::key_exchange::shared::DiffieHellman;
+use crate::serialization::SliceExt;
+
+/// Implementation for Curve25519.
+pub struct Curve25519;
+
+/// The implementation of such a subgroup for Curve25519
+impl Group for Curve25519 {
+    type Pk = NonIdentity;
+    type PkLen = U32;
+    type Sk = Scalar;
+    type SkLen = U32;
+
+    fn serialize_pk(pk: &Self::Pk) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::PkLen> {
+        pk.0.to_bytes().into()
+    }
+
+    fn deserialize_take_pk(bytes: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Pk, ProtocolError> {
+        bytes
+            .take_array::<U32>("public key")
+            .and_then(|bytes| NonIdentity::from_bytes(bytes.into()))
+    }
+
+    fn random_sk<R: Rng + CryptoRng>(rng: &mut R) -> Self::Sk {
+        // Sample 32 random bytes and then clamp, as described in https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html
+        let mut scalar_bytes = [0u8; 32];
+        rng.fill_bytes(&mut scalar_bytes);
+        let scalar = scalar::clamp_integer(scalar_bytes);
+
+        Scalar(scalar)
+    }
+
+    fn derive_scalar(seed: GenericArray<u8, Self::SkLen>) -> Result<Self::Sk, InternalError> {
+        Ok(Scalar(scalar::clamp_integer(seed.into())))
+    }
+
+    fn public_key(sk: &Self::Sk) -> Self::Pk {
+        NonIdentity(MontgomeryPoint::mul_base_clamped(sk.0))
+    }
+
+    fn serialize_sk(sk: &Self::Sk) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::SkLen> {
+        sk.0.into()
+    }
+
+    fn deserialize_take_sk(bytes: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Sk, ProtocolError> {
+        bytes
+            .take_array::<U32>("secret key")
+            .and_then(|bytes| Scalar::from_bytes(bytes.into()))
+    }
+}
+
+impl DiffieHellman<Curve25519> for Scalar {
+    fn diffie_hellman(&self, pk: &NonIdentity) -> GenericArray<u8, U32> {
+        Curve25519::serialize_pk(&NonIdentity(pk.0.mul_clamped(self.0)))
+    }
+}
+
+/// Non-identity point wrapper for [`MontgomeryPoint`].
+#[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize))]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, Hash, PartialEq)]
+pub struct NonIdentity(
+    #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(deserialize_with = "serde_deserialize_pk"))]
+    MontgomeryPoint,
+);
+
+impl NonIdentity {
+    fn from_bytes(bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
+        let point = MontgomeryPoint(bytes);
+
+        if point.is_identity() {
+            Err(ProtocolError::SerializationError)
+        } else {
+            Ok(NonIdentity(point))
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "serde")]
+fn serde_deserialize_pk<'de, D>(deserializer: D) -> Result<MontgomeryPoint, D::Error>
+where
+    D: serde::Deserializer<'de>,
+{
+    use serde::de::{Deserialize, Error};
+
+    let point = MontgomeryPoint::deserialize(deserializer)?;
+
+    NonIdentity::from_bytes(point.0)
+        .map(|point| point.0)
+        .map_err(Error::custom)
+}
+
+/// Curve25519 scalar.
+#[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize))]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, Hash, PartialEq, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
+pub struct Scalar(
+    #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(deserialize_with = "serde_deserialize_sk"))] [u8; 32],
+);
+
+impl Scalar {
+    fn from_bytes(bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
+        let scalar = scalar::clamp_integer(bytes);
+
+        if scalar.ct_eq(&bytes).into() {
+            Ok(Self(scalar))
+        } else {
+            Err(ProtocolError::SerializationError)
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "serde")]
+fn serde_deserialize_sk<'de, D>(deserializer: D) -> Result<[u8; 32], D::Error>
+where
+    D: serde::Deserializer<'de>,
+{
+    use serde::de::{Deserialize, Error};
+
+    Scalar::from_bytes(<[u8; 32]>::deserialize(deserializer)?)
+        .map(|scalar| scalar.0)
+        .map_err(D::Error::custom)
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn non_zero_scalar() {
+    use std::vec;
+
+    use crate::tests::mock_rng::CycleRng;
+
+    let mut rng = CycleRng::new(vec![0]);
+    let sk = Curve25519::random_sk(&mut rng);
+    assert_ne!(sk.0, curve25519_dalek::Scalar::ZERO.to_bytes());
+}

src/key_exchange/group/ed25519.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,504 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) VexaHub and contributors.
+// Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates.
+
+//! Key Exchange group implementation for Ed25519
+
+use core::iter;
+
+use curve25519_dalek::edwards::CompressedEdwardsY;
+use curve25519_dalek::traits::IsIdentity;
+use curve25519_dalek::{EdwardsPoint, Scalar};
+use digest::Digest;
+pub use ed25519_dalek;
+use ed25519_dalek::hazmat::ExpandedSecretKey;
+use ed25519_dalek::{SecretKey, Sha512};
+use generic_array::GenericArray;
+use generic_array::typenum::{U32, U64};
+use rand::{CryptoRng, Rng};
+use zeroize::{Zeroize, ZeroizeOnDrop};
+
+use super::Group;
+use crate::ciphersuite::CipherSuite;
+use crate::errors::{InternalError, ProtocolError};
+use crate::key_exchange::sigma_i::hash_eddsa::implementation::HashEddsaImpl;
+use crate::key_exchange::sigma_i::pure_eddsa::implementation::PureEddsaImpl;
+pub use crate::key_exchange::sigma_i::shared::PreHash;
+use crate::key_exchange::sigma_i::{CachedMessage, Message, MessageBuilder};
+use crate::serialization::{ConcatExt, SliceExt, UpdateExt};
+
+/// Implementation for Ed25519.
+pub struct Ed25519;
+
+impl Group for Ed25519 {
+    type Pk = VerifyingKey;
+    type PkLen = U32;
+    type Sk = SigningKey;
+    type SkLen = U32;
+
+    fn serialize_pk(pk: &Self::Pk) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::PkLen> {
+        pk.compressed.0.into()
+    }
+
+    fn deserialize_take_pk(bytes: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Pk, ProtocolError> {
+        let bytes = bytes.take_array::<U32>("public key")?;
+
+        VerifyingKey::from_bytes(bytes.into())
+    }
+
+    fn random_sk<R: Rng + CryptoRng>(rng: &mut R) -> Self::Sk {
+        let mut sk = <[u8; 32]>::default();
+        rng.fill_bytes(&mut sk);
+
+        SigningKey::from_bytes(sk)
+    }
+
+    fn derive_scalar(seed: GenericArray<u8, Self::SkLen>) -> Result<Self::Sk, InternalError> {
+        Ok(SigningKey::from_bytes(seed.into()))
+    }
+
+    fn public_key(sk: &Self::Sk) -> Self::Pk {
+        sk.verifying_key
+    }
+
+    fn serialize_sk(sk: &Self::Sk) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::SkLen> {
+        sk.sk.into()
+    }
+
+    fn deserialize_take_sk(bytes: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Sk, ProtocolError> {
+        Ok(SigningKey::from_bytes(
+            bytes.take_array::<U32>("secret key")?.into(),
+        ))
+    }
+}
+
+impl PureEddsaImpl for Ed25519 {
+    type Signature = Signature;
+    type SignatureLen = U64;
+
+    fn sign<CS: CipherSuite, KE: Group>(
+        sk: &Self::Sk,
+        message: &Message<CS, KE>,
+    ) -> (Self::Signature, CachedMessage<CS, KE>) {
+        (sign(sk, false, message.sign_message()), message.to_cached())
+    }
+
+    /// Validates that the signature was created by signing the given message
+    /// with the corresponding private key.
+    fn verify<CS: CipherSuite, KE: Group>(
+        pk: &Self::Pk,
+        message_builder: MessageBuilder<'_, CS>,
+        state: CachedMessage<CS, KE>,
+        signature: &Self::Signature,
+    ) -> Result<(), ProtocolError> {
+        verify(
+            pk,
+            false,
+            message_builder.build::<KE>(state).verify_message(),
+            signature,
+        )
+    }
+
+    fn deserialize_take_signature(bytes: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signature, ProtocolError> {
+        Signature::deserialize_take(bytes)
+    }
+
+    fn serialize_signature(signature: &Self::Signature) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::SignatureLen> {
+        signature.serialize()
+    }
+}
+
+impl HashEddsaImpl for Ed25519 {
+    type Signature = Signature;
+    type SignatureLen = U64;
+    type VerifyState<CS: CipherSuite, KE: Group> = PreHash<Sha512>;
+
+    fn sign<CS: CipherSuite, KE: Group>(
+        sk: &Self::Sk,
+        message: &Message<CS, KE>,
+    ) -> (Self::Signature, Self::VerifyState<CS, KE>) {
+        let hash = message.hash::<Sha512>();
+
+        (
+            sign(sk, true, iter::once(hash.sign.finalize().as_slice())),
+            PreHash(hash.verify.finalize()),
+        )
+    }
+
+    /// Validates that the signature was created by signing the given message
+    /// with the corresponding private key.
+    fn verify<CS: CipherSuite, KE: Group>(
+        pk: &Self::Pk,
+        state: Self::VerifyState<CS, KE>,
+        signature: &Self::Signature,
+    ) -> Result<(), ProtocolError> {
+        verify(pk, true, iter::once(state.0.as_slice()), signature)
+    }
+
+    fn deserialize_take_signature(bytes: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signature, ProtocolError> {
+        Signature::deserialize_take(bytes)
+    }
+
+    fn serialize_signature(signature: &Self::Signature) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::SignatureLen> {
+        signature.serialize()
+    }
+}
+
+// This contains a manual implementation of EdDSA because `ed25519-dalek`
+// doesn't support message streaming. See
+// TODO: remove after https://github.com/dalek-cryptography/curve25519-dalek/pull/556.
+fn sign<'a>(
+    sk: &SigningKey,
+    pre_hash: bool,
+    message: impl Clone + Iterator<Item = &'a [u8]>,
+) -> Signature {
+    let mut h = Sha512::new();
+
+    if pre_hash {
+        h.update(b"SigEd25519 no Ed25519 collisions");
+        h.update([1]); // Ed25519ph
+        h.update([0]);
+    }
+
+    h.update(sk.hash_prefix);
+    h.update_iter(message.clone());
+
+    let r = Scalar::from_hash(h);
+    #[allow(non_snake_case)]
+    let R = EdwardsPoint::mul_base(&r).compress();
+
+    h = Sha512::new();
+
+    if pre_hash {
+        h.update(b"SigEd25519 no Ed25519 collisions");
+        h.update([1]); // Ed25519ph
+        h.update([0]);
+    }
+
+    h.update(R.as_bytes());
+    h.update(sk.verifying_key.compressed.0);
+    h.update_iter(message);
+
+    let k = Scalar::from_hash(h);
+    let s: Scalar = (k * sk.scalar) + r;
+
+    Signature { R, s }
+}
+
+fn verify<'a>(
+    pk: &VerifyingKey,
+    pre_hash: bool,
+    message: impl Iterator<Item = &'a [u8]>,
+    signature: &Signature,
+) -> Result<(), ProtocolError> {
+    let mut h = Sha512::new();
+
+    if pre_hash {
+        h.update(b"SigEd25519 no Ed25519 collisions");
+        h.update([1]); // Ed25519ph
+        h.update([0]);
+    }
+
+    h.update(signature.R.as_bytes());
+    h.update(pk.compressed.as_bytes());
+    h.update_iter(message);
+    let k = Scalar::from_hash(h);
+
+    #[allow(non_snake_case)]
+    let minus_A: EdwardsPoint = -pk.point;
+    #[allow(non_snake_case)]
+    let expected_R =
+        EdwardsPoint::vartime_double_scalar_mul_basepoint(&k, &(minus_A), &signature.s).compress();
+
+    if expected_R == signature.R {
+        Ok(())
+    } else {
+        Err(ProtocolError::InvalidLoginError)
+    }
+}
+
+/// Ed25519 verifying key.
+// `ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey` doesn't implement `Zeroize`.
+// TODO: remove after https://github.com/dalek-cryptography/curve25519-dalek/pull/747.
+// Required for manual implementation of EdDSA.
+// TODO: remove after https://github.com/dalek-cryptography/curve25519-dalek/pull/556.
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Eq, PartialEq, Zeroize)]
+pub struct VerifyingKey {
+    point: EdwardsPoint,
+    compressed: CompressedEdwardsY,
+}
+
+impl VerifyingKey {
+    fn from_bytes(bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
+        let compressed = CompressedEdwardsY(bytes);
+
+        if let Some(point) = compressed.decompress().filter(|point| !point.is_identity()) {
+            Ok(Self { point, compressed })
+        } else {
+            Err(ProtocolError::SerializationError)
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "serde")]
+impl<'de> serde::Deserialize<'de> for VerifyingKey {
+    fn deserialize<D>(deserializer: D) -> Result<Self, D::Error>
+    where
+        D: serde::Deserializer<'de>,
+    {
+        use core::fmt::{self, Formatter};
+
+        use serde::de::{Deserialize, Deserializer, Error, SeqAccess, Visitor};
+
+        struct VerifyingKeyVisitor;
+
+        impl<'de> Visitor<'de> for VerifyingKeyVisitor {
+            type Value = VerifyingKey;
+
+            fn expecting(&self, formatter: &mut Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
+                Formatter::write_str(formatter, "tuple struct VerifyingKey")
+            }
+
+            fn visit_newtype_struct<D>(self, deserializer: D) -> Result<Self::Value, D::Error>
+            where
+                D: Deserializer<'de>,
+            {
+                let compressed = CompressedEdwardsY::deserialize(deserializer)?;
+                VerifyingKey::from_bytes(compressed.0).map_err(Error::custom)
+            }
+
+            fn visit_seq<A>(self, mut seq: A) -> Result<Self::Value, A::Error>
+            where
+                A: SeqAccess<'de>,
+            {
+                let compressed: CompressedEdwardsY = seq.next_element()?.ok_or_else(|| {
+                    Error::invalid_length(0, &"tuple struct VerifyingKey with 1 element")
+                })?;
+                VerifyingKey::from_bytes(compressed.0).map_err(Error::custom)
+            }
+        }
+
+        deserializer.deserialize_newtype_struct("VerifyingKey", VerifyingKeyVisitor)
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "serde")]
+impl serde::Serialize for VerifyingKey {
+    fn serialize<S>(&self, serializer: S) -> Result<S::Ok, S::Error>
+    where
+        S: serde::Serializer,
+    {
+        serializer.serialize_newtype_struct("VerifyingKey", &self.compressed)
+    }
+}
+
+/// Ed25519 signing key.
+// We store the `ExpandedSecret` in memory to avoid computing it on demand and then discarding it
+// again.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
+pub struct SigningKey {
+    // `ed25519_dalek::SigningKey` doesn't implement `Zeroize`. See
+    // https://github.com/dalek-cryptography/curve25519-dalek/pull/747
+    // Required for manual implementation of EdDSA.
+    // TODO: remove after https://github.com/dalek-cryptography/curve25519-dalek/pull/556.
+    sk: SecretKey,
+    verifying_key: VerifyingKey,
+    // `ed25519_dalek::ExpandedSecret` doesn't implement traits we need. See
+    // TODO: remove after https://github.com/dalek-cryptography/curve25519-dalek/pull/748 and
+    // https://github.com/dalek-cryptography/curve25519-dalek/pull/747.
+    scalar: Scalar,
+    hash_prefix: [u8; 32],
+}
+
+impl SigningKey {
+    fn from_bytes(sk: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
+        let ExpandedSecretKey {
+            scalar,
+            hash_prefix,
+        } = ExpandedSecretKey::from(&sk);
+        let point = EdwardsPoint::mul_base(&scalar);
+        let verifying_key = VerifyingKey {
+            point,
+            compressed: point.compress(),
+        };
+
+        SigningKey {
+            sk,
+            verifying_key,
+            scalar,
+            hash_prefix,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "serde")]
+impl<'de> serde::Deserialize<'de> for SigningKey {
+    fn deserialize<D>(deserializer: D) -> Result<Self, D::Error>
+    where
+        D: serde::Deserializer<'de>,
+    {
+        use core::fmt::{self, Formatter};
+
+        use serde::de::{Deserialize, Deserializer, Error, SeqAccess, Visitor};
+
+        struct SigningKeyVisitor;
+
+        impl<'de> Visitor<'de> for SigningKeyVisitor {
+            type Value = SigningKey;
+
+            fn expecting(&self, formatter: &mut Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
+                Formatter::write_str(formatter, "tuple struct SigningKey")
+            }
+
+            fn visit_newtype_struct<D>(self, deserializer: D) -> Result<Self::Value, D::Error>
+            where
+                D: Deserializer<'de>,
+            {
+                let sk = Scalar::deserialize(deserializer)?;
+                Ok(SigningKey::from_bytes(sk.to_bytes()))
+            }
+
+            fn visit_seq<A>(self, mut seq: A) -> Result<Self::Value, A::Error>
+            where
+                A: SeqAccess<'de>,
+            {
+                let sk: Scalar = seq.next_element()?.ok_or_else(|| {
+                    Error::invalid_length(0, &"tuple struct SigningKey with 1 element")
+                })?;
+                Ok(SigningKey::from_bytes(sk.to_bytes()))
+            }
+        }
+
+        deserializer.deserialize_newtype_struct("SigningKey", SigningKeyVisitor)
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "serde")]
+impl serde::Serialize for SigningKey {
+    fn serialize<S>(&self, serializer: S) -> Result<S::Ok, S::Error>
+    where
+        S: serde::Serializer,
+    {
+        serializer.serialize_newtype_struct("SigningKey", &self.sk)
+    }
+}
+
+/// Ed25519 Signature.
+// `ed25519_dalek::Signature` doesn't implement validation with Serde de/serialization.
+#[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize))]
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)]
+#[allow(non_snake_case)]
+pub struct Signature {
+    R: CompressedEdwardsY,
+    s: Scalar,
+}
+
+impl Signature {
+    /// Expects the `R` and `s` components of an Ed25519 signature with no added
+    /// framing.
+    pub fn from_slice(mut bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
+        Self::deserialize_take(&mut bytes)
+    }
+
+    fn deserialize_take(bytes: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
+        #[allow(non_snake_case)]
+        let R = CompressedEdwardsY(bytes.take_array::<U32>("signature R")?.into());
+
+        let s = Scalar::from_canonical_bytes(bytes.take_array::<U32>("signature s")?.into())
+            .into_option()
+            .ok_or(ProtocolError::SerializationError)?;
+
+        Ok(Self { R, s })
+    }
+
+    fn serialize(&self) -> GenericArray<u8, U64> {
+        GenericArray::<u8, U32>::from(self.R.0)
+            .cat(GenericArray::<u8, U32>::from(self.s.to_bytes()))
+    }
+}
+
+impl Zeroize for Signature {
+    fn zeroize(&mut self) {
+        self.R.0 = [0; 32];
+        self.s = Scalar::default();
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod test {
+    use std::iter;
+
+    use ed25519_dalek::{Signer, SigningKey, Verifier, VerifyingKey};
+    use rand::rand_core::UnwrapErr;
+    use rand::rngs::SysRng;
+
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn pure_eddsa() {
+        let mut message = [0; 1024];
+        UnwrapErr(SysRng).fill_bytes(&mut message);
+
+        let mut sk = SecretKey::default();
+        UnwrapErr(SysRng).fill_bytes(&mut sk);
+        let signing_key = SigningKey::from_bytes(&sk);
+
+        let signature = signing_key.sign(&message);
+
+        let custom_sk = Ed25519::deserialize_take_sk(&mut sk.as_slice()).unwrap();
+        let custom_signature = sign(&custom_sk, false, iter::once(message.as_slice()));
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            signature.to_bytes(),
+            custom_signature.serialize().as_slice()
+        );
+
+        let verifying_key = VerifyingKey::from(&signing_key);
+        verifying_key.verify(&message, &signature).unwrap();
+
+        let custom_pk = Ed25519::public_key(&custom_sk);
+        verify(
+            &custom_pk,
+            false,
+            iter::once(message.as_slice()),
+            &custom_signature,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn hash_eddsa() {
+        let mut message = [0; 1024];
+        UnwrapErr(SysRng).fill_bytes(&mut message);
+        let message = Sha512::new_with_prefix(message);
+        let pre_hash = message.clone().finalize();
+
+        let mut sk = SecretKey::default();
+        UnwrapErr(SysRng).fill_bytes(&mut sk);
+        let signing_key = SigningKey::from_bytes(&sk);
+
+        let signature = signing_key.sign_prehashed(message.clone(), None).unwrap();
+
+        let custom_sk = Ed25519::deserialize_take_sk(&mut sk.as_slice()).unwrap();
+        let custom_signature = sign(&custom_sk, true, iter::once(pre_hash.as_slice()));
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            signature.to_bytes(),
+            custom_signature.serialize().as_slice()
+        );
+
+        let verifying_key = VerifyingKey::from(&signing_key);
+        verifying_key
+            .verify_prehashed(message, None, &signature)
+            .unwrap();
+
+        let custom_pk = Ed25519::public_key(&custom_sk);
+        verify(
+            &custom_pk,
+            true,
+            iter::once(pre_hash.as_slice()),
+            &custom_signature,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+    }
+}

src/key_exchange/group/elliptic_curve.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) VexaHub and contributors.
+// Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates.
+
+//! Implementation for EC curves via [`elliptic_curve`] traits.
+
+use core::ops::Mul;
+
+use elliptic_curve::group::GroupEncoding;
+use elliptic_curve::point::NonIdentity;
+use elliptic_curve::sec1::{ModulusSize, ToSec1Point};
+use elliptic_curve::{
+    CurveArithmetic, FieldBytesSize, Generate, NonZeroScalar, ProjectivePoint, Scalar, SecretKey,
+};
+use generic_array::typenum::U2;
+use generic_array::{ArrayLength, GenericArray};
+use rand::{CryptoRng, Rng};
+use voprf::Mode;
+
+use super::{Group, STR_OPAQUE_DERIVE_AUTH_KEY_PAIR};
+use crate::errors::{InternalError, ProtocolError};
+use crate::key_exchange::shared::DiffieHellman;
+use crate::serialization::SliceExt;
+
+impl<G> Group for G
+where
+    Self: CurveArithmetic + voprf::CipherSuite<Group = Self> + voprf::Group<Scalar = Scalar<Self>>,
+    FieldBytesSize<Self>: ModulusSize + ArrayLength,
+    <FieldBytesSize<Self> as ModulusSize>::CompressedPointSize: ArrayLength,
+    ProjectivePoint<Self>: GroupEncoding<
+            Repr = hybrid_array::Array<
+                u8,
+                <FieldBytesSize<Self> as ModulusSize>::CompressedPointSize,
+            >,
+        > + ToSec1Point<Self>,
+    // Bounds required by voprf::CipherSuite
+    <Self as voprf::Group>::SecurityLevel: Mul<U2>,
+{
+    // We don't use `elliptic_curve::PublicKey` because it stores its internals in a
+    // format ideal for serialization and not computation. This is inconsistent with
+    // our other implementations.
+    type Pk = NonIdentity<ProjectivePoint<Self>>;
+
+    type PkLen = <FieldBytesSize<Self> as ModulusSize>::CompressedPointSize;
+
+    type Sk = SecretKey<Self>;
+
+    type SkLen = FieldBytesSize<Self>;
+
+    fn serialize_pk(pk: &Self::Pk) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::PkLen> {
+        GenericArray::from_slice(pk.to_sec1_point(true).as_bytes()).clone()
+    }
+
+    fn deserialize_take_pk(bytes: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Pk, ProtocolError> {
+        NonIdentity::<ProjectivePoint<Self>>::from_bytes(
+            &bytes.take_array("public key")?.into_ha0_4(),
+        )
+        .into_option()
+        .ok_or(ProtocolError::SerializationError)
+    }
+
+    fn random_sk<R: Rng + CryptoRng>(rng: &mut R) -> Self::Sk {
+        SecretKey::<Self>::generate_from_rng(rng)
+    }
+
+    fn derive_scalar(seed: GenericArray<u8, Self::SkLen>) -> Result<Self::Sk, InternalError> {
+        voprf::derive_key::<Self>(&seed, &STR_OPAQUE_DERIVE_AUTH_KEY_PAIR, Mode::Oprf)
+            .map(|scalar| {
+                NonZeroScalar::new(scalar).expect("`voprf::derive_key()` returned a zero scalar")
+            })
+            .map(SecretKey::from)
+            .map_err(InternalError::from)
+    }
+
+    fn public_key(sk: &Self::Sk) -> Self::Pk {
+        NonIdentity::<ProjectivePoint<Self>>::mul_by_generator(&sk.to_nonzero_scalar())
+    }
+
+    fn serialize_sk(sk: &Self::Sk) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::SkLen> {
+        GenericArray::from(sk.to_bytes())
+    }
+
+    fn deserialize_take_sk(bytes: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Sk, ProtocolError> {
+        SecretKey::<Self>::from_bytes(&bytes.take_array("secret key")?.into_ha0_4())
+            .map_err(|_| ProtocolError::SerializationError)
+    }
+}
+
+impl<G> DiffieHellman<G> for SecretKey<G>
+where
+    G: CurveArithmetic + voprf::CipherSuite<Group = G> + voprf::Group<Scalar = Scalar<G>>,
+    FieldBytesSize<G>: ModulusSize + ArrayLength,
+    <FieldBytesSize<G> as ModulusSize>::CompressedPointSize: ArrayLength,
+    ProjectivePoint<G>: GroupEncoding<
+            Repr = hybrid_array::Array<u8, <FieldBytesSize<G> as ModulusSize>::CompressedPointSize>,
+        > + ToSec1Point<G>,
+    // Bounds required by voprf::CipherSuite
+    <G as voprf::Group>::SecurityLevel: Mul<U2>,
+{
+    fn diffie_hellman(
+        &self,
+        pk: &NonIdentity<ProjectivePoint<G>>,
+    ) -> GenericArray<u8, <FieldBytesSize<G> as ModulusSize>::CompressedPointSize> {
+        GenericArray::from_slice(
+            (pk * self.to_nonzero_scalar())
+                .to_sec1_point(true)
+                .as_bytes(),
+        )
+        .clone()
+    }
+}

src/key_exchange/group/mod.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) VexaHub and contributors.
+// Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates.
+
+//! Includes the [`Group`] trait and definitions for the key exchange groups
+
+#[cfg(feature = "curve25519")]
+pub mod curve25519;
+#[cfg(feature = "ed25519")]
+pub mod ed25519;
+pub mod elliptic_curve;
+#[cfg(feature = "ristretto255")]
+pub mod ristretto255;
+
+use generic_array::{ArrayLength, GenericArray};
+use hybrid_array::ArraySize;
+use rand::{CryptoRng, Rng};
+use zeroize::ZeroizeOnDrop;
+
+use crate::errors::{InternalError, ProtocolError};
+
+const STR_OPAQUE_DERIVE_AUTH_KEY_PAIR: [u8; 33] = *b"OPAQUE-DeriveDiffieHellmanKeyPair";
+
+/// A group representation for use in the key exchange
+pub trait Group {
+    /// Public key
+    type Pk: Clone;
+    /// Length of the public key
+    type PkLen: ArrayLength + ArraySize;
+    /// Secret key
+    type Sk: Clone + ZeroizeOnDrop;
+    /// Length of the secret key
+    type SkLen: ArrayLength + ArraySize;
+
+    /// Serializes `self`
+    fn serialize_pk(pk: &Self::Pk) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::PkLen>;
+
+    /// Return a public key from its fixed-length bytes representation
+    ///
+    /// The deserialized bytes must be taken from `bytes`.
+    fn deserialize_take_pk(bytes: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Pk, ProtocolError>;
+
+    /// Generate a random secret key
+    fn random_sk<R: Rng + CryptoRng>(rng: &mut R) -> Self::Sk;
+
+    /// Deterministically derive a [`Self::Sk`] from `seed`.
+    fn derive_scalar(seed: GenericArray<u8, Self::SkLen>) -> Result<Self::Sk, InternalError>;
+
+    /// Return a public key from its secret key
+    fn public_key(sk: &Self::Sk) -> Self::Pk;
+
+    /// Serializes `self`
+    fn serialize_sk(sk: &Self::Sk) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::SkLen>;
+
+    /// Return a public key from its fixed-length bytes representation
+    ///
+    /// The deserialized bytes must be taken from `bytes`.
+    fn deserialize_take_sk(bytes: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Sk, ProtocolError>;
+}

src/key_exchange/group/ristretto255.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,232 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) VexaHub and contributors.
+// Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates.
+
+//! Key Exchange group implementation for ristretto255
+
+pub use curve25519_dalek;
+use curve25519_dalek::constants::RISTRETTO_BASEPOINT_POINT;
+use curve25519_dalek::ristretto::{CompressedRistretto, RistrettoPoint};
+use curve25519_dalek::scalar::Scalar;
+use curve25519_dalek::traits::IsIdentity;
+use digest::block_api::BlockSizeUser;
+use digest::{FixedOutput, HashMarker};
+use generic_array::GenericArray;
+use generic_array::typenum::{IsGreaterOrEqual, IsLess, IsLessOrEqual, Prod, True, U2, U32, U256};
+use hybrid_array::Array;
+use rand::{CryptoRng, Rng, TryCryptoRng, TryRng};
+use voprf::Mode;
+use zeroize::ZeroizeOnDrop;
+
+use super::{Group, STR_OPAQUE_DERIVE_AUTH_KEY_PAIR};
+use crate::errors::{InternalError, ProtocolError};
+use crate::key_exchange::shared::DiffieHellman;
+use crate::serialization::SliceExt;
+
+/// Implementation for Ristretto255.
+// This is necessary because Rust lacks specialization, otherwise we could
+// implement `KeGroup` for `voprf::Ristretto255`.
+pub struct Ristretto255;
+
+impl Group for Ristretto255 {
+    type Pk = NonIdentity;
+    type PkLen = U32;
+    type Sk = NonZeroScalar;
+    type SkLen = U32;
+
+    fn serialize_pk(pk: &Self::Pk) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::PkLen> {
+        pk.0.compress().to_bytes().into()
+    }
+
+    fn deserialize_take_pk(bytes: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Pk, ProtocolError> {
+        CompressedRistretto(bytes.take_array::<U32>("public key")?.into())
+            .decompress()
+            .ok_or(ProtocolError::SerializationError)
+            .and_then(NonIdentity::from_point)
+    }
+
+    fn random_sk<R: Rng + CryptoRng>(rng: &mut R) -> Self::Sk {
+        loop {
+            let mut bytes = [0u8; 64];
+
+            rng.fill_bytes(&mut bytes);
+
+            let scalar = Scalar::from_bytes_mod_order_wide(&bytes);
+
+            if scalar != Scalar::ZERO {
+                break NonZeroScalar(scalar);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn derive_scalar(seed: GenericArray<u8, Self::SkLen>) -> Result<Self::Sk, InternalError> {
+        voprf::derive_key::<Self>(&seed, &STR_OPAQUE_DERIVE_AUTH_KEY_PAIR, Mode::Oprf)
+            .map(NonZeroScalar)
+            .map_err(InternalError::from)
+    }
+
+    fn public_key(sk: &Self::Sk) -> Self::Pk {
+        NonIdentity(RISTRETTO_BASEPOINT_POINT * sk.0)
+    }
+
+    fn serialize_sk(sk: &Self::Sk) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::SkLen> {
+        sk.0.to_bytes().into()
+    }
+
+    fn deserialize_take_sk(bytes: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Sk, ProtocolError> {
+        Scalar::from_canonical_bytes(bytes.take_array::<U32>("secret key")?.into())
+            .into_option()
+            .ok_or(ProtocolError::SerializationError)
+            .and_then(NonZeroScalar::from_scalar)
+    }
+}
+
+impl DiffieHellman<Ristretto255> for NonZeroScalar {
+    fn diffie_hellman(&self, pk: &NonIdentity) -> GenericArray<u8, U32> {
+        Ristretto255::serialize_pk(&NonIdentity(pk.0 * self.0))
+    }
+}
+
+/// Non-identity point wrapper for [`RistrettoPoint`].
+#[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize))]
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)]
+pub struct NonIdentity(
+    #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(deserialize_with = "serde_deserialize_pk"))] RistrettoPoint,
+);
+
+impl NonIdentity {
+    fn from_point(point: RistrettoPoint) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
+        if point.is_identity() {
+            Err(ProtocolError::SerializationError)
+        } else {
+            Ok(NonIdentity(point))
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "serde")]
+fn serde_deserialize_pk<'de, D>(deserializer: D) -> Result<RistrettoPoint, D::Error>
+where
+    D: serde::Deserializer<'de>,
+{
+    use serde::de::{Deserialize, Error};
+
+    let point = RistrettoPoint::deserialize(deserializer)?;
+
+    NonIdentity::from_point(point)
+        .map(|point| point.0)
+        .map_err(Error::custom)
+}
+
+/// Non-zero scalar wrapper for [`Scalar`]
+#[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize))]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, Hash, PartialEq, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
+pub struct NonZeroScalar(
+    #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(deserialize_with = "serde_deserialize_sk"))] Scalar,
+);
+
+impl NonZeroScalar {
+    fn from_scalar(scalar: Scalar) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
+        if scalar == Scalar::ZERO {
+            Err(ProtocolError::SerializationError)
+        } else {
+            Ok(Self(scalar))
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "serde")]
+fn serde_deserialize_sk<'de, D>(deserializer: D) -> Result<Scalar, D::Error>
+where
+    D: serde::Deserializer<'de>,
+{
+    use serde::de::{Deserialize, Error};
+
+    let scalar = Scalar::deserialize(deserializer)?;
+
+    NonZeroScalar::from_scalar(scalar)
+        .map(|scalar| scalar.0)
+        .map_err(Error::custom)
+}
+
+impl voprf::CipherSuite for Ristretto255 {
+    const ID: &'static [u8] = voprf::Ristretto255::ID;
+
+    type Group = <voprf::Ristretto255 as voprf::CipherSuite>::Group;
+
+    type Hash = <voprf::Ristretto255 as voprf::CipherSuite>::Hash;
+}
+
+impl voprf::Group for Ristretto255 {
+    type Elem = <voprf::Ristretto255 as voprf::Group>::Elem;
+
+    type ElemLen = <voprf::Ristretto255 as voprf::Group>::ElemLen;
+
+    type Scalar = <voprf::Ristretto255 as voprf::Group>::Scalar;
+
+    type ScalarLen = <voprf::Ristretto255 as voprf::Group>::ScalarLen;
+
+    type SecurityLevel = <voprf::Ristretto255 as voprf::Group>::SecurityLevel;
+
+    fn hash_to_curve<H>(
+        input: &[&[u8]],
+        dst: &[&[u8]],
+    ) -> voprf::Result<Self::Elem, voprf::InternalError>
+    where
+        H: BlockSizeUser + Default + FixedOutput + HashMarker,
+        H::OutputSize: IsLess<U256>
+            + IsLessOrEqual<H::BlockSize, Output = True>
+            + IsGreaterOrEqual<Prod<<Self as voprf::Group>::SecurityLevel, U2>, Output = True>,
+    {
+        <voprf::Ristretto255 as voprf::Group>::hash_to_curve::<H>(input, dst)
+    }
+
+    fn hash_to_scalar<H>(
+        input: &[&[u8]],
+        dst: &[&[u8]],
+    ) -> voprf::Result<Self::Scalar, voprf::InternalError>
+    where
+        H: BlockSizeUser + Default + FixedOutput + HashMarker,
+        H::OutputSize: IsLess<U256>
+            + IsLessOrEqual<H::BlockSize, Output = True>
+            + IsGreaterOrEqual<Prod<<Self as voprf::Group>::SecurityLevel, U2>, Output = True>,
+    {
+        <voprf::Ristretto255 as voprf::Group>::hash_to_scalar::<H>(input, dst)
+    }
+
+    fn base_elem() -> Self::Elem {
+        <voprf::Ristretto255 as voprf::Group>::base_elem()
+    }
+
+    fn identity_elem() -> Self::Elem {
+        <voprf::Ristretto255 as voprf::Group>::identity_elem()
+    }
+
+    fn serialize_elem(elem: Self::Elem) -> Array<u8, Self::ElemLen> {
+        <voprf::Ristretto255 as voprf::Group>::serialize_elem(elem)
+    }
+
+    fn deserialize_elem(element_bits: &[u8]) -> voprf::Result<Self::Elem> {
+        <voprf::Ristretto255 as voprf::Group>::deserialize_elem(element_bits)
+    }
+
+    fn random_scalar<R: TryRng + TryCryptoRng>(rng: &mut R) -> voprf::Result<Self::Scalar> {
+        <voprf::Ristretto255 as voprf::Group>::random_scalar(rng)
+    }
+
+    fn invert_scalar(scalar: Self::Scalar) -> Self::Scalar {
+        <voprf::Ristretto255 as voprf::Group>::invert_scalar(scalar)
+    }
+
+    fn is_zero_scalar(scalar: Self::Scalar) -> subtle::Choice {
+        <voprf::Ristretto255 as voprf::Group>::is_zero_scalar(scalar)
+    }
+
+    fn serialize_scalar(scalar: Self::Scalar) -> Array<u8, Self::ScalarLen> {
+        <voprf::Ristretto255 as voprf::Group>::serialize_scalar(scalar)
+    }
+
+    fn deserialize_scalar(scalar_bits: &[u8]) -> voprf::Result<Self::Scalar> {
+        <voprf::Ristretto255 as voprf::Group>::deserialize_scalar(scalar_bits)
+    }
+}

src/key_exchange/mod.rs

@@ -1,10 +1,412 @@
-// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
-//
-// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
-// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) VexaHub and contributors.
+// Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates.
 
-//! Includes instantiations of key exchange protocols used in the
-//! login step for OPAQUE
+//! Includes instantiations of key exchange protocols used in the login step for
+//! OPAQUE
 
-pub(crate) mod traits;
+pub mod group;
+pub(crate) mod shared;
+pub mod sigma_i;
 pub mod tripledh;
+#[cfg(feature = "kem")]
+pub mod tripledh_kem;
+
+use core::iter;
+use core::ops::Add;
+
+use derive_where::derive_where;
+use digest::Output;
+use digest::block_api::{CoreProxy, SmallBlockSizeUser};
+use generic_array::typenum::{IsLess, Le, NonZero, Sum, U2, U256};
+use generic_array::{ArrayLength, GenericArray};
+use hybrid_array::Array;
+use rand::{CryptoRng, Rng};
+use voprf::{BlindedElement, EvaluationElement};
+use zeroize::{Zeroize, ZeroizeOnDrop};
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+use crate::ciphersuite::KeHash;
+use crate::ciphersuite::{CipherSuite, OprfGroup};
+use crate::errors::ProtocolError;
+use crate::hash::{Hash, OutputSize, ProxyHash};
+use crate::key_exchange::group::Group;
+use crate::key_exchange::shared::{NonceLen, STR_CONTEXT};
+use crate::keypair::{PrivateKey, PublicKey};
+use crate::opaque::{Identifiers, MaskedResponse, MaskedResponseLen};
+use crate::serialization::{ConcatExt, SliceExt, i2osp};
+
+/// The key exchange trait.
+pub trait KeyExchange
+where
+    <Self::Hash as CoreProxy>::Core: ProxyHash,
+    <<Self::Hash as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: IsLess<U256>,
+    Le<<<Self::Hash as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize, U256>: NonZero,
+    OutputSize<Self::Hash>: ArrayLength,
+{
+    /// The group used for the key exchange.
+    type Group: Group;
+    /// The hash used for the key exchange.
+    type Hash: Hash;
+
+    /// Client state.
+    type KE1State: ZeroizeOnDrop + Clone;
+    /// Server state.
+    type KE2State<CS: CipherSuite>: ZeroizeOnDrop + Clone;
+    /// First message sent by the client.
+    type KE1Message: ZeroizeOnDrop + Clone;
+    /// Server state builder.
+    type KE2Builder<'a, CS: CipherSuite<KeyExchange = Self>>: ZeroizeOnDrop + Clone;
+    /// Server data for the remote key interaction.
+    type KE2BuilderData<'a, CS: 'static + CipherSuite>;
+    /// Server remote key input.
+    type KE2BuilderInput<CS: CipherSuite>;
+    /// Message sent by the server.
+    type KE2Message: ZeroizeOnDrop + Clone;
+    /// Second message sent by the client.
+    type KE3Message: ZeroizeOnDrop + Clone;
+
+    /// Client generates [`KE1Message`](Self::KE1Message) and
+    /// [`KE1State`](Self::KE1State).
+    fn generate_ke1<R: Rng + CryptoRng>(
+        rng: &mut R,
+    ) -> Result<GenerateKe1Result<Self>, ProtocolError>;
+
+    /// Server generates [`KE2Builder`](Self::KE2Builder).
+    fn ke2_builder<'a, CS: CipherSuite<KeyExchange = Self>, R: Rng + CryptoRng>(
+        rng: &mut R,
+        credential_request: SerializedCredentialRequest<CS>,
+        ke1_message: Self::KE1Message,
+        credential_response: SerializedCredentialResponse<CS>,
+        client_s_pk: PublicKey<Self::Group>,
+        identifiers: SerializedIdentifiers<'a, Self::Group>,
+        context: SerializedContext<'a>,
+    ) -> Result<Self::KE2Builder<'a, CS>, ProtocolError>;
+
+    /// Server returns the data for the remote key interaction.
+    fn ke2_builder_data<'a, CS: CipherSuite<KeyExchange = Self>>(
+        builder: &'a Self::KE2Builder<'_, CS>,
+    ) -> Self::KE2BuilderData<'a, CS>;
+
+    /// Server generates the input without a remote key.
+    fn generate_ke2_input<CS: CipherSuite<KeyExchange = Self>, R: CryptoRng + Rng>(
+        builder: &Self::KE2Builder<'_, CS>,
+        rng: &mut R,
+        server_s_sk: &PrivateKey<Self::Group>,
+    ) -> Self::KE2BuilderInput<CS>;
+
+    /// Server generates [`KE2Message`](Self::KE2Message) and
+    /// [`KE2State`](Self::KE2State).
+    fn build_ke2<CS: CipherSuite<KeyExchange = Self>>(
+        builder: Self::KE2Builder<'_, CS>,
+        input: Self::KE2BuilderInput<CS>,
+    ) -> Result<GenerateKe2Result<CS>, ProtocolError>;
+
+    /// Client generates [`KE3Message`](Self::KE3Message) and the session key.
+    #[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
+    fn generate_ke3<CS: CipherSuite<KeyExchange = Self>, R: CryptoRng + Rng>(
+        rng: &mut R,
+        credential_request: SerializedCredentialRequest<CS>,
+        ke1_message: Self::KE1Message,
+        credential_response: SerializedCredentialResponse<CS>,
+        ke1_state: &Self::KE1State,
+        ke2_message: Self::KE2Message,
+        server_s_pk: PublicKey<Self::Group>,
+        client_s_sk: PrivateKey<Self::Group>,
+        identifiers: SerializedIdentifiers<'_, Self::Group>,
+        context: SerializedContext<'_>,
+    ) -> Result<GenerateKe3Result<Self>, ProtocolError>;
+
+    /// Server generates the session key.
+    fn finish_ke<CS: CipherSuite<KeyExchange = Self>>(
+        ke2_state: &Self::KE2State<CS>,
+        ke3_message: Self::KE3Message,
+        identifiers: Identifiers<'_>,
+        context: SerializedContext<'_>,
+    ) -> Result<Output<Self::Hash>, ProtocolError>;
+}
+
+/// Serialized form of [`CredentialRequest`](crate::CredentialRequest).
+#[cfg_attr(
+    feature = "serde",
+    derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize),
+    serde(bound = "")
+)]
+#[derive_where(Clone, Debug, Eq, Hash, Ord, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Zeroize)]
+pub struct SerializedCredentialRequest<CS: CipherSuite>(
+    Array<u8, <OprfGroup<CS> as voprf::Group>::ElemLen>,
+);
+
+impl<CS: CipherSuite> SerializedCredentialRequest<CS> {
+    pub(crate) fn new(blinded_element: &BlindedElement<CS::OprfCs>) -> Self {
+        Self(blinded_element.serialize())
+    }
+
+    /// Returns the serialized form of
+    /// [`CredentialRequest`](crate::CredentialRequest) in multiple byte slices.
+    pub fn iter(&self) -> impl Clone + Iterator<Item = &[u8]> {
+        iter::once(self.0.as_slice())
+    }
+
+    /// Returns a [`SerializedCredentialRequest`] deserialized from the given
+    /// `bytes`.
+    pub fn deserialize_take(bytes: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
+        Ok(Self(bytes.take_array("blinded element")?.into_ha0_4()))
+    }
+}
+
+type SerializedCredentialRequestLen<CS: CipherSuite> = <OprfGroup<CS> as voprf::Group>::ElemLen;
+
+impl<CS: CipherSuite> Serialize for SerializedCredentialRequest<CS>
+where
+    <OprfGroup<CS> as voprf::Group>::ElemLen: ArrayLength,
+{
+    type Len = SerializedCredentialRequestLen<CS>;
+
+    fn serialize(&self) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::Len> {
+        GenericArray::from_slice(self.0.as_slice()).clone()
+    }
+}
+
+/// Serialized form of [`CredentialResponse`](crate::CredentialResponse).
+#[cfg_attr(
+    feature = "serde",
+    derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize),
+    serde(bound = "")
+)]
+#[derive_where(Clone, Debug, Eq, Hash, PartialEq, Zeroize)]
+pub struct SerializedCredentialResponse<CS: CipherSuite> {
+    evaluation_element: Array<u8, <OprfGroup<CS> as voprf::Group>::ElemLen>,
+    masking_nonce: GenericArray<u8, NonceLen>,
+    masked_response: MaskedResponse<CS>,
+}
+
+impl<CS: CipherSuite> SerializedCredentialResponse<CS> {
+    pub(crate) fn new(
+        evaluation_element: &EvaluationElement<CS::OprfCs>,
+        masking_nonce: GenericArray<u8, NonceLen>,
+        masked_response: MaskedResponse<CS>,
+    ) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            evaluation_element: evaluation_element.serialize(),
+            masking_nonce,
+            masked_response,
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Returns the serialized form of
+    /// [`CredentialResponse`](crate::CredentialResponse) in multiple byte
+    /// slices.
+    pub fn iter(&self) -> impl Clone + Iterator<Item = &[u8]> {
+        [self.evaluation_element.as_slice(), &self.masking_nonce]
+            .into_iter()
+            .chain(self.masked_response.iter())
+    }
+
+    /// Returns a [`SerializedCredentialRequest`] deserialized from the given
+    /// `bytes`.
+    pub fn deserialize_take(input: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
+        Ok(Self {
+            evaluation_element: input.take_array("evaluation element")?.into_ha0_4(),
+            masking_nonce: input.take_array("masking nonce")?,
+            masked_response: MaskedResponse::deserialize_take(input)?,
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+type SerializedCredentialResponseLen<CS: CipherSuite> =
+    Sum<Sum<<OprfGroup<CS> as voprf::Group>::ElemLen, NonceLen>, MaskedResponseLen<CS>>;
+
+impl<CS: CipherSuite> Serialize for SerializedCredentialResponse<CS>
+where
+    <OprfGroup<CS> as voprf::Group>::ElemLen: Add<NonceLen>,
+    Sum<<OprfGroup<CS> as voprf::Group>::ElemLen, NonceLen>:
+        ArrayLength + Add<MaskedResponseLen<CS>>,
+    SerializedCredentialResponseLen<CS>: ArrayLength,
+{
+    type Len = SerializedCredentialResponseLen<CS>;
+
+    fn serialize(&self) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::Len> {
+        let elem = GenericArray::<u8, <OprfGroup<CS> as voprf::Group>::ElemLen>::from_slice(
+            self.evaluation_element.as_slice(),
+        )
+        .clone();
+
+        elem.cat(self.masking_nonce)
+            .cat(self.masked_response.serialize())
+    }
+}
+
+/// Serialized form of a `context` given in
+/// [`ClientLoginFinishParameters`](crate::ClientLoginFinishParameters) or
+/// [`ServerLoginParameters`](crate::ServerLoginParameters).
+#[cfg_attr(
+    feature = "serde",
+    derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize),
+    serde(bound = "")
+)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, Hash, PartialEq, Zeroize)]
+#[allow(unused_assignments)]
+pub struct SerializedContext<'a> {
+    length: GenericArray<u8, U2>,
+    #[zeroize(skip)]
+    context: &'a [u8],
+}
+
+impl<'a> SerializedContext<'a> {
+    pub(crate) fn from(context: Option<&'a [u8]>) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
+        let context = context.unwrap_or(&[]);
+
+        Ok(Self {
+            length: i2osp::<U2>(context.len())?,
+            context,
+        })
+    }
+
+    /// Returns the serialized form of `context` in multiple byte slices.
+    pub fn iter(&self) -> impl Clone + Iterator<Item = &[u8]> {
+        iter::once(STR_CONTEXT).chain([self.length.as_slice(), self.context])
+    }
+}
+
+/// Serialized form of [`Identifiers`].
+#[cfg_attr(
+    feature = "serde",
+    derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize),
+    serde(bound(deserialize = "'de: 'a", serialize = ""))
+)]
+#[derive_where(Clone, Debug, Eq, Hash, PartialEq, Zeroize)]
+pub struct SerializedIdentifiers<'a, G: Group> {
+    /// Client identifiers.
+    pub client: SerializedIdentifier<'a, G>,
+    /// Server identifiers.
+    pub server: SerializedIdentifier<'a, G>,
+}
+
+/// Serialized form of a single identifier from [`Identifiers`].
+#[cfg_attr(
+    feature = "serde",
+    derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize),
+    serde(bound(deserialize = "'de: 'a", serialize = ""))
+)]
+#[derive_where(Clone, Debug, Eq, Hash, PartialEq, Zeroize)]
+pub struct SerializedIdentifier<'a, G: Group> {
+    length: GenericArray<u8, U2>,
+    identifier: Identifier<'a, G>,
+}
+
+#[cfg_attr(
+    feature = "serde",
+    derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize),
+    serde(bound = "")
+)]
+#[derive_where(Clone, Debug, Eq, Hash, PartialEq, Zeroize)]
+enum Identifier<'a, G: Group> {
+    Owned(GenericArray<u8, G::PkLen>),
+    #[derive_where(skip_inner(Zeroize))]
+    Borrowed(&'a [u8]),
+}
+
+impl<'a, G: Group> SerializedIdentifiers<'a, G> {
+    pub(crate) fn from_identifiers(
+        ids: Identifiers<'a>,
+        client_s_pk: GenericArray<u8, G::PkLen>,
+        server_s_pk: GenericArray<u8, G::PkLen>,
+    ) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
+        let client = SerializedIdentifier::from_identifier(ids.client, client_s_pk)?;
+        let server = SerializedIdentifier::from_identifier(ids.server, server_s_pk)?;
+
+        Ok(Self { client, server })
+    }
+}
+
+impl<'a, G: Group> SerializedIdentifier<'a, G> {
+    /// Creates a [`SerializedIdentifier`] an identifier or the corresponding
+    /// static public key.
+    pub fn from_identifier(
+        id: Option<&'a [u8]>,
+        s_pk: GenericArray<u8, G::PkLen>,
+    ) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
+        if let Some(id) = id {
+            Ok(SerializedIdentifier {
+                length: i2osp::<U2>(id.len())?,
+                identifier: Identifier::Borrowed(id),
+            })
+        } else {
+            Ok(SerializedIdentifier {
+                length: i2osp::<U2>(s_pk.len())?,
+                identifier: Identifier::Owned(s_pk),
+            })
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Returns the serialized form of an identifier in multiple byte slices.
+    pub fn iter(&self) -> impl Clone + Iterator<Item = &[u8]> {
+        [self.length.as_slice()]
+            .into_iter()
+            .chain(match &self.identifier {
+                Identifier::Owned(bytes) => [bytes.as_slice()],
+                Identifier::Borrowed(bytes) => [*bytes],
+            })
+    }
+}
+
+/// Deserialization trait for key exchange types.
+pub trait Deserialize: Sized {
+    /// Deserialize [`Self`] from the given `bytes`.
+    ///
+    /// The deserialized bytes must be taken from `bytes`.
+    fn deserialize_take(bytes: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError>;
+}
+
+/// Serialization trait for key exchange types.
+pub trait Serialize {
+    /// The length of the serialized types.
+    type Len: ArrayLength;
+
+    /// Serialize [`Self`] to a fixed-length byte array.
+    fn serialize(&self) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::Len>;
+}
+
+/// Result type of [`KeyExchange::generate_ke1()`].
+pub struct GenerateKe1Result<KE: KeyExchange + ?Sized> {
+    /// The client state.
+    pub state: KE::KE1State,
+    /// The first client message.
+    pub message: KE::KE1Message,
+}
+
+/// Result type of [`KeyExchange::build_ke2()`].
+pub struct GenerateKe2Result<CS: CipherSuite> {
+    /// The server state.
+    pub state: <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE2State<CS>,
+    /// The server message.
+    pub message: <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE2Message,
+    #[cfg(test)]
+    pub(crate) handshake_secret: Output<KeHash<CS>>,
+    #[cfg(test)]
+    pub(crate) km2: Output<KeHash<CS>>,
+}
+
+/// Result type of [`KeyExchange::generate_ke3()`].
+pub struct GenerateKe3Result<KE: KeyExchange + ?Sized> {
+    /// The session key.
+    pub session_key: Output<KE::Hash>,
+    /// The second client message.
+    pub message: KE::KE3Message,
+    #[cfg(test)]
+    pub(crate) handshake_secret: Output<KE::Hash>,
+    #[cfg(test)]
+    pub(crate) km3: Output<KE::Hash>,
+}
+
+pub(crate) type Ke1StateLen<CS: CipherSuite> =
+    <<CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE1State as Serialize>::Len;
+pub(crate) type Ke1MessageLen<CS: CipherSuite> =
+    <<CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE1Message as Serialize>::Len;
+pub(crate) type Ke2StateLen<CS: CipherSuite> =
+    <<CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE2State<CS> as Serialize>::Len;
+pub(crate) type Ke2MessageLen<CS: CipherSuite> =
+    <<CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE2Message as Serialize>::Len;
+pub(crate) type Ke3MessageLen<CS: CipherSuite> =
+    <<CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE3Message as Serialize>::Len;

src/key_exchange/shared.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,488 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) VexaHub and contributors.
+// Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates.
+
+use core::ops::Add;
+
+use derive_where::derive_where;
+use digest::block_api::{CoreProxy, SmallBlockSizeUser};
+use digest::{Digest, Mac, Output, OutputSizeUser, Update};
+use generic_array::typenum::{IsLess, Le, NonZero, Sum, U1, U2, U32, U256, Unsigned};
+use generic_array::{ArrayLength, GenericArray};
+use hkdf::SimpleHkdf as Hkdf;
+use hkdf::SimpleHkdfExtract as HkdfExtract;
+use hmac::{KeyInit, SimpleHmac};
+use rand::{CryptoRng, Rng};
+
+use super::{
+    Deserialize, GenerateKe1Result, KeyExchange, Serialize, SerializedContext,
+    SerializedCredentialRequest, SerializedCredentialResponse, SerializedIdentifiers,
+};
+use crate::ciphersuite::{CipherSuite, KeGroup, KeHash};
+use crate::errors::{InternalError, ProtocolError};
+use crate::hash::{Hash, OutputSize, ProxyHash};
+use crate::key_exchange::group::Group;
+use crate::keypair::{KeyPair, PrivateKey, PublicKey};
+use crate::serialization::{ConcatExt, SliceExt, UpdateExt, i2osp};
+
+///////////////
+// Constants //
+// ========= //
+///////////////
+
+pub(crate) type NonceLen = U32;
+pub(super) static STR_CONTEXT: &[u8] = b"OPAQUEv1-";
+static STR_CLIENT_MAC: &[u8] = b"ClientMAC";
+static STR_HANDSHAKE_SECRET: &[u8] = b"HandshakeSecret";
+static STR_SERVER_MAC: &[u8] = b"ServerMAC";
+static STR_SESSION_KEY: &[u8] = b"SessionKey";
+static STR_OPAQUE: &[u8] = b"OPAQUE-";
+
+////////////////////////////
+// High-level API Structs //
+// ====================== //
+////////////////////////////
+
+/// Trait required by [`Group::Sk`] to be compatible with
+/// [`TripleDh`](crate::TripleDh) and [`SigmaI`](crate::SigmaI).
+pub trait DiffieHellman<G: Group> {
+    /// Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
+    fn diffie_hellman(&self, pk: &G::Pk) -> GenericArray<u8, G::PkLen>;
+}
+
+/// The client state produced after the first key exchange message
+#[cfg_attr(
+    feature = "serde",
+    derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize),
+    serde(bound(
+        deserialize = "G::Sk: serde::Deserialize<'de>",
+        serialize = "G::Sk: serde::Serialize"
+    ))
+)]
+#[derive_where(Clone, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
+#[derive_where(Debug, Eq, Hash, Ord, PartialEq, PartialOrd; G::Sk)]
+pub struct Ke1State<G: Group> {
+    pub(super) client_e_sk: PrivateKey<G>,
+    pub(super) client_nonce: GenericArray<u8, NonceLen>,
+}
+
+/// The first key exchange message
+#[cfg_attr(
+    feature = "serde",
+    derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize),
+    serde(bound(
+        deserialize = "G::Pk: serde::Deserialize<'de>",
+        serialize = "G::Pk: serde::Serialize"
+    ))
+)]
+#[derive_where(Clone, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
+#[derive_where(Debug, Eq, Hash, Ord, PartialEq, PartialOrd; G::Pk)]
+pub struct Ke1Message<G: Group> {
+    pub(super) client_nonce: GenericArray<u8, NonceLen>,
+    #[derive_where(skip(Zeroize))]
+    pub(super) client_e_pk: PublicKey<G>,
+}
+
+/////////////////////////
+// Convenience Structs //
+//==================== //
+/////////////////////////
+
+// Consists of a session key, followed by two mac keys: (session_key, km2, km3)
+pub(super) struct DerivedKeys<H: OutputSizeUser> {
+    pub(super) session_key: Output<H>,
+    pub(super) km2: Output<H>,
+    pub(super) km3: Output<H>,
+    #[cfg(test)]
+    pub(super) handshake_secret: Output<H>,
+}
+
+/// Helper bundle containing the common `TripleDH` server state that both
+/// `TripleDh` and `TripleDhKem` builders need.
+pub(super) struct Ke2BuilderCommon<G: Group, H: Hash>
+where
+    H::Core: ProxyHash,
+    <<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: IsLess<U256>,
+    Le<<<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize, U256>: NonZero,
+    OutputSize<H>: ArrayLength,
+    G::Sk: DiffieHellman<G>,
+{
+    pub(super) server_nonce: GenericArray<u8, NonceLen>,
+    pub(super) transcript_hasher: H,
+    pub(super) client_e_pk: PublicKey<G>,
+    pub(super) server_e_pk: PublicKey<G>,
+    pub(super) shared_secret_1: GenericArray<u8, G::PkLen>,
+    pub(super) shared_secret_3: GenericArray<u8, G::PkLen>,
+}
+
+////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// Helper functions and Trait Implementations //
+// ========================================== //
+////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// Helper functions
+
+pub(super) fn generate_ke1<
+    R: Rng + CryptoRng,
+    KE: KeyExchange<KE1State = Ke1State<G>, KE1Message = Ke1Message<G>>,
+    G: Group,
+>(
+    rng: &mut R,
+) -> Result<GenerateKe1Result<KE>, ProtocolError> {
+    let client_e_kp = KeyPair::<G>::derive_random(rng);
+    let client_nonce = generate_nonce::<R>(rng);
+
+    let ke1_message = Ke1Message {
+        client_nonce,
+        client_e_pk: client_e_kp.public().clone(),
+    };
+
+    Ok(GenerateKe1Result {
+        state: Ke1State {
+            client_e_sk: client_e_kp.private().clone(),
+            client_nonce,
+        },
+        message: ke1_message,
+    })
+}
+
+// Generate a random nonce up to NonceLen::USIZE bytes.
+pub(super) fn generate_nonce<R: Rng + CryptoRng>(rng: &mut R) -> GenericArray<u8, NonceLen> {
+    let mut nonce_bytes = GenericArray::default();
+    rng.fill_bytes(&mut nonce_bytes);
+    nonce_bytes
+}
+
+pub(super) fn transcript<CS: CipherSuite, KE: Group>(
+    context: &SerializedContext<'_>,
+    identifiers: &SerializedIdentifiers<'_, KeGroup<CS>>,
+    credential_request: &SerializedCredentialRequest<CS>,
+    ke1_message: &Ke1MessageIter<KE>,
+    credential_response: &SerializedCredentialResponse<CS>,
+    server_nonce: GenericArray<u8, NonceLen>,
+    server_e_pk: &GenericArray<u8, KE::PkLen>,
+) -> KeHash<CS> {
+    KeHash::<CS>::new()
+        .chain_iter(context.iter())
+        .chain_iter(identifiers.client.iter())
+        .chain_iter(credential_request.iter())
+        .chain_iter(ke1_message.iter())
+        .chain_iter(identifiers.server.iter())
+        .chain_iter(credential_response.iter())
+        .chain(server_nonce)
+        .chain(server_e_pk)
+}
+
+/// Generates the server-side `TripleDH` transcript state shared by multiple
+/// key-exchange variants.
+pub(super) fn ke2_builder_common<'a, G, H, CS, R>(
+    rng: &mut R,
+    credential_request: SerializedCredentialRequest<CS>,
+    ke1_message: Ke1Message<G>,
+    credential_response: SerializedCredentialResponse<CS>,
+    client_s_pk: PublicKey<G>,
+    identifiers: SerializedIdentifiers<'a, KeGroup<CS>>,
+    context: SerializedContext<'a>,
+) -> Result<Ke2BuilderCommon<G, H>, ProtocolError>
+where
+    G: Group,
+    H: Hash,
+    R: Rng + CryptoRng,
+    CS: CipherSuite,
+    H::Core: ProxyHash,
+    <<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: IsLess<U256>,
+    Le<<<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize, U256>: NonZero,
+    OutputSize<H>: ArrayLength,
+    G::Sk: DiffieHellman<G>,
+    CS::KeyExchange: KeyExchange<Group = G, Hash = H>,
+{
+    let server_ephemeral = KeyPair::<G>::derive_random(rng);
+    let server_nonce = generate_nonce::<R>(rng);
+    let server_e_pk_bytes = server_ephemeral.public().serialize();
+
+    let ke1_iter = ke1_message.to_iter();
+    let client_e_pk = ke1_message.client_e_pk.clone();
+
+    let transcript_hasher = transcript(
+        &context,
+        &identifiers,
+        &credential_request,
+        &ke1_iter,
+        &credential_response,
+        server_nonce,
+        &server_e_pk_bytes,
+    );
+
+    let shared_secret_1 = server_ephemeral
+        .private()
+        .ke_diffie_hellman(&ke1_message.client_e_pk);
+    let shared_secret_3 = server_ephemeral.private().ke_diffie_hellman(&client_s_pk);
+
+    Ok(Ke2BuilderCommon {
+        server_nonce,
+        transcript_hasher,
+        client_e_pk,
+        server_e_pk: server_ephemeral.public().clone(),
+        shared_secret_1,
+        shared_secret_3,
+    })
+}
+
+// Internal function which takes computed shared secrets, along with some
+// auxiliary metadata, to produce the session key and two MAC keys
+pub(super) fn derive_keys<'a, H: Hash>(
+    ikms: impl Iterator<Item = &'a [u8]>,
+    hashed_derivation_transcript: &[u8],
+) -> Result<DerivedKeys<H>, ProtocolError>
+where
+    H::Core: ProxyHash,
+    <<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: IsLess<U256>,
+    Le<<<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize, U256>: NonZero,
+    OutputSize<H>: ArrayLength,
+{
+    let mut hkdf = HkdfExtract::<H>::new(None);
+
+    for ikm in ikms {
+        hkdf.input_ikm(ikm);
+    }
+
+    let (_, extracted_ikm) = hkdf.finalize();
+    let handshake_secret = derive_secrets::<H>(
+        &extracted_ikm,
+        STR_HANDSHAKE_SECRET,
+        hashed_derivation_transcript,
+    )?;
+    let session_key = derive_secrets::<H>(
+        &extracted_ikm,
+        STR_SESSION_KEY,
+        hashed_derivation_transcript,
+    )?;
+
+    let km2 = hkdf_expand_label::<H>(&handshake_secret, STR_SERVER_MAC, b"")?;
+    let km3 = hkdf_expand_label::<H>(&handshake_secret, STR_CLIENT_MAC, b"")?;
+
+    Ok(DerivedKeys {
+        session_key,
+        km2,
+        km3,
+        #[cfg(test)]
+        handshake_secret,
+    })
+}
+
+/// Helper function for shared functionality in KE2 MAC computation
+/// for both `TripleDH` and TripleDH-KEM
+pub(super) fn compute_ke2_macs<H: Hash>(
+    transcript_hasher: &mut H,
+    derived_keys: &DerivedKeys<H>,
+    transcript_digest: &[u8],
+) -> Result<(Output<H>, Output<H>), ProtocolError>
+where
+    H::Core: ProxyHash,
+    <<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: IsLess<U256>,
+    Le<<<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize, U256>: NonZero,
+    OutputSize<H>: ArrayLength,
+{
+    let mut mac_hasher =
+        SimpleHmac::<H>::new_from_slice(&derived_keys.km2).map_err(|_| InternalError::HmacError)?;
+    Mac::update(&mut mac_hasher, transcript_digest);
+    let mac = mac_hasher.finalize().into_bytes();
+
+    Update::update(transcript_hasher, &mac);
+    let finalized_transcript = transcript_hasher.clone().finalize();
+
+    let mut expected_mac_hasher =
+        SimpleHmac::<H>::new_from_slice(&derived_keys.km3).map_err(|_| InternalError::HmacError)?;
+    Mac::update(&mut expected_mac_hasher, &finalized_transcript);
+    let expected_mac = expected_mac_hasher.finalize().into_bytes();
+
+    Ok((mac, expected_mac))
+}
+
+/// Finalizes the KE3 transcript by deriving session material from the provided
+/// shared secrets and verifying the server's MAC, returning both the derived
+/// keys and the client's MAC response. Callers are expected to supply any
+/// protocol-specific shared secrets (e.g. classic Diffie-Hellman results or
+/// KEM outputs) as byte slices.
+pub(super) fn finalize_ke3_transcript<'a, H: Hash>(
+    transcript_hasher: &mut H,
+    shared_secrets: impl Iterator<Item = &'a [u8]>,
+    server_mac: &Output<H>,
+) -> Result<(DerivedKeys<H>, Output<H>), ProtocolError>
+where
+    H::Core: ProxyHash,
+    <<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: IsLess<U256>,
+    Le<<<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize, U256>: NonZero,
+    OutputSize<H>: ArrayLength,
+{
+    let transcript_digest = transcript_hasher.clone().finalize();
+    let derived_keys = derive_keys::<H>(shared_secrets, &transcript_digest)?;
+    let mut server_mac_hasher =
+        SimpleHmac::<H>::new_from_slice(&derived_keys.km2).map_err(|_| InternalError::HmacError)?;
+    Mac::update(&mut server_mac_hasher, &transcript_digest);
+    server_mac_hasher
+        .verify(server_mac)
+        .map_err(|_| ProtocolError::InvalidLoginError)?;
+
+    Update::update(transcript_hasher, server_mac);
+    let finalized_transcript = transcript_hasher.clone().finalize();
+
+    let mut client_mac_hasher =
+        SimpleHmac::<H>::new_from_slice(&derived_keys.km3).map_err(|_| InternalError::HmacError)?;
+    Mac::update(&mut client_mac_hasher, &finalized_transcript);
+
+    let client_mac = client_mac_hasher.finalize().into_bytes();
+
+    Ok((derived_keys, client_mac))
+}
+
+fn hkdf_expand_label<H: Hash>(
+    secret: &[u8],
+    label: &[u8],
+    context: &[u8],
+) -> Result<Output<H>, ProtocolError>
+where
+    H::Core: ProxyHash,
+    <<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: IsLess<U256>,
+    Le<<<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize, U256>: NonZero,
+    OutputSize<H>: ArrayLength,
+{
+    let h = Hkdf::<H>::from_prk(secret).map_err(|_| InternalError::HkdfError)?;
+    hkdf_expand_label_extracted(&h, label, context)
+}
+
+fn hkdf_expand_label_extracted<H: Hash>(
+    hkdf: &Hkdf<H>,
+    label: &[u8],
+    context: &[u8],
+) -> Result<Output<H>, ProtocolError>
+where
+    H::Core: ProxyHash,
+    <<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: IsLess<U256>,
+    Le<<<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize, U256>: NonZero,
+    OutputSize<H>: ArrayLength,
+{
+    let mut okm = GenericArray::default().into_ha0_4();
+
+    let length = i2osp::<U2>(OutputSize::<H>::USIZE)?;
+    let label_length = i2osp::<U1>(STR_OPAQUE.len() + label.len())?;
+    let context_len = i2osp::<U1>(context.len())?;
+
+    let hkdf_label = [
+        length.as_slice(),
+        &label_length,
+        STR_OPAQUE,
+        label,
+        &context_len,
+        context,
+    ];
+
+    hkdf.expand_multi_info(&hkdf_label, &mut okm)
+        .map_err(|_| InternalError::HkdfError)?;
+    Ok(okm)
+}
+
+fn derive_secrets<H: Hash>(
+    hkdf: &Hkdf<H>,
+    label: &[u8],
+    hashed_derivation_transcript: &[u8],
+) -> Result<Output<H>, ProtocolError>
+where
+    H::Core: ProxyHash,
+    <<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: IsLess<U256>,
+    Le<<<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize, U256>: NonZero,
+    OutputSize<H>: ArrayLength,
+{
+    hkdf_expand_label_extracted::<H>(hkdf, label, hashed_derivation_transcript)
+}
+
+// Serialization and deserialization implementations
+
+impl<G: Group> Deserialize for Ke1State<G> {
+    fn deserialize_take(bytes: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
+        Ok(Self {
+            client_e_sk: PrivateKey::deserialize_take(bytes)?,
+            client_nonce: bytes.take_array("client nonce")?,
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+impl<G: Group> Serialize for Ke1State<G>
+where
+    // Ke1State: KeSk + Nonce
+    G::SkLen: Add<NonceLen>,
+    Sum<G::SkLen, NonceLen>: ArrayLength,
+{
+    type Len = Sum<G::SkLen, NonceLen>;
+
+    fn serialize(&self) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::Len> {
+        self.client_e_sk.serialize().cat(self.client_nonce)
+    }
+}
+
+impl<G: Group> Deserialize for Ke1Message<G> {
+    fn deserialize_take(input: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
+        Ok(Self {
+            client_nonce: input.take_array("client nonce")?,
+            client_e_pk: PublicKey::deserialize_take(input)?,
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+impl<G: Group> Serialize for Ke1Message<G>
+where
+    // Ke1Message: Nonce + KePk
+    NonceLen: Add<G::PkLen>,
+    Sum<NonceLen, G::PkLen>: ArrayLength,
+{
+    type Len = Sum<NonceLen, G::PkLen>;
+
+    fn serialize(&self) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::Len> {
+        self.client_nonce.cat(self.client_e_pk.serialize())
+    }
+}
+
+impl<G: Group> Ke1Message<G> {
+    pub(crate) fn to_iter(&self) -> Ke1MessageIter<G> {
+        Ke1MessageIter {
+            client_nonce: self.client_nonce,
+            client_e_pk: self.client_e_pk.serialize(),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg_attr(
+    feature = "serde",
+    derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize),
+    serde(bound = "")
+)]
+#[derive_where(Clone, Debug, Eq, Hash, Ord, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Zeroize)]
+pub(crate) struct Ke1MessageIter<G: Group> {
+    client_nonce: GenericArray<u8, NonceLen>,
+    client_e_pk: GenericArray<u8, G::PkLen>,
+}
+
+pub(crate) type Ke1MessageIterLen<G: Group> = Sum<NonceLen, G::PkLen>;
+
+impl<G: Group> Ke1MessageIter<G> {
+    pub(crate) fn iter(&self) -> impl Clone + Iterator<Item = &[u8]> {
+        [self.client_nonce.as_slice(), self.client_e_pk.as_slice()].into_iter()
+    }
+
+    pub(crate) fn deserialize_take(input: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
+        Ok(Ke1MessageIter {
+            client_nonce: input.take_array("client nonce")?,
+            client_e_pk: input.take_array("client ephemeral public key")?,
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+impl<G: Group> Ke1MessageIter<G>
+where
+    NonceLen: Add<G::PkLen>,
+    Ke1MessageIterLen<G>: ArrayLength,
+{
+    pub(crate) fn serialize(&self) -> GenericArray<u8, Ke1MessageIterLen<G>> {
+        self.client_nonce.cat(self.client_e_pk.clone())
+    }
+}

src/key_exchange/sigma_i/ecdsa.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) VexaHub and contributors.
+// Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates.
+
+//! ECDSA implementation for [`elliptic_curve`] [`Group`] implementations to
+//! support [`SigmaI`](crate::SigmaI).
+
+use core::marker::PhantomData;
+
+use digest::block_api::{BlockSizeUser, EagerHash};
+use digest::{Digest, FixedOutputReset, HashMarker};
+use ecdsa::{EcdsaCurve, SignatureSize};
+use elliptic_curve::point::NonIdentity;
+use elliptic_curve::{CurveArithmetic, FieldBytes, ProjectivePoint, SecretKey};
+use generic_array::{ArrayLength, GenericArray};
+use hybrid_array::ArraySize;
+use rand::{CryptoRng, Rng};
+
+use super::{Message, MessageBuilder, SignatureProtocol};
+use crate::ciphersuite::CipherSuite;
+use crate::errors::ProtocolError;
+use crate::key_exchange::group::Group;
+pub use crate::key_exchange::sigma_i::shared::PreHash;
+use crate::serialization::SliceExt;
+
+/// ECDSA for [`SigmaI`](crate::SigmaI).
+///
+/// The ["verification state"](Self::VerifyState) is the pre-hash for the
+/// message to be verified.
+pub struct Ecdsa<G, H>(PhantomData<(G, H)>);
+
+impl<G, H> SignatureProtocol for Ecdsa<G, H>
+where
+    G: CurveArithmetic
+        + Group<Sk = SecretKey<G>, Pk = NonIdentity<ProjectivePoint<G>>>
+        + EcdsaCurve,
+    SignatureSize<G>: ArrayLength + ArraySize,
+    H: EagerHash + FixedOutputReset + BlockSizeUser + HashMarker + Digest + Clone + Default,
+{
+    type Group = G;
+    type Signature = ecdsa::Signature<G>;
+    type SignatureLen = SignatureSize<G>;
+    type VerifyState<CS: CipherSuite, KE: Group> = PreHash<H>;
+
+    // We use a manual implementation of `RandomizedPrehashSigner` to use the same
+    // hash for the message as for generating `k`. See
+    // https://github.com/RustCrypto/signatures/issues/949.
+    fn sign<'a, R: CryptoRng + Rng, CS: CipherSuite, KE: Group>(
+        sk: &<Self::Group as Group>::Sk,
+        rng: &mut R,
+        message: &Message<CS, KE>,
+    ) -> (Self::Signature, Self::VerifyState<CS, KE>) {
+        let hash = message.hash::<H>();
+
+        (
+            sign::<_, G, H>(sk, rng, &hash.sign.finalize_fixed()),
+            PreHash(hash.verify.finalize_fixed()),
+        )
+    }
+
+    fn verify<CS: CipherSuite, KE: Group>(
+        pk: &<Self::Group as Group>::Pk,
+        _: MessageBuilder<'_, CS>,
+        state: Self::VerifyState<CS, KE>,
+        signature: &Self::Signature,
+    ) -> Result<(), ProtocolError> {
+        verify(pk, &state.0, signature)
+    }
+
+    fn serialize_signature(signature: &Self::Signature) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::SignatureLen> {
+        GenericArray::from_slice(signature.to_bytes().as_slice()).clone()
+    }
+
+    fn deserialize_take_signature(bytes: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signature, ProtocolError> {
+        ecdsa::Signature::from_bytes(&bytes.take_array("signature")?.into_ha0_4())
+            .map_err(|_| ProtocolError::SerializationError)
+    }
+}
+
+fn sign<R, C, H>(sk: &SecretKey<C>, rng: &mut R, pre_hash: &[u8]) -> ecdsa::Signature<C>
+where
+    R: CryptoRng + Rng,
+    C: CurveArithmetic + EcdsaCurve,
+    SignatureSize<C>: ArraySize,
+    H: Digest + BlockSizeUser + FixedOutputReset,
+{
+    let mut ad = FieldBytes::<C>::default();
+    rng.fill_bytes(&mut ad);
+    ecdsa::hazmat::sign_prehashed_rfc6979::<C, H>(&sk.to_nonzero_scalar(), pre_hash, &ad).0
+}
+
+fn verify<C>(
+    pk: &NonIdentity<ProjectivePoint<C>>,
+    pre_hash: &[u8],
+    signature: &ecdsa::Signature<C>,
+) -> Result<(), ProtocolError>
+where
+    C: CurveArithmetic + EcdsaCurve,
+    SignatureSize<C>: ArraySize,
+{
+    ecdsa::hazmat::verify_prehashed(&pk.to_point(), pre_hash, signature)
+        .map_err(|_| ProtocolError::InvalidLoginError)
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn ecdsa() {
+    use std::vec;
+
+    use digest::Digest;
+    use ecdsa::signature::hazmat::PrehashVerifier;
+    use p256::ecdsa::signature::RandomizedDigestSigner;
+    use p256::ecdsa::{Signature, SigningKey, VerifyingKey};
+    use p256::{NistP256, PublicKey};
+    use rand::rand_core::UnwrapErr;
+    use rand::rngs::SysRng;
+    use sha2::Sha256;
+
+    use crate::tests::mock_rng::CycleRng;
+
+    let mut rng = CycleRng::new(vec![1; 32]);
+
+    let mut message = [0; 1024];
+    UnwrapErr(SysRng).fill_bytes(&mut message);
+    let hash = Sha256::new_with_prefix(message);
+
+    let sk = NistP256::random_sk(&mut UnwrapErr(SysRng));
+    let signing_key = SigningKey::from(sk.clone());
+
+    let signature: Signature = signing_key.sign_digest_with_rng(&mut rng, |d: &mut Sha256| {
+        d.update(message);
+    });
+    let custom_signature = sign::<_, _, Sha256>(&sk, &mut rng, &hash.clone().finalize());
+
+    assert_eq!(signature, custom_signature);
+
+    let pk = NistP256::public_key(&sk);
+    let verifying_key = VerifyingKey::from(PublicKey::from(&pk));
+
+    verifying_key
+        .verify_prehash(&hash.clone().finalize(), &signature)
+        .unwrap();
+    verify(&pk, &hash.finalize(), &custom_signature).unwrap();
+}

src/key_exchange/sigma_i/hash_eddsa.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) VexaHub and contributors.
+// Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates.
+
+//! HashEdDSA implementation for [`SigmaI`](crate::SigmaI). Currently only
+//! supports [`Ed25519`](crate::Ed25519).
+
+use core::marker::PhantomData;
+
+use generic_array::GenericArray;
+use rand::{CryptoRng, Rng};
+use zeroize::Zeroize;
+
+use self::implementation::HashEddsaImpl;
+use super::{Message, MessageBuilder, SignatureProtocol};
+use crate::ciphersuite::CipherSuite;
+use crate::errors::ProtocolError;
+use crate::key_exchange::group::Group;
+
+/// HashEdDSA for [`SigmaI`](crate::SigmaI).
+///
+/// The ["verification state"](Self::VerifyState) is the pre-hash for the
+/// message to be verified.
+pub struct HashEddsa<G>(PhantomData<G>);
+
+impl<G: HashEddsaImpl> SignatureProtocol for HashEddsa<G> {
+    type Group = G;
+    type Signature = G::Signature;
+    type SignatureLen = G::SignatureLen;
+    type VerifyState<CS: CipherSuite, KE: Group> = G::VerifyState<CS, KE>;
+
+    fn sign<'a, R: CryptoRng + Rng, CS: CipherSuite, KE: Group>(
+        sk: &<Self::Group as Group>::Sk,
+        _: &mut R,
+        message: &Message<CS, KE>,
+    ) -> (Self::Signature, Self::VerifyState<CS, KE>) {
+        G::sign(sk, message)
+    }
+
+    fn verify<CS: CipherSuite, KE: Group>(
+        pk: &<Self::Group as Group>::Pk,
+        _: MessageBuilder<'_, CS>,
+        state: Self::VerifyState<CS, KE>,
+        signature: &Self::Signature,
+    ) -> Result<(), ProtocolError> {
+        G::verify(pk, state, signature)
+    }
+
+    fn serialize_signature(signature: &Self::Signature) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::SignatureLen> {
+        G::serialize_signature(signature)
+    }
+
+    fn deserialize_take_signature(bytes: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signature, ProtocolError> {
+        G::deserialize_take_signature(bytes)
+    }
+}
+
+pub(in super::super) mod implementation {
+    use generic_array::ArrayLength;
+
+    use super::*;
+
+    pub trait HashEddsaImpl: Group {
+        type Signature: Clone + Zeroize;
+        type SignatureLen: ArrayLength;
+        type VerifyState<CS: CipherSuite, KE: Group>: Clone + Zeroize;
+
+        fn sign<CS: CipherSuite, KE: Group>(
+            sk: &Self::Sk,
+            message: &Message<CS, KE>,
+        ) -> (Self::Signature, Self::VerifyState<CS, KE>);
+
+        fn verify<CS: CipherSuite, KE: Group>(
+            pk: &Self::Pk,
+            state: Self::VerifyState<CS, KE>,
+            signature: &Self::Signature,
+        ) -> Result<(), ProtocolError>;
+
+        fn deserialize_take_signature(bytes: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signature, ProtocolError>;
+
+        fn serialize_signature(signature: &Self::Signature)
+        -> GenericArray<u8, Self::SignatureLen>;
+    }
+}

src/key_exchange/sigma_i/message.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,307 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) VexaHub and contributors.
+// Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates.
+
+use core::ops::Add;
+
+use derive_where::derive_where;
+use digest::{FixedOutput, Output, Update};
+use generic_array::typenum::Sum;
+use generic_array::{ArrayLength, GenericArray};
+use zeroize::Zeroize;
+
+use crate::ciphersuite::{CipherSuite, KeGroup, KeHash, OprfGroup};
+use crate::errors::ProtocolError;
+use crate::hash::OutputSize;
+use crate::key_exchange::group::Group;
+use crate::key_exchange::shared::{Ke1MessageIter, Ke1MessageIterLen, NonceLen};
+use crate::key_exchange::{
+    Deserialize, Serialize, SerializedContext, SerializedCredentialRequest,
+    SerializedCredentialRequestLen, SerializedCredentialResponse, SerializedCredentialResponseLen,
+    SerializedIdentifier, SerializedIdentifiers,
+};
+use crate::opaque::MaskedResponseLen;
+use crate::serialization::{ConcatExt, SliceExt, UpdateExt};
+
+/// This holds the message to be signed and the message to be verified.
+///
+/// If your signature protocol requires pre-hashes, you can call [`hash()`].
+///
+/// If you require the actual message, call [`sign_message()`]. To get the
+/// message to verify, call [`to_cached()`] to create a [`CachedMessage`] and
+/// save it in [`SignatureProtocol::VerifyState`], which you can then use in
+/// [`SignatureProtocol::verify()`] with [`MessageBuilder`] to create
+/// [`VerifyMessage`].
+///
+/// [`hash()`]: super::Message::hash
+/// [`sign_message()`]: super::Message::sign_message
+/// [`to_cached()`]: super::Message::to_cached
+/// [`SignatureProtocol::sign()`]: super::SignatureProtocol::sign
+/// [`SignatureProtocol::verify()`]: super::SignatureProtocol::verify
+/// [`SignatureProtocol::VerifyState`]: super::SignatureProtocol::VerifyState
+#[cfg_attr(
+    feature = "serde",
+    derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize),
+    serde(bound(deserialize = "'de: 'a", serialize = ""))
+)]
+#[derive_where(Clone, Debug, Eq, Hash, PartialEq, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
+pub struct Message<'a, CS: CipherSuite, KE: Group> {
+    pub(super) role: Role,
+    pub(super) context: SerializedContext<'a>,
+    pub(super) identifiers: SerializedIdentifiers<'a, KeGroup<CS>>,
+    pub(super) cache: CachedMessage<CS, KE>,
+}
+
+/// This holds the message to be verified.
+///
+/// Create it by using [`MessageBuilder::build()`] with [`CachedMessage`].
+#[cfg_attr(
+    feature = "serde",
+    derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize),
+    serde(bound(deserialize = "'de: 'a", serialize = ""))
+)]
+#[derive_where(Clone, Debug, Eq, Hash, PartialEq, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
+pub struct VerifyMessage<'a, CS: CipherSuite, KE: Group> {
+    role: Role,
+    context: SerializedContext<'a>,
+    identifier: SerializedIdentifier<'a, KeGroup<CS>>,
+    pub(super) cache: CachedMessage<CS, KE>,
+}
+
+/// Used to build [`VerifyMessage`]. It is only available in
+/// [`SignatureProtocol::verify()`].
+///
+/// [`SignatureProtocol::verify()`]: super::SignatureProtocol::verify
+#[derive_where(Debug, Eq, Hash, PartialEq, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
+pub struct MessageBuilder<'a, CS: CipherSuite> {
+    pub(super) role: Role,
+    pub(super) context: SerializedContext<'a>,
+    pub(super) identifier: SerializedIdentifier<'a, KeGroup<CS>>,
+}
+
+/// Created by [`Message::to_cached()`]. This is used to save the message to be
+/// verified in [`SignatureProtocol::VerifyState`].
+///
+/// Use [`MessageBuilder::build()`] to create [`VerifyMessage`] in
+/// [`SignatureProtocol::verify()`].
+///
+/// [`SignatureProtocol::verify()`]: super::SignatureProtocol::verify
+/// [`SignatureProtocol::VerifyState`]: super::SignatureProtocol::VerifyState
+#[cfg_attr(
+    feature = "serde",
+    derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize),
+    serde(bound = "")
+)]
+#[derive_where(Clone, Debug, Eq, Hash, PartialEq, Zeroize, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
+pub struct CachedMessage<CS: CipherSuite, KE: Group> {
+    pub(super) credential_request: SerializedCredentialRequest<CS>,
+    pub(super) ke1_message: Ke1MessageIter<KE>,
+    pub(super) credential_response: SerializedCredentialResponse<CS>,
+    pub(super) server_nonce: GenericArray<u8, NonceLen>,
+    pub(super) server_e_pk: GenericArray<u8, KE::PkLen>,
+    pub(super) server_mac: Output<KeHash<CS>>,
+}
+
+impl<CS: CipherSuite, KE: Group> Message<'_, CS, KE> {
+    /// Returns the message to be signed.
+    pub fn sign_message(&self) -> impl Clone + Iterator<Item = &[u8]> {
+        self.context.iter().chain(self.post_message(Stage::Sign))
+    }
+
+    /// Returns the hash of both messages.
+    pub fn hash<KEH: Default + Clone + FixedOutput + Update>(&self) -> HashOutput<KEH> {
+        let mut context = KEH::default();
+        context.update_iter(self.context.iter());
+
+        let sign = context.clone().chain_iter(self.post_message(Stage::Sign));
+        let verify = context.chain_iter(self.post_message(Stage::Verify));
+
+        HashOutput { sign, verify }
+    }
+
+    fn post_message(&self, stage: Stage) -> impl Clone + Iterator<Item = &[u8]> {
+        let transcript = match (self.role, stage) {
+            (Role::Server, Stage::Sign) => Role::Server,
+            (Role::Server, Stage::Verify) => Role::Client,
+            (Role::Client, Stage::Sign) => Role::Client,
+            (Role::Client, Stage::Verify) => Role::Server,
+        };
+        let identifier = match transcript {
+            Role::Server => &self.identifiers.server,
+            Role::Client => &self.identifiers.client,
+        };
+
+        self.cache.post_message(transcript, identifier)
+    }
+
+    /// Create a [`CachedMessage`], which can be saved in
+    /// [`SignatureProtocol::VerifyState`] and create a [`VerifyMessage`] with
+    /// [`MessageBuilder::build()`].
+    ///
+    /// [`SignatureProtocol::VerifyState`]: super::SignatureProtocol::VerifyState
+    pub fn to_cached(&self) -> CachedMessage<CS, KE> {
+        self.cache.clone()
+    }
+}
+
+impl<CS: CipherSuite, KE: Group> VerifyMessage<'_, CS, KE> {
+    /// Returns the message to be verified.
+    pub fn verify_message(&self) -> impl Clone + Iterator<Item = &[u8]> {
+        let transcript = match self.role {
+            Role::Server => Role::Client,
+            Role::Client => Role::Server,
+        };
+
+        self.context
+            .iter()
+            .chain(self.cache.post_message(transcript, &self.identifier))
+    }
+}
+
+impl<CS: CipherSuite, KE: Group> CachedMessage<CS, KE> {
+    fn post_message<'a>(
+        &'a self,
+        transcript: Role,
+        identifier: &'a SerializedIdentifier<'_, KeGroup<CS>>,
+    ) -> impl Clone + Iterator<Item = &'a [u8]> {
+        Some(identifier.iter())
+            .filter(|_| matches!(transcript, Role::Client))
+            .into_iter()
+            .flatten()
+            .chain(self.credential_request.iter())
+            .chain(self.ke1_message.iter())
+            .chain(
+                Some(identifier.iter())
+                    .filter(|_| matches!(transcript, Role::Server))
+                    .into_iter()
+                    .flatten(),
+            )
+            .chain(self.credential_response.iter())
+            .chain([self.server_nonce.as_slice(), &self.server_e_pk])
+            .chain(Some(self.server_mac.as_slice()).filter(|_| matches!(transcript, Role::Client)))
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg_attr(
+    feature = "serde",
+    derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize),
+    serde(bound = "")
+)]
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Eq, Hash, PartialEq)]
+pub(super) enum Role {
+    Server,
+    Client,
+}
+
+impl Zeroize for Role {
+    fn zeroize(&mut self) {
+        *self = Self::Server;
+    }
+}
+
+enum Stage {
+    Sign,
+    Verify,
+}
+
+/// Returned by [`Message::hash()`] containing the hash of the message to be
+/// signed and the message to be verified.
+pub struct HashOutput<H> {
+    /// The hash of the message to be signed.
+    pub sign: H,
+    /// The hash of the message to be verified.
+    pub verify: H,
+}
+
+impl<'a, CS: CipherSuite> MessageBuilder<'a, CS> {
+    /// Creates a [`VerifyMessage`]. [`CachedMessage`] can be created by
+    /// [`Message::to_cached()`] and stored in
+    /// [`SignatureProtocol::VerifyState`].
+    ///
+    /// [`SignatureProtocol::VerifyState`]: super::SignatureProtocol::VerifyState
+    pub fn build<KE: Group>(self, cache: CachedMessage<CS, KE>) -> VerifyMessage<'a, CS, KE> {
+        VerifyMessage {
+            role: self.role,
+            context: self.context.clone(),
+            identifier: self.identifier.clone(),
+            cache,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl<CS: CipherSuite, KE: Group> Deserialize for CachedMessage<CS, KE> {
+    fn deserialize_take(input: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
+        Ok(Self {
+            credential_request: SerializedCredentialRequest::deserialize_take(input)?,
+            ke1_message: Ke1MessageIter::deserialize_take(input)?,
+            credential_response: SerializedCredentialResponse::deserialize_take(input)?,
+            server_nonce: input.take_array("server nonce")?,
+            server_e_pk: input.take_array("serialized server ephemeral key")?,
+            server_mac: input.take_array("server mac")?.into_ha0_4(),
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+/// Length of [`CachedMessage`].
+type CachedMessageLen<CS: CipherSuite, KE: Group> = Sum<
+    Sum<
+        Sum<
+            Sum<
+                Sum<SerializedCredentialRequestLen<CS>, Ke1MessageIterLen<KE>>,
+                SerializedCredentialResponseLen<CS>,
+            >,
+            NonceLen,
+        >,
+        KE::PkLen,
+    >,
+    OutputSize<KeHash<CS>>,
+>;
+
+impl<CS: CipherSuite, KE: Group> Serialize for CachedMessage<CS, KE>
+where
+    SerializedCredentialRequestLen<CS>: ArrayLength + Add<Ke1MessageIterLen<KE>>,
+    Sum<SerializedCredentialRequestLen<CS>, Ke1MessageIterLen<KE>>:
+        ArrayLength + Add<SerializedCredentialResponseLen<CS>>,
+    Sum<
+        Sum<SerializedCredentialRequestLen<CS>, Ke1MessageIterLen<KE>>,
+        SerializedCredentialResponseLen<CS>,
+    >: ArrayLength + Add<NonceLen>,
+    Sum<
+        Sum<
+            Sum<SerializedCredentialRequestLen<CS>, Ke1MessageIterLen<KE>>,
+            SerializedCredentialResponseLen<CS>,
+        >,
+        NonceLen,
+    >: ArrayLength + Add<KE::PkLen>,
+    Sum<
+        Sum<
+            Sum<
+                Sum<SerializedCredentialRequestLen<CS>, Ke1MessageIterLen<KE>>,
+                SerializedCredentialResponseLen<CS>,
+            >,
+            NonceLen,
+        >,
+        KE::PkLen,
+    >: ArrayLength + Add<OutputSize<KeHash<CS>>>,
+    CachedMessageLen<CS, KE>: ArrayLength,
+    // Ke1MessageIter
+    NonceLen: Add<KE::PkLen>,
+    Ke1MessageIterLen<KE>: ArrayLength,
+    // CredentialResponseParts
+    <OprfGroup<CS> as voprf::Group>::ElemLen: Add<NonceLen>,
+    Sum<<OprfGroup<CS> as voprf::Group>::ElemLen, NonceLen>:
+        ArrayLength + Add<MaskedResponseLen<CS>>,
+    SerializedCredentialResponseLen<CS>: ArrayLength,
+{
+    type Len = CachedMessageLen<CS, KE>;
+
+    fn serialize(&self) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::Len> {
+        self.credential_request
+            .serialize()
+            .cat(self.ke1_message.serialize())
+            .cat(self.credential_response.serialize())
+            .cat(self.server_nonce)
+            .cat(self.server_e_pk.clone())
+            .cat(GenericArray::from_slice(self.server_mac.as_slice()).clone())
+    }
+}

src/key_exchange/sigma_i/mod.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,597 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) VexaHub and contributors.
+// Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates.
+
+//! An implementation of the SIGMA-I key exchange protocol
+//!
+//! ⚠️ **Warning**: This implementation has not been audited. Use at your own
+//! risk!
+
+#[cfg(feature = "ecdsa")]
+pub mod ecdsa;
+pub mod hash_eddsa;
+mod message;
+pub mod pure_eddsa;
+pub(super) mod shared;
+
+use core::iter;
+use core::marker::PhantomData;
+use core::ops::Add;
+
+use derive_where::derive_where;
+use digest::block_api::{BlockSizeUser, CoreProxy, SmallBlockSizeUser};
+use digest::{Mac, Output, OutputSizeUser};
+use generic_array::typenum::{IsLess, Le, NonZero, Sum, U256};
+use generic_array::{ArrayLength, GenericArray};
+use hmac::{KeyInit, SimpleHmac};
+use rand::{CryptoRng, Rng};
+use subtle::{ConstantTimeEq, CtOption};
+use zeroize::Zeroize;
+
+use self::message::Role;
+pub use self::message::{CachedMessage, HashOutput, Message, MessageBuilder, VerifyMessage};
+use super::{
+    Deserialize, GenerateKe1Result, GenerateKe2Result, GenerateKe3Result, KeyExchange, Serialize,
+    SerializedContext, SerializedCredentialRequest, SerializedCredentialResponse,
+    SerializedIdentifier, SerializedIdentifiers,
+};
+use crate::ciphersuite::{CipherSuite, KeGroup, KeHash};
+use crate::envelope::NonceLen;
+use crate::errors::{InternalError, ProtocolError};
+use crate::hash::{Hash, OutputSize, ProxyHash};
+use crate::key_exchange::group::Group;
+pub use crate::key_exchange::shared::{DiffieHellman, Ke1Message, Ke1State};
+use crate::key_exchange::shared::{derive_keys, generate_ke1, generate_nonce, transcript};
+use crate::keypair::{KeyPair, PrivateKey, PublicKey};
+use crate::opaque::Identifiers;
+use crate::serialization::{ConcatExt, SliceExt, UpdateExt};
+
+/// The SIGMA-I key exchange implementation
+///
+/// `SIG` determines the algorithm used for the signature. `KE` determines the
+/// algorithm used for establishing the shared secret. `KEH` determines the hash
+/// used for the key exchange.
+///
+/// # Remote Key
+///
+/// [`ServerLoginBuilder::data()`](crate::ServerLoginBuilder::data()) will
+/// return [`Message`].
+///
+/// [`ServerLoginBuilder::build()`](crate::ServerLoginBuilder::build()) expects
+/// a signature from signing the [message](Message::sign_message) with the
+/// servers private key, and a ["verification
+/// state"](SignatureProtocol::VerifyState).
+///
+/// To understand what kind of "verification state" is expected here exactly,
+/// refer to the documentation of your chosen [`SignatureProtocol`] `SIG`. E.g.
+/// [`Ecdsa`](ecdsa::Ecdsa), [`PureEddsa`](pure_eddsa::PureEddsa) or
+/// [`HashEddsa`](hash_eddsa::HashEddsa).
+pub struct SigmaI<SIG, KE, KEH>(PhantomData<(SIG, KE, KEH)>);
+
+/// Trait to implement for `SIG` used in [`SigmaI`].
+///
+/// The [`sign()`] and [`verify()`] methods do not function independent of each
+/// other. [`sign()`] is always called first and receives a [Message] containing
+/// the message for both signing and verifying. A ["verification
+/// state"](Self::VerifyState) is created by [`sign()`] and then passed onto
+/// [`verify()`].
+///
+/// The most straightforward implementation would simply store the message for
+/// verifying in [`VerifyState`](Self::VerifyState). However, protocols that
+/// allow for pre-hashing don't need to store the whole message and can
+/// preemptively hash the verification message and only store that instead,
+/// getting rid of the much larger message.
+///
+/// [`sign()`]: Self::sign
+/// [`verify()`]: Self::verify
+pub trait SignatureProtocol {
+    /// The [`Group`] used to generate and derive keys.
+    type Group: Group;
+    /// The signature.
+    type Signature: Clone + Zeroize;
+    /// Length of a serialized [`Signature`](Self::Signature).
+    type SignatureLen: ArrayLength;
+    /// The state required to run the verification. This is used to cache the
+    /// pre-hash for curves that support that, otherwise the [`Message`] to
+    /// verify is stored via [`CachedMessage`].
+    type VerifyState<CS: CipherSuite, KE: Group>: Clone + Zeroize;
+
+    /// Returns a signature from the given message signed by the given private
+    /// key.
+    ///
+    /// [`Message`] contains both signature messages for signing and
+    /// verification. If you need it again during verification, consider
+    /// using [`CachedMessage`].
+    ///
+    /// The returned [`VerifyState`](Self::VerifyState) will be passed to
+    /// [`verify()`](Self::verify) and must contain the necessary
+    /// information to verify the incoming signature.
+    fn sign<R: CryptoRng + Rng, CS: CipherSuite, KE: Group>(
+        sk: &<Self::Group as Group>::Sk,
+        rng: &mut R,
+        message: &Message<CS, KE>,
+    ) -> (Self::Signature, Self::VerifyState<CS, KE>);
+
+    /// Validates that the signature was created by signing the message with the
+    /// corresponding private key.
+    ///
+    /// The [`MessageBuilder`] can be used with [`CachedMessage`] to create
+    /// [`VerifyMessage`] which contains the message of the given `signature`.
+    ///
+    /// The `state` is created by [`sign()`](Self::sign()).
+    fn verify<CS: CipherSuite, KE: Group>(
+        pk: &<Self::Group as Group>::Pk,
+        message_builder: MessageBuilder<'_, CS>,
+        state: Self::VerifyState<CS, KE>,
+        signature: &Self::Signature,
+    ) -> Result<(), ProtocolError>;
+
+    /// Serialize [`Signature`](Self::Signature) into a fixed-sized byte array.
+    fn serialize_signature(signature: &Self::Signature) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::SignatureLen>;
+
+    /// Deserialize [`Signature`](Self::Signature) from the given `bytes`.
+    ///
+    /// The deserialized bytes must be taken from `bytes`.
+    fn deserialize_take_signature(bytes: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signature, ProtocolError>;
+}
+
+/// Builder for the second key exchange message
+#[cfg_attr(
+    feature = "serde",
+    derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize),
+    serde(bound(
+        deserialize = "'de: 'a, <KeGroup<CS> as Group>::Pk: serde::Deserialize<'de>, KE::Pk: \
+                       serde::Deserialize<'de>",
+        serialize = "<KeGroup<CS> as Group>::Pk: serde::Serialize, KE::Pk: serde::Serialize"
+    ))
+)]
+#[derive_where(Clone, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
+#[derive_where(Debug, Eq, Hash, PartialEq; <KeGroup<CS> as Group>::Pk, KE::Pk)]
+pub struct Ke2Builder<'a, CS: CipherSuite, KE: Group> {
+    transcript: Message<'a, CS, KE>,
+    server_nonce: GenericArray<u8, NonceLen>,
+    #[derive_where(skip(Zeroize))]
+    client_s_pk: PublicKey<KeGroup<CS>>,
+    #[derive_where(skip(Zeroize))]
+    server_e_pk: PublicKey<KE>,
+    expected_mac: Output<KeHash<CS>>,
+    session_key: Output<KeHash<CS>>,
+    #[cfg(test)]
+    handshake_secret: Output<KeHash<CS>>,
+    #[cfg(test)]
+    km2: Output<KeHash<CS>>,
+}
+
+/// The server state produced after the second key exchange message
+#[cfg_attr(
+    feature = "serde",
+    derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize),
+    serde(bound(
+        deserialize = "<SIG::Group as Group>::Pk: serde::Deserialize<'de>, SIG::VerifyState<CS, \
+                       KE>: serde::Deserialize<'de>",
+        serialize = "<SIG::Group as Group>::Pk: serde::Serialize, SIG::VerifyState<CS, KE>: \
+                     serde::Serialize"
+    ))
+)]
+#[derive_where(Clone, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
+#[derive_where(Debug, Eq, Hash, PartialEq; <SIG::Group as Group>::Pk, SIG::VerifyState<CS, KE>)]
+pub struct Ke2State<CS: CipherSuite, SIG: SignatureProtocol, KE: Group> {
+    #[derive_where(skip(Zeroize))]
+    client_s_pk: PublicKey<SIG::Group>,
+    session_key: Output<KeHash<CS>>,
+    verify_state: SIG::VerifyState<CS, KE>,
+    expected_mac: Output<KeHash<CS>>,
+}
+
+/// The second key exchange message
+#[cfg_attr(
+    feature = "serde",
+    derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize),
+    serde(bound(
+        deserialize = "KE::Pk: serde::Deserialize<'de>, SIG::Signature: serde::Deserialize<'de>",
+        serialize = "KE::Pk: serde::Serialize, SIG::Signature: serde::Serialize"
+    ))
+)]
+#[derive_where(Clone, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
+#[derive_where(Debug, Eq, Hash, Ord, PartialEq, PartialOrd; KE::Pk, SIG::Signature)]
+pub struct Ke2Message<SIG: SignatureProtocol, KE: Group, KEH: Hash>
+where
+    KEH::Core: ProxyHash,
+    <<KEH as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: IsLess<U256>,
+    Le<<<KEH as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize, U256>: NonZero,
+    OutputSize<KEH>: ArrayLength,
+{
+    server_nonce: GenericArray<u8, NonceLen>,
+    #[derive_where(skip(Zeroize))]
+    server_e_pk: PublicKey<KE>,
+    signature: SIG::Signature,
+    mac: Output<KEH>,
+}
+
+/// The third key exchange message
+#[cfg_attr(
+    feature = "serde",
+    derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize),
+    serde(bound(
+        deserialize = "SIG::Signature: serde::Deserialize<'de>",
+        serialize = "SIG::Signature: serde::Serialize"
+    ))
+)]
+#[derive_where(Clone, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
+#[derive_where(Debug, Eq, Hash, Ord, PartialEq, PartialOrd; SIG::Signature)]
+pub struct Ke3Message<SIG: SignatureProtocol, KEH: OutputSizeUser>
+where
+    <KEH as OutputSizeUser>::OutputSize: ArrayLength,
+{
+    signature: SIG::Signature,
+    mac: Output<KEH>,
+}
+
+impl<SIG: SignatureProtocol, KE: 'static + Group, KEH: Hash + BlockSizeUser> KeyExchange
+    for SigmaI<SIG, KE, KEH>
+where
+    KE::Sk: DiffieHellman<KE>,
+    KEH::Core: ProxyHash,
+    <<KEH as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: IsLess<U256>,
+    Le<<<KEH as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize, U256>: NonZero,
+    OutputSize<KEH>: ArrayLength,
+{
+    type Group = SIG::Group;
+    type Hash = KEH;
+
+    type KE1State = Ke1State<KE>;
+    type KE2State<CS: CipherSuite> = Ke2State<CS, SIG, KE>;
+    type KE1Message = Ke1Message<KE>;
+    type KE2Builder<'a, CS: CipherSuite<KeyExchange = Self>> = Ke2Builder<'a, CS, KE>;
+    type KE2BuilderData<'a, CS: 'static + CipherSuite> = &'a Message<'a, CS, KE>;
+    type KE2BuilderInput<CS: CipherSuite> = (SIG::Signature, SIG::VerifyState<CS, KE>);
+    type KE2Message = Ke2Message<SIG, KE, KEH>;
+    type KE3Message = Ke3Message<SIG, KEH>;
+
+    fn generate_ke1<R: Rng + CryptoRng>(
+        rng: &mut R,
+    ) -> Result<GenerateKe1Result<Self>, ProtocolError> {
+        generate_ke1(rng)
+    }
+
+    fn ke2_builder<'a, CS: CipherSuite<KeyExchange = Self>, R: Rng + CryptoRng>(
+        rng: &mut R,
+        credential_request: SerializedCredentialRequest<CS>,
+        ke1_message: Self::KE1Message,
+        credential_response: SerializedCredentialResponse<CS>,
+        client_s_pk: PublicKey<Self::Group>,
+        identifiers: SerializedIdentifiers<'a, KeGroup<CS>>,
+        context: SerializedContext<'a>,
+    ) -> Result<Self::KE2Builder<'a, CS>, ProtocolError> {
+        let server_e = KeyPair::<KE>::derive_random(rng);
+        let server_nonce = generate_nonce::<R>(rng);
+
+        let ke1_message_iter = ke1_message.to_iter();
+        let server_e_pk = server_e.public().serialize();
+
+        let transcript_hasher = transcript(
+            &context,
+            &identifiers,
+            &credential_request,
+            &ke1_message_iter,
+            &credential_response,
+            server_nonce,
+            &server_e_pk,
+        );
+
+        let shared_secret = server_e
+            .private()
+            .ke_diffie_hellman(&ke1_message.client_e_pk);
+
+        let derived_keys = derive_keys::<KEH>(
+            iter::once(shared_secret.as_slice()),
+            &transcript_hasher.finalize(),
+        )?;
+
+        let mut server_mac = SimpleHmac::<KEH>::new_from_slice(&derived_keys.km2)
+            .map_err(|_| InternalError::HmacError)?;
+        server_mac.update_iter(identifiers.server.iter());
+        let server_mac = server_mac.finalize().into_bytes();
+
+        let mut client_mac = SimpleHmac::<KEH>::new_from_slice(&derived_keys.km3)
+            .map_err(|_| InternalError::HmacError)?;
+        client_mac.update_iter(identifiers.client.iter());
+        let client_mac = client_mac.finalize().into_bytes();
+
+        let message = Message {
+            role: Role::Server,
+            context,
+            identifiers,
+            cache: CachedMessage {
+                credential_request,
+                ke1_message: ke1_message_iter,
+                credential_response,
+                server_nonce,
+                server_e_pk,
+                server_mac,
+            },
+        };
+
+        Ok(Ke2Builder {
+            transcript: message,
+            server_nonce,
+            client_s_pk,
+            server_e_pk: server_e.public().clone(),
+            expected_mac: client_mac,
+            session_key: derived_keys.session_key,
+            #[cfg(test)]
+            handshake_secret: derived_keys.handshake_secret,
+            #[cfg(test)]
+            km2: derived_keys.km2,
+        })
+    }
+
+    fn ke2_builder_data<'a, CS: 'static + CipherSuite<KeyExchange = Self>>(
+        builder: &'a Self::KE2Builder<'_, CS>,
+    ) -> Self::KE2BuilderData<'a, CS> {
+        &builder.transcript
+    }
+
+    fn generate_ke2_input<CS: CipherSuite<KeyExchange = Self>, R: CryptoRng + Rng>(
+        builder: &Self::KE2Builder<'_, CS>,
+        rng: &mut R,
+        server_s_sk: &PrivateKey<Self::Group>,
+    ) -> Self::KE2BuilderInput<CS> {
+        server_s_sk.sign::<_, CS, SIG, KE>(rng, &builder.transcript)
+    }
+
+    fn build_ke2<CS: CipherSuite<KeyExchange = Self>>(
+        builder: Self::KE2Builder<'_, CS>,
+        input: Self::KE2BuilderInput<CS>,
+    ) -> Result<GenerateKe2Result<CS>, ProtocolError> {
+        Ok(GenerateKe2Result {
+            state: Ke2State {
+                client_s_pk: builder.client_s_pk.clone(),
+                session_key: builder.session_key.clone(),
+                verify_state: input.1,
+                expected_mac: builder.expected_mac.clone(),
+            },
+            message: Ke2Message {
+                server_nonce: builder.server_nonce,
+                server_e_pk: builder.server_e_pk.clone(),
+                signature: input.0,
+                mac: builder.transcript.cache.server_mac.clone(),
+            },
+            #[cfg(test)]
+            handshake_secret: builder.handshake_secret.clone(),
+            #[cfg(test)]
+            km2: builder.km2.clone(),
+        })
+    }
+
+    fn generate_ke3<CS: CipherSuite<KeyExchange = Self>, R: CryptoRng + Rng>(
+        rng: &mut R,
+        credential_request: SerializedCredentialRequest<CS>,
+        ke1_message: Self::KE1Message,
+        credential_response: SerializedCredentialResponse<CS>,
+        ke1_state: &Self::KE1State,
+        ke2_message: Self::KE2Message,
+        server_s_pk: PublicKey<Self::Group>,
+        client_s_sk: PrivateKey<Self::Group>,
+        identifiers: SerializedIdentifiers<'_, KeGroup<CS>>,
+        context: SerializedContext<'_>,
+    ) -> Result<GenerateKe3Result<Self>, ProtocolError> {
+        let ke1_message_iter = ke1_message.to_iter();
+        let server_e_pk = ke2_message.server_e_pk.serialize();
+
+        let transcript_hasher = transcript(
+            &context,
+            &identifiers,
+            &credential_request,
+            &ke1_message_iter,
+            &credential_response,
+            ke2_message.server_nonce,
+            &server_e_pk,
+        );
+
+        let shared_secret = ke1_state
+            .client_e_sk
+            .ke_diffie_hellman(&ke2_message.server_e_pk);
+
+        let derived_keys = derive_keys::<KEH>(
+            iter::once(shared_secret.as_slice()),
+            &transcript_hasher.finalize(),
+        )?;
+
+        let mut server_mac = SimpleHmac::<KEH>::new_from_slice(&derived_keys.km2)
+            .map_err(|_| InternalError::HmacError)?;
+        server_mac.update_iter(identifiers.server.iter());
+        let server_mac = server_mac.finalize().into_bytes();
+
+        bool::from(server_mac.ct_eq(&ke2_message.mac))
+            .then_some(())
+            .ok_or(ProtocolError::InvalidLoginError)?;
+
+        let mut client_mac = SimpleHmac::<KEH>::new_from_slice(&derived_keys.km3)
+            .map_err(|_| InternalError::HmacError)?;
+        client_mac.update_iter(identifiers.client.iter());
+        let client_mac = client_mac.finalize().into_bytes();
+
+        let message = Message {
+            role: Role::Client,
+            context: context.clone(),
+            identifiers: identifiers.clone(),
+            cache: CachedMessage {
+                credential_request,
+                ke1_message: ke1_message_iter,
+                credential_response,
+                server_nonce: ke2_message.server_nonce,
+                server_e_pk,
+                server_mac,
+            },
+        };
+
+        let (signature, state) = client_s_sk.sign::<_, CS, SIG, KE>(rng, &message);
+
+        server_s_pk.verify::<CS, SIG, KE>(
+            MessageBuilder {
+                role: Role::Client,
+                context,
+                identifier: identifiers.server,
+            },
+            state,
+            &ke2_message.signature,
+        )?;
+
+        Ok(GenerateKe3Result {
+            session_key: derived_keys.session_key,
+            message: Ke3Message {
+                signature,
+                mac: client_mac,
+            },
+            #[cfg(test)]
+            handshake_secret: derived_keys.handshake_secret,
+            #[cfg(test)]
+            km3: derived_keys.km3,
+        })
+    }
+
+    fn finish_ke<CS: CipherSuite<KeyExchange = Self>>(
+        ke2_state: &Self::KE2State<CS>,
+        ke3_message: Self::KE3Message,
+        identifiers: Identifiers<'_>,
+        context: SerializedContext<'_>,
+    ) -> Result<Output<KEH>, ProtocolError> {
+        ke2_state.client_s_pk.verify::<CS, SIG, KE>(
+            MessageBuilder {
+                role: Role::Server,
+                context,
+                identifier: SerializedIdentifier::from_identifier(
+                    identifiers.client,
+                    ke2_state.client_s_pk.serialize(),
+                )?,
+            },
+            ke2_state.verify_state.clone(),
+            &ke3_message.signature,
+        )?;
+
+        CtOption::new(
+            ke2_state.session_key.clone(),
+            ke2_state.expected_mac.ct_eq(&ke3_message.mac),
+        )
+        .into_option()
+        .ok_or(ProtocolError::InvalidLoginError)
+    }
+}
+
+impl<CS: CipherSuite, SIG: SignatureProtocol, KE: Group> Deserialize for Ke2State<CS, SIG, KE>
+where
+    SIG::VerifyState<CS, KE>: Deserialize,
+    OutputSize<KeHash<CS>>: ArrayLength,
+{
+    fn deserialize_take(input: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
+        Ok(Self {
+            client_s_pk: PublicKey::deserialize_take(input)?,
+            session_key: input.take_array("session key")?.into_ha0_4(),
+            verify_state: SIG::VerifyState::<CS, KE>::deserialize_take(input)?,
+            expected_mac: input.take_array("expected mac")?.into_ha0_4(),
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+type Ke2StateLen<CS, SIG: SignatureProtocol, KE> = Sum<
+    Sum<Sum<<SIG::Group as Group>::PkLen, OutputSize<KeHash<CS>>>, VerifyStateLen<CS, SIG, KE>>,
+    OutputSize<KeHash<CS>>,
+>;
+
+type VerifyStateLen<CS, SIG: SignatureProtocol, KE> = <SIG::VerifyState<CS, KE> as Serialize>::Len;
+
+impl<CS: CipherSuite, SIG: SignatureProtocol, KE: Group> Serialize for Ke2State<CS, SIG, KE>
+where
+    SIG::VerifyState<CS, KE>: Serialize,
+    OutputSize<KeHash<CS>>: ArrayLength,
+    // Ke2State: ((SigPk + Hash) + VerifyState) + Hash
+    <SIG::Group as Group>::PkLen: Add<OutputSize<KeHash<CS>>>,
+    Sum<<SIG::Group as Group>::PkLen, OutputSize<KeHash<CS>>>:
+        ArrayLength + Add<VerifyStateLen<CS, SIG, KE>>,
+    Sum<Sum<<SIG::Group as Group>::PkLen, OutputSize<KeHash<CS>>>, VerifyStateLen<CS, SIG, KE>>:
+        ArrayLength + Add<OutputSize<KeHash<CS>>>,
+    Ke2StateLen<CS, SIG, KE>: ArrayLength,
+{
+    type Len = Ke2StateLen<CS, SIG, KE>;
+
+    fn serialize(&self) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::Len> {
+        self.client_s_pk
+            .serialize()
+            .cat(GenericArray::from_slice(self.session_key.as_slice()).clone())
+            .cat(self.verify_state.serialize())
+            .cat(GenericArray::from_slice(self.expected_mac.as_slice()).clone())
+    }
+}
+
+impl<SIG: SignatureProtocol, KE: Group, KEH: Hash> Deserialize for Ke2Message<SIG, KE, KEH>
+where
+    KEH::Core: ProxyHash,
+    <<KEH as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: IsLess<U256>,
+    Le<<<KEH as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize, U256>: NonZero,
+    OutputSize<KEH>: ArrayLength,
+{
+    fn deserialize_take(input: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
+        Ok(Self {
+            server_nonce: input.take_array("server nonce")?,
+            server_e_pk: PublicKey::deserialize_take(input)?,
+            signature: SIG::deserialize_take_signature(input)?,
+            mac: input.take_array("mac")?.into_ha0_4(),
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+impl<SIG: SignatureProtocol, KE: Group, KEH: Hash> Serialize for Ke2Message<SIG, KE, KEH>
+where
+    KEH::Core: ProxyHash,
+    <<KEH as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: IsLess<U256>,
+    Le<<<KEH as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize, U256>: NonZero,
+    OutputSize<KEH>: ArrayLength,
+    // Ke2Message: ((Nonce + KePk) + Signature) + Hash
+    NonceLen: Add<KE::PkLen>,
+    Sum<NonceLen, KE::PkLen>: ArrayLength + Add<SIG::SignatureLen>,
+    Sum<Sum<NonceLen, KE::PkLen>, SIG::SignatureLen>: ArrayLength + Add<OutputSize<KEH>>,
+    Sum<Sum<Sum<NonceLen, KE::PkLen>, SIG::SignatureLen>, OutputSize<KEH>>: ArrayLength,
+{
+    type Len = Sum<Sum<Sum<NonceLen, KE::PkLen>, SIG::SignatureLen>, OutputSize<KEH>>;
+
+    fn serialize(&self) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::Len> {
+        self.server_nonce
+            .cat(self.server_e_pk.serialize())
+            .cat(SIG::serialize_signature(&self.signature))
+            .cat(GenericArray::from_slice(self.mac.as_slice()).clone())
+    }
+}
+
+impl<SIG: SignatureProtocol, KEH: Hash> Deserialize for Ke3Message<SIG, KEH>
+where
+    KEH::Core: ProxyHash,
+    <<KEH as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: IsLess<U256>,
+    Le<<<KEH as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize, U256>: NonZero,
+    OutputSize<KEH>: ArrayLength,
+{
+    fn deserialize_take(input: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
+        Ok(Self {
+            signature: SIG::deserialize_take_signature(input)?,
+            mac: input.take_array("mac")?.into_ha0_4(),
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+impl<SIG: SignatureProtocol, KEH: Hash> Serialize for Ke3Message<SIG, KEH>
+where
+    KEH::Core: ProxyHash,
+    <<KEH as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: IsLess<U256>,
+    Le<<<KEH as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize, U256>: NonZero,
+    OutputSize<KEH>: ArrayLength,
+    // Ke2Message: Signature + Hash
+    SIG::SignatureLen: Add<OutputSize<KEH>>,
+    Sum<SIG::SignatureLen, OutputSize<KEH>>: ArrayLength,
+{
+    type Len = Sum<SIG::SignatureLen, OutputSize<KEH>>;
+
+    fn serialize(&self) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::Len> {
+        SIG::serialize_signature(&self.signature)
+            .cat(GenericArray::from_slice(self.mac.as_slice()).clone())
+    }
+}

src/key_exchange/sigma_i/pure_eddsa.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) VexaHub and contributors.
+// Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates.
+
+//! PureEdDSA implementation for [`SigmaI`](crate::SigmaI). Currently only
+//! supports [`Ed25519`](crate::Ed25519).
+
+use core::marker::PhantomData;
+
+use generic_array::GenericArray;
+use rand::{CryptoRng, Rng};
+use zeroize::Zeroize;
+
+use self::implementation::PureEddsaImpl;
+use super::{Message, MessageBuilder, SignatureProtocol};
+use crate::ciphersuite::CipherSuite;
+use crate::errors::ProtocolError;
+use crate::key_exchange::group::Group;
+use crate::key_exchange::sigma_i::CachedMessage;
+
+/// PureEdDSA for [`SigmaI`](crate::SigmaI).
+///
+/// The ["verification state"](Self::VerifyState) is a [`CachedMessage`],
+/// created by calling [`Message::to_cached()`].
+pub struct PureEddsa<G>(PhantomData<G>);
+
+impl<G: PureEddsaImpl> SignatureProtocol for PureEddsa<G> {
+    type Group = G;
+    type Signature = G::Signature;
+    type SignatureLen = G::SignatureLen;
+    type VerifyState<CS: CipherSuite, KE: Group> = CachedMessage<CS, KE>;
+
+    fn sign<'a, R: CryptoRng + Rng, CS: CipherSuite, KE: Group>(
+        sk: &G::Sk,
+        _: &mut R,
+        message: &Message<CS, KE>,
+    ) -> (Self::Signature, Self::VerifyState<CS, KE>) {
+        G::sign(sk, message)
+    }
+
+    fn verify<CS: CipherSuite, KE: Group>(
+        pk: &G::Pk,
+        message_builder: MessageBuilder<'_, CS>,
+        state: Self::VerifyState<CS, KE>,
+        signature: &Self::Signature,
+    ) -> Result<(), ProtocolError> {
+        G::verify(pk, message_builder, state, signature)
+    }
+
+    fn serialize_signature(signature: &Self::Signature) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::SignatureLen> {
+        G::serialize_signature(signature)
+    }
+
+    fn deserialize_take_signature(bytes: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signature, ProtocolError> {
+        G::deserialize_take_signature(bytes)
+    }
+}
+
+pub(in super::super) mod implementation {
+    use generic_array::ArrayLength;
+
+    use super::*;
+
+    pub trait PureEddsaImpl: Group {
+        type Signature: Clone + Zeroize;
+        type SignatureLen: ArrayLength;
+
+        fn sign<CS: CipherSuite, KE: Group>(
+            sk: &Self::Sk,
+            message: &Message<CS, KE>,
+        ) -> (Self::Signature, CachedMessage<CS, KE>);
+
+        fn verify<CS: CipherSuite, KE: Group>(
+            pk: &Self::Pk,
+            message_builder: MessageBuilder<'_, CS>,
+            state: CachedMessage<CS, KE>,
+            signature: &Self::Signature,
+        ) -> Result<(), ProtocolError>;
+
+        fn deserialize_take_signature(bytes: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signature, ProtocolError>;
+
+        fn serialize_signature(signature: &Self::Signature)
+        -> GenericArray<u8, Self::SignatureLen>;
+    }
+}

src/key_exchange/sigma_i/shared.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) VexaHub and contributors.
+// Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates.
+
+use derive_where::derive_where;
+use digest::{Output, OutputSizeUser};
+use generic_array::{ArrayLength, GenericArray};
+
+use crate::errors::ProtocolError;
+use crate::key_exchange::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use crate::serialization::SliceExt;
+
+/// Pre-hash of the message to be verified.
+#[derive_where(Clone, Debug, Eq, Hash, PartialEq, Zeroize)]
+#[cfg_attr(
+    feature = "serde",
+    derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize),
+    serde(bound = "")
+)]
+#[allow(dead_code)]
+pub struct PreHash<H: OutputSizeUser>(pub Output<H>);
+
+impl<H: OutputSizeUser> Deserialize for PreHash<H>
+where
+    H::OutputSize: ArrayLength,
+{
+    fn deserialize_take(input: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
+        Ok(Self(input.take_array("pre-hash")?.into_ha0_4()))
+    }
+}
+
+impl<H: OutputSizeUser> Serialize for PreHash<H>
+where
+    H::OutputSize: ArrayLength,
+{
+    type Len = H::OutputSize;
+
+    fn serialize(&self) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::Len> {
+        GenericArray::from_slice(self.0.as_slice()).clone()
+    }
+}

src/key_exchange/traits.rs

@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
-//
-// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
-// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
-
-use crate::{
-    errors::{PakeError, ProtocolError},
-    group::Group,
-    hash::Hash,
-    keypair::Key,
-};
-use rand_core::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
-
-use std::convert::TryFrom;
-
-pub trait KeyExchange<D: Hash, G: Group> {
-    type KE1State: for<'r> TryFrom<&'r [u8], Error = PakeError> + ToBytes;
-    type KE2State: for<'r> TryFrom<&'r [u8], Error = PakeError> + ToBytes;
-    type KE1Message: for<'r> TryFrom<&'r [u8], Error = PakeError> + ToBytes;
-    type KE2Message: for<'r> TryFrom<&'r [u8], Error = PakeError> + ToBytes;
-    type KE3Message: for<'r> TryFrom<&'r [u8], Error = PakeError> + ToBytes;
-
-    fn generate_ke1<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
-        info: Vec<u8>,
-        rng: &mut R,
-    ) -> Result<(Self::KE1State, Self::KE1Message), ProtocolError>;
-
-    #[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments, clippy::type_complexity)]
-    fn generate_ke2<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
-        rng: &mut R,
-        l1_bytes: Vec<u8>,
-        l2_bytes: Vec<u8>,
-        ke1_message: Self::KE1Message,
-        client_s_pk: Key,
-        server_s_sk: Key,
-        id_u: Vec<u8>,
-        id_s: Vec<u8>,
-        e_info: Vec<u8>,
-    ) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, Self::KE2State, Self::KE2Message), ProtocolError>;
-
-    #[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments, clippy::type_complexity)]
-    fn generate_ke3(
-        l2_component: Vec<u8>,
-        ke2_message: Self::KE2Message,
-        ke1_state: &Self::KE1State,
-        serialized_credential_request: &[u8],
-        server_s_pk: Key,
-        client_s_sk: Key,
-        id_u: Vec<u8>,
-        id_s: Vec<u8>,
-    ) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>, Self::KE3Message), ProtocolError>;
-
-    #[allow(clippy::type_complexity)]
-    fn finish_ke(
-        ke3_message: Self::KE3Message,
-        ke2_state: &Self::KE2State,
-    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, ProtocolError>;
-
-    fn ke2_message_size() -> usize;
-}
-
-pub trait ToBytes {
-    fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8>;
-}

src/key_exchange/tripledh.rs

@@ -1,554 +1,418 @@
-// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
-//
-// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
-// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) VexaHub and contributors.
+// Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates.
 
 //! An implementation of the Triple Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol
-use crate::{
-    errors::{
-        utils::{check_slice_size, check_slice_size_atleast},
-        InternalPakeError, PakeError, ProtocolError,
-    },
-    group::Group,
-    hash::Hash,
-    key_exchange::traits::{KeyExchange, ToBytes},
-    keypair::{Key, KeyPair, SizedBytesExt},
-    serialization::{serialize, tokenize},
+
+use core::marker::PhantomData;
+use core::ops::Add;
+
+use derive_where::derive_where;
+use digest::block_api::{CoreProxy, SmallBlockSizeUser};
+use digest::{Output, OutputSizeUser};
+use generic_array::typenum::{IsLess, Le, NonZero, Sum, U256};
+use generic_array::{ArrayLength, GenericArray};
+use rand::{CryptoRng, Rng};
+use subtle::{ConstantTimeEq, CtOption};
+
+use super::{
+    Deserialize, GenerateKe1Result, GenerateKe2Result, GenerateKe3Result, KeyExchange, Serialize,
+    SerializedContext, SerializedCredentialRequest, SerializedCredentialResponse,
+    SerializedIdentifiers,
 };
-use digest::{Digest, FixedOutput};
-use generic_array::{
-    typenum::{Unsigned, U32},
-    ArrayLength, GenericArray,
-};
-use generic_bytes::SizedBytes;
-use hkdf::Hkdf;
-use hmac::{Hmac, Mac, NewMac};
-use rand_core::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
+use crate::ciphersuite::{CipherSuite, KeGroup};
+use crate::errors::ProtocolError;
+use crate::hash::{Hash, OutputSize, ProxyHash};
+use crate::key_exchange::group::Group;
+use crate::key_exchange::shared::{self, NonceLen};
+pub use crate::key_exchange::shared::{DiffieHellman, Ke1Message, Ke1State};
+use crate::keypair::{PrivateKey, PublicKey};
+use crate::opaque::Identifiers;
+use crate::serialization::{ConcatExt, SliceExt};
 
-use std::convert::TryFrom;
-
-const KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
-pub(crate) type NonceLen = U32;
-
-static STR_3DH: &[u8] = b"3DH keys";
-static STR_CLIENT_MAC: &[u8] = b"client mac";
-static STR_HANDSHAKE_SECRET: &[u8] = b"handshake secret";
-static STR_SERVER_MAC: &[u8] = b"server mac";
-static STR_SERVER_ENC: &[u8] = b"handshake enc";
-static STR_ENCRYPTION_PAD: &[u8] = b"encryption pad";
-static STR_SESSION_KEY: &[u8] = b"session secret";
-static STR_OPAQUE: &[u8] = b"OPAQUE ";
+////////////////////////////
+// High-level API Structs //
+// ====================== //
+////////////////////////////
 
 /// The Triple Diffie-Hellman key exchange implementation
-pub struct TripleDH;
+///
+/// # Remote Key
+///
+/// [`ServerLoginBuilder::data()`](crate::ServerLoginBuilder::data()) will
+/// return the client's ephemeral public key.
+///
+/// [`ServerLoginBuilder::build()`](crate::ServerLoginBuilder::build()) expects
+/// a shared secret computed through Diffie-Hellman from the servers private key
+/// and the given public key.
+pub struct TripleDh<G, H>(PhantomData<(G, H)>);
 
-impl<D: Hash, G: Group> KeyExchange<D, G> for TripleDH {
-    type KE1State = KE1State;
-    type KE2State = KE2State<<D as FixedOutput>::OutputSize>;
-    type KE1Message = KE1Message;
-    type KE2Message = KE2Message<<D as FixedOutput>::OutputSize>;
-    type KE3Message = KE3Message<<D as FixedOutput>::OutputSize>;
-
-    fn generate_ke1<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
-        info: Vec<u8>,
-        rng: &mut R,
-    ) -> Result<(Self::KE1State, Self::KE1Message), ProtocolError> {
-        let client_e_kp = KeyPair::<G>::generate_random(rng);
-        let client_nonce: GenericArray<u8, NonceLen> = {
-            let mut client_nonce_bytes = vec![0u8; NonceLen::to_usize()];
-            rng.fill_bytes(&mut client_nonce_bytes);
-            GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&client_nonce_bytes)
-        };
-
-        let ke1_message = KE1Message {
-            client_nonce,
-            info,
-            client_e_pk: client_e_kp.public().clone(),
-        };
-
-        Ok((
-            KE1State {
-                client_e_sk: client_e_kp.private().clone(),
-                client_nonce,
-            },
-            ke1_message,
-        ))
-    }
-
-    #[allow(clippy::type_complexity)]
-    fn generate_ke2<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
-        rng: &mut R,
-        serialized_credential_request: Vec<u8>,
-        l2_bytes: Vec<u8>,
-        ke1_message: Self::KE1Message,
-        client_s_pk: Key,
-        server_s_sk: Key,
-        id_u: Vec<u8>,
-        id_s: Vec<u8>,
-        e_info: Vec<u8>,
-    ) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, Self::KE2State, Self::KE2Message), ProtocolError> {
-        let server_e_kp = KeyPair::<G>::generate_random(rng);
-        let server_nonce: GenericArray<u8, NonceLen> = {
-            let mut server_nonce_bytes = vec![0u8; NonceLen::to_usize()];
-            rng.fill_bytes(&mut server_nonce_bytes);
-            GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&server_nonce_bytes)
-        };
-
-        let (session_key, km2, ke2, km3) = derive_3dh_keys::<D, G>(
-            TripleDHComponents {
-                pk1: ke1_message.client_e_pk.clone(),
-                sk1: server_e_kp.private().clone(),
-                pk2: ke1_message.client_e_pk,
-                sk2: server_s_sk,
-                pk3: client_s_pk,
-                sk3: server_e_kp.private().clone(),
-            },
-            &ke1_message.client_nonce,
-            &server_nonce,
-            &id_u,
-            &id_s,
-        )?;
-
-        // Compute encryption of e_info
-        let h = Hkdf::<D>::from_prk(&ke2).map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HkdfError)?;
-        let mut encryption_pad = vec![0u8; e_info.len()];
-        h.expand(STR_ENCRYPTION_PAD, &mut encryption_pad)
-            .map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HkdfError)?;
-        let ciphertext: Vec<u8> = encryption_pad
-            .iter()
-            .zip(e_info.iter())
-            .map(|(&x1, &x2)| x1 ^ x2)
-            .collect();
-
-        let transcript2: Vec<u8> = [
-            &serialized_credential_request[..],
-            &l2_bytes[..],
-            &server_nonce[..],
-            &server_e_kp.public().to_arr(),
-            &serialize(&ciphertext, 2),
-        ]
-        .concat();
-
-        let mut hasher = D::new();
-        hasher.update(&transcript2);
-        let hashed_transcript_without_mac = hasher.finalize_reset();
-
-        let mut mac_hasher =
-            Hmac::<D>::new_varkey(&km2).map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HmacError)?;
-        mac_hasher.update(&hashed_transcript_without_mac);
-        let mac = mac_hasher.finalize().into_bytes();
-
-        hasher.update(&transcript2);
-        hasher.update(&mac);
-        let hashed_transcript = hasher.finalize();
-
-        Ok((
-            ke1_message.info,
-            KE2State {
-                km3,
-                hashed_transcript,
-                session_key,
-            },
-            KE2Message {
-                server_nonce,
-                server_e_pk: server_e_kp.public().clone(),
-                e_info: ciphertext,
-                mac,
-            },
-        ))
-    }
-
-    #[allow(clippy::type_complexity)]
-    fn generate_ke3(
-        l2_component: Vec<u8>,
-        ke2_message: Self::KE2Message,
-        ke1_state: &Self::KE1State,
-        serialized_credential_request: &[u8],
-        server_s_pk: Key,
-        client_s_sk: Key,
-        id_u: Vec<u8>,
-        id_s: Vec<u8>,
-    ) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>, Self::KE3Message), ProtocolError> {
-        let (session_key, km2, ke2, km3) = derive_3dh_keys::<D, G>(
-            TripleDHComponents {
-                pk1: ke2_message.server_e_pk.clone(),
-                sk1: ke1_state.client_e_sk.clone(),
-                pk2: server_s_pk,
-                sk2: ke1_state.client_e_sk.clone(),
-                pk3: ke2_message.server_e_pk.clone(),
-                sk3: client_s_sk,
-            },
-            &ke1_state.client_nonce,
-            &ke2_message.server_nonce,
-            &id_u,
-            &id_s,
-        )?;
-
-        let transcript: Vec<u8> = [
-            &serialized_credential_request,
-            &l2_component[..],
-            &ke2_message.to_bytes_without_mac(),
-        ]
-        .concat();
-
-        let mut hasher = D::new();
-        hasher.update(&transcript);
-        let hashed_transcript_without_mac = hasher.finalize_reset();
-
-        let mut server_mac =
-            Hmac::<D>::new_varkey(&km2).map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HmacError)?;
-        server_mac.update(&hashed_transcript_without_mac);
-
-        if ke2_message.mac != server_mac.finalize().into_bytes() {
-            return Err(ProtocolError::VerificationError(
-                PakeError::KeyExchangeMacValidationError,
-            ));
-        }
-
-        hasher.update(transcript);
-        hasher.update(ke2_message.mac.to_vec());
-        let hashed_transcript = hasher.finalize();
-
-        let mut client_mac =
-            Hmac::<D>::new_varkey(&km3).map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HmacError)?;
-        client_mac.update(&hashed_transcript);
-
-        // Compute decryption of e_info
-        let h = Hkdf::<D>::from_prk(&ke2).map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HkdfError)?;
-        let mut encryption_pad = vec![0u8; ke2_message.e_info.len()];
-        h.expand(STR_ENCRYPTION_PAD, &mut encryption_pad)
-            .map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HkdfError)?;
-        let plaintext: Vec<u8> = encryption_pad
-            .iter()
-            .zip(ke2_message.e_info.iter())
-            .map(|(&x1, &x2)| x1 ^ x2)
-            .collect();
-
-        Ok((
-            plaintext,
-            session_key.to_vec(),
-            KE3Message {
-                mac: client_mac.finalize().into_bytes(),
-            },
-        ))
-    }
-
-    #[allow(clippy::type_complexity)]
-    fn finish_ke(
-        ke3_message: Self::KE3Message,
-        ke2_state: &Self::KE2State,
-    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, ProtocolError> {
-        let mut client_mac =
-            Hmac::<D>::new_varkey(&ke2_state.km3).map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HmacError)?;
-        client_mac.update(&ke2_state.hashed_transcript);
-
-        if ke3_message.mac != client_mac.finalize().into_bytes() {
-            return Err(ProtocolError::VerificationError(
-                PakeError::KeyExchangeMacValidationError,
-            ));
-        }
-
-        Ok(ke2_state.session_key.to_vec())
-    }
-
-    fn ke2_message_size() -> usize {
-        NonceLen::to_usize() + KEY_LEN + <<D as FixedOutput>::OutputSize as Unsigned>::to_usize()
-    }
-}
-
-/// The client state produced after the first key exchange message
-#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
-pub struct KE1State {
-    client_e_sk: Key,
-    client_nonce: GenericArray<u8, NonceLen>,
-}
-
-/// The first key exchange message
-#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
-pub struct KE1Message {
-    pub(crate) client_nonce: GenericArray<u8, NonceLen>,
-    pub(crate) info: Vec<u8>,
-    pub(crate) client_e_pk: Key,
-}
-
-impl TryFrom<&[u8]> for KE1State {
-    type Error = PakeError;
-
-    fn try_from(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
-        let nonce_len = NonceLen::to_usize();
-        let checked_bytes = check_slice_size_atleast(bytes, KEY_LEN + nonce_len, "ke1_state")?;
-
-        Ok(Self {
-            client_e_sk: Key::from_bytes(&checked_bytes[..KEY_LEN])?,
-            client_nonce: GenericArray::clone_from_slice(
-                &checked_bytes[KEY_LEN..KEY_LEN + nonce_len],
-            ),
-        })
-    }
-}
-
-impl ToBytes for KE1State {
-    fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        let output: Vec<u8> = [&self.client_e_sk.to_arr(), &self.client_nonce[..]].concat();
-        output
-    }
-}
-
-impl ToBytes for KE1Message {
-    fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        [
-            &self.client_nonce[..],
-            &serialize(&self.info, 2),
-            &self.client_e_pk.to_arr(),
-        ]
-        .concat()
-    }
-}
-
-impl TryFrom<&[u8]> for KE1Message {
-    type Error = PakeError;
-
-    fn try_from(ke1_message_bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
-        let nonce_len = NonceLen::to_usize();
-        let checked_nonce =
-            check_slice_size_atleast(ke1_message_bytes, nonce_len, "ke1_message nonce")?;
-
-        let (info, remainder) = tokenize(&checked_nonce[nonce_len..], 2)?;
-
-        let checked_client_e_pk = check_slice_size(&remainder, KEY_LEN, "ke1_message client_e_pk")?;
-
-        Ok(Self {
-            client_nonce: GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&checked_nonce[..nonce_len]),
-            info,
-            client_e_pk: Key::from_bytes(&checked_client_e_pk)?,
-        })
-    }
-}
 /// The server state produced after the second key exchange message
-pub struct KE2State<HashLen: ArrayLength<u8>> {
-    km3: GenericArray<u8, HashLen>,
-    hashed_transcript: GenericArray<u8, HashLen>,
-    session_key: GenericArray<u8, HashLen>,
+#[cfg_attr(
+    feature = "serde",
+    derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize),
+    serde(bound = "")
+)]
+#[derive_where(Clone, Debug, Eq, Hash, Ord, PartialEq, PartialOrd, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
+pub struct Ke2State<H: OutputSizeUser> {
+    pub(super) session_key: Output<H>,
+    pub(super) expected_mac: Output<H>,
+}
+
+/// Builder for the second key exchange message
+#[cfg_attr(
+    feature = "serde",
+    derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize),
+    serde(bound(
+        deserialize = "H: serde::Deserialize<'de>,  PublicKey<G>: serde::Deserialize<'de>",
+        serialize = "H: serde::Serialize, PublicKey<G>: serde::Serialize",
+    ))
+)]
+#[derive_where(Clone, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
+#[derive_where(Debug, Eq, Hash, PartialEq; H, PublicKey<G>)]
+pub struct Ke2Builder<G: Group, H: Hash>
+where
+    H::Core: ProxyHash,
+    <<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: IsLess<U256>,
+    Le<<<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize, U256>: NonZero,
+    OutputSize<H>: ArrayLength,
+{
+    server_nonce: GenericArray<u8, NonceLen>,
+    transcript_hasher: H,
+    #[derive_where(skip(Zeroize))]
+    client_e_pk: PublicKey<G>,
+    #[derive_where(skip(Zeroize))]
+    server_e_pk: PublicKey<G>,
+    shared_secret_1: GenericArray<u8, G::PkLen>,
+    shared_secret_3: GenericArray<u8, G::PkLen>,
 }
 
 /// The second key exchange message
-pub struct KE2Message<HashLen: ArrayLength<u8>> {
-    server_nonce: GenericArray<u8, NonceLen>,
-    server_e_pk: Key,
-    e_info: Vec<u8>,
-    mac: GenericArray<u8, HashLen>,
+#[cfg_attr(
+    feature = "serde",
+    derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize),
+    serde(bound(
+        deserialize = "G::Pk: serde::Deserialize<'de>",
+        serialize = "G::Pk: serde::Serialize"
+    ))
+)]
+#[derive_where(Clone, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
+#[derive_where(Debug, Eq, Hash, Ord, PartialEq, PartialOrd; G::Pk)]
+pub struct Ke2Message<G: Group, H: Hash>
+where
+    H::Core: ProxyHash,
+    <<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: IsLess<U256>,
+    Le<<<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize, U256>: NonZero,
+    OutputSize<H>: ArrayLength,
+{
+    pub(super) server_nonce: GenericArray<u8, NonceLen>,
+    #[derive_where(skip(Zeroize))]
+    pub(super) server_e_pk: PublicKey<G>,
+    pub(super) mac: Output<H>,
 }
 
-impl<HashLen: ArrayLength<u8>> ToBytes for KE2State<HashLen> {
-    fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        [
-            &self.km3[..],
-            &self.hashed_transcript[..],
-            &self.session_key[..],
-        ]
-        .concat()
-    }
-}
-
-impl<HashLen: ArrayLength<u8>> TryFrom<&[u8]> for KE2State<HashLen> {
-    type Error = PakeError;
-
-    fn try_from(input: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
-        let hash_len = HashLen::to_usize();
-        let checked_bytes = check_slice_size(input, 3 * hash_len, "ke2_state")?;
-
-        Ok(Self {
-            km3: GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&checked_bytes[..hash_len]),
-            hashed_transcript: GenericArray::clone_from_slice(
-                &checked_bytes[hash_len..2 * hash_len],
-            ),
-            session_key: GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&checked_bytes[2 * hash_len..3 * hash_len]),
-        })
-    }
-}
-
-impl<HashLen: ArrayLength<u8>> ToBytes for KE2Message<HashLen> {
-    fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        [&self.to_bytes_without_mac(), &self.mac[..]].concat()
-    }
-}
-
-impl<HashLen: ArrayLength<u8>> KE2Message<HashLen> {
-    fn to_bytes_without_mac(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        [
-            &self.server_nonce[..],
-            &self.server_e_pk.to_arr(),
-            &serialize(&self.e_info, 2),
-        ]
-        .concat()
-    }
-}
-
-impl<HashLen: ArrayLength<u8>> TryFrom<&[u8]> for KE2Message<HashLen> {
-    type Error = PakeError;
-
-    fn try_from(input: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
-        let nonce_len = NonceLen::to_usize();
-        let checked_nonce = check_slice_size_atleast(input, nonce_len, "ke2_message nonce")?;
-        let checked_server_e_pk = check_slice_size_atleast(
-            &checked_nonce[nonce_len..],
-            KEY_LEN,
-            "ke2_message server_e_pk",
-        )?;
-        let (e_info, remainder) = tokenize(&checked_server_e_pk[KEY_LEN..], 2)?;
-        let checked_mac = check_slice_size(&remainder, HashLen::to_usize(), "ke1_message mac")?;
-
-        Ok(Self {
-            server_nonce: GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&checked_nonce[..nonce_len]),
-            server_e_pk: Key::from_bytes(&checked_server_e_pk[..KEY_LEN])?,
-            e_info,
-            mac: GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&checked_mac),
-        })
-    }
-}
-
-// The triple of public and private components used in the 3DH computation
-struct TripleDHComponents {
-    pk1: Key,
-    sk1: Key,
-    pk2: Key,
-    sk2: Key,
-    pk3: Key,
-    sk3: Key,
-}
-
-// Consists of a session key, followed by two mac keys and an encryption key: (session_key, km2, ke2, km3)
-type TripleDHDerivationResult<D> = (
-    GenericArray<u8, <D as FixedOutput>::OutputSize>,
-    GenericArray<u8, <D as FixedOutput>::OutputSize>,
-    GenericArray<u8, <D as FixedOutput>::OutputSize>,
-    GenericArray<u8, <D as FixedOutput>::OutputSize>,
-);
-
 /// The third key exchange message
-pub struct KE3Message<HashLen: ArrayLength<u8>> {
-    mac: GenericArray<u8, HashLen>,
+#[cfg_attr(
+    feature = "serde",
+    derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize),
+    serde(bound = "")
+)]
+#[derive_where(Clone, Debug, Eq, Hash, Ord, PartialEq, PartialOrd, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
+pub struct Ke3Message<H: Hash>
+where
+    H::Core: ProxyHash,
+    <<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: IsLess<U256>,
+    Le<<<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize, U256>: NonZero,
+    OutputSize<H>: ArrayLength,
+{
+    pub(super) mac: Output<H>,
 }
 
-impl<HashLen: ArrayLength<u8>> ToBytes for KE3Message<HashLen> {
-    fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        self.mac.to_vec()
+////////////////////////////////
+// High-level Implementations //
+// ========================== //
+////////////////////////////////
+
+impl<G: Group + 'static, H: Hash> KeyExchange for TripleDh<G, H>
+where
+    G::Sk: DiffieHellman<G>,
+    H::Core: ProxyHash,
+    <<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: IsLess<U256>,
+    Le<<<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize, U256>: NonZero,
+    OutputSize<H>: ArrayLength,
+{
+    type Group = G;
+    type Hash = H;
+
+    type KE1State = Ke1State<G>;
+    type KE2State<CS: CipherSuite> = Ke2State<H>;
+    type KE1Message = Ke1Message<G>;
+    type KE2Builder<'a, CS: CipherSuite<KeyExchange = Self>> = Ke2Builder<G, H>;
+    type KE2BuilderData<'a, CS: 'static + CipherSuite> = &'a PublicKey<G>;
+    type KE2BuilderInput<CS: CipherSuite> = GenericArray<u8, G::PkLen>;
+    type KE2Message = Ke2Message<G, H>;
+    type KE3Message = Ke3Message<H>;
+
+    fn generate_ke1<R: Rng + CryptoRng>(
+        rng: &mut R,
+    ) -> Result<GenerateKe1Result<Self>, ProtocolError> {
+        shared::generate_ke1(rng)
+    }
+
+    fn ke2_builder<'a, CS: CipherSuite<KeyExchange = Self>, R: Rng + CryptoRng>(
+        rng: &mut R,
+        credential_request: SerializedCredentialRequest<CS>,
+        ke1_message: Self::KE1Message,
+        credential_response: SerializedCredentialResponse<CS>,
+        client_s_pk: PublicKey<G>,
+        identifiers: SerializedIdentifiers<'_, KeGroup<CS>>,
+        context: SerializedContext<'a>,
+    ) -> Result<Self::KE2Builder<'a, CS>, ProtocolError> {
+        let shared::Ke2BuilderCommon {
+            server_nonce,
+            transcript_hasher,
+            client_e_pk,
+            server_e_pk,
+            shared_secret_1,
+            shared_secret_3,
+        } = shared::ke2_builder_common::<G, H, CS, R>(
+            rng,
+            credential_request,
+            ke1_message,
+            credential_response,
+            client_s_pk,
+            identifiers,
+            context,
+        )?;
+
+        Ok(Ke2Builder {
+            server_nonce,
+            transcript_hasher,
+            client_e_pk,
+            server_e_pk,
+            shared_secret_1,
+            shared_secret_3,
+        })
+    }
+
+    fn ke2_builder_data<'a, CS: 'static + CipherSuite<KeyExchange = Self>>(
+        builder: &'a Self::KE2Builder<'_, CS>,
+    ) -> Self::KE2BuilderData<'a, CS> {
+        &builder.client_e_pk
+    }
+
+    fn generate_ke2_input<CS: CipherSuite<KeyExchange = Self>, R: CryptoRng + Rng>(
+        builder: &Self::KE2Builder<'_, CS>,
+        _: &mut R,
+        server_s_sk: &PrivateKey<G>,
+    ) -> Self::KE2BuilderInput<CS> {
+        server_s_sk.ke_diffie_hellman(&builder.client_e_pk)
+    }
+
+    fn build_ke2<CS: CipherSuite<KeyExchange = Self>>(
+        mut builder: Self::KE2Builder<'_, CS>,
+        shared_secret_2: Self::KE2BuilderInput<CS>,
+    ) -> Result<GenerateKe2Result<CS>, ProtocolError> {
+        let transcript_digest = builder.transcript_hasher.clone().finalize();
+        let derived_keys = shared::derive_keys::<H>(
+            [
+                builder.shared_secret_1.as_slice(),
+                &shared_secret_2,
+                &builder.shared_secret_3,
+            ]
+            .into_iter(),
+            &transcript_digest,
+        )?;
+
+        let (mac, expected_mac) = shared::compute_ke2_macs(
+            &mut builder.transcript_hasher,
+            &derived_keys,
+            &transcript_digest,
+        )?;
+
+        Ok(GenerateKe2Result {
+            state: Ke2State {
+                session_key: derived_keys.session_key,
+                expected_mac,
+            },
+            message: Ke2Message {
+                server_nonce: builder.server_nonce,
+                server_e_pk: builder.server_e_pk.clone(),
+                mac,
+            },
+            #[cfg(test)]
+            handshake_secret: derived_keys.handshake_secret,
+            #[cfg(test)]
+            km2: derived_keys.km2,
+        })
+    }
+
+    fn generate_ke3<CS: CipherSuite<KeyExchange = Self>, R: CryptoRng + Rng>(
+        _: &mut R,
+        credential_request: SerializedCredentialRequest<CS>,
+        ke1_message: Self::KE1Message,
+        credential_response: SerializedCredentialResponse<CS>,
+        ke1_state: &Self::KE1State,
+        ke2_message: Self::KE2Message,
+        server_s_pk: PublicKey<G>,
+        client_s_sk: PrivateKey<G>,
+        identifiers: SerializedIdentifiers<'_, KeGroup<CS>>,
+        context: SerializedContext<'_>,
+    ) -> Result<GenerateKe3Result<Self>, ProtocolError> {
+        let mut transcript_hasher = shared::transcript(
+            &context,
+            &identifiers,
+            &credential_request,
+            &ke1_message.to_iter(),
+            &credential_response,
+            ke2_message.server_nonce,
+            &ke2_message.server_e_pk.serialize(),
+        );
+
+        let shared_secret_1 = ke1_state
+            .client_e_sk
+            .ke_diffie_hellman(&ke2_message.server_e_pk);
+        let shared_secret_2 = ke1_state.client_e_sk.ke_diffie_hellman(&server_s_pk);
+        let shared_secret_3 = client_s_sk.ke_diffie_hellman(&ke2_message.server_e_pk);
+
+        let (derived_keys, client_mac) = shared::finalize_ke3_transcript(
+            &mut transcript_hasher,
+            [
+                shared_secret_1.as_slice(),
+                shared_secret_2.as_slice(),
+                shared_secret_3.as_slice(),
+            ]
+            .into_iter(),
+            &ke2_message.mac,
+        )?;
+
+        Ok(GenerateKe3Result {
+            session_key: derived_keys.session_key,
+            message: Ke3Message { mac: client_mac },
+            #[cfg(test)]
+            handshake_secret: derived_keys.handshake_secret,
+            #[cfg(test)]
+            km3: derived_keys.km3,
+        })
+    }
+
+    fn finish_ke<CS: CipherSuite>(
+        ke2_state: &Self::KE2State<CS>,
+        ke3_message: Self::KE3Message,
+        _: Identifiers<'_>,
+        _: SerializedContext<'_>,
+    ) -> Result<Output<H>, ProtocolError> {
+        CtOption::new(
+            ke2_state.session_key.clone(),
+            ke2_state.expected_mac.ct_eq(&ke3_message.mac),
+        )
+        .into_option()
+        .ok_or(ProtocolError::InvalidLoginError)
     }
 }
 
-impl<HashLen: ArrayLength<u8>> TryFrom<&[u8]> for KE3Message<HashLen> {
-    type Error = PakeError;
-
-    fn try_from(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
-        let checked_bytes = check_slice_size(&bytes, HashLen::to_usize(), "ke3_message")?;
+////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// Trait Implementations //
+// ========================================== //
+////////////////////////////////////////////////
 
+impl<H: Hash> Deserialize for Ke2State<H>
+where
+    H::Core: ProxyHash,
+    <<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: IsLess<U256>,
+    Le<<<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize, U256>: NonZero,
+    OutputSize<H>: ArrayLength,
+{
+    fn deserialize_take(input: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
         Ok(Self {
-            mac: GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&checked_bytes),
+            session_key: input.take_array("session key")?.into_ha0_4(),
+            expected_mac: input.take_array("expected mac")?.into_ha0_4(),
         })
     }
 }
 
-// Helper functions
+impl<H: Hash> Serialize for Ke2State<H>
+where
+    H::Core: ProxyHash,
+    <<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: IsLess<U256>,
+    Le<<<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize, U256>: NonZero,
+    OutputSize<H>: ArrayLength,
+    // Ke2State: Hash + Hash
+    OutputSize<H>: Add<OutputSize<H>>,
+    Sum<OutputSize<H>, OutputSize<H>>: ArrayLength,
+{
+    type Len = Sum<OutputSize<H>, OutputSize<H>>;
 
-// Internal function which takes the public and private components of the client and server keypairs, along
-// with some auxiliary metadata, to produce the session key and two MAC keys
-fn derive_3dh_keys<D: Hash, G: Group>(
-    dh: TripleDHComponents,
-    client_nonce: &GenericArray<u8, NonceLen>,
-    server_nonce: &GenericArray<u8, NonceLen>,
-    id_u: &[u8],
-    id_s: &[u8],
-) -> Result<TripleDHDerivationResult<D>, ProtocolError> {
-    let ikm: Vec<u8> = [
-        &KeyPair::<G>::diffie_hellman(dh.pk1, dh.sk1)?[..],
-        &KeyPair::<G>::diffie_hellman(dh.pk2, dh.sk2)?[..],
-        &KeyPair::<G>::diffie_hellman(dh.pk3, dh.sk3)?[..],
-    ]
-    .concat();
+    fn serialize(&self) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::Len> {
+        let sk: GenericArray<u8, OutputSize<H>> =
+            GenericArray::from_slice(self.session_key.as_slice()).clone();
+        let mac: GenericArray<u8, OutputSize<H>> =
+            GenericArray::from_slice(self.expected_mac.as_slice()).clone();
 
-    let info: Vec<u8> = [
-        STR_3DH,
-        &serialize(&client_nonce, 2),
-        &serialize(&server_nonce, 2),
-        &serialize(id_u, 2),
-        &serialize(id_s, 2),
-    ]
-    .concat();
-
-    let extracted_ikm = Hkdf::<D>::new(None, &ikm);
-    let handshake_secret = derive_secrets::<D>(&extracted_ikm, &STR_HANDSHAKE_SECRET, &info)?;
-    let session_key = derive_secrets::<D>(&extracted_ikm, &STR_SESSION_KEY, &info)?;
-
-    let km2 = hkdf_expand_label::<D>(
-        &handshake_secret,
-        &STR_SERVER_MAC,
-        b"",
-        <D as Digest>::OutputSize::to_usize(),
-    )?;
-    let ke2 = hkdf_expand_label::<D>(
-        &handshake_secret,
-        &STR_SERVER_ENC,
-        b"",
-        <D as Digest>::OutputSize::to_usize(),
-    )?;
-    let km3 = hkdf_expand_label::<D>(
-        &handshake_secret,
-        &STR_CLIENT_MAC,
-        b"",
-        <D as Digest>::OutputSize::to_usize(),
-    )?;
-
-    Ok((
-        GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&session_key),
-        GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&km2),
-        GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&ke2),
-        GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&km3),
-    ))
+        sk.cat(mac)
+    }
 }
 
-fn hkdf_expand_label<D: Hash>(
-    secret: &[u8],
-    label: &[u8],
-    context: &[u8],
-    length: usize,
-) -> Result<Vec<u8>, ProtocolError> {
-    let h = Hkdf::<D>::from_prk(secret).map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HkdfError)?;
-    hkdf_expand_label_extracted(&h, label, context, length)
+impl<G: Group, H: Hash> Deserialize for Ke2Message<G, H>
+where
+    H::Core: ProxyHash,
+    <<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: IsLess<U256>,
+    Le<<<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize, U256>: NonZero,
+    OutputSize<H>: ArrayLength,
+{
+    fn deserialize_take(input: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
+        Ok(Self {
+            server_nonce: input.take_array("server nonce")?,
+            server_e_pk: PublicKey::deserialize_take(input)?,
+            mac: input.take_array("mac")?.into_ha0_4(),
+        })
+    }
 }
 
-fn hkdf_expand_label_extracted<D: Hash>(
-    hkdf: &Hkdf<D>,
-    label: &[u8],
-    context: &[u8],
-    length: usize,
-) -> Result<Vec<u8>, ProtocolError> {
-    let mut okm = vec![0u8; length];
+impl<H: Hash, G: Group> Serialize for Ke2Message<G, H>
+where
+    H::Core: ProxyHash,
+    <<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: IsLess<U256>,
+    Le<<<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize, U256>: NonZero,
+    OutputSize<H>: ArrayLength,
+    // Ke2Message: (Nonce + KePk) + Hash
+    NonceLen: Add<G::PkLen>,
+    Sum<NonceLen, G::PkLen>: ArrayLength + Add<OutputSize<H>>,
+    Sum<Sum<NonceLen, G::PkLen>, OutputSize<H>>: ArrayLength,
+{
+    type Len = Sum<Sum<NonceLen, G::PkLen>, OutputSize<H>>;
 
-    let mut hkdf_label: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
-    hkdf_label.extend_from_slice(&length.to_be_bytes()[std::mem::size_of::<usize>() - 2..]);
-
-    let mut opaque_label: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
-    opaque_label.extend_from_slice(&STR_OPAQUE);
-    opaque_label.extend_from_slice(&label);
-    hkdf_label.extend_from_slice(&serialize(&opaque_label, 1));
-
-    hkdf_label.extend_from_slice(&serialize(&context, 1));
-
-    hkdf.expand(&hkdf_label, &mut okm)
-        .map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HkdfError)?;
-    Ok(okm)
+    fn serialize(&self) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::Len> {
+        self.server_nonce
+            .cat(self.server_e_pk.serialize())
+            .cat(GenericArray::from_slice(self.mac.as_slice()).clone())
+    }
 }
 
-fn derive_secrets<D: Hash>(
-    hkdf: &Hkdf<D>,
-    label: &[u8],
-    transcript: &[u8],
-) -> Result<Vec<u8>, ProtocolError> {
-    let hashed_transcript = D::digest(transcript);
-    hkdf_expand_label_extracted::<D>(
-        hkdf,
-        label,
-        &hashed_transcript,
-        <D as Digest>::OutputSize::to_usize(),
-    )
+impl<H: Hash> Deserialize for Ke3Message<H>
+where
+    H::Core: ProxyHash,
+    <<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: IsLess<U256>,
+    Le<<<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize, U256>: NonZero,
+    OutputSize<H>: ArrayLength,
+{
+    fn deserialize_take(bytes: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
+        Ok(Self {
+            mac: bytes.take_array("mac")?.into_ha0_4(),
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+impl<H: Hash> Serialize for Ke3Message<H>
+where
+    H::Core: ProxyHash,
+    <<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: IsLess<U256>,
+    Le<<<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize, U256>: NonZero,
+    OutputSize<H>: ArrayLength,
+{
+    type Len = OutputSize<H>;
+
+    fn serialize(&self) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::Len> {
+        GenericArray::from_slice(self.mac.as_slice()).clone()
+    }
 }

src/key_exchange/tripledh_kem.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,706 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) VexaHub and contributors.
+// Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates.
+
+//! TripleDH-KEM is a variant of the OPAQUE Triple Diffie-Hellman handshake in
+//! which the client supplies a KEM public key in KE1 and the server performs a
+//! KEM encapsulation in KE2 instead of relying solely on the final Diffie-
+//! Hellman hop. The server bundles the KEM ciphertext alongside the classic
+//! `TripleDH` payload, both parties absorb the ciphertext into the transcript
+//! and mix the encapsulated shared secret with the three Diffie-Hellman
+//! products when deriving handshake keys, and the client decapsulates during
+//! KE3 to recover that shared secret before validating the server MAC. This
+//! file contains the data model and trait glue that layer
+//! the generic `ml-kem` abstractions into the existing OPAQUE key-exchange
+//! pipeline.
+
+use core::fmt::Debug;
+use core::marker::PhantomData;
+use core::ops::Add;
+
+use derive_where::derive_where;
+use digest::Output;
+use digest::block_api::{CoreProxy, SmallBlockSizeUser};
+use generic_array::typenum::{Cmp, IsLess, Le, NonZero, Sum, U256};
+use generic_array::{ArrayLength, GenericArray};
+use hybrid_array::ArraySize;
+use ml_kem::kem::{
+    Ciphertext as MlKemCiphertext, Decapsulate, Encapsulate, Kem as MlKemTrait, KeyExport, KeyInit,
+    KeySizeUser, TryKeyInit,
+};
+use rand::{CryptoRng, Rng};
+use subtle::{ConstantTimeEq, CtOption};
+
+use super::shared::{self, Ke1Message, Ke1State, NonceLen};
+use super::{
+    Deserialize, GenerateKe1Result, GenerateKe2Result, GenerateKe3Result, KeyExchange, Serialize,
+    SerializedContext, SerializedCredentialRequest, SerializedCredentialResponse,
+    SerializedIdentifiers,
+};
+use crate::ciphersuite::{CipherSuite, KeGroup};
+use crate::errors::ProtocolError;
+use crate::hash::{Hash, OutputSize, ProxyHash};
+use crate::key_exchange::group::Group;
+use crate::keypair::{PrivateKey, PublicKey};
+use crate::opaque::Identifiers;
+use crate::serialization::{ConcatExt, SliceExt};
+
+/// Adapter trait that augments the `ml-kem` core traits with the metadata
+/// required by OPAQUE (e.g. fixed lengths and serialization hooks).
+pub trait KemCoreWrapper {
+    /// Public key type used for encapsulation operations.
+    type EncapsulationKey: Clone;
+
+    /// Secret key type used for decapsulation operations.
+    type DecapsulationKey: Clone + zeroize::ZeroizeOnDrop;
+
+    /// Length (in bytes) of the serialized public key.
+    type EncapsulationKeyLen: ArrayLength + ArraySize;
+    /// Length (in bytes) of the serialized secret key.
+    type DecapsulationKeyLen: ArrayLength + ArraySize;
+    /// Length (in bytes) of the encapsulated ciphertext.
+    type CiphertextLen: ArrayLength + ArraySize;
+    /// Length (in bytes) of the shared secret output by the KEM.
+    type SharedSecretLen: ArrayLength + ArraySize;
+
+    /// Generates a fresh KEM key pair.
+    fn generate<R: Rng + CryptoRng>(
+        rng: &mut R,
+    ) -> Result<(Self::DecapsulationKey, Self::EncapsulationKey), ProtocolError>;
+
+    /// Serializes the public encapsulation key.
+    fn serialize_encapsulation_key(
+        key: &Self::EncapsulationKey,
+    ) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::EncapsulationKeyLen>;
+
+    /// Deserializes the public encapsulation key, advancing the input slice.
+    fn deserialize_encapsulation_key(
+        input: &mut &[u8],
+    ) -> Result<Self::EncapsulationKey, ProtocolError>;
+
+    /// Serializes the secret decapsulation key.
+    fn serialize_decapsulation_key(
+        key: &Self::DecapsulationKey,
+    ) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::DecapsulationKeyLen>;
+
+    /// Deserializes the secret decapsulation key, advancing the input slice.
+    fn deserialize_decapsulation_key(
+        input: &mut &[u8],
+    ) -> Result<Self::DecapsulationKey, ProtocolError>;
+
+    /// Encapsulates to the given public key, returning the ciphertext and
+    /// shared secret.
+    #[allow(clippy::type_complexity)]
+    fn encapsulate<R: Rng + CryptoRng>(
+        key: &Self::EncapsulationKey,
+        rng: &mut R,
+    ) -> Result<
+        (
+            GenericArray<u8, Self::CiphertextLen>,
+            GenericArray<u8, Self::SharedSecretLen>,
+        ),
+        ProtocolError,
+    >;
+
+    /// Decapsulates the shared secret from the provided ciphertext.
+    fn decapsulate(
+        key: &Self::DecapsulationKey,
+        encapsulated_key: &GenericArray<u8, Self::CiphertextLen>,
+    ) -> Result<GenericArray<u8, Self::SharedSecretLen>, ProtocolError>;
+}
+
+/// Adapter to bridge `rand 0.8` (`rand_core 0.6`) RNGs to `rand_core 0.10`
+/// which is required by `ml-kem 0.3.x`.
+struct RngCompat<'a, R>(&'a mut R);
+
+impl<R: Rng> rand::rand_core::TryRng for RngCompat<'_, R> {
+    type Error = core::convert::Infallible;
+
+    fn try_next_u32(&mut self) -> Result<u32, Self::Error> {
+        Ok(self.0.next_u32())
+    }
+
+    fn try_next_u64(&mut self) -> Result<u64, Self::Error> {
+        Ok(self.0.next_u64())
+    }
+
+    fn try_fill_bytes(&mut self, dst: &mut [u8]) -> Result<(), Self::Error> {
+        self.0.fill_bytes(dst);
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+
+impl<R: Rng + CryptoRng> rand::rand_core::TryCryptoRng for RngCompat<'_, R> {}
+
+type RcEncapsulationKeyLen<K> = <<K as MlKemTrait>::EncapsulationKey as KeySizeUser>::KeySize;
+type RcDecapsulationKeyLen<K> = <<K as MlKemTrait>::DecapsulationKey as KeySizeUser>::KeySize;
+type RcCiphertextLen<K> = <K as MlKemTrait>::CiphertextSize;
+type RcSharedSecretLen<K> = <K as MlKemTrait>::SharedKeySize;
+
+impl<K> KemCoreWrapper for K
+where
+    K: MlKemTrait,
+    K::EncapsulationKey: Encapsulate<Kem = K> + KeyExport + TryKeyInit + Clone,
+    K::DecapsulationKey:
+        Decapsulate<Kem = K> + KeyExport + KeyInit + Clone + zeroize::ZeroizeOnDrop,
+    RcEncapsulationKeyLen<K>: ArrayLength + ArraySize,
+    RcDecapsulationKeyLen<K>: ArrayLength + ArraySize,
+    RcCiphertextLen<K>: ArrayLength + ArraySize,
+    RcSharedSecretLen<K>: ArrayLength + ArraySize,
+{
+    type EncapsulationKey = K::EncapsulationKey;
+    type DecapsulationKey = K::DecapsulationKey;
+    type EncapsulationKeyLen = RcEncapsulationKeyLen<K>;
+    type DecapsulationKeyLen = RcDecapsulationKeyLen<K>;
+    type CiphertextLen = RcCiphertextLen<K>;
+    type SharedSecretLen = RcSharedSecretLen<K>;
+
+    fn generate<R: Rng + CryptoRng>(
+        rng: &mut R,
+    ) -> Result<(Self::DecapsulationKey, Self::EncapsulationKey), ProtocolError> {
+        Ok(K::generate_keypair_from_rng(&mut RngCompat(rng)))
+    }
+
+    fn serialize_encapsulation_key(
+        key: &Self::EncapsulationKey,
+    ) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::EncapsulationKeyLen> {
+        GenericArray::from_slice(key.to_bytes().as_slice()).clone()
+    }
+
+    fn deserialize_encapsulation_key(
+        input: &mut &[u8],
+    ) -> Result<Self::EncapsulationKey, ProtocolError> {
+        let bytes: GenericArray<u8, RcEncapsulationKeyLen<K>> =
+            input.take_array("kem encapsulation key")?;
+        let key = ml_kem::array::Array::try_from(bytes.as_slice())
+            .map_err(|_| ProtocolError::SerializationError)?;
+        TryKeyInit::new(&key).map_err(|_| ProtocolError::SerializationError)
+    }
+
+    fn serialize_decapsulation_key(
+        key: &Self::DecapsulationKey,
+    ) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::DecapsulationKeyLen> {
+        GenericArray::from_slice(key.to_bytes().as_slice()).clone()
+    }
+
+    fn deserialize_decapsulation_key(
+        input: &mut &[u8],
+    ) -> Result<Self::DecapsulationKey, ProtocolError> {
+        let bytes: GenericArray<u8, RcDecapsulationKeyLen<K>> =
+            input.take_array("kem decapsulation key")?;
+        let seed = ml_kem::array::Array::try_from(bytes.as_slice())
+            .map_err(|_| ProtocolError::SerializationError)?;
+        Ok(KeyInit::new(&seed))
+    }
+
+    fn encapsulate<R: Rng + CryptoRng>(
+        key: &Self::EncapsulationKey,
+        rng: &mut R,
+    ) -> Result<
+        (
+            GenericArray<u8, Self::CiphertextLen>,
+            GenericArray<u8, Self::SharedSecretLen>,
+        ),
+        ProtocolError,
+    > {
+        let (ciphertext, shared) = key.encapsulate_with_rng(&mut RngCompat(rng));
+        Ok((
+            GenericArray::from_slice(ciphertext.as_slice()).clone(),
+            GenericArray::from_slice(shared.as_slice()).clone(),
+        ))
+    }
+
+    fn decapsulate(
+        key: &Self::DecapsulationKey,
+        encapsulated_key: &GenericArray<u8, Self::CiphertextLen>,
+    ) -> Result<GenericArray<u8, Self::SharedSecretLen>, ProtocolError> {
+        let ciphertext = MlKemCiphertext::<K>::try_from(encapsulated_key.as_slice())
+            .map_err(|_| ProtocolError::SerializationError)?;
+        let shared = key.decapsulate(&ciphertext);
+        Ok(GenericArray::from_slice(shared.as_slice()).clone())
+    }
+}
+/// Triple Diffie-Hellman-style key exchange that offloads the second hop to a
+/// generic KEM.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
+pub struct TripleDhKem<G, H, K>(PhantomData<(G, H, K)>);
+
+/// Client state combining the classic `TripleDH` state with a KEM secret key.
+#[cfg_attr(
+    feature = "serde",
+    derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize),
+    serde(bound(
+        deserialize = "Ke1State<G>: serde::Deserialize<'de>, K::DecapsulationKey: \
+                       serde::Deserialize<'de>",
+        serialize = "Ke1State<G>: serde::Serialize, K::DecapsulationKey: serde::Serialize",
+    ))
+)]
+#[derive_where(Clone, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
+#[derive_where(Debug, Eq, Hash, Ord, PartialEq, PartialOrd; Ke1State<G>, K::DecapsulationKey)]
+pub struct KemKe1State<G: Group, K: KemCoreWrapper> {
+    dh_state: Ke1State<G>,
+    kem_decapsulation_key: K::DecapsulationKey,
+}
+
+/// Client message including the ephemeral Diffie-Hellman component alongside a
+/// serialized KEM public key.
+#[cfg_attr(
+    feature = "serde",
+    derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize),
+    serde(bound(
+        deserialize = "Ke1Message<G>: serde::Deserialize<'de>",
+        serialize = "Ke1Message<G>: serde::Serialize",
+    ))
+)]
+#[derive_where(Clone, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
+#[derive_where(Debug, Eq, Hash, Ord, PartialEq, PartialOrd; Ke1Message<G>)]
+pub struct KemKe1Message<G: Group, K: KemCoreWrapper> {
+    dh_message: Ke1Message<G>,
+    kem_encapsulation_key: GenericArray<u8, K::EncapsulationKeyLen>,
+}
+
+/// Server state mirrors the `TripleDH` state and carries the client’s KEM
+/// public key for later use.
+#[cfg_attr(
+    feature = "serde",
+    derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize),
+    serde(bound = "")
+)]
+#[derive_where(Clone, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
+#[derive_where(Debug, Eq, Hash, Ord, PartialEq, PartialOrd)]
+pub struct KemKe2State<K: KemCoreWrapper, H: Hash>
+where
+    H::Core: ProxyHash,
+    <<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: IsLess<U256>,
+    Le<<<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize, U256>: NonZero,
+    <<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: Cmp<U256>,
+    OutputSize<H>: ArrayLength,
+{
+    base_state: super::tripledh::Ke2State<H>,
+    kem_encapsulation_key: GenericArray<u8, K::EncapsulationKeyLen>,
+    server_kem_ciphertext: GenericArray<u8, K::CiphertextLen>,
+}
+
+/// Server builder placeholder capturing the data needed to finish the KEM
+/// exchange.
+#[derive_where(Clone, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
+pub struct KemKe2Builder<G: Group, H: Hash, K: KemCoreWrapper>
+where
+    H::Core: ProxyHash,
+    <<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: IsLess<U256>,
+    Le<<<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize, U256>: NonZero,
+    <<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: Cmp<U256>,
+    OutputSize<H>: ArrayLength,
+{
+    server_nonce: GenericArray<u8, NonceLen>,
+    transcript_hasher: H,
+    #[derive_where(skip(Zeroize))]
+    client_e_pk: PublicKey<G>,
+    #[derive_where(skip(Zeroize))]
+    server_e_pk: PublicKey<G>,
+    shared_secret_1: GenericArray<u8, G::PkLen>,
+    shared_secret_3: GenericArray<u8, G::PkLen>,
+    #[derive_where(skip(Zeroize))]
+    kem_encapsulation_key: GenericArray<u8, K::EncapsulationKeyLen>,
+    kem_ciphertext: GenericArray<u8, K::CiphertextLen>,
+    kem_shared_secret: GenericArray<u8, K::SharedSecretLen>,
+}
+
+/// Server message bundles the `TripleDH` payload with the KEM encapsulation.
+#[cfg_attr(
+    feature = "serde",
+    derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize),
+    serde(bound(
+        deserialize = "super::tripledh::Ke2Message<G, H>: serde::Deserialize<'de>",
+        serialize = "super::tripledh::Ke2Message<G, H>: serde::Serialize",
+    ))
+)]
+#[derive_where(Clone, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
+#[derive_where(Debug, Eq, Hash, Ord, PartialEq, PartialOrd; super::tripledh::Ke2Message<G, H>)]
+pub struct KemKe2Message<G: Group, H: Hash, K: KemCoreWrapper>
+where
+    H::Core: ProxyHash,
+    <<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: IsLess<U256>,
+    Le<<<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize, U256>: NonZero,
+    <<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: Cmp<U256>,
+    OutputSize<H>: ArrayLength,
+{
+    dh_message: super::tripledh::Ke2Message<G, H>,
+    kem_ciphertext: GenericArray<u8, K::CiphertextLen>,
+}
+
+/// Third message remains the same as `TripleDH`.
+pub type KemKe3Message<H> = super::tripledh::Ke3Message<H>;
+
+impl<G, H, K> KeyExchange for TripleDhKem<G, H, K>
+where
+    G: Group + 'static,
+    G::Sk: shared::DiffieHellman<G>,
+    H: Hash,
+    H::Core: ProxyHash,
+    <<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: IsLess<U256>,
+    Le<<<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize, U256>: NonZero,
+    <<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: Cmp<U256>,
+    OutputSize<H>: ArrayLength,
+    K: KemCoreWrapper,
+    NonceLen: Add<K::EncapsulationKeyLen>,
+    Sum<NonceLen, K::EncapsulationKeyLen>: ArrayLength,
+{
+    type Group = G;
+    type Hash = H;
+
+    type KE1State = KemKe1State<G, K>;
+    type KE2State<CS: CipherSuite> = KemKe2State<K, H>;
+    type KE1Message = KemKe1Message<G, K>;
+    type KE2Builder<'a, CS: CipherSuite<KeyExchange = Self>> = KemKe2Builder<G, H, K>;
+    type KE2BuilderData<'a, CS: 'static + CipherSuite> = (
+        &'a PublicKey<G>,
+        &'a GenericArray<u8, K::EncapsulationKeyLen>,
+    );
+    type KE2BuilderInput<CS: CipherSuite> = GenericArray<u8, G::PkLen>;
+    type KE2Message = KemKe2Message<G, H, K>;
+    type KE3Message = KemKe3Message<H>;
+
+    fn generate_ke1<R: Rng + CryptoRng>(
+        rng: &mut R,
+    ) -> Result<GenerateKe1Result<Self>, ProtocolError> {
+        let base = super::tripledh::TripleDh::<G, H>::generate_ke1(rng)?;
+        let (kem_secret, kem_public) = K::generate(rng)?;
+        let kem_encapsulation_key = K::serialize_encapsulation_key(&kem_public);
+
+        Ok(GenerateKe1Result {
+            state: KemKe1State {
+                dh_state: base.state,
+                kem_decapsulation_key: kem_secret,
+            },
+            message: KemKe1Message {
+                dh_message: base.message,
+                kem_encapsulation_key,
+            },
+        })
+    }
+
+    fn ke2_builder<'a, CS: CipherSuite<KeyExchange = Self>, R: Rng + CryptoRng>(
+        rng: &mut R,
+        credential_request: SerializedCredentialRequest<CS>,
+        ke1_message: Self::KE1Message,
+        credential_response: SerializedCredentialResponse<CS>,
+        client_s_pk: PublicKey<G>,
+        identifiers: SerializedIdentifiers<'_, KeGroup<CS>>,
+        context: SerializedContext<'a>,
+    ) -> Result<Self::KE2Builder<'a, CS>, ProtocolError> {
+        let shared::Ke2BuilderCommon {
+            server_nonce,
+            transcript_hasher,
+            client_e_pk,
+            server_e_pk,
+            shared_secret_1,
+            shared_secret_3,
+        } = shared::ke2_builder_common::<G, H, CS, R>(
+            rng,
+            credential_request,
+            ke1_message.dh_message.clone(),
+            credential_response,
+            client_s_pk,
+            identifiers,
+            context,
+        )?;
+
+        let mut kem_bytes_slice: &[u8] = ke1_message.kem_encapsulation_key.as_slice();
+        let encapsulation_key = K::deserialize_encapsulation_key(&mut kem_bytes_slice)?;
+        let (kem_ciphertext, kem_shared_secret) = K::encapsulate(&encapsulation_key, rng)?;
+
+        let mut transcript_hasher = transcript_hasher;
+        digest::Digest::update(
+            &mut transcript_hasher,
+            ke1_message.kem_encapsulation_key.as_slice(),
+        );
+        digest::Digest::update(&mut transcript_hasher, kem_ciphertext.as_slice());
+
+        Ok(KemKe2Builder {
+            server_nonce,
+            transcript_hasher,
+            client_e_pk,
+            server_e_pk,
+            shared_secret_1,
+            shared_secret_3,
+            kem_encapsulation_key: ke1_message.kem_encapsulation_key.clone(),
+            kem_ciphertext,
+            kem_shared_secret,
+        })
+    }
+
+    fn ke2_builder_data<'a, CS: 'static + CipherSuite<KeyExchange = Self>>(
+        builder: &'a Self::KE2Builder<'_, CS>,
+    ) -> Self::KE2BuilderData<'a, CS> {
+        (&builder.client_e_pk, &builder.kem_encapsulation_key)
+    }
+
+    fn generate_ke2_input<CS: CipherSuite<KeyExchange = Self>, R: CryptoRng + Rng>(
+        builder: &Self::KE2Builder<'_, CS>,
+        _: &mut R,
+        server_s_sk: &PrivateKey<G>,
+    ) -> Self::KE2BuilderInput<CS> {
+        server_s_sk.ke_diffie_hellman(&builder.client_e_pk)
+    }
+
+    fn build_ke2<CS: CipherSuite<KeyExchange = Self>>(
+        mut builder: Self::KE2Builder<'_, CS>,
+        shared_secret_2: Self::KE2BuilderInput<CS>,
+    ) -> Result<GenerateKe2Result<CS>, ProtocolError> {
+        let transcript_digest = builder.transcript_hasher.clone().finalize();
+        let derived_keys = shared::derive_keys::<H>(
+            [
+                builder.shared_secret_1.as_slice(),
+                shared_secret_2.as_slice(),
+                builder.shared_secret_3.as_slice(),
+                builder.kem_shared_secret.as_slice(),
+            ]
+            .into_iter(),
+            &transcript_digest,
+        )?;
+
+        let (mac, expected_mac) = shared::compute_ke2_macs(
+            &mut builder.transcript_hasher,
+            &derived_keys,
+            &transcript_digest,
+        )?;
+
+        Ok(GenerateKe2Result {
+            state: KemKe2State {
+                base_state: super::tripledh::Ke2State {
+                    session_key: derived_keys.session_key.clone(),
+                    expected_mac,
+                },
+                kem_encapsulation_key: builder.kem_encapsulation_key.clone(),
+                server_kem_ciphertext: builder.kem_ciphertext.clone(),
+            },
+            message: KemKe2Message {
+                dh_message: super::tripledh::Ke2Message {
+                    server_nonce: builder.server_nonce,
+                    server_e_pk: builder.server_e_pk.clone(),
+                    mac,
+                },
+                kem_ciphertext: builder.kem_ciphertext.clone(),
+            },
+            #[cfg(test)]
+            handshake_secret: derived_keys.handshake_secret,
+            #[cfg(test)]
+            km2: derived_keys.km2,
+        })
+    }
+
+    fn generate_ke3<CS: CipherSuite<KeyExchange = Self>, R: CryptoRng + Rng>(
+        _rng: &mut R,
+        credential_request: SerializedCredentialRequest<CS>,
+        ke1_message: Self::KE1Message,
+        credential_response: SerializedCredentialResponse<CS>,
+        ke1_state: &Self::KE1State,
+        ke2_message: Self::KE2Message,
+        server_s_pk: PublicKey<G>,
+        client_s_sk: PrivateKey<G>,
+        identifiers: SerializedIdentifiers<'_, KeGroup<CS>>,
+        context: SerializedContext<'_>,
+    ) -> Result<GenerateKe3Result<Self>, ProtocolError> {
+        let mut transcript_hasher = shared::transcript(
+            &context,
+            &identifiers,
+            &credential_request,
+            &ke1_message.dh_message.to_iter(),
+            &credential_response,
+            ke2_message.dh_message.server_nonce,
+            &ke2_message.dh_message.server_e_pk.serialize(),
+        );
+        digest::Digest::update(
+            &mut transcript_hasher,
+            ke1_message.kem_encapsulation_key.as_slice(),
+        );
+        digest::Digest::update(
+            &mut transcript_hasher,
+            ke2_message.kem_ciphertext.as_slice(),
+        );
+
+        let shared_secret_1 = ke1_state
+            .dh_state
+            .client_e_sk
+            .ke_diffie_hellman(&ke2_message.dh_message.server_e_pk);
+        let shared_secret_2 = ke1_state
+            .dh_state
+            .client_e_sk
+            .ke_diffie_hellman(&server_s_pk);
+        let shared_secret_3 = client_s_sk.ke_diffie_hellman(&ke2_message.dh_message.server_e_pk);
+        let kem_shared_secret = K::decapsulate(
+            &ke1_state.kem_decapsulation_key,
+            &ke2_message.kem_ciphertext,
+        )?;
+
+        let (derived_keys, client_mac) = shared::finalize_ke3_transcript(
+            &mut transcript_hasher,
+            [
+                shared_secret_1.as_slice(),
+                shared_secret_2.as_slice(),
+                shared_secret_3.as_slice(),
+                kem_shared_secret.as_slice(),
+            ]
+            .into_iter(),
+            &ke2_message.dh_message.mac,
+        )?;
+
+        Ok(GenerateKe3Result {
+            session_key: derived_keys.session_key,
+            message: super::tripledh::Ke3Message { mac: client_mac },
+            #[cfg(test)]
+            handshake_secret: derived_keys.handshake_secret,
+            #[cfg(test)]
+            km3: derived_keys.km3,
+        })
+    }
+
+    fn finish_ke<CS: CipherSuite>(
+        ke2_state: &Self::KE2State<CS>,
+        ke3_message: Self::KE3Message,
+        _identifiers: Identifiers<'_>,
+        _context: SerializedContext<'_>,
+    ) -> Result<Output<Self::Hash>, ProtocolError> {
+        CtOption::new(
+            ke2_state.base_state.session_key.clone(),
+            ke2_state.base_state.expected_mac.ct_eq(&ke3_message.mac),
+        )
+        .into_option()
+        .ok_or(ProtocolError::InvalidLoginError)
+    }
+}
+
+/// Serialization logic will be implemented once the concrete KEM wiring is in
+/// place.
+impl<G: Group, K: KemCoreWrapper> Deserialize for KemKe1State<G, K> {
+    fn deserialize_take(input: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
+        Ok(Self {
+            dh_state: Ke1State::<G>::deserialize_take(input)?,
+            kem_decapsulation_key: K::deserialize_decapsulation_key(input)?,
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+impl<G: Group, K: KemCoreWrapper> Serialize for KemKe1State<G, K>
+where
+    Ke1State<G>: Serialize,
+    <Ke1State<G> as Serialize>::Len: Add<K::DecapsulationKeyLen>,
+    Sum<<Ke1State<G> as Serialize>::Len, K::DecapsulationKeyLen>: ArrayLength,
+{
+    type Len = Sum<<Ke1State<G> as Serialize>::Len, K::DecapsulationKeyLen>;
+
+    fn serialize(&self) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::Len> {
+        self.dh_state
+            .serialize()
+            .cat(K::serialize_decapsulation_key(&self.kem_decapsulation_key))
+    }
+}
+
+impl<G: Group, K: KemCoreWrapper> Deserialize for KemKe1Message<G, K> {
+    fn deserialize_take(input: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
+        Ok(Self {
+            dh_message: Ke1Message::<G>::deserialize_take(input)?,
+            kem_encapsulation_key: input.take_array("kem encapsulation key")?,
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+impl<G: Group, K: KemCoreWrapper> Serialize for KemKe1Message<G, K>
+where
+    Ke1Message<G>: Serialize,
+    <Ke1Message<G> as Serialize>::Len: Add<K::EncapsulationKeyLen>,
+    Sum<<Ke1Message<G> as Serialize>::Len, K::EncapsulationKeyLen>: ArrayLength,
+{
+    type Len = Sum<<Ke1Message<G> as Serialize>::Len, K::EncapsulationKeyLen>;
+
+    fn serialize(&self) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::Len> {
+        self.dh_message
+            .serialize()
+            .cat(self.kem_encapsulation_key.clone())
+    }
+}
+
+impl<K: KemCoreWrapper, H: Hash> Deserialize for KemKe2State<K, H>
+where
+    H::Core: ProxyHash,
+    <<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: IsLess<U256>,
+    Le<<<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize, U256>: NonZero,
+    <<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: Cmp<U256>,
+    OutputSize<H>: ArrayLength,
+{
+    fn deserialize_take(input: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
+        Ok(Self {
+            base_state: super::tripledh::Ke2State::<H>::deserialize_take(input)?,
+            kem_encapsulation_key: input.take_array("kem encapsulation key")?,
+            server_kem_ciphertext: input.take_array("kem ciphertext")?,
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+impl<K: KemCoreWrapper, H: Hash> Serialize for KemKe2State<K, H>
+where
+    H::Core: ProxyHash,
+    <<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: IsLess<U256>,
+    Le<<<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize, U256>: NonZero,
+    <<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: Cmp<U256>,
+    OutputSize<H>: ArrayLength,
+    super::tripledh::Ke2State<H>: Serialize,
+    <super::tripledh::Ke2State<H> as Serialize>::Len: Add<K::EncapsulationKeyLen>,
+    Sum<<super::tripledh::Ke2State<H> as Serialize>::Len, K::EncapsulationKeyLen>:
+        ArrayLength + Add<K::CiphertextLen>,
+    Sum<
+        Sum<<super::tripledh::Ke2State<H> as Serialize>::Len, K::EncapsulationKeyLen>,
+        K::CiphertextLen,
+    >: ArrayLength,
+{
+    type Len = Sum<
+        Sum<<super::tripledh::Ke2State<H> as Serialize>::Len, K::EncapsulationKeyLen>,
+        K::CiphertextLen,
+    >;
+
+    fn serialize(&self) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::Len> {
+        self.base_state
+            .serialize()
+            .cat(self.kem_encapsulation_key.clone())
+            .cat(self.server_kem_ciphertext.clone())
+    }
+}
+
+impl<G: Group, H: Hash, K: KemCoreWrapper> Deserialize for KemKe2Message<G, H, K>
+where
+    H::Core: ProxyHash,
+    <<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: IsLess<U256>,
+    Le<<<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize, U256>: NonZero,
+    <<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: Cmp<U256>,
+    OutputSize<H>: ArrayLength,
+{
+    fn deserialize_take(input: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
+        Ok(Self {
+            dh_message: super::tripledh::Ke2Message::<G, H>::deserialize_take(input)?,
+            kem_ciphertext: input.take_array("kem ciphertext")?,
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+impl<G: Group, H: Hash, K: KemCoreWrapper> Serialize for KemKe2Message<G, H, K>
+where
+    H::Core: ProxyHash,
+    <<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: IsLess<U256>,
+    Le<<<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize, U256>: NonZero,
+    <<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: Cmp<U256>,
+    OutputSize<H>: ArrayLength,
+    NonceLen: Add<G::PkLen>,
+    Sum<NonceLen, G::PkLen>: ArrayLength + Add<OutputSize<H>>,
+    Sum<Sum<NonceLen, G::PkLen>, OutputSize<H>>: ArrayLength,
+    super::tripledh::Ke2Message<G, H>: Serialize,
+    <super::tripledh::Ke2Message<G, H> as Serialize>::Len: Add<K::CiphertextLen>,
+    <<super::tripledh::Ke2Message<G, H> as Serialize>::Len as Add<K::CiphertextLen>>::Output:
+        ArrayLength,
+{
+    type Len = Sum<<super::tripledh::Ke2Message<G, H> as Serialize>::Len, K::CiphertextLen>;
+
+    fn serialize(&self) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::Len> {
+        self.dh_message.serialize().cat(self.kem_ciphertext.clone())
+    }
+}

src/keypair.rs

@@ -1,186 +1,516 @@
-// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
-//
-// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
-// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) VexaHub and contributors.
+// Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates.
 
 //! Contains the keypair types that must be supplied for the OPAQUE API
 
-use crate::errors::InternalPakeError;
-use crate::group::Group;
-use generic_array::{typenum::U32, GenericArray};
-use generic_bytes::{SizedBytes, TryFromSizedBytesError};
-use generic_bytes_derive::TryFromForSizedBytes;
-#[cfg(test)]
-use proptest::prelude::*;
-#[cfg(test)]
-use rand::{rngs::StdRng, SeedableRng};
-use rand_core::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
-use std::fmt::Debug;
-use std::marker::PhantomData;
-use std::ops::Deref;
+#![allow(unsafe_code)]
 
-// Pub(crate) convenience extension trait of SizedBytes for our purposes
-pub(crate) trait SizedBytesExt: SizedBytes {
-    fn from_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, TryFromSizedBytesError> {
-        <Self as SizedBytes>::from_arr(GenericArray::from_slice(bytes))
-    }
-}
+use derive_where::derive_where;
+use digest::{Output, OutputSizeUser};
+use generic_array::{ArrayLength, GenericArray};
+use rand::{CryptoRng, Rng};
 
-// blanket implementation
-impl<T> SizedBytesExt for T where T: SizedBytes {}
+use crate::ciphersuite::CipherSuite;
+use crate::errors::ProtocolError;
+use crate::key_exchange::group::Group;
+use crate::key_exchange::shared::DiffieHellman;
+use crate::key_exchange::sigma_i::{Message, MessageBuilder, SignatureProtocol};
+use crate::serialization::SliceExt;
 
 /// A Keypair trait with public-private verification
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
-pub struct KeyPair<G> {
-    pk: Key,
-    sk: Key,
-    _g: PhantomData<G>,
+#[cfg_attr(
+    feature = "serde",
+    derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize),
+    serde(bound(
+        deserialize = "G::Pk: serde::Deserialize<'de>, SK: serde::Deserialize<'de>",
+        serialize = "G::Pk: serde::Serialize, SK: serde::Serialize"
+    ))
+)]
+#[derive_where(Clone)]
+#[derive_where(Debug, Eq, Hash, Ord, PartialEq, PartialOrd; G::Pk, SK)]
+pub struct KeyPair<G: Group, SK: Clone = PrivateKey<G>> {
+    pk: PublicKey<G>,
+    sk: SK,
 }
 
-impl<G: Group> KeyPair<G> {
+impl<G: Group, SK: Clone> KeyPair<G, SK> {
+    /// Creates a new [`KeyPair`] from the given keys.
+    pub fn new(sk: SK, pk: PublicKey<G>) -> Self {
+        Self { pk, sk }
+    }
+
     /// The public key component
-    pub fn public(&self) -> &Key {
+    pub fn public(&self) -> &PublicKey<G> {
         &self.pk
     }
 
     /// The private key component
-    pub fn private(&self) -> &Key {
+    pub fn private(&self) -> &SK {
         &self.sk
     }
-
-    /// A constructor that receives public and private key independently as
-    /// bytes
-    pub fn new(public: Key, private: Key) -> Result<Self, InternalPakeError> {
-        Ok(Self {
-            pk: public,
-            sk: private,
-            _g: PhantomData,
-        })
-    }
-
-    /// Generating a random key pair given a cryptographic rng
-    pub(crate) fn generate_random<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(rng: &mut R) -> Self {
-        let sk = G::random_scalar(rng);
-        let sk_bytes = G::scalar_as_bytes(&sk);
-        let pk = G::base_point().mult_by_slice(&sk_bytes);
-        Self {
-            pk: Key(pk.to_arr().to_vec()),
-            sk: Key(sk_bytes.to_vec()),
-            _g: PhantomData,
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Obtaining a public key from secret bytes. At all times, we should have
-    /// &public_from_private(self.private()) == self.public()
-    pub(crate) fn public_from_private(bytes: &Key) -> Key {
-        let bytes_data = GenericArray::<u8, G::ScalarLen>::from_slice(&bytes.0[..]);
-        Key(G::base_point().mult_by_slice(&bytes_data).to_arr().to_vec())
-    }
-
-    /// Check whether a public key is valid. This is meant to be applied on
-    /// material provided through the network which fits the key
-    /// representation (i.e. can be mapped to a curve point), but presents
-    /// some risk - e.g. small subgroup check
-    pub(crate) fn check_public_key(key: Key) -> Result<Key, InternalPakeError> {
-        G::from_element_slice(GenericArray::from_slice(&key.0)).map(|_| key)
-    }
-
-    /// Computes the diffie hellman function on a public key and private key
-    pub(crate) fn diffie_hellman(pk: Key, sk: Key) -> Result<Vec<u8>, InternalPakeError> {
-        let pk_data = GenericArray::<u8, G::ElemLen>::from_slice(&pk.0[..]);
-        let point = G::from_element_slice(&pk_data)?;
-        let secret_data = GenericArray::<u8, G::ScalarLen>::from_slice(&sk.0[..]);
-        Ok(G::mult_by_slice(&point, &secret_data).to_arr().to_vec())
-    }
-
-    /// Obtains a KeyPair from a slice representing the private key
-    pub fn from_private_key_slice(input: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, InternalPakeError> {
-        let sk = Key::from_arr(GenericArray::from_slice(&input))?;
-        let pk = Self::public_from_private(&sk);
-        Self::new(pk, sk)
-    }
 }
 
+impl<G: Group> KeyPair<G> {
+    pub(crate) fn random<R: Rng + CryptoRng>(rng: &mut R) -> Self {
+        let sk = G::random_sk(rng);
+        let pk = G::public_key(&sk);
+        Self {
+            pk: PublicKey(pk),
+            sk: PrivateKey(sk),
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Generating a random key pair given a cryptographic rng
+    pub(crate) fn derive_random<R: Rng + CryptoRng>(rng: &mut R) -> Self {
+        let mut scalar_bytes = GenericArray::<_, <G as Group>::SkLen>::default();
+        rng.fill_bytes(&mut scalar_bytes);
+        let sk = G::derive_scalar(scalar_bytes).unwrap();
+        let pk = G::public_key(&sk);
+        Self {
+            pk: PublicKey(pk),
+            sk: PrivateKey(sk),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Wrapper around a Key to enforce that it's a private one.
+#[cfg_attr(
+    feature = "serde",
+    derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize),
+    serde(bound(
+        deserialize = "G::Sk: serde::Deserialize<'de>",
+        serialize = "G::Sk: serde::Serialize"
+    ))
+)]
+#[derive_where(Clone, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
+#[derive_where(Debug, Eq, Hash, Ord, PartialEq, PartialOrd; G::Sk)]
+pub struct PrivateKey<G: Group>(G::Sk);
+
+impl<G: Group> PrivateKey<G> {
+    pub(crate) fn new(key: G::Sk) -> Self {
+        Self(key)
+    }
+
+    /// Returns public key from private key
+    pub fn public_key(&self) -> PublicKey<G> {
+        PublicKey(G::public_key(&self.0))
+    }
+
+    /// Serializes this private key to a fixed-length byte array.
+    pub fn serialize(&self) -> GenericArray<u8, G::SkLen> {
+        G::serialize_sk(&self.0)
+    }
+
+    /// Creates a [`PrivateKey`] from the given bytes.
+    pub fn deserialize(mut input: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
+        Self::deserialize_take(&mut input)
+    }
+
+    pub(crate) fn deserialize_take(input: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
+        G::deserialize_take_sk(input).map(Self)
+    }
+}
+
+impl<G: Group> PrivateKey<G>
+where
+    G::Sk: DiffieHellman<G>,
+{
+    /// Diffie-Hellman key exchange implementation
+    pub(crate) fn ke_diffie_hellman(&self, pk: &PublicKey<G>) -> GenericArray<u8, G::PkLen> {
+        self.0.diffie_hellman(&pk.0)
+    }
+}
+
+impl<G: Group> PrivateKey<G> {
+    /// Private-key signing implementation
+    pub(crate) fn sign<
+        R: CryptoRng + Rng,
+        CS: CipherSuite,
+        SIG: SignatureProtocol<Group = G>,
+        KE: Group,
+    >(
+        &self,
+        rng: &mut R,
+        message: &Message<CS, KE>,
+    ) -> (SIG::Signature, SIG::VerifyState<CS, KE>) {
+        SIG::sign(&self.0, rng, message)
+    }
+}
+
+/// A trait to facilitate
+/// [`ServerSetup::de/serialize`](crate::ServerSetup::serialize).
+pub trait PrivateKeySerialization<G: Group>: Clone {
+    /// Custom error type that can be passed down to `ProtocolError::Custom`
+    type Error;
+    /// Serialization size in bytes.
+    type Len: ArrayLength;
+
+    /// Serialization into bytes
+    fn serialize_key_pair(key_pair: &KeyPair<G, Self>) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::Len>;
+
+    /// Deserialization from bytes
+    ///
+    /// The deserialized bytes must be taken from `bytes`.
+    fn deserialize_take_key_pair(
+        bytes: &mut &[u8],
+    ) -> Result<KeyPair<G, Self>, ProtocolError<Self::Error>>;
+}
+
+impl<G: Group> PrivateKeySerialization<G> for PrivateKey<G> {
+    type Error = core::convert::Infallible;
+    type Len = G::SkLen;
+
+    fn serialize_key_pair(key_pair: &KeyPair<G, Self>) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::Len> {
+        key_pair.private().serialize()
+    }
+
+    fn deserialize_take_key_pair(input: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<KeyPair<G, Self>, ProtocolError> {
+        let sk = PrivateKey::deserialize_take(input)?;
+        let pk = sk.public_key();
+
+        Ok(KeyPair::new(sk, pk))
+    }
+}
+
+/// Wrapper around a Key to enforce that it's a public one.
+#[cfg_attr(
+    feature = "serde",
+    derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize),
+    serde(bound(
+        deserialize = "G::Pk: serde::Deserialize<'de>",
+        serialize = "G::Pk: serde::Serialize"
+    ))
+)]
+#[derive_where(Clone)]
+#[derive_where(Debug, Eq, Hash, Ord, PartialEq, PartialOrd; G::Pk)]
+pub struct PublicKey<G: Group + ?Sized>(G::Pk);
+
+impl<G: Group> PublicKey<G> {
+    /// Convert from bytes
+    pub fn deserialize(mut key_bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
+        Self::deserialize_take(&mut key_bytes)
+    }
+
+    pub(crate) fn deserialize_take(key_bytes: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
+        G::deserialize_take_pk(key_bytes).map(Self)
+    }
+
+    /// Convert to bytes
+    pub fn serialize(&self) -> GenericArray<u8, G::PkLen> {
+        G::serialize_pk(&self.0)
+    }
+
+    /// Returns the inner [`Group::Pk`].
+    pub fn to_group_type(&self) -> &G::Pk {
+        &self.0
+    }
+}
+
+impl<G: Group> PublicKey<G> {
+    /// Public-key verifying implementation
+    pub(crate) fn verify<CS: CipherSuite, SIG: SignatureProtocol<Group = G>, KE: Group>(
+        &self,
+        message_builder: MessageBuilder<'_, CS>,
+        state: SIG::VerifyState<CS, KE>,
+        signature: &SIG::Signature,
+    ) -> Result<(), ProtocolError> {
+        SIG::verify(&self.0, message_builder, state, signature)
+    }
+}
+
+/// Default OPRF seed container.
+#[cfg_attr(
+    feature = "serde",
+    derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize),
+    serde(bound = "")
+)]
+#[derive_where(Clone, Debug, Eq, Hash, PartialEq, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
+pub struct OprfSeed<H: OutputSizeUser>(pub(crate) Output<H>);
+
+/// A trait to facilitate
+/// [`ServerSetup::de/serialize`](crate::ServerSetup::serialize).
+///
+/// Will be called with `E` being [`PrivateKeySerialization::Error`].
+pub trait OprfSeedSerialization<H, E>: Sized {
+    /// Serialization size in bytes.
+    type Len: ArrayLength;
+
+    /// Serialization into bytes
+    fn serialize(&self) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::Len>;
+
+    /// Deserialization from bytes
+    ///
+    /// The deserialized bytes must be taken from `bytes`.
+    fn deserialize_take(bytes: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError<E>>;
+}
+
+impl<H: OutputSizeUser, E> OprfSeedSerialization<H, E> for OprfSeed<H>
+where
+    H::OutputSize: ArrayLength,
+{
+    type Len = H::OutputSize;
+
+    fn serialize(&self) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::Len> {
+        GenericArray::from_slice(self.0.as_slice()).clone()
+    }
+
+    fn deserialize_take(input: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError<E>> {
+        Ok(Self(
+            input
+                .take_array("OPRF seed")
+                .map_err(ProtocolError::into_custom)?
+                .into_ha0_4(),
+        ))
+    }
+}
+
+//////////////////////////
+// Test Implementations //
+//===================== //
+//////////////////////////
+
 #[cfg(test)]
-impl<G: Group + Debug> KeyPair<G> {
+impl<G: Group> KeyPair<G>
+where
+    G::Pk: core::fmt::Debug,
+    G::Sk: core::fmt::Debug,
+{
     /// Test-only strategy returning a proptest Strategy based on
-    /// generate_random
-    fn uniform_keypair_strategy() -> BoxedStrategy<Self> {
-        // The no_shrink is because keypairs should be fixed -- shrinking would cause a different
-        // keypair to be generated, which appears to not be very useful.
+    /// [`Self::derive_random`]
+    fn uniform_keypair_strategy() -> proptest::prelude::BoxedStrategy<Self> {
+        use proptest::prelude::*;
+        use rand::SeedableRng;
+        use rand::rngs::StdRng;
+
+        // The no_shrink is because keypairs should be fixed -- shrinking would cause a
+        // different keypair to be generated, which appears to not be very useful.
         any::<[u8; 32]>()
             .prop_filter_map("valid random keypair", |seed| {
                 let mut rng = StdRng::from_seed(seed);
-                Some(Self::generate_random(&mut rng))
+                Some(Self::derive_random(&mut rng))
             })
             .no_shrink()
             .boxed()
     }
 }
 
-/// A minimalist key type built around [u8;32]
-#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Clone, TryFromForSizedBytes)]
-#[ErrorType = "::generic_bytes::TryFromSizedBytesError"]
-#[repr(transparent)]
-pub struct Key(Vec<u8>);
-
-impl Deref for Key {
-    type Target = Vec<u8>;
-
-    fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
-        &self.0
-    }
-}
-
-impl SizedBytes for Key {
-    type Len = U32;
-
-    fn to_arr(&self) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::Len> {
-        GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&self.0[..])
-    }
-
-    fn from_arr(key_bytes: &GenericArray<u8, Self::Len>) -> Result<Self, TryFromSizedBytesError> {
-        Ok(Key(key_bytes.to_vec()))
-    }
-}
-
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
-    use curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoPoint;
+    use crate::ciphersuite::{KeGroup, OprfHash};
+    use crate::{
+        CipherSuite, ClientLogin, ClientLoginFinishParameters, ClientLoginFinishResult,
+        ClientLoginStartResult, ClientRegistration, ClientRegistrationFinishParameters,
+        ClientRegistrationFinishResult, ClientRegistrationStartResult, ServerLogin,
+        ServerLoginParameters, ServerLoginStartResult, ServerRegistration,
+        ServerRegistrationStartResult, ServerSetup,
+    };
+    use hkdf::Hkdf;
+    use rand::rand_core::UnwrapErr;
+    use rand::rngs::SysRng;
 
-    proptest! {
-        #[test]
-        fn test_ristretto_check(kp in KeyPair::<RistrettoPoint>::uniform_keypair_strategy()) {
-            let pk = kp.public();
-            prop_assert!(KeyPair::<RistrettoPoint>::check_public_key(pk.clone()).is_ok());
-        }
+    macro_rules! test {
+        ($mod:ident, $point:ty) => {
+            mod $mod {
 
-        #[test]
-        fn test_ristretto_pub_from_priv(kp in KeyPair::<RistrettoPoint>::uniform_keypair_strategy()) {
-            let pk = kp.public();
-            let sk = kp.private();
-            prop_assert_eq!(&KeyPair::<RistrettoPoint>::public_from_private(sk), pk);
-        }
+                use proptest::prelude::*;
 
-        #[test]
-        fn test_ristretto_dh(kp1 in KeyPair::<RistrettoPoint>::uniform_keypair_strategy(),
-                          kp2 in KeyPair::<RistrettoPoint>::uniform_keypair_strategy()) {
+                use super::*;
 
-            let dh1 = KeyPair::<RistrettoPoint>::diffie_hellman(kp1.public().clone(), kp2.private().clone())?;
-            let dh2 = KeyPair::<RistrettoPoint>::diffie_hellman(kp2.public().clone(), kp1.private().clone())?;
+                proptest! {
+                    #[test]
+                    fn pub_from_priv(kp in KeyPair::<$point>::uniform_keypair_strategy()) {
+                        let pk = kp.public();
+                        let sk = kp.private();
+                        prop_assert_eq!(sk.public_key().serialize(), pk.serialize());
+                    }
 
-            prop_assert_eq!(dh1, dh2);
-        }
+                    #[test]
+                    fn dh(kp1 in KeyPair::<$point>::uniform_keypair_strategy(),
+                                      kp2 in KeyPair::<$point>::uniform_keypair_strategy()) {
 
-        #[test]
-        fn test_private_key_slice(kp in KeyPair::<RistrettoPoint>::uniform_keypair_strategy()) {
-            let sk_bytes = kp.private().to_vec();
+                        let dh1 = kp2.private().ke_diffie_hellman(&kp1.public());
+                        let dh2 = kp1.private().ke_diffie_hellman(kp2.public());
 
-            let kp2 = KeyPair::<RistrettoPoint>::from_private_key_slice(&sk_bytes)?;
-            let kp2_private_bytes = kp2.private().to_vec();
+                        prop_assert_eq!(dh1, dh2);
+                    }
 
-            prop_assert_eq!(sk_bytes, kp2_private_bytes);
-        }
+                    #[test]
+                    fn private_key_slice(kp in KeyPair::<$point>::uniform_keypair_strategy()) {
+                        let sk_bytes = kp.private().serialize().to_vec();
+
+                        let kp2 = PrivateKey::<$point>::deserialize_take_key_pair(&mut (sk_bytes.as_slice()))?;
+                        let kp2_private_bytes = kp2.private().serialize().to_vec();
+
+                        prop_assert_eq!(sk_bytes, kp2_private_bytes);
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        };
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(feature = "ristretto255")]
+    test!(ristretto, crate::Ristretto255);
+    test!(p256, ::p256::NistP256);
+    test!(p384, ::p384::NistP384);
+    test!(p521, ::p521::NistP521);
+
+    struct Default;
+
+    impl CipherSuite for Default {
+        #[cfg(feature = "ristretto255")]
+        type OprfCs = crate::Ristretto255;
+        #[cfg(not(feature = "ristretto255"))]
+        type OprfCs = ::p256::NistP256;
+        #[cfg(feature = "ristretto255")]
+        type KeyExchange = crate::TripleDh<crate::Ristretto255, sha2::Sha512>;
+        #[cfg(not(feature = "ristretto255"))]
+        type KeyExchange = crate::TripleDh<::p256::NistP256, sha2::Sha256>;
+        type Ksf = crate::ksf::Identity;
+    }
+
+    #[derive(Clone)]
+    struct RemoteSeed<H: OutputSizeUser>(Output<H>);
+
+    #[derive(Clone)]
+    struct RemoteKey(PrivateKey<KeGroup<Default>>);
+
+    const PASSWORD: &str = "password";
+
+    #[test]
+    fn remote_key() {
+        let sk = PrivateKey(KeGroup::<Default>::random_sk(&mut UnwrapErr(SysRng)));
+        let pk = sk.public_key();
+        let sk = RemoteKey(sk);
+        let keypair = KeyPair::new(sk, pk);
+
+        let server_setup =
+            ServerSetup::<Default, RemoteKey>::new_with_key_pair(&mut UnwrapErr(SysRng), keypair);
+
+        let ClientRegistrationStartResult {
+            message,
+            state: client,
+        } = ClientRegistration::<Default>::start(&mut UnwrapErr(SysRng), PASSWORD.as_bytes())
+            .unwrap();
+        let ServerRegistrationStartResult { message, .. } =
+            ServerRegistration::start(&server_setup, message, &[]).unwrap();
+        let ClientRegistrationFinishResult { message, .. } = client
+            .finish(
+                &mut UnwrapErr(SysRng),
+                PASSWORD.as_bytes(),
+                message,
+                ClientRegistrationFinishParameters::default(),
+            )
+            .unwrap();
+        let file = ServerRegistration::finish(message);
+
+        let ClientLoginStartResult {
+            message,
+            state: client,
+        } = ClientLogin::<Default>::start(&mut UnwrapErr(SysRng), PASSWORD.as_bytes()).unwrap();
+        let builder = ServerLogin::builder(
+            &mut UnwrapErr(SysRng),
+            &server_setup,
+            Some(file),
+            message,
+            &[],
+            ServerLoginParameters::default(),
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        let shared_secret = builder.private_key().0.ke_diffie_hellman(builder.data());
+        let ServerLoginStartResult {
+            message,
+            state: server,
+            ..
+        } = builder.build(shared_secret).unwrap();
+        let ClientLoginFinishResult { message, .. } = client
+            .finish(
+                &mut UnwrapErr(SysRng),
+                PASSWORD.as_bytes(),
+                message,
+                ClientLoginFinishParameters::default(),
+            )
+            .unwrap();
+        server
+            .finish(message, ServerLoginParameters::default())
+            .unwrap();
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn remote_seed() {
+        let mut oprf_seed = RemoteSeed::<OprfHash<Default>>(GenericArray::default().into_ha0_4());
+        UnwrapErr(SysRng).fill_bytes(&mut oprf_seed.0);
+
+        let sk = PrivateKey(KeGroup::<Default>::random_sk(&mut UnwrapErr(SysRng)));
+        let pk = sk.public_key();
+        let sk = RemoteKey(sk);
+        let keypair = KeyPair::new(sk, pk);
+
+        let server_setup = ServerSetup::<Default, _, _>::new_with_key_pair_and_seed(
+            &mut UnwrapErr(SysRng),
+            keypair,
+            oprf_seed,
+        );
+
+        let ClientRegistrationStartResult {
+            message,
+            state: client,
+        } = ClientRegistration::<Default>::start(&mut UnwrapErr(SysRng), PASSWORD.as_bytes())
+            .unwrap();
+        let km = server_setup.key_material_info(&[]);
+        let mut ikm = GenericArray::default();
+        Hkdf::<OprfHash<Default>>::from_prk(&km.ikm.0)
+            .unwrap()
+            .expand_multi_info(&km.info, &mut ikm)
+            .unwrap();
+        let ServerRegistrationStartResult { message, .. } =
+            ServerRegistration::start_with_key_material(&server_setup, ikm, message).unwrap();
+        let ClientRegistrationFinishResult { message, .. } = client
+            .finish(
+                &mut UnwrapErr(SysRng),
+                PASSWORD.as_bytes(),
+                message,
+                ClientRegistrationFinishParameters::default(),
+            )
+            .unwrap();
+        let file = ServerRegistration::finish(message);
+
+        let ClientLoginStartResult {
+            message,
+            state: client,
+        } = ClientLogin::<Default>::start(&mut UnwrapErr(SysRng), PASSWORD.as_bytes()).unwrap();
+        let km = server_setup.key_material_info(&[]);
+        let mut ikm = GenericArray::default();
+        Hkdf::<OprfHash<Default>>::from_prk(&km.ikm.0)
+            .unwrap()
+            .expand_multi_info(&km.info, &mut ikm)
+            .unwrap();
+        let builder = ServerLogin::builder_with_key_material(
+            &mut UnwrapErr(SysRng),
+            &server_setup,
+            ikm,
+            Some(file),
+            message,
+            ServerLoginParameters::default(),
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        let shared_secret = builder.private_key().0.ke_diffie_hellman(builder.data());
+        let ServerLoginStartResult {
+            message,
+            state: server,
+            ..
+        } = builder.build(shared_secret).unwrap();
+        let ClientLoginFinishResult { message, .. } = client
+            .finish(
+                &mut UnwrapErr(SysRng),
+                PASSWORD.as_bytes(),
+                message,
+                ClientLoginFinishParameters::default(),
+            )
+            .unwrap();
+        server
+            .finish(message, ServerLoginParameters::default())
+            .unwrap();
     }
 }

src/ksf.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) VexaHub and contributors.
+// Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates.
+
+//! Trait specifying a key stretching function
+
+use generic_array::{ArrayLength, GenericArray};
+
+use crate::errors::InternalError;
+
+/// Used for the key stretching function in OPAQUE
+pub trait Ksf: Default {
+    /// Computes the key stretching function
+    fn hash<L: ArrayLength>(
+        &self,
+        input: GenericArray<u8, L>,
+    ) -> Result<GenericArray<u8, L>, InternalError>;
+}
+
+/// A no-op hash which simply returns its input
+#[derive(Default)]
+pub struct Identity;
+
+impl Ksf for Identity {
+    fn hash<L: ArrayLength>(
+        &self,
+        input: GenericArray<u8, L>,
+    ) -> Result<GenericArray<u8, L>, InternalError> {
+        Ok(input)
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "argon2")]
+impl Ksf for argon2::Argon2<'_> {
+    fn hash<L: ArrayLength>(
+        &self,
+        input: GenericArray<u8, L>,
+    ) -> Result<GenericArray<u8, L>, InternalError> {
+        let mut output = GenericArray::default();
+        self.hash_password_into(&input, &[0; argon2::RECOMMENDED_SALT_LEN], &mut output)
+            .map_err(|_| InternalError::KsfError)?;
+        Ok(output)
+    }
+}

src/map_to_curve.rs

@@ -1,225 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
-//
-// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
-// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
-
-//! Defines the GroupWithMapToCurve trait to specify how to map a password to a
-//! curve point
-
-use crate::errors::InternalPakeError;
-use crate::group::Group;
-use crate::hash::Hash;
-use crate::serialization::i2osp;
-use curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoPoint;
-use digest::{BlockInput, Digest};
-use generic_array::typenum::Unsigned;
-use generic_array::GenericArray;
-
-/// A subtrait of Group specifying how to hash a password into a point
-pub trait GroupWithMapToCurve: Group {
-    /// The ciphersuite identifier as dictated by
-    /// <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-irtf-cfrg-voprf-05.txt>
-    const SUITE_ID: usize;
-
-    /// transforms a password and domain separation tag (DST) into a curve point
-    fn map_to_curve<H: Hash>(msg: &[u8], dst: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, InternalPakeError>;
-
-    /// Generates the contextString parameter as defined in
-    /// <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-irtf-cfrg-voprf-05.txt>
-    fn get_context_string(mode: u8) -> Vec<u8> {
-        [i2osp(mode as usize, 1), i2osp(Self::SUITE_ID, 2)].concat()
-    }
-}
-
-impl GroupWithMapToCurve for RistrettoPoint {
-    const SUITE_ID: usize = 0x0001;
-
-    // Implements the hash_to_ristretto255() function from
-    // https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-10.txt
-    fn map_to_curve<H: Hash>(msg: &[u8], dst: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, InternalPakeError> {
-        let uniform_bytes =
-            expand_message_xmd::<H>(msg, dst, <H as Digest>::OutputSize::to_usize())?;
-        Ok(<Self as Group>::hash_to_curve(
-            &GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&uniform_bytes[..]),
-        ))
-    }
-}
-
-// Computes ceil(x / y)
-fn div_ceil(x: usize, y: usize) -> usize {
-    let additive = (x % y != 0) as usize;
-    x / y + additive
-}
-
-fn xor(x: &[u8], y: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, InternalPakeError> {
-    if x.len() != y.len() {
-        return Err(InternalPakeError::HashToCurveError);
-    }
-
-    Ok(x.iter().zip(y).map(|(&x1, &x2)| x1 ^ x2).collect())
-}
-
-// Corresponds to the expand_message_xmd() function defined in
-// https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-10.txt
-pub(crate) fn expand_message_xmd<H: Hash>(
-    msg: &[u8],
-    dst: &[u8],
-    len_in_bytes: usize,
-) -> Result<Vec<u8>, InternalPakeError> {
-    let b_in_bytes = <H as Digest>::OutputSize::to_usize();
-    let r_in_bytes = <H as BlockInput>::BlockSize::to_usize();
-
-    let ell = div_ceil(len_in_bytes, b_in_bytes);
-    if ell > 255 {
-        return Err(InternalPakeError::HashToCurveError);
-    }
-    let dst_prime = [dst, &i2osp(dst.len(), 1)].concat();
-    let z_pad = i2osp(0, r_in_bytes);
-    let l_i_b_str = i2osp(len_in_bytes, 2);
-    let msg_prime = [&z_pad, msg, &l_i_b_str, &i2osp(0, 1), &dst_prime].concat();
-
-    let mut b: Vec<Vec<u8>> = vec![H::digest(&msg_prime).to_vec()]; // b[0]
-
-    let mut h = H::new();
-    h.update(&b[0]);
-    h.update(&i2osp(1, 1));
-    h.update(&dst_prime);
-    b.push(h.finalize_reset().to_vec()); // b[1]
-
-    let mut uniform_bytes: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
-    uniform_bytes.extend_from_slice(&b[1]);
-
-    for i in 2..(ell + 1) {
-        h.update(xor(&b[0], &b[i - 1])?);
-        h.update(&i2osp(i, 1));
-        h.update(&dst_prime);
-        b.push(h.finalize_reset().to_vec()); // b[i]
-        uniform_bytes.extend_from_slice(&b[i]);
-    }
-
-    Ok(uniform_bytes[..len_in_bytes].to_vec())
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-
-    struct Params {
-        msg: &'static str,
-        len_in_bytes: usize,
-        uniform_bytes: &'static str,
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_expand_message_xmd() {
-        // Test vectors taken from Section K.1 of https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-10.txt
-        let test_vectors: Vec<Params> = vec![
-            Params {
-                msg: "",
-                len_in_bytes: 0x20,
-                uniform_bytes: "f659819a6473c1835b25ea59e3d38914c98b374f0970b7e4c\
-                92181df928fca88",
-            },
-            Params {
-                msg: "abc",
-                len_in_bytes: 0x20,
-                uniform_bytes: "1c38f7c211ef233367b2420d04798fa4698080a8901021a79\
-                5a1151775fe4da7",
-            },
-            Params {
-                msg: "abcdef0123456789",
-                len_in_bytes: 0x20,
-                uniform_bytes: "8f7e7b66791f0da0dbb5ec7c22ec637f79758c0a48170bfb7c4611bd304ece89",
-            },
-            Params {
-                msg: "q128_qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq\
-                qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq\
-                qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq",
-                len_in_bytes: 0x20,
-                uniform_bytes: "72d5aa5ec810370d1f0013c0df2f1d65699494ee2a39f72e\
-                1716b1b964e1c642",
-            },
-            Params {
-                msg: "a512_aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\
-                aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\
-                aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\
-                aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\
-                aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\
-                aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\
-                aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\
-                aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\
-                aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\
-                aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa",
-                len_in_bytes: 0x20,
-                uniform_bytes: "3b8e704fc48336aca4c2a12195b720882f2162a4b7b13a9c\
-                350db46f429b771b",
-            },
-            Params {
-                msg: "",
-                len_in_bytes: 0x80,
-                uniform_bytes: "8bcffd1a3cae24cf9cd7ab85628fd111bb17e3739d3b53f8\
-                9580d217aa79526f1708354a76a402d3569d6a9d19ef3de4d0b991\
-                e4f54b9f20dcde9b95a66824cbdf6c1a963a1913d43fd7ac443a02\
-                fc5d9d8d77e2071b86ab114a9f34150954a7531da568a1ea8c7608\
-                61c0cde2005afc2c114042ee7b5848f5303f0611cf297f",
-            },
-            Params {
-                msg: "abc",
-                len_in_bytes: 0x80,
-                uniform_bytes: "fe994ec51bdaa821598047b3121c149b364b178606d5e72b\
-                fbb713933acc29c186f316baecf7ea22212f2496ef3f785a27e84a\
-                40d8b299cec56032763eceeff4c61bd1fe65ed81decafff4a31d01\
-                98619c0aa0c6c51fca15520789925e813dcfd318b542f879944127\
-                1f4db9ee3b8092a7a2e8d5b75b73e28fb1ab6b4573c192",
-            },
-            Params {
-                msg: "abcdef0123456789",
-                len_in_bytes: 0x80,
-                uniform_bytes: "c9ec7941811b1e19ce98e21db28d22259354d4d0643e3011\
-                75e2f474e030d32694e9dd5520dde93f3600d8edad94e5c3649030\
-                88a7228cc9eff685d7eaac50d5a5a8229d083b51de4ccc3733917f\
-                4b9535a819b445814890b7029b5de805bf62b33a4dc7e24acdf2c9\
-                24e9fe50d55a6b832c8c84c7f82474b34e48c6d43867be",
-            },
-            Params {
-                msg: "q128_qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq\
-                qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq\
-                qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq",
-                len_in_bytes: 0x80,
-                uniform_bytes: "48e256ddba722053ba462b2b93351fc966026e6d6db49318\
-                9798181c5f3feea377b5a6f1d8368d7453faef715f9aecb078cd40\
-                2cbd548c0e179c4ed1e4c7e5b048e0a39d31817b5b24f50db58bb3\
-                720fe96ba53db947842120a068816ac05c159bb5266c63658b4f00\
-                0cbf87b1209a225def8ef1dca917bcda79a1e42acd8069",
-            },
-            Params {
-                msg: "a512_aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\
-                aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\
-                aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\
-                aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\
-                aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\
-                aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\
-                aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\
-                aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\
-                aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\
-                aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa",
-                len_in_bytes: 0x80,
-                uniform_bytes: "396962db47f749ec3b5042ce2452b619607f27fd3939ece2\
-                746a7614fb83a1d097f554df3927b084e55de92c7871430d6b95c2\
-                a13896d8a33bc48587b1f66d21b128a1a8240d5b0c26dfe795a1a8\
-                42a0807bb148b77c2ef82ed4b6c9f7fcb732e7f94466c8b51e52bf\
-                378fba044a31f5cb44583a892f5969dcd73b3fa128816e",
-            },
-        ];
-        let dst = "QUUX-V01-CS02-with-expander";
-
-        for tv in test_vectors {
-            let uniform_bytes = super::expand_message_xmd::<sha2::Sha256>(
-                tv.msg.as_bytes(),
-                dst.as_bytes(),
-                tv.len_in_bytes,
-            )
-            .unwrap();
-            assert_eq!(tv.uniform_bytes, hex::encode(uniform_bytes));
-        }
-    }
-}

src/messages.rs

@@ -1,360 +1,494 @@
-// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
-//
-// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
-// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) VexaHub and contributors.
+// Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates.
 
 //! Contains the messages used for OPAQUE
 
-use crate::{
-    ciphersuite::CipherSuite,
-    envelope::Envelope,
-    errors::{
-        utils::{check_slice_size, check_slice_size_atleast},
-        PakeError, ProtocolError,
-    },
-    group::Group,
-    hash::Hash,
-    key_exchange::traits::{KeyExchange, ToBytes},
-    keypair::{Key, KeyPair, SizedBytesExt},
-    serialization::{serialize, tokenize},
-};
-use generic_array::{typenum::Unsigned, GenericArray};
-use generic_bytes::SizedBytes;
-use std::convert::TryFrom;
-use std::marker::PhantomData;
+use core::ops::Add;
 
-// Messages
-// =========
+use derive_where::derive_where;
+use digest::Output;
+use generic_array::typenum::{Sum, Unsigned};
+use generic_array::{ArrayLength, GenericArray};
+use hybrid_array::Array;
+use rand::{CryptoRng, Rng};
+use voprf::{BlindedElement, BlindedElementLen, EvaluationElement, EvaluationElementLen};
+use zeroize::Zeroizing;
+
+use crate::ciphersuite::{CipherSuite, KeGroup, OprfGroup, OprfHash};
+use crate::envelope::{Envelope, EnvelopeLen};
+use crate::errors::ProtocolError;
+use crate::hash::OutputSize;
+use crate::key_exchange::group::Group;
+use crate::key_exchange::shared::NonceLen;
+use crate::key_exchange::{
+    Deserialize, Ke1MessageLen, Ke2MessageLen, Ke3MessageLen, KeyExchange, Serialize,
+    SerializedCredentialRequest, SerializedCredentialResponse,
+};
+use crate::keypair::PublicKey;
+use crate::opaque::{
+    MaskedResponse, MaskedResponseLen, ServerLogin, ServerLoginStartResult, ServerSetup,
+};
+use crate::serialization::{ConcatExt, SliceExt};
+
+////////////////////////////
+// High-level API Structs //
+// ====================== //
+////////////////////////////
 
 /// The message sent by the client to the server, to initiate registration
-pub struct RegistrationRequest<Grp> {
+#[cfg_attr(
+    feature = "serde",
+    derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize),
+    serde(bound = "")
+)]
+#[derive_where(Clone)]
+#[derive_where(Debug, Eq, Hash, Ord, PartialEq, PartialOrd; voprf::BlindedElement<CS::OprfCs>)]
+pub struct RegistrationRequest<CS: CipherSuite> {
     /// blinded password information
-    pub(crate) alpha: Grp,
-}
-
-impl<Grp: Group> TryFrom<&[u8]> for RegistrationRequest<Grp> {
-    type Error = ProtocolError;
-    fn try_from(first_message_bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
-        let elem_len = Grp::ElemLen::to_usize();
-        let checked_slice = check_slice_size(first_message_bytes, elem_len, "first_message_bytes")?;
-
-        // Check that the message is actually containing an element of the
-        // correct subgroup
-        let arr = GenericArray::from_slice(&checked_slice[checked_slice.len() - elem_len..]);
-        let alpha = Grp::from_element_slice(arr)?;
-        Ok(Self { alpha })
-    }
-}
-
-impl<Grp: Group> RegistrationRequest<Grp> {
-    /// Byte representation for the registration request
-    pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        self.alpha.to_arr().to_vec()
-    }
-
-    /// Serialization into bytes
-    pub fn serialize(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        self.alpha.to_arr().to_vec()
-    }
-
-    /// Deserialization from bytes
-    pub fn deserialize(input: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
-        let checked_slice =
-            check_slice_size(&input, Grp::ElemLen::to_usize(), "first_message_bytes")?;
-        // Check that the message is actually containing an element of the
-        // correct subgroup
-        let arr = GenericArray::from_slice(checked_slice);
-        let alpha = Grp::from_element_slice(arr)?;
-        Ok(Self { alpha })
-    }
+    pub(crate) blinded_element: BlindedElement<CS::OprfCs>,
 }
 
 /// The answer sent by the server to the user, upon reception of the
 /// registration attempt
-pub struct RegistrationResponse<Grp> {
+#[cfg_attr(
+    feature = "serde",
+    derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize),
+    serde(bound(
+        deserialize = "<KeGroup<CS> as Group>::Pk: serde::Deserialize<'de>",
+        serialize = "<KeGroup<CS> as Group>::Pk: serde::Serialize"
+    ))
+)]
+#[derive_where(Clone)]
+#[derive_where(Debug, Eq, Hash, Ord, PartialEq, PartialOrd; voprf::EvaluationElement<CS::OprfCs>, <KeGroup<CS> as Group>::Pk
+)]
+pub struct RegistrationResponse<CS: CipherSuite> {
     /// The server's oprf output
-    pub(crate) beta: Grp,
+    pub(crate) evaluation_element: EvaluationElement<CS::OprfCs>,
     /// Server's static public key
-    pub(crate) server_s_pk: Vec<u8>,
-}
-
-impl<Grp> TryFrom<&[u8]> for RegistrationResponse<Grp>
-where
-    Grp: Group,
-{
-    type Error = ProtocolError;
-
-    fn try_from(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
-        let elem_len = Grp::ElemLen::to_usize();
-        let checked_slice = check_slice_size_atleast(bytes, elem_len, "second_message_bytes")?;
-
-        // Check that the message is actually containing an element of the
-        // correct subgroup
-        let arr = GenericArray::from_slice(&checked_slice[..elem_len]);
-        let beta = Grp::from_element_slice(arr)?;
-
-        // FIXME check public key bytes
-        let server_s_pk = checked_slice[elem_len..].to_vec();
-
-        Ok(Self { beta, server_s_pk })
-    }
-}
-
-impl<Grp> RegistrationResponse<Grp>
-where
-    Grp: Group,
-{
-    /// Byte representation for the registration response message. This does not
-    /// include the envelope credentials format
-    pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        [&self.beta.to_arr().to_vec()[..], &self.server_s_pk[..]].concat()
-    }
-
-    /// Serialization into bytes
-    pub fn serialize(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        let mut registration_response: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
-        registration_response.extend_from_slice(&self.beta.to_arr());
-        registration_response.extend_from_slice(&serialize(&self.server_s_pk, 2));
-        registration_response
-    }
-
-    /// Deserialization from bytes
-    pub fn deserialize(input: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
-        let checked_slice =
-            check_slice_size_atleast(&input, Grp::ElemLen::to_usize(), "second_message_bytes")?;
-
-        // Check that the message is actually containing an element of the
-        // correct subgroup
-        let arr = GenericArray::from_slice(&checked_slice[..Grp::ElemLen::to_usize()]);
-        let beta = Grp::from_element_slice(arr)?;
-
-        let (server_s_pk, remainder) = tokenize(&checked_slice[Grp::ElemLen::to_usize()..], 2)?;
-        if !remainder.is_empty() {
-            return Err(PakeError::SerializationError.into());
-        }
-
-        Ok(Self { server_s_pk, beta })
-    }
+    pub(crate) server_s_pk: PublicKey<KeGroup<CS>>,
 }
 
 /// The final message from the client, containing sealed cryptographic
 /// identifiers
-pub struct RegistrationUpload<D: Hash, G: Group> {
-    /// The "envelope" generated by the user, containing sealed
-    /// cryptographic identifiers
-    pub(crate) envelope: Envelope<D>,
+#[cfg_attr(
+    feature = "serde",
+    derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize),
+    serde(bound(
+        deserialize = "<KeGroup<CS> as Group>::Pk: serde::Deserialize<'de>",
+        serialize = "<KeGroup<CS> as Group>::Pk: serde::Serialize"
+    ))
+)]
+#[derive_where(Clone, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
+#[derive_where(Debug, Eq, Hash, Ord, PartialEq, PartialOrd; <KeGroup<CS> as Group>::Pk)]
+pub struct RegistrationUpload<CS: CipherSuite> {
+    /// The "envelope" generated by the user, containing sealed cryptographic
+    /// identifiers
+    pub(crate) envelope: Envelope<CS>,
+    /// The masking key used to mask the envelope
+    pub(crate) masking_key: Output<OprfHash<CS>>,
     /// The user's public key
-    pub(crate) client_s_pk: Key,
-    pub(crate) _g: PhantomData<G>,
-}
-
-impl<D: Hash, G: Group> TryFrom<&[u8]> for RegistrationUpload<D, G> {
-    type Error = ProtocolError;
-
-    fn try_from(third_message_bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
-        let key_len = <Key as SizedBytes>::Len::to_usize();
-        let envelope_size = key_len + Envelope::<D>::additional_size();
-        let checked_bytes = check_slice_size(
-            third_message_bytes,
-            envelope_size + key_len,
-            "third_message",
-        )?;
-        let unchecked_client_s_pk = Key::from_bytes(&checked_bytes[envelope_size..])?;
-        let client_s_pk = KeyPair::<G>::check_public_key(unchecked_client_s_pk)?;
-
-        Ok(Self {
-            envelope: Envelope::<D>::from_bytes(&checked_bytes[..envelope_size])?,
-            client_s_pk,
-            _g: PhantomData,
-        })
-    }
-}
-
-impl<D: Hash, G: Group> RegistrationUpload<D, G> {
-    /// Serialization into bytes
-    pub fn serialize(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        let mut message: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
-        message.extend_from_slice(&serialize(&self.client_s_pk.to_arr(), 2));
-        message.extend_from_slice(&self.envelope.serialize());
-        message
-    }
-
-    /// Deserialization from bytes
-    pub fn deserialize(input: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
-        let (client_s_pk, remainder) = tokenize(&input, 2)?;
-        let (envelope, remainder) = Envelope::<D>::deserialize(&remainder)?;
-
-        if !remainder.is_empty() {
-            return Err(PakeError::SerializationError.into());
-        }
-
-        Ok(Self {
-            envelope,
-            client_s_pk: KeyPair::<G>::check_public_key(Key::from_bytes(&client_s_pk)?)?,
-            _g: PhantomData,
-        })
-    }
+    #[derive_where(skip(Zeroize))]
+    pub(crate) client_s_pk: PublicKey<KeGroup<CS>>,
 }
 
 /// The message sent by the user to the server, to initiate registration
+#[cfg_attr(
+    feature = "serde",
+    derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize),
+    serde(bound(
+        deserialize = "<CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE1Message: serde::Deserialize<'de>",
+        serialize = "<CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE1Message: serde::Serialize"
+    ))
+)]
+#[derive_where(Clone, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
+#[derive_where(
+    Debug, Eq, Hash, PartialEq;
+    voprf::BlindedElement<CS::OprfCs>,
+    <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE1Message,
+)]
 pub struct CredentialRequest<CS: CipherSuite> {
-    /// blinded password information
-    pub(crate) alpha: CS::Group,
-    pub(crate) ke1_message: <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange<CS::Hash, CS::Group>>::KE1Message,
+    pub(crate) blinded_element: BlindedElement<CS::OprfCs>,
+    pub(crate) ke1_message: <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE1Message,
 }
 
-impl<CS: CipherSuite> TryFrom<&[u8]> for CredentialRequest<CS> {
-    type Error = ProtocolError;
-    fn try_from(first_message_bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
-        Self::deserialize(first_message_bytes)
+/// Builder for [`ServerLogin`] when using remote keys.
+#[cfg_attr(
+    feature = "serde",
+    derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize),
+    serde(bound(
+        deserialize = "SK: serde::Deserialize<'de>, <CS::KeyExchange as \
+                       KeyExchange>::KE2Builder<'a, CS>: serde::Deserialize<'de>",
+        serialize = "SK: serde::Serialize, <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE2Builder<'a, CS>: \
+                     serde::Serialize"
+    ))
+)]
+#[derive_where(Clone)]
+#[derive_where(
+    Debug, Eq, PartialEq;
+    <KeGroup<CS> as Group>::Pk,
+    SK,
+    voprf::EvaluationElement<CS::OprfCs>,
+    <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE2Builder<'a, CS>,
+)]
+pub struct ServerLoginBuilder<'a, CS: CipherSuite, SK: Clone> {
+    pub(crate) server_s_sk: SK,
+    pub(crate) evaluation_element: EvaluationElement<CS::OprfCs>,
+    pub(crate) masking_nonce: Zeroizing<GenericArray<u8, NonceLen>>,
+    pub(crate) masked_response: MaskedResponse<CS>,
+    #[cfg(test)]
+    pub(crate) oprf_key: Zeroizing<GenericArray<u8, <OprfGroup<CS> as voprf::Group>::ScalarLen>>,
+    pub(crate) ke2_builder: <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE2Builder<'a, CS>,
+}
+
+impl<CS: CipherSuite, SK: Clone> ServerLoginBuilder<'_, CS, SK> {
+    /// The returned data here has to be processed and the result given as an
+    /// input to [`ServerLoginBuilder::build()`]. To understand what kind of
+    /// output is expected here and how to process it, refer to the
+    /// documentation of your chosen [`CipherSuite::KeyExchange`].
+    pub fn data(&self) -> <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE2BuilderData<'_, CS> {
+        CS::KeyExchange::ke2_builder_data(&self.ke2_builder)
+    }
+
+    /// The handle to the corresponding [`ServerSetup`]s private key.
+    pub fn private_key(&self) -> &SK {
+        &self.server_s_sk
+    }
+
+    /// Build [`ServerLogin`] after attaining the input for the key exchange. To
+    /// understand what kind of input is expected here, refer to the
+    /// documentation of your chosen [`CipherSuite::KeyExchange`].
+    ///
+    /// See [`ServerLogin::start()`] for the regular path.
+    pub fn build(
+        self,
+        input: <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE2BuilderInput<CS>,
+    ) -> Result<ServerLoginStartResult<CS>, ProtocolError> {
+        ServerLogin::build(self, input)
     }
 }
 
-impl<CS: CipherSuite> CredentialRequest<CS> {
-    /// byte representation for the login request
-    pub(crate) fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        [&self.alpha.to_arr()[..], &self.ke1_message.to_bytes()].concat()
-    }
-
-    /// Serialization into bytes
-    pub fn serialize(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        let mut credential_request: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
-        credential_request.extend_from_slice(&self.alpha.to_arr());
-        credential_request.extend_from_slice(&self.ke1_message.to_bytes());
-        credential_request
-    }
-
-    /// Deserialization from bytes
-    pub fn deserialize(input: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
-        let elem_len = <CS::Group as Group>::ElemLen::to_usize();
-
-        let checked_slice =
-            check_slice_size_atleast(&input, elem_len, "login_first_message_bytes")?;
-
-        // Check that the message is actually containing an element of the
-        // correct subgroup
-        let arr = GenericArray::from_slice(&checked_slice[..elem_len]);
-        let alpha = CS::Group::from_element_slice(arr)?;
-
-        let ke1_message =
-            <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange<CS::Hash, CS::Group>>::KE1Message::try_from(
-                &checked_slice[elem_len..],
-            )?;
-
-        Ok(Self { alpha, ke1_message })
-    }
-}
-
-/// The answer sent by the server to the user, upon reception of the
-/// login attempt
+/// The answer sent by the server to the user, upon reception of the login
+/// attempt
+#[cfg_attr(
+    feature = "serde",
+    derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize),
+    serde(bound(
+        deserialize = "<CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE2Message: serde::Deserialize<'de>",
+        serialize = "<CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE2Message: serde::Serialize"
+    ))
+)]
+#[derive_where(Clone)]
+#[derive_where(
+    Debug, Eq, Hash, PartialEq;
+    EvaluationElement<CS::OprfCs>,
+    <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE2Message,
+)]
 pub struct CredentialResponse<CS: CipherSuite> {
     /// the server's oprf output
-    pub(crate) beta: CS::Group,
-    pub(crate) server_s_pk: Key,
-    /// the user's sealed information,
-    pub(crate) envelope: Envelope<CS::Hash>,
-    pub(crate) ke2_message: <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange<CS::Hash, CS::Group>>::KE2Message,
+    pub(crate) evaluation_element: EvaluationElement<CS::OprfCs>,
+    pub(crate) masking_nonce: GenericArray<u8, NonceLen>,
+    pub(crate) masked_response: MaskedResponse<CS>,
+    pub(crate) ke2_message: <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE2Message,
 }
 
-impl<CS: CipherSuite> CredentialResponse<CS> {
-    /// Serialization into bytes
-    pub fn serialize(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        [
-            Self::serialize_without_ke(&self.beta, &self.server_s_pk, &self.envelope),
-            self.ke2_message.to_bytes(),
-        ]
-        .concat()
+/// The answer sent by the client to the server, upon reception of the sealed
+/// envelope
+#[cfg_attr(
+    feature = "serde",
+    derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize),
+    serde(bound(
+        deserialize = "<CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE3Message: serde::Deserialize<'de>",
+        serialize = "<CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE3Message: serde::Serialize"
+    ))
+)]
+#[derive_where(Clone)]
+#[derive_where(
+    Debug, Eq, Hash, PartialEq;
+    <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE3Message,
+)]
+pub struct CredentialFinalization<CS: CipherSuite> {
+    pub(crate) ke3_message: <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE3Message,
+}
+
+////////////////////////////////
+// High-level Implementations //
+// ========================== //
+////////////////////////////////
+
+/// Length of [`RegistrationRequest`] in bytes for serialization.
+pub type RegistrationRequestLen<CS: CipherSuite> = <OprfGroup<CS> as voprf::Group>::ElemLen;
+
+impl<CS: CipherSuite> RegistrationRequest<CS> {
+    /// Only used for testing purposes
+    #[cfg(test)]
+    pub(crate) fn get_blinded_element_for_testing(&self) -> BlindedElement<CS::OprfCs> {
+        self.blinded_element.clone()
     }
 
-    pub(crate) fn serialize_without_ke(
-        beta: &CS::Group,
-        server_s_pk: &Key,
-        envelope: &Envelope<CS::Hash>,
-    ) -> Vec<u8> {
-        [
-            &beta.to_arr(),
-            &serialize(&server_s_pk.to_arr().to_vec(), 2)[..],
-            &envelope.to_bytes(),
-        ]
-        .concat()
+    /// Serialization into bytes
+    pub fn serialize(&self) -> Array<u8, RegistrationRequestLen<CS>> {
+        <OprfGroup<CS> as voprf::Group>::serialize_elem(self.blinded_element.value())
     }
 
     /// Deserialization from bytes
     pub fn deserialize(input: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
-        Self::try_from(input)
-    }
-}
-
-impl<CS: CipherSuite> TryFrom<&[u8]> for CredentialResponse<CS> {
-    type Error = ProtocolError;
-    fn try_from(second_message_bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
-        let elem_len = <CS::Group as Group>::ElemLen::to_usize();
-        let checked_slice =
-            check_slice_size_atleast(second_message_bytes, elem_len, "login_second_message_bytes")?;
-
-        // Check that the message is actually containing an element of the
-        // correct subgroup
-        let beta_bytes = &checked_slice[..elem_len];
-        let arr = GenericArray::from_slice(beta_bytes);
-        let beta = CS::Group::from_element_slice(arr)?;
-
-        let (serialized_server_s_pk, remainder) = tokenize(&checked_slice[elem_len..], 2)?;
-        let sized_server_s_pk = check_slice_size(
-            &serialized_server_s_pk[..],
-            <Key as SizedBytes>::Len::to_usize(),
-            "server_s_pk in credential_response",
-        )?;
-        let unchecked_server_s_pk = Key::from_bytes(&sized_server_s_pk[..])?;
-        let server_s_pk = KeyPair::<CS::Group>::check_public_key(unchecked_server_s_pk)?;
-
-        let (envelope, remainder) = Envelope::<CS::Hash>::deserialize(&remainder)?;
-
-        let ke2_message_size = CS::KeyExchange::ke2_message_size();
-        let checked_remainder =
-            check_slice_size_atleast(&remainder, ke2_message_size, "login_second_message_bytes")?;
-        let ke2_message =
-            <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange<CS::Hash, CS::Group>>::KE2Message::try_from(
-                &checked_remainder,
-            )?;
-
+        let elem_len = <OprfGroup<CS> as voprf::Group>::ElemLen::USIZE;
+        if input.len() < elem_len {
+            return Err(ProtocolError::SerializationError);
+        }
         Ok(Self {
-            beta,
-            server_s_pk,
-            envelope,
-            ke2_message,
+            blinded_element: BlindedElement::deserialize(input)?,
         })
     }
 }
 
-/// The answer sent by the client to the server, upon reception of the
-/// sealed envelope
-pub struct CredentialFinalization<CS: CipherSuite> {
-    pub(crate) ke3_message: <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange<CS::Hash, CS::Group>>::KE3Message,
-}
+/// Length of [`RegistrationResponse`] in bytes for serialization.
+pub type RegistrationResponseLen<CS: CipherSuite> =
+    Sum<<OprfGroup<CS> as voprf::Group>::ElemLen, <KeGroup<CS> as Group>::PkLen>;
 
-impl<CS: CipherSuite> TryFrom<&[u8]> for CredentialFinalization<CS> {
-    type Error = ProtocolError;
-
-    fn try_from(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
-        let ke3_message =
-            <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange<CS::Hash, CS::Group>>::KE3Message::try_from(bytes)?;
-        Ok(Self { ke3_message })
-    }
-}
-
-impl<CS: CipherSuite> CredentialFinalization<CS> {
+impl<CS: CipherSuite> RegistrationResponse<CS> {
     /// Serialization into bytes
-    pub fn serialize(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        self.ke3_message.to_bytes()
+    pub fn serialize(&self) -> GenericArray<u8, RegistrationResponseLen<CS>>
+    where
+        // RegistrationResponse: KgPk + KePk
+        <OprfGroup<CS> as voprf::Group>::ElemLen: Add<<KeGroup<CS> as Group>::PkLen> + ArrayLength,
+        RegistrationResponseLen<CS>: ArrayLength,
+    {
+        let elem = GenericArray::from_ha0_4(<OprfGroup<CS> as voprf::Group>::serialize_elem(
+            self.evaluation_element.value(),
+        ));
+
+        elem.cat(self.server_s_pk.serialize())
     }
 
     /// Deserialization from bytes
-    pub fn deserialize(input: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
-        Self::try_from(&input[..])
+    pub fn deserialize(mut input: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
+        let elem_len = EvaluationElementLen::<CS::OprfCs>::USIZE;
+        if input.len() < elem_len {
+            return Err(ProtocolError::SerializationError);
+        }
+        let evaluation_element = EvaluationElement::deserialize(&input[..elem_len])?;
+        input = &input[elem_len..];
+
+        Ok(Self {
+            evaluation_element,
+            server_s_pk: PublicKey::deserialize_take(&mut input)?,
+        })
     }
 
-    /// byte representation for the login finalization
-    pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
-        self.ke3_message.to_bytes()
+    #[cfg(test)]
+    /// Only used for tests, where we can set the beta value to test for the
+    /// reflection error case
+    pub(crate) fn set_evaluation_element_for_testing(
+        &self,
+        beta: <OprfGroup<CS> as voprf::Group>::Elem,
+    ) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            evaluation_element: EvaluationElement::from_value_unchecked(beta),
+            server_s_pk: self.server_s_pk.clone(),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Length of [`RegistrationUpload`] in bytes for serialization.
+pub type RegistrationUploadLen<CS: CipherSuite> =
+    Sum<Sum<<KeGroup<CS> as Group>::PkLen, OutputSize<OprfHash<CS>>>, EnvelopeLen<CS>>;
+
+impl<CS: CipherSuite> RegistrationUpload<CS> {
+    /// Serialization into bytes
+    pub fn serialize(&self) -> GenericArray<u8, RegistrationUploadLen<CS>>
+    where
+        // RegistrationUpload: (KePk + Hash) + Envelope
+        <KeGroup<CS> as Group>::PkLen: Add<OutputSize<OprfHash<CS>>>,
+        Sum<<KeGroup<CS> as Group>::PkLen, OutputSize<OprfHash<CS>>>:
+            ArrayLength + Add<EnvelopeLen<CS>>,
+        RegistrationUploadLen<CS>: ArrayLength,
+    {
+        self.client_s_pk
+            .serialize()
+            .cat(GenericArray::from_slice(self.masking_key.as_slice()).clone())
+            .cat(self.envelope.serialize())
+    }
+
+    /// Deserialization from bytes
+    pub fn deserialize(mut input: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
+        Ok(Self {
+            client_s_pk: PublicKey::deserialize_take(&mut input)?,
+            masking_key: input.take_array("masking key")?.into_ha0_4(),
+            envelope: Envelope::deserialize_take(&mut input)?,
+        })
+    }
+
+    // Creates a dummy instance used for faking a [CredentialResponse]
+    pub(crate) fn dummy<R: Rng + CryptoRng, SK: Clone, OS: Clone>(
+        rng: &mut R,
+        server_setup: &ServerSetup<CS, SK, OS>,
+    ) -> Self {
+        let mut masking_key = Output::<OprfHash<CS>>::default();
+        rng.fill_bytes(&mut masking_key);
+
+        Self {
+            envelope: Envelope::<CS>::dummy(),
+            masking_key,
+            client_s_pk: server_setup.dummy_pk.clone(),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Length of [`CredentialRequest`] in bytes for serialization.
+pub type CredentialRequestLen<CS: CipherSuite> =
+    Sum<<OprfGroup<CS> as voprf::Group>::ElemLen, Ke1MessageLen<CS>>;
+
+impl<CS: CipherSuite> CredentialRequest<CS> {
+    /// Serialization into bytes
+    pub fn serialize(&self) -> GenericArray<u8, CredentialRequestLen<CS>>
+    where
+        <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE1Message: Serialize,
+        // CredentialRequest: KgPk + Ke1Message
+        <OprfGroup<CS> as voprf::Group>::ElemLen: Add<Ke1MessageLen<CS>> + ArrayLength,
+        CredentialRequestLen<CS>: ArrayLength,
+    {
+        let elem = GenericArray::from_ha0_4(<OprfGroup<CS> as voprf::Group>::serialize_elem(
+            self.blinded_element.value(),
+        ));
+
+        elem.cat(self.ke1_message.serialize())
+    }
+
+    /// Deserialization from bytes
+    pub fn deserialize(mut input: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError>
+    where
+        <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE1Message: Deserialize,
+    {
+        Self::deserialize_take(&mut input)
+    }
+
+    pub(crate) fn deserialize_take(input: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError>
+    where
+        <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE1Message: Deserialize,
+    {
+        let elem_len = BlindedElementLen::<CS::OprfCs>::USIZE;
+        if input.len() < elem_len {
+            return Err(ProtocolError::SerializationError);
+        }
+        let blinded_element = BlindedElement::deserialize(&input[..elem_len])?;
+        *input = &input[elem_len..];
+
+        Ok(Self {
+            blinded_element,
+            ke1_message: <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE1Message::deserialize_take(input)?,
+        })
+    }
+
+    pub(crate) fn to_parts(&self) -> SerializedCredentialRequest<CS> {
+        SerializedCredentialRequest::new(&self.blinded_element)
+    }
+
+    /// Only used for testing purposes
+    #[cfg(test)]
+    pub(crate) fn get_blinded_element_for_testing(&self) -> BlindedElement<CS::OprfCs> {
+        self.blinded_element.clone()
+    }
+}
+
+/// Length of [`CredentialResponse`] in bytes for serialization.
+pub type CredentialResponseLen<CS: CipherSuite> =
+    Sum<CredentialResponseWithoutKeLen<CS>, Ke2MessageLen<CS>>;
+
+pub(crate) type CredentialResponseWithoutKeLen<CS: CipherSuite> =
+    Sum<Sum<<OprfGroup<CS> as voprf::Group>::ElemLen, NonceLen>, MaskedResponseLen<CS>>;
+
+impl<CS: CipherSuite> CredentialResponse<CS> {
+    /// Serialization into bytes
+    pub fn serialize(&self) -> GenericArray<u8, CredentialResponseLen<CS>>
+    where
+        <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE2Message: Serialize,
+        // CredentialResponseWithoutKeLen: (KgPk + Nonce) + MaskedResponse
+        <OprfGroup<CS> as voprf::Group>::ElemLen: Add<NonceLen> + ArrayLength,
+        Sum<<OprfGroup<CS> as voprf::Group>::ElemLen, NonceLen>:
+            ArrayLength + Add<MaskedResponseLen<CS>>,
+        CredentialResponseWithoutKeLen<CS>: ArrayLength,
+        // CredentialResponse: CredentialResponseWithoutKeLen + Ke2Message
+        CredentialResponseWithoutKeLen<CS>: Add<Ke2MessageLen<CS>>,
+        CredentialResponseLen<CS>: ArrayLength,
+    {
+        let elem = GenericArray::from_ha0_4(<OprfGroup<CS> as voprf::Group>::serialize_elem(
+            self.evaluation_element.value(),
+        ));
+
+        elem.cat(self.masking_nonce)
+            .cat(self.masked_response.serialize())
+            .cat(self.ke2_message.serialize())
+    }
+
+    /// Deserialization from bytes
+    pub fn deserialize(mut input: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError>
+    where
+        <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE2Message: Deserialize,
+    {
+        let elem_len = EvaluationElementLen::<CS::OprfCs>::USIZE;
+        if input.len() < elem_len {
+            return Err(ProtocolError::SerializationError);
+        }
+        let evaluation_element = EvaluationElement::deserialize(&input[..elem_len])?;
+        input = &input[elem_len..];
+
+        Ok(Self {
+            evaluation_element,
+            masking_nonce: input.take_array("masking nonce")?,
+            masked_response: MaskedResponse::deserialize_take(&mut input)?,
+            ke2_message: <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE2Message::deserialize_take(
+                &mut input,
+            )?,
+        })
+    }
+
+    pub(crate) fn to_parts(&self) -> SerializedCredentialResponse<CS> {
+        SerializedCredentialResponse::new(
+            &self.evaluation_element,
+            self.masking_nonce,
+            self.masked_response.clone(),
+        )
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(test)]
+    /// Only used for tests, where we can set the beta value to test for the
+    /// reflection error case
+    pub(crate) fn set_evaluation_element_for_testing(
+        &self,
+        beta: <OprfGroup<CS> as voprf::Group>::Elem,
+    ) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            evaluation_element: EvaluationElement::from_value_unchecked(beta),
+            masking_nonce: self.masking_nonce,
+            masked_response: self.masked_response.clone(),
+            ke2_message: self.ke2_message.clone(),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Length of [`CredentialFinalization`] in bytes for serialization.
+pub type CredentialFinalizationLen<CS: CipherSuite> = Ke3MessageLen<CS>;
+
+impl<CS: CipherSuite> CredentialFinalization<CS> {
+    /// Serialization into bytes
+    pub fn serialize(&self) -> GenericArray<u8, CredentialFinalizationLen<CS>>
+    where
+        <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE3Message: Serialize,
+    {
+        self.ke3_message.serialize()
+    }
+
+    /// Deserialization from bytes
+    pub fn deserialize(mut input: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError>
+    where
+        <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE3Message: Deserialize,
+    {
+        Ok(Self {
+            ke3_message: <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE3Message::deserialize_take(
+                &mut input,
+            )?,
+        })
     }
 }

src/oprf.rs

@@ -1,166 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
-//
-// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
-// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
-
-use crate::{
-    errors::InternalPakeError, group::Group, hash::Hash, map_to_curve::GroupWithMapToCurve,
-    serialization::serialize,
-};
-use digest::Digest;
-use generic_array::GenericArray;
-use rand_core::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
-
-/// Used to store the OPRF input and blinding factor
-pub struct Token<Grp: Group> {
-    pub(crate) data: Vec<u8>,
-    pub(crate) blind: Grp::Scalar,
-}
-
-static STR_VOPRF: &[u8] = b"VOPRF06-HashToGroup-";
-static STR_VOPRF_FINALIZE: &[u8] = b"VOPRF06-Finalize-";
-static MODE_BASE: u8 = 0x00;
-
-/// Computes the first step for the multiplicative blinding version of DH-OPRF. This
-/// message is sent from the client (who holds the input) to the server (who holds the OPRF key).
-/// The client can also pass in an optional "pepper" string to be mixed in with the input through
-/// an HKDF computation.
-pub(crate) fn blind<R: RngCore + CryptoRng, G: GroupWithMapToCurve, H: Hash>(
-    input: &[u8],
-    blinding_factor_rng: &mut R,
-) -> Result<(Token<G>, G), InternalPakeError> {
-    let blind = G::random_scalar(blinding_factor_rng);
-    let dst = [STR_VOPRF, &G::get_context_string(MODE_BASE)].concat();
-    let mapped_point = G::map_to_curve::<H>(input, &dst)?;
-    let blind_token = mapped_point * &blind;
-    Ok((
-        Token {
-            data: input.to_vec(),
-            blind,
-        },
-        blind_token,
-    ))
-}
-
-/// Computes the second step for the multiplicative blinding version of DH-OPRF. This
-/// message is sent from the server (who holds the OPRF key) to the client.
-pub(crate) fn evaluate<G: Group>(point: G, oprf_key: &G::Scalar) -> G {
-    point * oprf_key
-}
-
-/// Computes the third step for the multiplicative blinding version of DH-OPRF, in which
-/// the client unblinds the server's message.
-pub(crate) fn unblind<G: Group>(token: &Token<G>, point: G) -> Vec<u8> {
-    let unblinded = point * &G::scalar_invert(&token.blind);
-    unblinded.to_arr().to_vec()
-}
-
-pub(crate) fn finalize<G: GroupWithMapToCurve, H: Hash>(
-    token_data: &[u8],
-    issued_token: &[u8],
-    info: &[u8],
-) -> GenericArray<u8, <H as Digest>::OutputSize> {
-    let finalize_dst = [STR_VOPRF_FINALIZE, &G::get_context_string(MODE_BASE)].concat();
-    let hash_input = [
-        serialize(token_data, 2),
-        serialize(issued_token, 2),
-        serialize(info, 2),
-        serialize(&finalize_dst, 2),
-    ]
-    .concat();
-    <H as Digest>::digest(&hash_input)
-}
-
-////////////////////////
-// Benchmarking shims //
-////////////////////////
-
-#[cfg(feature = "bench")]
-#[doc(hidden)]
-#[inline]
-pub fn blind_shim<R: RngCore + CryptoRng, G: GroupWithMapToCurve, H: Hash>(
-    input: &[u8],
-    blinding_factor_rng: &mut R,
-) -> Result<(Token<G>, G), InternalPakeError> {
-    blind::<R, G, H>(input, blinding_factor_rng)
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "bench")]
-#[doc(hidden)]
-#[inline]
-pub fn evaluate_shim<G: Group>(point: G, oprf_key: &G::Scalar) -> G {
-    evaluate(point, oprf_key)
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "bench")]
-#[doc(hidden)]
-#[inline]
-pub fn unblind_and_finalize_shim<G: GroupWithMapToCurve, H: Hash>(
-    token: &Token<G>,
-    point: G,
-) -> Result<GenericArray<u8, <H as Digest>::OutputSize>, InternalPakeError> {
-    Ok(finalize::<G, H>(
-        &token.data,
-        &unblind::<G>(token, point),
-        b"",
-    ))
-}
-
-///////////
-// Tests //
-// ===== //
-///////////
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-    use crate::group::Group;
-    use curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoPoint;
-    use generic_array::{arr, GenericArray};
-    use rand_core::OsRng;
-    use sha2::Sha512;
-
-    fn prf(input: &[u8], oprf_key: &[u8; 32]) -> GenericArray<u8, <Sha512 as Digest>::OutputSize> {
-        let dst = [STR_VOPRF, &RistrettoPoint::get_context_string(MODE_BASE)].concat();
-        let point = RistrettoPoint::map_to_curve::<Sha512>(input, &dst).unwrap();
-        let scalar =
-            RistrettoPoint::from_scalar_slice(GenericArray::from_slice(&oprf_key[..])).unwrap();
-        let res = point * scalar;
-
-        finalize::<RistrettoPoint, sha2::Sha512>(&input, &res.to_arr().to_vec(), b"")
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn oprf_retrieval() -> Result<(), InternalPakeError> {
-        let input = b"hunter2";
-        let mut rng = OsRng;
-        let (token, alpha) = blind::<_, RistrettoPoint, Sha512>(&input[..], &mut rng)?;
-        let oprf_key_bytes = arr![
-            u8; 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23,
-            24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32,
-        ];
-        let oprf_key = RistrettoPoint::from_scalar_slice(&oprf_key_bytes)?;
-        let beta = evaluate::<RistrettoPoint>(alpha, &oprf_key);
-        let res =
-            finalize::<RistrettoPoint, sha2::Sha512>(&token.data, &unblind(&token, beta), b"");
-        let res2 = prf(&input[..], &oprf_key.as_bytes());
-        assert_eq!(res, res2);
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn oprf_inversion_unsalted() {
-        let mut rng = OsRng;
-        let mut input = vec![0u8; 64];
-        rng.fill_bytes(&mut input);
-        let (token, alpha) = blind::<_, RistrettoPoint, sha2::Sha512>(&input, &mut rng).unwrap();
-        let res =
-            finalize::<RistrettoPoint, sha2::Sha512>(&token.data, &unblind(&token, alpha), b"");
-
-        let dst = [STR_VOPRF, &RistrettoPoint::get_context_string(MODE_BASE)].concat();
-        let point = RistrettoPoint::map_to_curve::<Sha512>(&input, &dst).unwrap();
-        let res2 = finalize::<RistrettoPoint, sha2::Sha512>(&input, &point.to_arr().to_vec(), b"");
-
-        assert_eq!(res, res2);
-    }
-}

src/serialization/mod.rs

@@ -1,57 +1,156 @@
-// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
-//
-// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
-// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) VexaHub and contributors.
+// Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates.
 
-use crate::errors::PakeError;
+use core::ops::Add;
+
+use crate::errors::ProtocolError;
+use digest::Update;
+use generic_array::sequence::Concat;
+use generic_array::typenum::Sum;
+use generic_array::{ArrayLength, GenericArray};
+use hybrid_array::{Array, ArraySize};
 
 // Corresponds to the I2OSP() function from RFC8017
-pub(crate) fn i2osp(input: usize, length: usize) -> Vec<u8> {
-    if length <= std::mem::size_of::<usize>() {
-        return (&input.to_be_bytes()[std::mem::size_of::<usize>() - length..]).to_vec();
+pub(crate) fn i2osp<L: ArrayLength>(input: usize) -> Result<GenericArray<u8, L>, ProtocolError> {
+    const SIZEOF_USIZE: usize = size_of::<usize>();
+
+    // Make sure input fits in output.
+    if (SIZEOF_USIZE as u32 - input.leading_zeros() / 8) > L::U32 {
+        return Err(ProtocolError::SerializationError);
     }
 
-    let mut output = vec![0u8; length];
-    output.splice(
-        length - std::mem::size_of::<usize>()..length,
-        input.to_be_bytes().iter().cloned(),
-    );
-    output
+    let mut output = GenericArray::default();
+    output[L::USIZE.saturating_sub(SIZEOF_USIZE)..]
+        .copy_from_slice(&input.to_be_bytes()[SIZEOF_USIZE.saturating_sub(L::USIZE)..]);
+    Ok(output)
 }
 
 // Corresponds to the OS2IP() function from RFC8017
-pub(crate) fn os2ip(input: &[u8]) -> Result<usize, PakeError> {
-    if input.len() > std::mem::size_of::<usize>() {
-        return Err(PakeError::SerializationError);
+#[cfg(test)]
+pub(crate) fn os2ip(input: &[u8]) -> Result<usize, ProtocolError> {
+    if input.len() > size_of::<usize>() {
+        return Err(ProtocolError::SerializationError);
     }
 
-    let mut output_array = [0u8; std::mem::size_of::<usize>()];
-    output_array[std::mem::size_of::<usize>() - input.len()..].copy_from_slice(input);
+    let mut output_array = [0u8; size_of::<usize>()];
+    output_array[size_of::<usize>() - input.len()..].copy_from_slice(input);
     Ok(usize::from_be_bytes(output_array))
 }
 
-// Computes I2OSP(len(input), max_bytes) || input
-pub(crate) fn serialize(input: &[u8], max_bytes: usize) -> Vec<u8> {
-    [&i2osp(input.len(), max_bytes), &input[..]].concat()
+pub(crate) trait UpdateExt {
+    fn update_iter<'a>(&mut self, iter: impl Iterator<Item = &'a [u8]>);
+
+    fn chain_iter<'a>(self, iter: impl Iterator<Item = &'a [u8]>) -> Self;
 }
 
-// Tokenizes an input of the format I2OSP(len(input), max_bytes) || input, outputting
-// (input, remainder)
-pub(crate) fn tokenize(input: &[u8], size_bytes: usize) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>), PakeError> {
-    if size_bytes > std::mem::size_of::<usize>() || input.len() < size_bytes {
-        return Err(PakeError::SerializationError);
+impl<T: Update> UpdateExt for T {
+    fn update_iter<'a>(&mut self, iter: impl Iterator<Item = &'a [u8]>) {
+        for bytes in iter {
+            self.update(bytes);
+        }
     }
 
-    let size = os2ip(&input[..size_bytes])?;
-    if size_bytes + size > input.len() {
-        return Err(PakeError::SerializationError);
-    }
+    fn chain_iter<'a>(self, iter: impl Iterator<Item = &'a [u8]>) -> Self {
+        let mut self_ = self;
 
-    Ok((
-        input[size_bytes..size_bytes + size].to_vec(),
-        input[size_bytes + size..].to_vec(),
-    ))
+        for bytes in iter {
+            self_ = self_.chain(bytes);
+        }
+
+        self_
+    }
+}
+
+pub(crate) trait SliceExt {
+    fn take_array<L: ArrayLength + ArraySize>(
+        self: &mut &Self,
+        name: &'static str,
+    ) -> Result<GenericArray<u8, L>, ProtocolError>;
+}
+
+impl SliceExt for [u8] {
+    fn take_array<L: ArrayLength + ArraySize>(
+        self: &mut &Self,
+        name: &'static str,
+    ) -> Result<GenericArray<u8, L>, ProtocolError> {
+        if L::USIZE > self.len() {
+            return Err(ProtocolError::SizeError {
+                name,
+                len: L::USIZE,
+                actual_len: self.len(),
+            });
+        }
+
+        let (front, back) = self.split_at(L::USIZE);
+        *self = back;
+        let arr: Array<u8, L> = Array::try_from(front).unwrap();
+        Ok(GenericArray::from(arr))
+    }
+}
+
+pub(crate) trait GenericArrayExt<O: ArrayLength> {
+    type Output: ArrayLength;
+
+    /// This allows us to concat two [`GenericArray`]s but with `where` bounds
+    /// `Other + Self`. Because sometimes `Self + Other` doesn't imply the
+    /// bounds, and we have to add them to every call.
+    fn concat_ext(&self, rest: &GenericArray<u8, O>) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::Output>;
+}
+
+impl<L: ArrayLength, O: ArrayLength> GenericArrayExt<O> for GenericArray<u8, L>
+where
+    O: Add<L>,
+    Sum<O, L>: ArrayLength,
+{
+    type Output = Sum<O, L>;
+
+    fn concat_ext(&self, other: &GenericArray<u8, O>) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::Output> {
+        let mut output = GenericArray::<u8, O>::default().concat(GenericArray::<u8, L>::default());
+        output[..L::USIZE].copy_from_slice(self);
+        output[L::USIZE..].copy_from_slice(other);
+
+        output
+    }
+}
+
+pub(crate) trait ConcatExt<N: ArrayLength>: Sized {
+    fn cat<M: ArrayLength>(self, other: GenericArray<u8, M>) -> GenericArray<u8, Sum<N, M>>
+    where
+        N: Add<M>,
+        Sum<N, M>: ArrayLength;
+}
+
+impl<N: ArrayLength> ConcatExt<N> for GenericArray<u8, N> {
+    fn cat<M: ArrayLength>(self, other: GenericArray<u8, M>) -> GenericArray<u8, Sum<N, M>>
+    where
+        N: Add<M>,
+        Sum<N, M>: ArrayLength,
+    {
+        Concat::concat(self, other)
+    }
 }
 
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests;
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod unit_tests {
+    use generic_array::typenum::{U1, U2};
+
+    use super::*;
+
+    // Test the error condition for I2OSP
+    #[test]
+    fn test_i2osp_err_check() {
+        assert!(i2osp::<U1>(0).is_ok());
+
+        assert!(i2osp::<U1>(255).is_ok());
+        assert!(i2osp::<U1>(256).is_err());
+        assert!(i2osp::<U1>(257).is_err());
+
+        assert!(i2osp::<U2>(256 * 256 - 1).is_ok());
+        assert!(i2osp::<U2>(256 * 256).is_err());
+        assert!(i2osp::<U2>(256 * 256 + 1).is_err());
+    }
+}

src/slow_hash.rs

@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
-//
-// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
-// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
-
-//! Trait specifying a slow hashing function
-
-use crate::{errors::InternalPakeError, hash::Hash};
-use digest::Digest;
-#[cfg(feature = "slow-hash")]
-use generic_array::typenum::Unsigned;
-use generic_array::GenericArray;
-
-/// Used for the slow hashing function in OPAQUE
-pub trait SlowHash<D: Hash> {
-    /// Computes the slow hashing function
-    fn hash(
-        input: GenericArray<u8, <D as Digest>::OutputSize>,
-    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, InternalPakeError>;
-}
-
-/// A no-op hash which simply returns its input
-pub struct NoOpHash;
-
-impl<D: Hash> SlowHash<D> for NoOpHash {
-    fn hash(
-        input: GenericArray<u8, <D as Digest>::OutputSize>,
-    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, InternalPakeError> {
-        Ok(input.to_vec())
-    }
-}
-
-#[cfg(feature = "slow-hash")]
-impl<D: Hash> SlowHash<D> for scrypt::ScryptParams {
-    fn hash(
-        input: GenericArray<u8, <D as Digest>::OutputSize>,
-    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, InternalPakeError> {
-        let params =
-            scrypt::ScryptParams::new(15, 8, 1).map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::SlowHashError)?;
-        let mut output = vec![0u8; <D as Digest>::OutputSize::to_usize()];
-        scrypt::scrypt(&input, &[], &params, &mut output)
-            .map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::SlowHashError)?;
-        Ok(output)
-    }
-}

src/tests/mock_rng.rs

@@ -1,24 +1,24 @@
-// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
-//
-// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
-// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) VexaHub and contributors.
+// Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates.
 
-use rand_core::{CryptoRng, Error, RngCore};
-use std::cmp::min;
+use core::cmp::min;
+use std::vec::Vec;
 
-/// A simple implementation of `RngCore` for testing purposes.
+use core::convert::Infallible;
+use rand::rand_core::{TryCryptoRng, TryRng};
+
+/// A simple implementation of `Rng` for testing purposes.
 ///
 /// This generates a cyclic sequence (i.e. cycles over an initial buffer)
-///
-///
-#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
 pub struct CycleRng {
     v: Vec<u8>,
 }
 
 impl CycleRng {
-    /// Create a `CycleRng`, yielding a sequence starting with
-    /// `initial` and looping thereafter
+    /// Create a `CycleRng`, yielding a sequence starting with `initial` and
+    /// looping thereafter
     pub fn new(initial: Vec<u8>) -> Self {
         CycleRng { v: initial }
     }
@@ -35,29 +35,35 @@ fn rotate_left<T>(data: &mut [T], steps: usize) {
     data.reverse();
 }
 
-impl RngCore for CycleRng {
-    fn next_u32(&mut self) -> u32 {
-        unimplemented!()
+impl TryRng for CycleRng {
+    type Error = Infallible;
+
+    fn try_next_u32(&mut self) -> Result<u32, Self::Error> {
+        let mut buf = [0u8; 4];
+
+        self.try_fill_bytes(&mut buf)?;
+
+        Ok(u32::from_le_bytes(buf))
     }
 
-    #[inline]
-    fn next_u64(&mut self) -> u64 {
-        unimplemented!()
+    fn try_next_u64(&mut self) -> Result<u64, Self::Error> {
+        let mut buf = [0u8; 8];
+
+        self.try_fill_bytes(&mut buf)?;
+
+        Ok(u64::from_le_bytes(buf))
     }
 
-    #[inline]
-    fn fill_bytes(&mut self, dest: &mut [u8]) {
+    fn try_fill_bytes(&mut self, dest: &mut [u8]) -> Result<(), Self::Error> {
         let len = min(self.v.len(), dest.len());
-        (&mut dest[..len]).copy_from_slice(&self.v[..len]);
-        rotate_left(&mut self.v, len);
-    }
 
-    #[inline]
-    fn try_fill_bytes(&mut self, dest: &mut [u8]) -> Result<(), Error> {
-        self.fill_bytes(dest);
+        dest[..len].copy_from_slice(&self.v[..len]);
+
+        rotate_left(&mut self.v, len);
+
         Ok(())
     }
 }
 
 // This is meant for testing only
-impl CryptoRng for CycleRng {}
+impl TryCryptoRng for CycleRng {}

src/tests/mod.rs

@@ -1,9 +1,19 @@
-// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
-//
-// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
-// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) VexaHub and contributors.
+// Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates.
+
+use serde_json::Value;
+use std::vec::Vec;
 
 mod full_test;
+#[rustfmt::skip]
+#[allow(dead_code)]
+mod full_test_vectors;
 pub mod mock_rng;
-mod opaque_test_vectors;
-mod voprf_test_vectors;
+mod parser;
+mod rfc9807_vectors;
+mod test_opaque_vectors;
+
+pub(crate) fn decode(values: &Value, key: &str) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
+    values[key].as_str().and_then(|s| hex::decode(s).ok())
+}

src/tests/opaque_test_vectors.rs

@@ -1,574 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
-//
-// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
-// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
-
-use crate::{
-    ciphersuite::CipherSuite, errors::*, key_exchange::tripledh::TripleDH, keypair::Key, opaque::*,
-    slow_hash::NoOpHash, tests::mock_rng::CycleRng, *,
-};
-use curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoPoint;
-use serde_json::Value;
-use std::convert::TryFrom;
-
-// Tests
-// =====
-
-struct Ristretto255Sha512NoSlowHash;
-impl CipherSuite for Ristretto255Sha512NoSlowHash {
-    type Group = RistrettoPoint;
-    type KeyExchange = TripleDH;
-    type Hash = sha2::Sha512;
-    type SlowHash = NoOpHash;
-}
-
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
-pub enum EnvelopeMode {
-    Base,
-    CustomIdentifier,
-}
-
-#[allow(non_snake_case)]
-pub struct TestVectorParameters {
-    pub envelope_mode: EnvelopeMode,
-    pub client_public_key: Vec<u8>,
-    pub client_private_key: Vec<u8>,
-    pub client_keyshare: Vec<u8>,
-    pub client_private_keyshare: Vec<u8>,
-    pub server_public_key: Vec<u8>,
-    pub server_private_key: Vec<u8>,
-    pub server_keyshare: Vec<u8>,
-    pub server_private_keyshare: Vec<u8>,
-    pub client_identity: Vec<u8>,
-    pub server_identity: Vec<u8>,
-    pub password: Vec<u8>,
-    pub blind_registration: Vec<u8>,
-    pub oprf_key: Vec<u8>,
-    pub envelope_nonce: Vec<u8>,
-    pub client_nonce: Vec<u8>,
-    pub server_nonce: Vec<u8>,
-    pub client_info: Vec<u8>,
-    pub server_info: Vec<u8>,
-    pub registration_request: Vec<u8>,
-    pub registration_response: Vec<u8>,
-    pub registration_upload: Vec<u8>,
-    pub KE1: Vec<u8>,
-    pub blind_login: Vec<u8>,
-    pub KE2: Vec<u8>,
-    pub KE3: Vec<u8>,
-    pub export_key: Vec<u8>,
-    pub session_key: Vec<u8>,
-}
-
-static TEST_VECTORS: &[&str] = &[
-    r#"
-Group: ristretto255
-EnvelopeMode: 01
-OPRF: 0001
-SlowHash: Identity
-Hash: SHA512
-server_nonce: a4997137a8fa0d4baf7052a499bf877057f9404e03c889d641a0d7c
-807b6a518
-oprf_key: 5ed895206bfc53316d307b23e46ecc6623afb3086da74189a416012be03
-7e50b
-password: 436f7272656374486f72736542617474657279537461706c65
-blind_login: ed8366feb6b1d05d1f46acb727061e43aadfafe9c10e5a64e7518d63
-e3263503
-server_private_keyshare: 31587dff30b8001d9d43584decc22e358fa7f9d6e606
-29fb1223081c3bae7103
-client_nonce: 75a1ad27ab77578bc08b44c4318f09b31d53145c9ba3b42abf0ea08
-a781277a6
-server_info: 6772656574696e677320616c696365
-client_info: 68656c6c6f20626f62
-client_private_keyshare: fbbf4ad24119f08a35bf999f8ae0c779ed7b3e266bf3
-3f793f6bf9ebf4578005
-envelope_nonce: 6c6bb9021b9833c788dd25994d3ce7f3811338744fd6dc556e037
-585783444c0
-server_keyshare: 82be40ef93bf7c6edd43d4ed9f52fa19827649b819de39c52a22
-43e985b75d62
-blind_registration: c604c785ada70d77a5256ae21767de8c3304115237d262134
-f5e46e512cf8e03
-client_public_key: b2d1b10f3741a8efef3139f4d2889f2b11f776b79b9aa2c3ef
-caba4f1c4ae861
-client_private_key: f0f56cfb488649fe28691dd9aa5dc9ff4c0e6028075baa3c5
-615398a2cb12304
-client_keyshare: 484e47e31b3132f4ee512e41805a1690891111a7b885bc526198
-22c14cabf360
-server_public_key: 5442a6f57333a332b4c6f07308f6fa846bde3ed27425820cdc
-eeeb935924a903
-server_private_key: d63d709e3a739a128929a9f289ff263fdcbc457f2f47f7c43
-ccafbbfee72290c
-auth_key: 22198da4ad73b1d35cd8bb875e64ce1a9fc2edeb073d760e114d1d7a2f8
-6d47411caf1787907e2ff96cd3190b14d101101d74cff234259d9f19a18f2cfe29d0b
-server_mac_key: 9de28e2f7107afe266570934c033dd6a403fb2b09a9f1a1357a81
-9fb072d25e6651626638d77bd7f0adf4b2b715d0a0bee2ac531fd0f7da699aba6e9ed
-717466
-envelope: 016c6bb9021b9833c788dd25994d3ce7f3811338744fd6dc556e0375857
-83444c00022e9b28440a1dc99cca7513e8eb754d427caf8515642b45a92c73838c043
-fc316deeb83deface81589bc8e5c2c767b5ab79218834fbf4fa4f87cf23775aa54633
-ed75665cd88f451e044cac1b282d890269476d1ac18ff9a4c0cb832e1143ffa7d447a
-prk: 732303f65e76c39f30876aec31af1f5bcd8861626c922baa2e842209c7d5bf2e
-024912db2d6cac00b1260c437d34ec588a664a55fc7a0a40251915d2b15d8ec9
-client_mac_key: 1536168d48218d08dcbed3438e897d98eff566894240d8d136be0
-4ba46b2c788883fd165ce7614c52a6a9c926bf55d249e6c29bc4a23d5a1775ad294a7
-858922
-pseudorandom_pad: e99274b5cd27d14aeeaf16e7aa8d7e7a03071d58229c5dc96d0
-46ed57a761ddccdbc
-handshake_encrypt_key: c646def7a8ca75282ac1a0ad15630834cba2772837d7a3
-a26d00b36923e55b3f5d065679c715e4c799654f261c865f1a55bc94cabc29a6e2e72
-296dfc494a984
-handshake_secret: cc887e128c28064106d4101ac3de633e9096e170f2c4a9913d3
-50f306274b1665a5b251f761672c12db4c403a615c22cee96adb3539fa62662a17f2e
-18cd5fed
-registration_response: 1867301bcc67bdf8e640b7d6edcbe2a65488446417b50d
-30cdba66ccb379e57200205442a6f57333a332b4c6f07308f6fa846bde3ed27425820
-cdceeeb935924a903
-export_key: 6ca2c344763e5bc9e3d2bbfe3d982b826b709da597e28e85f9594ec54
-2a20c697d55de277ccce1d1af7c48ab7fea1467ac1e3a99c71dcf6326a909d280bd2f
-6f
-registration_upload: 0020b2d1b10f3741a8efef3139f4d2889f2b11f776b79b9a
-a2c3efcaba4f1c4ae861016c6bb9021b9833c788dd25994d3ce7f3811338744fd6dc5
-56e037585783444c00022e9b28440a1dc99cca7513e8eb754d427caf8515642b45a92
-c73838c043fc316deeb83deface81589bc8e5c2c767b5ab79218834fbf4fa4f87cf23
-775aa54633ed75665cd88f451e044cac1b282d890269476d1ac18ff9a4c0cb832e114
-3ffa7d447a
-registration_request: 241b621c417c0705b5ea7a8b7cdd5039fd61e6b63effe2a
-44418164c4d49003e
-session_key: ee9f1ef224d498858f6c9b3a121016a38bad7816055c452b1c7edf3d
-d439c42a4cc78cbd672e985a20910df14f8f1af4ce5793303ffe6954ff5f1a264e3fd
-515
-KE3: e771daf28bc5e8068dead67c3db19f9ad03ee919e52f6c7a6e79cf1085bd7448
-1e76512c77f37762578eb2faff8fe98e4185ca2d01957216c556d33a6fba3028
-KE2: e83812f06568d57b8cdfdcc90fe91454e21bd25dd2a1c32dd1599a2e4a4b6c35
-00205442a6f57333a332b4c6f07308f6fa846bde3ed27425820cdceeeb935924a9030
-16c6bb9021b9833c788dd25994d3ce7f3811338744fd6dc556e037585783444c00022
-e9b28440a1dc99cca7513e8eb754d427caf8515642b45a92c73838c043fc316deeb83
-deface81589bc8e5c2c767b5ab79218834fbf4fa4f87cf23775aa54633ed75665cd88
-f451e044cac1b282d890269476d1ac18ff9a4c0cb832e1143ffa7d447aa4997137a8f
-a0d4baf7052a499bf877057f9404e03c889d641a0d7c807b6a51882be40ef93bf7c6e
-dd43d4ed9f52fa19827649b819de39c52a2243e985b75d62000f13aed85ae30aee2f8
-9ac5e1c5dd53609b890267ef2d765bb56000bc704c2ba4e4256107befee6655cdb084
-64e6c75d8b251642e0d721b3fce38f245568b50e7f6c98825d54cc1a26d6eafadcc1d
-344
-KE1: b68e0e356f8490fa9c3bed952e16cc02db21eda686b3c484f3d9d912caa41f76
-75a1ad27ab77578bc08b44c4318f09b31d53145c9ba3b42abf0ea08a781277a600096
-8656c6c6f20626f62484e47e31b3132f4ee512e41805a1690891111a7b885bc526198
-22c14cabf360
-"#,
-    r#"
-Group: ristretto255
-EnvelopeMode: 02
-OPRF: 0001
-SlowHash: Identity
-Hash: SHA512
-server_nonce: 0f3a6da8b667bc7a383c987586bee749c5f2787691baca68757e78b
-6128b0a0f
-oprf_key: 89c61a42c8191a5ca41f2fe959843d333bcf43173b7de4c5c119e0e0d8b
-0e707
-password: 436f7272656374486f72736542617474657279537461706c65
-blind_login: e6d0f1d89ad552e383d6c6f4e8598cc3037d6e274d22da3089e7afbd
-4171ea02
-server_private_keyshare: 70c944dcb7f4dddde168ecb48dd9488c62b6fc7e9bb4
-2a16d291afca9dd25b07
-client_nonce: 480917b09c6720680b4a7a0ba9f54b69d870f640a4a7994b47ad07d
-1a95c984f
-server_info: 6772656574696e677320616c696365
-server_identity: 5442a6f57333a332b4c6f07308f6fa846bde3ed27425820cdcee
-eb935924a903
-client_info: 68656c6c6f20626f62
-client_private_keyshare: a4ba6cb7e16ab76eccdb4c0b9261eedd426d7863f00b
-fc4a0e09476d3121e70c
-envelope_nonce: e38fb444afe3df13ae05e6876d10eca7661196375518eb66d7dee
-b8cfb42d13f
-server_public_key: 5442a6f57333a332b4c6f07308f6fa846bde3ed27425820cdc
-eeeb935924a903
-client_identity: b2d1b10f3741a8efef3139f4d2889f2b11f776b79b9aa2c3efca
-ba4f1c4ae861
-blind_registration: 019cbd1d7420292528f8cdd62f339fdabb602f04a95dac9db
-cec831b8c681a09
-client_public_key: b2d1b10f3741a8efef3139f4d2889f2b11f776b79b9aa2c3ef
-caba4f1c4ae861
-client_private_key: f0f56cfb488649fe28691dd9aa5dc9ff4c0e6028075baa3c5
-615398a2cb12304
-client_keyshare: 4ae7d50bb80cc8f5034d36c1c27edc30caca0983677a941bc0ac
-e5e10b18300a
-server_keyshare: a2e9e0809b270a1d5c8208f3498a3188538265e6a9e6b274cb38
-c4c5d9b1792d
-server_private_key: d63d709e3a739a128929a9f289ff263fdcbc457f2f47f7c43
-ccafbbfee72290c
-auth_key: 4c7c0ae950ad7e9c518266f953d4a01bd2232695f92fb028aa6c124996e
-31a205f621305fd4997edf8a5fce04a51252ba8430227c134b81d7093a58e01c70752
-server_mac_key: 974bde939ef1d30ba29f9ec2addcaff1eeb105a1f534e04113f9f
-0b5c3b9a0797e3fa5f7006e63dfb2b0ce74d002bd1161767c361507bfb1fa0fed5063
-1cdcb7
-envelope: 02e38fb444afe3df13ae05e6876d10eca7661196375518eb66d7deeb8cf
-b42d13f00227ed4654d4452340f26c6304dceeeb1fddb142fcd91b3b26ecd566d7688
-095f9478a721e5a592be9dd3bda76ed97421819aca4a30752813223d33bc7ea443be9
-76754605116278c7fffda4de142674ed154f540bd3285080637eb4b929e1378336b11
-prk: e3bb74ca5f88a95571578e921489e1b6119b438e4efce6e955ae9b6453f24aa4
-e3a34fa22bc5f470cfc134ca0784a9cd7df64be46ff3b325fc19f4009979bf2e
-client_mac_key: 1c55ecba64d98dc2db8f45faa72b8fdd63cad8677b8665cc575cf
-8ad36ef38ec63c9dfc5552007573215983f55d8f5cfa1651da8417e3f27094dde5254
-7f5b89
-pseudorandom_pad: 7ef495b828a97c896f381824d3371ba012eb63c3f19bb535676
-a3b63b18373255ba3
-handshake_encrypt_key: 0852fb826109073be6e7c065b6e2d1f872c16f9977c177
-cd2f945b26bb933fe6252f226f40483f7aa52f545f801d1e4430f30f80fd42070494e
-a77fdcecd6595
-handshake_secret: bfd3bfbe451520880975d0e568cbd3b5155b23c02de504fccb9
-dd5a8195266cd94d49d040530b3d6b0a585d542eb24da708a2b6f6dc34dee4652d0c1
-c62c4e59
-registration_response: 088ac01ebf5700f0c96bc2988509343cb7e2dd6f0df820
-d0fb807faa11a26f5600205442a6f57333a332b4c6f07308f6fa846bde3ed27425820
-cdceeeb935924a903
-export_key: 0effa605dc47ba4fe565c423b782b8b6697b26ee2ede7059b0e17510d
-f8b11554ce053409671480a56ffbe77b91edc95205c213caeaf9dcb0841790ff834a0
-09
-registration_upload: 0020b2d1b10f3741a8efef3139f4d2889f2b11f776b79b9a
-a2c3efcaba4f1c4ae86102e38fb444afe3df13ae05e6876d10eca7661196375518eb6
-6d7deeb8cfb42d13f00227ed4654d4452340f26c6304dceeeb1fddb142fcd91b3b26e
-cd566d7688095f9478a721e5a592be9dd3bda76ed97421819aca4a30752813223d33b
-c7ea443be976754605116278c7fffda4de142674ed154f540bd3285080637eb4b929e
-1378336b11
-registration_request: c8d2e9ba503bf3f8821226653314427edb1ec8a3ecc94a5
-dfbbe33d59d07b645
-session_key: 8dc21ff264f2774de95955d35544ba314e92d07f4a3b32c89ead5e70
-c83ac4c0221deadd34ed11d43fc4d3651aec612d696c63979c96bf1ddd1ee44da5d0c
-d68
-KE3: c178e45ed9b314653685cdbf5f7730e3e40f8652ceb9b10f47d1c784fdd75dd1
-07c4ae3f7683de5a692359178c8f13f41a043fc1dcfc14b1fb7cb411514efc6c
-KE2: 5079b16709b195b3b63257b419efb752bd0603170160fa72b828ce9ff9209c0c
-00205442a6f57333a332b4c6f07308f6fa846bde3ed27425820cdceeeb935924a9030
-2e38fb444afe3df13ae05e6876d10eca7661196375518eb66d7deeb8cfb42d13f0022
-7ed4654d4452340f26c6304dceeeb1fddb142fcd91b3b26ecd566d7688095f9478a72
-1e5a592be9dd3bda76ed97421819aca4a30752813223d33bc7ea443be976754605116
-278c7fffda4de142674ed154f540bd3285080637eb4b929e1378336b110f3a6da8b66
-7bc7a383c987586bee749c5f2787691baca68757e78b6128b0a0fa2e9e0809b270a1d
-5c8208f3498a3188538265e6a9e6b274cb38c4c5d9b1792d000f5a1a0b34573bf728b
-14f53485f3bf62fd91154dc9ca01b21945b2204f96adc87bd80e8283ecf3522b6d893
-7527f2e9b9782a94fedab0fa304590d1d4f03d72fb1664fca1523a3be95f6c3a97d0a
-2ed
-KE1: 7024ca0d5423176294fbb9ca968d8ce3fc879a231f1ceef69e672c89e02ded59
-480917b09c6720680b4a7a0ba9f54b69d870f640a4a7994b47ad07d1a95c984f00096
-8656c6c6f20626f624ae7d50bb80cc8f5034d36c1c27edc30caca0983677a941bc0ac
-e5e10b18300a
-"#,
-];
-
-macro_rules! parse {
-    ( $v:ident, $s:expr ) => {
-        match decode(&$v, $s) {
-            Some(x) => x,
-            None => vec![],
-        }
-    };
-}
-
-macro_rules! rfc_to_params {
-    ( $v:ident ) => {
-        $v.iter()
-            .map(|x| populate_test_vectors(&serde_json::from_str(rfc_to_json(x).as_str()).unwrap()))
-            .collect::<Vec<TestVectorParameters>>()
-    };
-}
-
-fn rfc_to_json(input: &str) -> String {
-    let mut json = vec![];
-    for line in input.lines() {
-        // If line contains colon, then
-        if line.contains(":") {
-            if json.len() > 0 {
-                // Adding closing quote for previous line, comma, and newline
-                json.push("\",\n".to_string());
-            }
-
-            let mut iter = line.split(":");
-            let key = iter.next().unwrap().split_whitespace().next().unwrap();
-            let val = iter.next().unwrap().split_whitespace().next().unwrap();
-
-            json.push(format!("    \"{}\": \"{}", key, val));
-        } else {
-            let s = line.trim().to_string();
-            if s.len() > 0 {
-                json.push(s);
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    format!("{{\n{}\"\n}}", json.join(""))
-}
-
-fn decode(values: &Value, key: &str) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
-    values[key]
-        .as_str()
-        .and_then(|s| hex::decode(&s.to_string()).ok())
-}
-
-fn populate_test_vectors(values: &Value) -> TestVectorParameters {
-    TestVectorParameters {
-        envelope_mode: match values["EnvelopeMode"].as_str() {
-            Some("01") => EnvelopeMode::Base,
-            Some("02") => EnvelopeMode::CustomIdentifier,
-            _ => panic!("Could not match envelope mode"),
-        },
-        client_public_key: parse!(values, "client_public_key"),
-        client_private_key: parse!(values, "client_private_key"),
-        client_keyshare: parse!(values, "client_keyshare"),
-        client_private_keyshare: parse!(values, "client_private_keyshare"),
-        server_public_key: parse!(values, "server_public_key"),
-        server_private_key: parse!(values, "server_private_key"),
-        server_keyshare: parse!(values, "server_keyshare"),
-        server_private_keyshare: parse!(values, "server_private_keyshare"),
-        client_identity: parse!(values, "client_identity"),
-        server_identity: parse!(values, "server_identity"),
-        password: parse!(values, "password"),
-        blind_registration: parse!(values, "blind_registration"),
-        oprf_key: parse!(values, "oprf_key"),
-        envelope_nonce: parse!(values, "envelope_nonce"),
-        client_nonce: parse!(values, "client_nonce"),
-        server_nonce: parse!(values, "server_nonce"),
-        client_info: parse!(values, "client_info"),
-        server_info: parse!(values, "server_info"),
-        registration_request: parse!(values, "registration_request"),
-        registration_response: parse!(values, "registration_response"),
-        registration_upload: parse!(values, "registration_upload"),
-        KE1: parse!(values, "KE1"),
-        KE2: parse!(values, "KE2"),
-        KE3: parse!(values, "KE3"),
-        blind_login: parse!(values, "blind_login"),
-        export_key: parse!(values, "export_key"),
-        session_key: parse!(values, "session_key"),
-    }
-}
-
-fn get_password_file_bytes(parameters: &TestVectorParameters) -> Result<Vec<u8>, ProtocolError> {
-    let mut oprf_key_rng = CycleRng::new(parameters.oprf_key.clone());
-    let server_registration_start_result =
-        ServerRegistration::<Ristretto255Sha512NoSlowHash>::start(
-            &mut oprf_key_rng,
-            RegistrationRequest::deserialize(&parameters.registration_request[..]).unwrap(),
-            &Key::try_from(&parameters.server_public_key[..]).unwrap(),
-        )?;
-
-    let password_file = server_registration_start_result
-        .state
-        .finish(RegistrationUpload::deserialize(&parameters.registration_upload[..]).unwrap())?;
-
-    Ok(password_file.to_bytes())
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_registration_request() -> Result<(), ProtocolError> {
-    for parameters in rfc_to_params!(TEST_VECTORS) {
-        let mut rng = CycleRng::new(parameters.blind_registration.to_vec());
-        let client_registration_start_result =
-            ClientRegistration::<Ristretto255Sha512NoSlowHash>::start(
-                &mut rng,
-                &parameters.password,
-            )?;
-        assert_eq!(
-            hex::encode(&parameters.registration_request),
-            hex::encode(client_registration_start_result.message.serialize())
-        );
-    }
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_registration_response() -> Result<(), ProtocolError> {
-    for parameters in rfc_to_params!(TEST_VECTORS) {
-        let mut oprf_key_rng = CycleRng::new(parameters.oprf_key);
-        let server_registration_start_result =
-            ServerRegistration::<Ristretto255Sha512NoSlowHash>::start(
-                &mut oprf_key_rng,
-                RegistrationRequest::deserialize(&parameters.registration_request[..]).unwrap(),
-                &Key::try_from(&parameters.server_public_key[..]).unwrap(),
-            )?;
-        assert_eq!(
-            hex::encode(parameters.registration_response),
-            hex::encode(server_registration_start_result.message.serialize())
-        );
-    }
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_registration_upload() -> Result<(), ProtocolError> {
-    for parameters in rfc_to_params!(TEST_VECTORS) {
-        let mut rng = CycleRng::new(parameters.blind_registration.to_vec());
-        let client_registration_start_result =
-            ClientRegistration::<Ristretto255Sha512NoSlowHash>::start(
-                &mut rng,
-                &parameters.password,
-            )?;
-
-        let sk_u_and_nonce: Vec<u8> =
-            [parameters.client_private_key, parameters.envelope_nonce].concat();
-        let mut finish_registration_rng = CycleRng::new(sk_u_and_nonce);
-        let result = client_registration_start_result.state.finish(
-            &mut finish_registration_rng,
-            RegistrationResponse::deserialize(&parameters.registration_response[..]).unwrap(),
-            if parameters.envelope_mode == EnvelopeMode::CustomIdentifier {
-                ClientRegistrationFinishParameters::WithIdentifiers(
-                    parameters.client_identity,
-                    parameters.server_identity,
-                )
-            } else {
-                ClientRegistrationFinishParameters::default()
-            },
-        )?;
-
-        assert_eq!(
-            hex::encode(parameters.registration_upload),
-            hex::encode(result.message.serialize())
-        );
-        assert_eq!(
-            hex::encode(parameters.export_key),
-            hex::encode(result.export_key.to_vec())
-        );
-    }
-
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_ke1() -> Result<(), ProtocolError> {
-    for parameters in rfc_to_params!(TEST_VECTORS) {
-        let client_login_start = [
-            parameters.blind_login,
-            parameters.client_private_keyshare,
-            parameters.client_nonce,
-        ]
-        .concat();
-        let mut client_login_start_rng = CycleRng::new(client_login_start);
-        let client_login_start_result = ClientLogin::<Ristretto255Sha512NoSlowHash>::start(
-            &mut client_login_start_rng,
-            &parameters.password,
-            ClientLoginStartParameters::WithInfo(parameters.client_info),
-        )?;
-        assert_eq!(
-            hex::encode(&parameters.KE1),
-            hex::encode(client_login_start_result.message.serialize())
-        );
-    }
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_ke2() -> Result<(), ProtocolError> {
-    for parameters in rfc_to_params!(TEST_VECTORS) {
-        let password_file_bytes = get_password_file_bytes(&parameters)?;
-
-        let mut server_private_keyshare_and_nonce_rng =
-            CycleRng::new([parameters.server_private_keyshare, parameters.server_nonce].concat());
-        let server_login_start_result = ServerLogin::<Ristretto255Sha512NoSlowHash>::start(
-            &mut server_private_keyshare_and_nonce_rng,
-            ServerRegistration::try_from(&password_file_bytes[..]).unwrap(),
-            &Key::try_from(&parameters.server_private_key[..]).unwrap(),
-            CredentialRequest::<Ristretto255Sha512NoSlowHash>::deserialize(&parameters.KE1[..])
-                .unwrap(),
-            if parameters.envelope_mode == EnvelopeMode::CustomIdentifier {
-                ServerLoginStartParameters::WithInfoAndIdentifiers(
-                    parameters.server_info.to_vec(),
-                    parameters.client_identity,
-                    parameters.server_identity,
-                )
-            } else {
-                ServerLoginStartParameters::WithInfo(parameters.server_info.to_vec())
-            },
-        )?;
-        assert_eq!(
-            hex::encode(&parameters.client_info),
-            hex::encode(server_login_start_result.plain_info),
-        );
-        assert_eq!(
-            hex::encode(&parameters.KE2),
-            hex::encode(server_login_start_result.message.serialize())
-        );
-    }
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_ke3() -> Result<(), ProtocolError> {
-    for parameters in rfc_to_params!(TEST_VECTORS) {
-        let client_login_start = [
-            parameters.blind_login,
-            parameters.client_private_keyshare,
-            parameters.client_nonce,
-        ]
-        .concat();
-        let mut client_login_start_rng = CycleRng::new(client_login_start);
-        let client_login_start_result = ClientLogin::<Ristretto255Sha512NoSlowHash>::start(
-            &mut client_login_start_rng,
-            &parameters.password,
-            ClientLoginStartParameters::WithInfo(parameters.client_info),
-        )?;
-
-        let client_login_finish_result = client_login_start_result.state.finish(
-            CredentialResponse::<Ristretto255Sha512NoSlowHash>::deserialize(&parameters.KE2[..])?,
-            if parameters.envelope_mode == EnvelopeMode::CustomIdentifier {
-                ClientLoginFinishParameters::WithIdentifiers(
-                    parameters.client_identity,
-                    parameters.server_identity,
-                )
-            } else {
-                ClientLoginFinishParameters::default()
-            },
-        )?;
-
-        assert_eq!(
-            hex::encode(&parameters.server_info),
-            hex::encode(&client_login_finish_result.confidential_info)
-        );
-        assert_eq!(
-            hex::encode(&parameters.session_key),
-            hex::encode(&client_login_finish_result.session_key)
-        );
-        assert_eq!(
-            hex::encode(&parameters.KE3),
-            hex::encode(client_login_finish_result.message.to_bytes())
-        );
-        assert_eq!(
-            hex::encode(&parameters.export_key),
-            hex::encode(client_login_finish_result.export_key)
-        );
-    }
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-#[test]
-fn test_server_login_finish() -> Result<(), ProtocolError> {
-    for parameters in rfc_to_params!(TEST_VECTORS) {
-        let password_file_bytes = get_password_file_bytes(&parameters)?;
-
-        let mut server_private_keyshare_and_nonce_rng =
-            CycleRng::new([parameters.server_private_keyshare, parameters.server_nonce].concat());
-        let server_login_start_result = ServerLogin::<Ristretto255Sha512NoSlowHash>::start(
-            &mut server_private_keyshare_and_nonce_rng,
-            ServerRegistration::try_from(&password_file_bytes[..]).unwrap(),
-            &Key::try_from(&parameters.server_private_key[..]).unwrap(),
-            CredentialRequest::<Ristretto255Sha512NoSlowHash>::deserialize(&parameters.KE1[..])
-                .unwrap(),
-            if parameters.envelope_mode == EnvelopeMode::CustomIdentifier {
-                ServerLoginStartParameters::WithInfoAndIdentifiers(
-                    parameters.server_info.to_vec(),
-                    parameters.client_identity,
-                    parameters.server_identity,
-                )
-            } else {
-                ServerLoginStartParameters::WithInfo(parameters.server_info.to_vec())
-            },
-        )?;
-
-        let server_login_result = server_login_start_result
-            .state
-            .finish(CredentialFinalization::try_from(&parameters.KE3[..])?)?;
-
-        assert_eq!(
-            hex::encode(parameters.session_key),
-            hex::encode(server_login_result.session_key)
-        );
-    }
-    Ok(())
-}

src/tests/parser.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) VexaHub and contributors.
+// Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates.
+
+use std::string::{String, ToString};
+use std::vec::Vec;
+use std::{format, vec};
+
+pub(crate) fn rfc_to_json(input: &str) -> String {
+    format!("{{\n{}\n}}", parse_vector_types(input))
+}
+
+fn parse_vector_types(input: &str) -> String {
+    let re = regex::Regex::new(r" {2}(?P<type>.+?) Test Vectors").unwrap();
+    let mut vector_types = vec![];
+
+    let chunks: Vec<&str> = re.split(input).collect();
+
+    for (count, caps) in (1..).zip(re.captures_iter(input)) {
+        let vector_type = format!(
+            "\"{}\": [\n {} \n]",
+            &caps["type"].trim(),
+            parse_ciphersuites(chunks[count])
+        );
+        vector_types.push(vector_type);
+    }
+
+    vector_types.join(",\n")
+}
+
+fn parse_ciphersuites(input: &str) -> String {
+    let re = regex::Regex::new(
+        r" Configuration\n([\s\S])*?OPRF: (?P<oprf>.*?)\n([\s\S])*?Group: (?P<group>.*?)\n",
+    )
+    .unwrap();
+    let mut ciphersuites = vec![];
+
+    let chunks: Vec<&str> = re.split(input).collect();
+
+    for (count, caps) in (1..).zip(re.captures_iter(input)) {
+        let ciphersuite = format!(
+            "{{ \"{}, {}\": {{ {} }} }}",
+            &caps["oprf"],
+            &caps["group"],
+            parse_params(chunks[count])
+        );
+        ciphersuites.push(ciphersuite);
+    }
+
+    ciphersuites.join(",\n")
+}
+
+fn parse_params(input: &str) -> String {
+    let mut params = vec![];
+    let mut param = String::new();
+
+    let mut lines = input.lines();
+
+    loop {
+        match lines.next() {
+            None => {
+                // Clear out any existing string and flush to params
+                param += "\"";
+                params.push(param);
+
+                return params.join(",\n");
+            }
+            Some(line) => {
+                // First, trim out any whitespace
+                let line = line.trim();
+
+                // If line contains :, then
+                if line.contains(':') {
+                    // Clear out any existing string and flush to params
+                    if !param.is_empty() {
+                        param += "\"";
+                        params.push(param);
+                    }
+
+                    let mut iter = line.split(':');
+                    let key = iter.next().unwrap().split_whitespace().next().unwrap();
+                    let val = iter.next().unwrap().split_whitespace().next().unwrap();
+
+                    param = format!("    \"{key}\": \"{val}");
+                } else {
+                    let s = line.trim().to_string();
+                    if s.contains('~') || s.contains('#') {
+                        // Ignore comment lines
+                        continue;
+                    }
+                    if s.contains("C.") {
+                        // Ignore section lines
+                        continue;
+                    }
+                    if !s.is_empty() {
+                        param += &s;
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}

src/tests/rfc9807_vectors.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,806 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) VexaHub and contributors.
+// Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates.
+
+//! The OPAQUE test vectors taken from Appendix C of
+//! [RFC 9807](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9807.txt)
+
+pub(crate) static VECTORS: &str = r#"
+C.1.  Real Test Vectors
+
+C.1.1.  OPAQUE-3DH Real Test Vector 1
+
+C.1.1.1.  Configuration
+
+   OPRF: ristretto255-SHA512
+   Hash: SHA512
+   KSF: Identity
+   KDF: HKDF-SHA512
+   MAC: HMAC-SHA512
+   Group: ristretto255
+   Context: 4f50415155452d504f43
+   Nh: 64
+   Npk: 32
+   Nsk: 32
+   Nm: 64
+   Nx: 64
+   Nok: 32
+
+C.1.1.2.  Input Values
+
+   oprf_seed: f433d0227b0b9dd54f7c4422b600e764e47fb503f1f9a0f0a47c6606b0
+   54a7fdc65347f1a08f277e22358bbabe26f823fca82c7848e9a75661f4ec5d5c1989e
+   f
+   credential_identifier: 31323334
+   password: 436f7272656374486f72736542617474657279537461706c65
+   envelope_nonce: ac13171b2f17bc2c74997f0fce1e1f35bec6b91fe2e12dbd323d2
+   3ba7a38dfec
+   masking_nonce: 38fe59af0df2c79f57b8780278f5ae47355fe1f817119041951c80
+   f612fdfc6d
+   server_private_key: 47451a85372f8b3537e249d7b54188091fb18edde78094b43
+   e2ba42b5eb89f0d
+   server_public_key: b2fe7af9f48cc502d016729d2fe25cdd433f2c4bc904660b2a
+   382c9b79df1a78
+   server_nonce: 71cd9960ecef2fe0d0f7494986fa3d8b2bb01963537e60efb13981e
+   138e3d4a1
+   client_nonce: da7e07376d6d6f034cfa9bb537d11b8c6b4238c334333d1f0aebb38
+   0cae6a6cc
+   client_keyshare_seed: 82850a697b42a505f5b68fcdafce8c31f0af2b581f063cf
+   1091933541936304b
+   server_keyshare_seed: 05a4f54206eef1ba2f615bc0aa285cb22f26d1153b5b40a
+   1e85ff80da12f982f
+   blind_registration: 76cfbfe758db884bebb33582331ba9f159720ca8784a2a070
+   a265d9c2d6abe01
+   blind_login: 6ecc102d2e7a7cf49617aad7bbe188556792d4acd60a1a8a8d2b65d4
+   b0790308
+
+C.1.1.3.  Intermediate Values
+
+   client_public_key: 76a845464c68a5d2f7e442436bb1424953b17d3e2e289ccbac
+   cafb57ac5c3675
+   auth_key: 6cd32316f18d72a9a927a83199fa030663a38ce0c11fbaef82aa9003773
+   0494fc555c4d49506284516edd1628c27965b7555a4ebfed2223199f6c67966dde822
+   randomized_password: aac48c25ab036e30750839d31d6e73007344cb1155289fb7
+   d329beb932e9adeea73d5d5c22a0ce1952f8aba6d66007615cd1698d4ac85ef1fcf15
+   0031d1435d9
+   envelope: ac13171b2f17bc2c74997f0fce1e1f35bec6b91fe2e12dbd323d23ba7a3
+   8dfec634b0f5b96109c198a8027da51854c35bee90d1e1c781806d07d49b76de6a28b
+   8d9e9b6c93b9f8b64d16dddd9c5bfb5fea48ee8fd2f75012a8b308605cdd8ba5
+   handshake_secret: 81263cb85a0cfa12450f0f388de4e92291ec4c7c7a0878b6245
+   50ff528726332f1298fc6cc822a432c89504347c7a2ccd70316ae3da6a15e0399e6db
+   3f7c1b12
+   server_mac_key: 0d36b26cfe38f51f804f0a9361818f32ee1ce2a4e5578653b5271
+   84af058d3b2d8075c296fd84d24677913d1baa109290cd81a13ed383f9091a3804e65
+   298dfc
+   client_mac_key: 91750adbac54a5e8e53b4c233cc8d369fe83b0de1b6a3cd85575e
+   eb0bb01a6a90a086a2cf5fe75fff2a9379c30ba9049510a33b5b0b1444a88800fc3ee
+   e2260d
+   oprf_key: 5d4c6a8b7c7138182afb4345d1fae6a9f18a1744afbcc3854f8f5a2b4b4
+   c6d05
+
+C.1.1.4.  Output Values
+
+   registration_request: 5059ff249eb1551b7ce4991f3336205bde44a105a032e74
+   7d21bf382e75f7a71
+   registration_response: 7408a268083e03abc7097fc05b587834539065e86fb0c7
+   b6342fcf5e01e5b019b2fe7af9f48cc502d016729d2fe25cdd433f2c4bc904660b2a3
+   82c9b79df1a78
+   registration_upload: 76a845464c68a5d2f7e442436bb1424953b17d3e2e289ccb
+   accafb57ac5c36751ac5844383c7708077dea41cbefe2fa15724f449e535dd7dd562e
+   66f5ecfb95864eadddec9db5874959905117dad40a4524111849799281fefe3c51fa8
+   2785c5ac13171b2f17bc2c74997f0fce1e1f35bec6b91fe2e12dbd323d23ba7a38dfe
+   c634b0f5b96109c198a8027da51854c35bee90d1e1c781806d07d49b76de6a28b8d9e
+   9b6c93b9f8b64d16dddd9c5bfb5fea48ee8fd2f75012a8b308605cdd8ba5
+   KE1: c4dedb0ba6ed5d965d6f250fbe554cd45cba5dfcce3ce836e4aee778aa3cd44d
+   da7e07376d6d6f034cfa9bb537d11b8c6b4238c334333d1f0aebb380cae6a6cc6e29b
+   ee50701498605b2c085d7b241ca15ba5c32027dd21ba420b94ce60da326
+   KE2: 7e308140890bcde30cbcea28b01ea1ecfbd077cff62c4def8efa075aabcbb471
+   38fe59af0df2c79f57b8780278f5ae47355fe1f817119041951c80f612fdfc6dd6ec6
+   0bcdb26dc455ddf3e718f1020490c192d70dfc7e403981179d8073d1146a4f9aa1ced
+   4e4cd984c657eb3b54ced3848326f70331953d91b02535af44d9fedc80188ca46743c
+   52786e0382f95ad85c08f6afcd1ccfbff95e2bdeb015b166c6b20b92f832cc6df01e0
+   b86a7efd92c1c804ff865781fa93f2f20b446c8371b671cd9960ecef2fe0d0f749498
+   6fa3d8b2bb01963537e60efb13981e138e3d4a1c4f62198a9d6fa9170c42c3c71f197
+   1b29eb1d5d0bd733e40816c91f7912cc4a660c48dae03e57aaa38f3d0cffcfc21852e
+   bc8b405d15bd6744945ba1a93438a162b6111699d98a16bb55b7bdddfe0fc5608b23d
+   a246e7bd73b47369169c5c90
+   KE3: 4455df4f810ac31a6748835888564b536e6da5d9944dfea9e34defb9575fe5e2
+   661ef61d2ae3929bcf57e53d464113d364365eb7d1a57b629707ca48da18e442
+   export_key: 1ef15b4fa99e8a852412450ab78713aad30d21fa6966c9b8c9fb3262a
+   970dc62950d4dd4ed62598229b1b72794fc0335199d9f7fcc6eaedde92cc04870e63f
+   16
+   session_key: 42afde6f5aca0cfa5c163763fbad55e73a41db6b41bc87b8e7b62214
+   a8eedc6731fa3cb857d657ab9b3764b89a84e91ebcb4785166fbb02cedfcbdfda215b
+   96f
+
+C.1.2.  OPAQUE-3DH Real Test Vector 2
+
+C.1.2.1.  Configuration
+
+   OPRF: ristretto255-SHA512
+   Hash: SHA512
+   KSF: Identity
+   KDF: HKDF-SHA512
+   MAC: HMAC-SHA512
+   Group: ristretto255
+   Context: 4f50415155452d504f43
+   Nh: 64
+   Npk: 32
+   Nsk: 32
+   Nm: 64
+   Nx: 64
+   Nok: 32
+
+C.1.2.2.  Input Values
+
+   client_identity: 616c696365
+   server_identity: 626f62
+   oprf_seed: f433d0227b0b9dd54f7c4422b600e764e47fb503f1f9a0f0a47c6606b0
+   54a7fdc65347f1a08f277e22358bbabe26f823fca82c7848e9a75661f4ec5d5c1989e
+   f
+   credential_identifier: 31323334
+   password: 436f7272656374486f72736542617474657279537461706c65
+   envelope_nonce: ac13171b2f17bc2c74997f0fce1e1f35bec6b91fe2e12dbd323d2
+   3ba7a38dfec
+   masking_nonce: 38fe59af0df2c79f57b8780278f5ae47355fe1f817119041951c80
+   f612fdfc6d
+   server_private_key: 47451a85372f8b3537e249d7b54188091fb18edde78094b43
+   e2ba42b5eb89f0d
+   server_public_key: b2fe7af9f48cc502d016729d2fe25cdd433f2c4bc904660b2a
+   382c9b79df1a78
+   server_nonce: 71cd9960ecef2fe0d0f7494986fa3d8b2bb01963537e60efb13981e
+   138e3d4a1
+   client_nonce: da7e07376d6d6f034cfa9bb537d11b8c6b4238c334333d1f0aebb38
+   0cae6a6cc
+   client_keyshare_seed: 82850a697b42a505f5b68fcdafce8c31f0af2b581f063cf
+   1091933541936304b
+   server_keyshare_seed: 05a4f54206eef1ba2f615bc0aa285cb22f26d1153b5b40a
+   1e85ff80da12f982f
+   blind_registration: 76cfbfe758db884bebb33582331ba9f159720ca8784a2a070
+   a265d9c2d6abe01
+   blind_login: 6ecc102d2e7a7cf49617aad7bbe188556792d4acd60a1a8a8d2b65d4
+   b0790308
+
+C.1.2.3.  Intermediate Values
+
+   client_public_key: 76a845464c68a5d2f7e442436bb1424953b17d3e2e289ccbac
+   cafb57ac5c3675
+   auth_key: 6cd32316f18d72a9a927a83199fa030663a38ce0c11fbaef82aa9003773
+   0494fc555c4d49506284516edd1628c27965b7555a4ebfed2223199f6c67966dde822
+   randomized_password: aac48c25ab036e30750839d31d6e73007344cb1155289fb7
+   d329beb932e9adeea73d5d5c22a0ce1952f8aba6d66007615cd1698d4ac85ef1fcf15
+   0031d1435d9
+   envelope: ac13171b2f17bc2c74997f0fce1e1f35bec6b91fe2e12dbd323d23ba7a3
+   8dfec1ac902dc5589e9a5f0de56ad685ea8486210ef41449cd4d8712828913c5d2b68
+   0b2b3af4a26c765cff329bfb66d38ecf1d6cfa9e7a73c222c6efe0d9520f7d7c
+   handshake_secret: 5e723bed1e5276de2503419eba9da61ead573109c4012268323
+   98c7e08155b885bfe7bc93451f9d887a0c1d0c19233e40a8e47b347a9ac3907f94032
+   a4cff64f
+   server_mac_key: dad66bb9251073d17a13f8e5500f36e5998e3cde520ca0738e708
+   5af62fd97812eb79a745c94d0bf8a6ac17f980cf435504cf64041eeb6bb237796d2c7
+   f81e9a
+   client_mac_key: f816fe2914f7c5b29852385615d7c7f31ac122adf202d7ccd4976
+   06d7aabd48930323d1d02b1cc9ecd456c4de6f46c7950becb18bffd921dd5876381b5
+   486ffe
+   oprf_key: 5d4c6a8b7c7138182afb4345d1fae6a9f18a1744afbcc3854f8f5a2b4b4
+   c6d05
+
+C.1.2.4.  Output Values
+
+   registration_request: 5059ff249eb1551b7ce4991f3336205bde44a105a032e74
+   7d21bf382e75f7a71
+   registration_response: 7408a268083e03abc7097fc05b587834539065e86fb0c7
+   b6342fcf5e01e5b019b2fe7af9f48cc502d016729d2fe25cdd433f2c4bc904660b2a3
+   82c9b79df1a78
+   registration_upload: 76a845464c68a5d2f7e442436bb1424953b17d3e2e289ccb
+   accafb57ac5c36751ac5844383c7708077dea41cbefe2fa15724f449e535dd7dd562e
+   66f5ecfb95864eadddec9db5874959905117dad40a4524111849799281fefe3c51fa8
+   2785c5ac13171b2f17bc2c74997f0fce1e1f35bec6b91fe2e12dbd323d23ba7a38dfe
+   c1ac902dc5589e9a5f0de56ad685ea8486210ef41449cd4d8712828913c5d2b680b2b
+   3af4a26c765cff329bfb66d38ecf1d6cfa9e7a73c222c6efe0d9520f7d7c
+   KE1: c4dedb0ba6ed5d965d6f250fbe554cd45cba5dfcce3ce836e4aee778aa3cd44d
+   da7e07376d6d6f034cfa9bb537d11b8c6b4238c334333d1f0aebb380cae6a6cc6e29b
+   ee50701498605b2c085d7b241ca15ba5c32027dd21ba420b94ce60da326
+   KE2: 7e308140890bcde30cbcea28b01ea1ecfbd077cff62c4def8efa075aabcbb471
+   38fe59af0df2c79f57b8780278f5ae47355fe1f817119041951c80f612fdfc6dd6ec6
+   0bcdb26dc455ddf3e718f1020490c192d70dfc7e403981179d8073d1146a4f9aa1ced
+   4e4cd984c657eb3b54ced3848326f70331953d91b02535af44d9fea502150b67fe367
+   95dd8914f164e49f81c7688a38928372134b7dccd50e09f8fed9518b7b2f94835b3c4
+   fe4c8475e7513f20eb97ff0568a39caee3fd6251876f71cd9960ecef2fe0d0f749498
+   6fa3d8b2bb01963537e60efb13981e138e3d4a1c4f62198a9d6fa9170c42c3c71f197
+   1b29eb1d5d0bd733e40816c91f7912cc4a292371e7809a9031743e943fb3b56f51de9
+   03552fc91fba4e7419029951c3970b2e2f0a9dea218d22e9e4e0000855bb6421aa361
+   0d6fc0f4033a6517030d4341
+   KE3: 7a026de1d6126905736c3f6d92463a08d209833eb793e46d0f7f15b3e0f62c76
+   43763c02bbc6b8d3d15b63250cae98171e9260f1ffa789750f534ac11a0176d5
+   export_key: 1ef15b4fa99e8a852412450ab78713aad30d21fa6966c9b8c9fb3262a
+   970dc62950d4dd4ed62598229b1b72794fc0335199d9f7fcc6eaedde92cc04870e63f
+   16
+   session_key: ae7951123ab5befc27e62e63f52cf472d6236cb386c968cc47b7e34f
+   866aa4bc7638356a73cfce92becf39d6a7d32a1861f12130e824241fe6cab34fbd471
+   a57
+
+C.1.3.  OPAQUE-3DH Real Test Vector 3
+
+C.1.3.1.  Configuration
+
+   OPRF: ristretto255-SHA512
+   Hash: SHA512
+   KSF: Identity
+   KDF: HKDF-SHA512
+   MAC: HMAC-SHA512
+   Group: curve25519
+   Context: 4f50415155452d504f43
+   Nh: 64
+   Npk: 32
+   Nsk: 32
+   Nm: 64
+   Nx: 64
+   Nok: 32
+
+C.1.3.2.  Input Values
+
+   oprf_seed: a78342ab84d3d30f08d5a9630c79bf311c31ed7f85d9d4959bf492ec67
+   a0eec8a67dfbf4497248eebd49e878aab173e5e4ff76354288fdd53e949a5f7c9f7f1
+   b
+   credential_identifier: 31323334
+   password: 436f7272656374486f72736542617474657279537461706c65
+   envelope_nonce: 40d6b67fdd7da7c49894750754514dbd2070a407166bd2a5237cc
+   a9bf44d6e0b
+   masking_nonce: 38fe59af0df2c79f57b8780278f5ae47355fe1f817119041951c80
+   f612fdfc6d
+   server_private_key: c06139381df63bfc91c850db0b9cfbec7a62e86d80040a41a
+   a7725bf0e79d564
+   server_public_key: a41e28269b4e97a66468cc00c5a57753e192e1527669897706
+   88aa90486ef031
+   server_nonce: 71cd9960ecef2fe0d0f7494986fa3d8b2bb01963537e60efb13981e
+   138e3d4a1
+   client_nonce: da7e07376d6d6f034cfa9bb537d11b8c6b4238c334333d1f0aebb38
+   0cae6a6cc
+   client_keyshare_seed: 82850a697b42a505f5b68fcdafce8c31f0af2b581f063cf
+   1091933541936304b
+   server_keyshare_seed: 05a4f54206eef1ba2f615bc0aa285cb22f26d1153b5b40a
+   1e85ff80da12f982f
+   blind_registration: c575731ffe1cb0ca5ba63b42c4699767b8b9ab78ba39316ee
+   04baddb2034a70a
+   blind_login: 6ecc102d2e7a7cf49617aad7bbe188556792d4acd60a1a8a8d2b65d4
+   b0790308
+
+C.1.3.3.  Intermediate Values
+
+   client_public_key: 0936ea94ab030ec332e29050d266c520e916731a052d05ced7
+   e0cfe751142b48
+   auth_key: 7e880ab484f750e80e6f839d975aff476070ce65066d85ea62523d1d576
+   4739d91307fac47186a4ab935e6a5c7f70cb47faa9473311947502c022cc67ae9440c
+   randomized_password: 3a602c295a9c323d9362fe286f104567ed6862b25dbe30fa
+   da844f19e41cf40047424b7118e15dc2c1a815a70fea5c8de6c30aa61440cd4b4b5e8
+   f3963fbb2e1
+   envelope: 40d6b67fdd7da7c49894750754514dbd2070a407166bd2a5237cca9bf44
+   d6e0b20c1e81fef28e92e897ca8287d49a55075b47c3988ff0fff367d79a3e350ccac
+   150b4a3ff48b4770c8e84e437b3d4e68d2b95833f7788f7eb93fa6a8afb85ecb
+   handshake_secret: 178c8c15e025252380c3edb1c6ad8ac52573b38d536099e2f86
+   5786f5e31c642608550c0c6f281c37ce259667dd72768af31630e0eb36f1096a2e642
+   1c2aa163
+   server_mac_key: f3c6a8e069c54bb0d8905139f723c9e22f5c662dc08848243a665
+   4c8223800019b9823523d84da2ef67ca1c14277630aace464c113be8a0a658c39e181
+   a8bb71
+   client_mac_key: b1ee7ce52dbd0ab72872924ff11596cb196bbabfc319e74aca78a
+   de54a0f74dd15dcf5621f6d2e79161b0c9b701381d494836dedbb86e584a65b34267a
+   370e01
+   oprf_key: 62ef7f7d9506a14600c34f642aaf6ef8019cc82a6755db4fded5248ea14
+   6030a
+
+C.1.3.4.  Output Values
+
+   registration_request: 26f3dbfd76b8e5f85b4da604f42889a7d4b1bc919f65538
+   1a67de02c59fd5436
+   registration_response: 506e8f1b89c098fb89b5b6210a05f7898cafdaea221761
+   e8d5272fc39e0f9f08a41e28269b4e97a66468cc00c5a57753e192e15276698977068
+   8aa90486ef031
+   registration_upload: 0936ea94ab030ec332e29050d266c520e916731a052d05ce
+   d7e0cfe751142b486d23c6ed818882f9bdfdcf91389fcbc0b7a3faf92bd0bd6be4a1e
+   7730277b694fc7c6ba327fbe786af18487688e0f7c148bbd54dc2fc80c28e7a976d9e
+   f53c3540d6b67fdd7da7c49894750754514dbd2070a407166bd2a5237cca9bf44d6e0
+   b20c1e81fef28e92e897ca8287d49a55075b47c3988ff0fff367d79a3e350ccac150b
+   4a3ff48b4770c8e84e437b3d4e68d2b95833f7788f7eb93fa6a8afb85ecb
+   KE1: c4dedb0ba6ed5d965d6f250fbe554cd45cba5dfcce3ce836e4aee778aa3cd44d
+   da7e07376d6d6f034cfa9bb537d11b8c6b4238c334333d1f0aebb380cae6a6cc10a83
+   b9117d3798cb2957fbdb0268a0d63dbf9d66bde5c00c78affd80026c911
+   KE2: 9a0e5a1514f62e005ea098b0d8cf6750e358c4389e6add1c52aed9500fa19d00
+   38fe59af0df2c79f57b8780278f5ae47355fe1f817119041951c80f612fdfc6d22cc3
+   1127d6f0096755be3c3d2dd6287795c317aeea10c9485bf4f419a786642c19a8f151c
+   eb5e8767d175248c62c017de94057398d28bf0ed00d1b50ee4f812fd9afddf98af8cd
+   58067ca43b0633b6cadd0e9d987f89623fed4d3583bdf6910c425600e90dab3c6b351
+   3188a465461a67f6bbc47aeba808f7f7e2c6d66f5c3271cd9960ecef2fe0d0f749498
+   6fa3d8b2bb01963537e60efb13981e138e3d4a141f55f0bef355cfb34ccd468fdacad
+   75865ee7efef95f4cb6c25d477f720502676f06a3b806da262139bf3fa76a1090b94d
+   ac78bc3bc6f8747d5b35acf94eff3ec2ebe7d49b8cf16be64120b279fe92664e47be5
+   da7e60f08f12e91192652f79
+   KE3: 550e923829a544496d8316c490da2b979b78c730dd75be3a17f237a26432c19f
+   bba54b6a0467b1c22ecbd6794bc5fa5b04215ba1ef974c6b090baa42c5bb984f
+   export_key: 9dec51d6d0f6ce7e4345f10961053713b07310cc2e45872f57bbd2fe5
+   070fdf0fb5b77c7ddaa2f3dc5c35132df7417ad7fefe0f690ad266e5a54a21d045c9c
+   38
+   session_key: fd2fdd07c1bcc88e81c1b1d1de5ad62dfdef1c0b8209ff9d671e1fac
+   55ce9c34d381c1fb2703ff53a797f77daccbe33047ccc167b8105171e10ec962eea20
+   3aa
+
+C.1.4.  OPAQUE-3DH Real Test Vector 4
+
+C.1.4.1.  Configuration
+
+   OPRF: ristretto255-SHA512
+   Hash: SHA512
+   KSF: Identity
+   KDF: HKDF-SHA512
+   MAC: HMAC-SHA512
+   Group: curve25519
+   Context: 4f50415155452d504f43
+   Nh: 64
+   Npk: 32
+   Nsk: 32
+   Nm: 64
+   Nx: 64
+   Nok: 32
+
+C.1.4.2.  Input Values
+
+   client_identity: 616c696365
+   server_identity: 626f62
+   oprf_seed: a78342ab84d3d30f08d5a9630c79bf311c31ed7f85d9d4959bf492ec67
+   a0eec8a67dfbf4497248eebd49e878aab173e5e4ff76354288fdd53e949a5f7c9f7f1
+   b
+   credential_identifier: 31323334
+   password: 436f7272656374486f72736542617474657279537461706c65
+   envelope_nonce: 40d6b67fdd7da7c49894750754514dbd2070a407166bd2a5237cc
+   a9bf44d6e0b
+   masking_nonce: 38fe59af0df2c79f57b8780278f5ae47355fe1f817119041951c80
+   f612fdfc6d
+   server_private_key: c06139381df63bfc91c850db0b9cfbec7a62e86d80040a41a
+   a7725bf0e79d564
+   server_public_key: a41e28269b4e97a66468cc00c5a57753e192e1527669897706
+   88aa90486ef031
+   server_nonce: 71cd9960ecef2fe0d0f7494986fa3d8b2bb01963537e60efb13981e
+   138e3d4a1
+   client_nonce: da7e07376d6d6f034cfa9bb537d11b8c6b4238c334333d1f0aebb38
+   0cae6a6cc
+   client_keyshare_seed: 82850a697b42a505f5b68fcdafce8c31f0af2b581f063cf
+   1091933541936304b
+   server_keyshare_seed: 05a4f54206eef1ba2f615bc0aa285cb22f26d1153b5b40a
+   1e85ff80da12f982f
+   blind_registration: c575731ffe1cb0ca5ba63b42c4699767b8b9ab78ba39316ee
+   04baddb2034a70a
+   blind_login: 6ecc102d2e7a7cf49617aad7bbe188556792d4acd60a1a8a8d2b65d4
+   b0790308
+
+C.1.4.3.  Intermediate Values
+
+   client_public_key: 0936ea94ab030ec332e29050d266c520e916731a052d05ced7
+   e0cfe751142b48
+   auth_key: 7e880ab484f750e80e6f839d975aff476070ce65066d85ea62523d1d576
+   4739d91307fac47186a4ab935e6a5c7f70cb47faa9473311947502c022cc67ae9440c
+   randomized_password: 3a602c295a9c323d9362fe286f104567ed6862b25dbe30fa
+   da844f19e41cf40047424b7118e15dc2c1a815a70fea5c8de6c30aa61440cd4b4b5e8
+   f3963fbb2e1
+   envelope: 40d6b67fdd7da7c49894750754514dbd2070a407166bd2a5237cca9bf44
+   d6e0bb4c0eab6143959a650c5f6b32acf162b1fbe95bb36c5c4f99df53865c4d3537d
+   69061d80522d772cd0efdbe91f817f6bf7259a56e20b4eb9cbe9443702f4b759
+   handshake_secret: 13e7dc6afa5334b9dfffe26bee3caf744ef4add176caee464cd
+   eb3d37303b90de35a8bf095df84471ac77d705f12fe232f1571de1d6a001d3e808998
+   73a142dc
+   server_mac_key: a58135acfb2bde92d506cf59119729a6404ad94eba294e4b52a63
+   baf58cfe03f21bcf735222c7f2c27a60bd958be7f6aed50dc03a78f64e7ae4ac1ff07
+   1b95aa
+   client_mac_key: 1e1a8ba156aadc4a302f707d2193c9dab477b355f430d450dd407
+   ce40dc75613f76ec33dec494f8a6bfdcf951eb060dac33e6572c693954fe92e33730c
+   9ab0a2
+   oprf_key: 62ef7f7d9506a14600c34f642aaf6ef8019cc82a6755db4fded5248ea14
+   6030a
+
+C.1.4.4.  Output Values
+
+   registration_request: 26f3dbfd76b8e5f85b4da604f42889a7d4b1bc919f65538
+   1a67de02c59fd5436
+   registration_response: 506e8f1b89c098fb89b5b6210a05f7898cafdaea221761
+   e8d5272fc39e0f9f08a41e28269b4e97a66468cc00c5a57753e192e15276698977068
+   8aa90486ef031
+   registration_upload: 0936ea94ab030ec332e29050d266c520e916731a052d05ce
+   d7e0cfe751142b486d23c6ed818882f9bdfdcf91389fcbc0b7a3faf92bd0bd6be4a1e
+   7730277b694fc7c6ba327fbe786af18487688e0f7c148bbd54dc2fc80c28e7a976d9e
+   f53c3540d6b67fdd7da7c49894750754514dbd2070a407166bd2a5237cca9bf44d6e0
+   bb4c0eab6143959a650c5f6b32acf162b1fbe95bb36c5c4f99df53865c4d3537d6906
+   1d80522d772cd0efdbe91f817f6bf7259a56e20b4eb9cbe9443702f4b759
+   KE1: c4dedb0ba6ed5d965d6f250fbe554cd45cba5dfcce3ce836e4aee778aa3cd44d
+   da7e07376d6d6f034cfa9bb537d11b8c6b4238c334333d1f0aebb380cae6a6cc10a83
+   b9117d3798cb2957fbdb0268a0d63dbf9d66bde5c00c78affd80026c911
+   KE2: 9a0e5a1514f62e005ea098b0d8cf6750e358c4389e6add1c52aed9500fa19d00
+   38fe59af0df2c79f57b8780278f5ae47355fe1f817119041951c80f612fdfc6d22cc3
+   1127d6f0096755be3c3d2dd6287795c317aeea10c9485bf4f419a786642c19a8f151c
+   eb5e8767d175248c62c017de94057398d28bf0ed00d1b50ee4f812699bff7663be3c5
+   d59de94d8e7e58817c7da005b39c25d25555c929e1c5cf6c1b82837b1367c839aab56
+   a422c0d97719426a79a16f9869cf852100597b23b5a071cd9960ecef2fe0d0f749498
+   6fa3d8b2bb01963537e60efb13981e138e3d4a141f55f0bef355cfb34ccd468fdacad
+   75865ee7efef95f4cb6c25d477f72050267cc22c87edbf3ecaca64cb33bc60dc3bfc5
+   51e365f0d46a7fed0e09d96f9afbb48868f5bb3c3e05a86ed8c9476fc22c58306c5a2
+   91be34388e09548ba9d70f39
+   KE3: d16344e791c3f18594d22ba068984fa18ec1e9bead662b75f66826ffd627932f
+   cd1ec40cd01dcf5f63f4055ebe45c7717a57a833aad360256cf1e1c20c0eae1c
+   export_key: 9dec51d6d0f6ce7e4345f10961053713b07310cc2e45872f57bbd2fe5
+   070fdf0fb5b77c7ddaa2f3dc5c35132df7417ad7fefe0f690ad266e5a54a21d045c9c
+   38
+   session_key: f6116d3aa0e4089a179713bad4d98ed5cb57e5443cae8d36ef78996f
+   a60f3dc6e9fcdd63c001596b06dbc1285d80211035cc0e485506b3f7a650cbf78c5bf
+   fc9
+
+C.1.5.  OPAQUE-3DH Real Test Vector 5
+
+C.1.5.1.  Configuration
+
+   OPRF: P256-SHA256
+   Hash: SHA256
+   KSF: Identity
+   KDF: HKDF-SHA256
+   MAC: HMAC-SHA256
+   Group: P256_XMD:SHA-256_SSWU_RO_
+   Context: 4f50415155452d504f43
+   Nh: 32
+   Npk: 33
+   Nsk: 32
+   Nm: 32
+   Nx: 32
+   Nok: 32
+
+C.1.5.2.  Input Values
+
+   oprf_seed: 62f60b286d20ce4fd1d64809b0021dad6ed5d52a2c8cf27ae6582543a0
+   a8dce2
+   credential_identifier: 31323334
+   password: 436f7272656374486f72736542617474657279537461706c65
+   envelope_nonce: a921f2a014513bd8a90e477a629794e89fec12d12206dde662ebd
+   cf65670e51f
+   masking_nonce: 38fe59af0df2c79f57b8780278f5ae47355fe1f817119041951c80
+   f612fdfc6d
+   server_private_key: c36139381df63bfc91c850db0b9cfbec7a62e86d80040a41a
+   a7725bf0e79d5e5
+   server_public_key: 035f40ff9cf88aa1f5cd4fe5fd3da9ea65a4923a5594f84fd9
+   f2092d6067784874
+   server_nonce: 71cd9960ecef2fe0d0f7494986fa3d8b2bb01963537e60efb13981e
+   138e3d4a1
+   client_nonce: ab3d33bde0e93eda72392346a7a73051110674bbf6b1b7ffab8be4f
+   91fdaeeb1
+   client_keyshare_seed: 633b875d74d1556d2a2789309972b06db21dfcc4f5ad51d
+   7e74d783b7cfab8dc
+   server_keyshare_seed: 05a4f54206eef1ba2f615bc0aa285cb22f26d1153b5b40a
+   1e85ff80da12f982f
+   blind_registration: 411bf1a62d119afe30df682b91a0a33d777972d4f2daa4b34
+   ca527d597078153
+   blind_login: c497fddf6056d241e6cf9fb7ac37c384f49b357a221eb0a802c989b9
+   942256c1
+
+C.1.5.3.  Intermediate Values
+
+   client_public_key: 03b218507d978c3db570ca994aaf36695a731ddb2db272c817
+   f79746fc37ae5214
+   auth_key: 5bd4be1602516092dc5078f8d699f5721dc1720a49fb80d8e5c16377abd
+   0987b
+   randomized_password: 06be0a1a51d56557a3adad57ba29c5510565dcd8b5078fa3
+   19151b9382258fb0
+   envelope: a921f2a014513bd8a90e477a629794e89fec12d12206dde662ebdcf6567
+   0e51fad30bbcfc1f8eda0211553ab9aaf26345ad59a128e80188f035fe4924fad67b8
+   handshake_secret: 83a932431a8f25bad042f008efa2b07c6cd0faa8285f335b636
+   3546a9f9b235f
+   server_mac_key: 13e928581febfad28855e3e7f03306d61bd69489686f621535d44
+   a1365b73b0d
+   client_mac_key: afdc53910c25183b08b930e6953c35b3466276736d9de2e9c5efa
+   f150f4082c5
+   oprf_key: 2dfb5cb9aa1476093be74ca0d43e5b02862a05f5d6972614d7433acdc66
+   f7f31
+
+C.1.5.4.  Output Values
+
+   registration_request: 029e949a29cfa0bf7c1287333d2fb3dc586c41aa652f507
+   0d26a5315a1b50229f8
+   registration_response: 0350d3694c00978f00a5ce7cd08a00547e4ab5fb5fc2b2
+   f6717cdaa6c89136efef035f40ff9cf88aa1f5cd4fe5fd3da9ea65a4923a5594f84fd
+   9f2092d6067784874
+   registration_upload: 03b218507d978c3db570ca994aaf36695a731ddb2db272c8
+   17f79746fc37ae52147f0ed53532d3ae8e505ecc70d42d2b814b6b0e48156def71ea0
+   29148b2803aafa921f2a014513bd8a90e477a629794e89fec12d12206dde662ebdcf6
+   5670e51fad30bbcfc1f8eda0211553ab9aaf26345ad59a128e80188f035fe4924fad6
+   7b8
+   KE1: 037342f0bcb3ecea754c1e67576c86aa90c1de3875f390ad599a26686cdfee6e
+   07ab3d33bde0e93eda72392346a7a73051110674bbf6b1b7ffab8be4f91fdaeeb1022
+   ed3f32f318f81bab80da321fecab3cd9b6eea11a95666dfa6beeaab321280b6
+   KE2: 0246da9fe4d41d5ba69faa6c509a1d5bafd49a48615a47a8dd4b0823cc147648
+   1138fe59af0df2c79f57b8780278f5ae47355fe1f817119041951c80f612fdfc6d2f0
+   c547f70deaeca54d878c14c1aa5e1ab405dec833777132eea905c2fbb12504a67dcbe
+   0e66740c76b62c13b04a38a77926e19072953319ec65e41f9bfd2ae26837b6ce688bf
+   9af2542f04eec9ab96a1b9328812dc2f5c89182ed47fead61f09f71cd9960ecef2fe0
+   d0f7494986fa3d8b2bb01963537e60efb13981e138e3d4a103c1701353219b53acf33
+   7bf6456a83cefed8f563f1040b65afbf3b65d3bc9a19b50a73b145bc87a157e8c58c0
+   342e2047ee22ae37b63db17e0a82a30fcc4ecf7b
+   KE3: e97cab4433aa39d598e76f13e768bba61c682947bdcf9936035e8a3a3ebfb66e
+   export_key: c3c9a1b0e33ac84dd83d0b7e8af6794e17e7a3caadff289fbd9dc769a
+   853c64b
+   session_key: 484ad345715ccce138ca49e4ea362c6183f0949aaaa1125dc3bc3f80
+   876e7cd1
+
+C.1.6.  OPAQUE-3DH Real Test Vector 6
+
+C.1.6.1.  Configuration
+
+   OPRF: P256-SHA256
+   Hash: SHA256
+   KSF: Identity
+   KDF: HKDF-SHA256
+   MAC: HMAC-SHA256
+   Group: P256_XMD:SHA-256_SSWU_RO_
+   Context: 4f50415155452d504f43
+   Nh: 32
+   Npk: 33
+   Nsk: 32
+   Nm: 32
+   Nx: 32
+   Nok: 32
+
+C.1.6.2.  Input Values
+
+   client_identity: 616c696365
+   server_identity: 626f62
+   oprf_seed: 62f60b286d20ce4fd1d64809b0021dad6ed5d52a2c8cf27ae6582543a0
+   a8dce2
+   credential_identifier: 31323334
+   password: 436f7272656374486f72736542617474657279537461706c65
+   envelope_nonce: a921f2a014513bd8a90e477a629794e89fec12d12206dde662ebd
+   cf65670e51f
+   masking_nonce: 38fe59af0df2c79f57b8780278f5ae47355fe1f817119041951c80
+   f612fdfc6d
+   server_private_key: c36139381df63bfc91c850db0b9cfbec7a62e86d80040a41a
+   a7725bf0e79d5e5
+   server_public_key: 035f40ff9cf88aa1f5cd4fe5fd3da9ea65a4923a5594f84fd9
+   f2092d6067784874
+   server_nonce: 71cd9960ecef2fe0d0f7494986fa3d8b2bb01963537e60efb13981e
+   138e3d4a1
+   client_nonce: ab3d33bde0e93eda72392346a7a73051110674bbf6b1b7ffab8be4f
+   91fdaeeb1
+   client_keyshare_seed: 633b875d74d1556d2a2789309972b06db21dfcc4f5ad51d
+   7e74d783b7cfab8dc
+   server_keyshare_seed: 05a4f54206eef1ba2f615bc0aa285cb22f26d1153b5b40a
+   1e85ff80da12f982f
+   blind_registration: 411bf1a62d119afe30df682b91a0a33d777972d4f2daa4b34
+   ca527d597078153
+   blind_login: c497fddf6056d241e6cf9fb7ac37c384f49b357a221eb0a802c989b9
+   942256c1
+
+C.1.6.3.  Intermediate Values
+
+   client_public_key: 03b218507d978c3db570ca994aaf36695a731ddb2db272c817
+   f79746fc37ae5214
+   auth_key: 5bd4be1602516092dc5078f8d699f5721dc1720a49fb80d8e5c16377abd
+   0987b
+   randomized_password: 06be0a1a51d56557a3adad57ba29c5510565dcd8b5078fa3
+   19151b9382258fb0
+   envelope: a921f2a014513bd8a90e477a629794e89fec12d12206dde662ebdcf6567
+   0e51f4d7773a36a208a866301dbb2858e40dc5638017527cf91aef32d3848eebe0971
+   handshake_secret: 80bdcc498f22de492e90ee8101fcc7c101e158dd49c77f7c283
+   816ae329ed62f
+   server_mac_key: 0f82432fbdb5b90daf27a91a3acc42299a9590dba1b77932c2207
+   b4cb3d4a157
+   client_mac_key: 7f629eb0b1b69979b07ca1f564b3e92ed22f07569fd1d11725d93
+   e46731fbe71
+   oprf_key: 2dfb5cb9aa1476093be74ca0d43e5b02862a05f5d6972614d7433acdc66
+   f7f31
+
+C.1.6.4.  Output Values
+
+   registration_request: 029e949a29cfa0bf7c1287333d2fb3dc586c41aa652f507
+   0d26a5315a1b50229f8
+   registration_response: 0350d3694c00978f00a5ce7cd08a00547e4ab5fb5fc2b2
+   f6717cdaa6c89136efef035f40ff9cf88aa1f5cd4fe5fd3da9ea65a4923a5594f84fd
+   9f2092d6067784874
+   registration_upload: 03b218507d978c3db570ca994aaf36695a731ddb2db272c8
+   17f79746fc37ae52147f0ed53532d3ae8e505ecc70d42d2b814b6b0e48156def71ea0
+   29148b2803aafa921f2a014513bd8a90e477a629794e89fec12d12206dde662ebdcf6
+   5670e51f4d7773a36a208a866301dbb2858e40dc5638017527cf91aef32d3848eebe0
+   971
+   KE1: 037342f0bcb3ecea754c1e67576c86aa90c1de3875f390ad599a26686cdfee6e
+   07ab3d33bde0e93eda72392346a7a73051110674bbf6b1b7ffab8be4f91fdaeeb1022
+   ed3f32f318f81bab80da321fecab3cd9b6eea11a95666dfa6beeaab321280b6
+   KE2: 0246da9fe4d41d5ba69faa6c509a1d5bafd49a48615a47a8dd4b0823cc147648
+   1138fe59af0df2c79f57b8780278f5ae47355fe1f817119041951c80f612fdfc6d2f0
+   c547f70deaeca54d878c14c1aa5e1ab405dec833777132eea905c2fbb12504a67dcbe
+   0e66740c76b62c13b04a38a77926e19072953319ec65e41f9bfd2ae268d7f10604202
+   1c80300e4c6f585980cf39fc51a4a6bba41b0729f9b240c729e5671cd9960ecef2fe0
+   d0f7494986fa3d8b2bb01963537e60efb13981e138e3d4a103c1701353219b53acf33
+   7bf6456a83cefed8f563f1040b65afbf3b65d3bc9a19b84922c7e5d074838a8f27859
+   2c53f61fb59f031e85ad480c0c71086b871e1b24
+   KE3: 46833578cee137775f6be3f01b80748daac5a694101ad0e9e7025480552da56a
+   export_key: c3c9a1b0e33ac84dd83d0b7e8af6794e17e7a3caadff289fbd9dc769a
+   853c64b
+   session_key: 27766fabd8dd88ff37fbd0ef1a491e601d10d9f016c2b28c4bd1b0fb
+   7511a3c3
+
+C.2.  Fake Test Vectors
+
+C.2.1.  OPAQUE-3DH Fake Test Vector 1
+
+C.2.1.1.  Configuration
+
+   OPRF: ristretto255-SHA512
+   Hash: SHA512
+   KSF: Identity
+   KDF: HKDF-SHA512
+   MAC: HMAC-SHA512
+   Group: ristretto255
+   Context: 4f50415155452d504f43
+   Nh: 64
+   Npk: 32
+   Nsk: 32
+   Nm: 64
+   Nx: 64
+   Nok: 32
+
+C.2.1.2.  Input Values
+
+   client_identity: 616c696365
+   server_identity: 626f62
+   oprf_seed: 743fc168d1f826ad43738933e5adb23da6fb95f95a1b069f0daa0522d0
+   a78b617f701fc6aa46d3e7981e70de7765dfcd6b1e13e3369a582eb8dc456b10aa53b
+   0
+   credential_identifier: 31323334
+   masking_nonce: 9c035896a043e70f897d87180c543e7a063b83c1bb728fbd189c61
+   9e27b6e5a6
+   client_private_key: 2b98980aa95ab53a0f39f0291903d2fdf04b00c167f081416
+   9922df873002409
+   client_public_key: 84f43f9492e19c22d8bdaa4447cc3d4db1cdb5427a9f852c47
+   07921212c36251
+   server_private_key: c788585ae8b5ba2942b693b849be0c0426384e41977c18d2e
+   81fbe30fd7c9f06
+   server_public_key: 825f832667480f08b0c9069da5083ac4d0e9ee31b49c4e0310
+   031fea04d52966
+   server_nonce: 1e10f6eeab2a7a420bf09da9b27a4639645622c46358de9cf7ae813
+   055ae2d12
+   client_keyshare_seed: a270dc715dc2b4612bc7864312a05c3e9788ee1bad1f276
+   d1e15bdeb4c355e94
+   server_keyshare_seed: 360b0937f47d45f6123a4d8f0d0c0814b6120d840ebb8bc
+   5b4f6b62df07f78c2
+   masking_key: 39ebd51f0e39a07a1c2d2431995b0399bca9996c5d10014d6ebab445
+   3dc10ce5cef38ed3df6e56bfff40c2d8dd4671c2b4cf63c3d54860f31fe40220d690b
+   b71
+   KE1: b0a26dcaca2230b8f5e4b1bcab9c84b586140221bb8b2848486874b0be448905
+   42d4e61ed3f8d64cdd3b9d153343eca15b9b0d5e388232793c6376bd2d9cfd0ab641d
+   7f20a245a09f1d4dbb6e301661af7f352beb0791d055e48d3645232f77f
+
+C.2.1.3.  Output Values
+
+   KE2: 928f79ad8df21963e91411b9f55165ba833dea918f441db967cdc09521d22925
+   9c035896a043e70f897d87180c543e7a063b83c1bb728fbd189c619e27b6e5a632b5a
+   b1bff96636144faa4f9f9afaac75dd88ea99cf5175902ae3f3b2195693f165f11929b
+   a510a5978e64dcdabecbd7ee1e4380ce270e58fea58e6462d92964a1aaef72698bca1
+   c673baeb04cc2bf7de5f3c2f5553464552d3a0f7698a9ca7f9c5e70c6cb1f706b2f17
+   5ab9d04bbd13926e816b6811a50b4aafa9799d5ed7971e10f6eeab2a7a420bf09da9b
+   27a4639645622c46358de9cf7ae813055ae2d1298251c5ba55f6b0b2d58d9ff0c88fe
+   4176484be62a96db6e2a8c4d431bd1bf27fe6c1d0537603835217d42ebf7b25819827
+   32e74892fd28211b31ed33863f0beaf75ba6f59474c0aaf9d78a60a9b2f4cd24d7ab5
+   4131b3c8efa192df6b72db4c
+
+C.2.2.  OPAQUE-3DH Fake Test Vector 2
+
+C.2.2.1.  Configuration
+
+   OPRF: ristretto255-SHA512
+   Hash: SHA512
+   KSF: Identity
+   KDF: HKDF-SHA512
+   MAC: HMAC-SHA512
+   Group: curve25519
+   Context: 4f50415155452d504f43
+   Nh: 64
+   Npk: 32
+   Nsk: 32
+   Nm: 64
+   Nx: 64
+   Nok: 32
+
+C.2.2.2.  Input Values
+
+   client_identity: 616c696365
+   server_identity: 626f62
+   oprf_seed: 66e650652a8266b2205f31fdd68adeb739a05b5e650b19e7edc75e734a
+   1296d6088188ca46c31ae8ccbd42a52ed338c06e53645387a7efbc94b6a0449526155
+   e
+   credential_identifier: 31323334
+   masking_nonce: 9c035896a043e70f897d87180c543e7a063b83c1bb728fbd189c61
+   9e27b6e5a6
+   client_private_key: 288bf63470199221847bb035d99f96531adf8badd14cb1571
+   b48f7a506649660
+   client_public_key: 3c64a3153854cc9f0c23aab3c1a19106ec8bab4730736d1d00
+   3880a1d5a59005
+   server_private_key: 30fbe7e830be1fe8d2187c97414e3826040cbe49b893b6422
+   9bab5e85a588846
+   server_public_key: 78b3040047ff26572a7619617601a61b9c81899bee92f00cfc
+   aa5eed96863555
+   server_nonce: 1e10f6eeab2a7a420bf09da9b27a4639645622c46358de9cf7ae813
+   055ae2d12
+   client_keyshare_seed: a270dc715dc2b4612bc7864312a05c3e9788ee1bad1f276
+   d1e15bdeb4c355e94
+   server_keyshare_seed: 360b0937f47d45f6123a4d8f0d0c0814b6120d840ebb8bc
+   5b4f6b62df07f78c2
+   masking_key: 79ad2621b0757a447dff7108a8ae20a068ce67872095620f415ea611
+   c9dcc04972fa359538cd2fd6528775ca775487b2b56db642049b8a90526b975a38484
+   c6a
+   KE1: b0a26dcaca2230b8f5e4b1bcab9c84b586140221bb8b2848486874b0be448905
+   42d4e61ed3f8d64cdd3b9d153343eca15b9b0d5e388232793c6376bd2d9cfd0ac059b
+   7ba2aec863933ae48816360c7a9022e83d822704f3b0b86c0502a66e574
+
+C.2.2.3.  Output Values
+
+   KE2: 6606b6fedbb33f19a81a1feb5149c600fe77252f58acd3080d7504d3dad4922f
+   9c035896a043e70f897d87180c543e7a063b83c1bb728fbd189c619e27b6e5a67db39
+   8c0f65d8c298eac430abdae4c80e82b552fb940c00f0cbcea853c0f96c1c15099f3d4
+   b0e83ecc249613116d605b8d77bb68bdf76994c2bc507e2dcae4176f00afed68ad25c
+   f3040a0e991acece31ca532117f5c12816997372ff031ad04ebcdce06c501da24e7b4
+   db95343456e2ed260895ec362694230a1fa20e24a9c71e10f6eeab2a7a420bf09da9b
+   27a4639645622c46358de9cf7ae813055ae2d122d9055eb8f83e1b497370adad5cc2a
+   417bf9be436a792def0c7b7ccb92b9e275d7c663104ea4655bd70570d975c05351655
+   d55fbfb392286edb55600a23b55ce18f8c60e0d1960c960412dd08eabc81ba7ca8ae2
+   b04aad65462321f51c298010
+
+C.2.3.  OPAQUE-3DH Fake Test Vector 3
+
+C.2.3.1.  Configuration
+
+   OPRF: P256-SHA256
+   Hash: SHA256
+   KSF: Identity
+   KDF: HKDF-SHA256
+   MAC: HMAC-SHA256
+   Group: P256_XMD:SHA-256_SSWU_RO_
+   Context: 4f50415155452d504f43
+   Nh: 32
+   Npk: 33
+   Nsk: 32
+   Nm: 32
+   Nx: 32
+   Nok: 32
+
+C.2.3.2.  Input Values
+
+   client_identity: 616c696365
+   server_identity: 626f62
+   oprf_seed: bb1cd59e16ac09bc0cb6d528541695d7eba2239b1613a3db3ade77b362
+   80f725
+   credential_identifier: 31323334
+   masking_nonce: 9c035896a043e70f897d87180c543e7a063b83c1bb728fbd189c61
+   9e27b6e5a6
+   client_private_key: d423b87899fc61d014fc8330a4e26190fcfa470a3afe59243
+   24294af7dbbc1dd
+   client_public_key: 03b81708eae026a9370616c22e1e8542fe9dbebd36ce8a2661
+   b708e9628f4a57fc
+   server_private_key: 34fbe7e830be1fe8d2187c97414e3826040cbe49b893b6422
+   9bab5e85a5888c7
+   server_public_key: 0221e034c0e202fe883dcfc96802a7624166fed4cfcab4ae30
+   cf5f3290d01c88bf
+   server_nonce: 1e10f6eeab2a7a420bf09da9b27a4639645622c46358de9cf7ae813
+   055ae2d12
+   client_keyshare_seed: a270dc715dc2b4612bc7864312a05c3e9788ee1bad1f276
+   d1e15bdeb4c355e94
+   server_keyshare_seed: 360b0937f47d45f6123a4d8f0d0c0814b6120d840ebb8bc
+   5b4f6b62df07f78c2
+   masking_key: caecc6ccb4cae27cb54d8f3a1af1bac52a3d53107ce08497cdd362b1
+   992e4e5e
+   KE1: 0396875da2b4f7749bba411513aea02dc514a48d169d8a9531bd61d3af3fa9ba
+   ae42d4e61ed3f8d64cdd3b9d153343eca15b9b0d5e388232793c6376bd2d9cfd0a021
+   47a6583983cc9973b5082db5f5070890cb373d70f7ac1b41ed2305361009784
+
+C.2.3.3.  Output Values
+
+   KE2: 0201198dcd13f9792eb75dcfa815f61b049abfe2e3e9456d4bbbceec5f442efd
+   049c035896a043e70f897d87180c543e7a063b83c1bb728fbd189c619e27b6e5a6fac
+   da65ce0a97b9085e7af07f61fd3fdd046d257cbf2183ce8766090b8041a8bf28d79dd
+   4c9031ddc75bb6ddb4c291e639937840e3d39fc0d5a3d6e7723c09f7945df485bcf9a
+   efe3fe82d149e84049e259bb5b33d6a2ff3b25e4bfb7eff0962821e10f6eeab2a7a42
+   0bf09da9b27a4639645622c46358de9cf7ae813055ae2d12023f82bbb24e75b8683fd
+   13b843cd566efae996cd0016cffdcc24ee2bc937d026f80144878749a69565b433c10
+   40aff67e94f79345de888a877422b9bbe21ec329
+"#;

src/tests/test_opaque_vectors.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,688 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) VexaHub and contributors.
+// Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates.
+
+use core::ops::Add;
+use std::vec;
+use std::vec::Vec;
+
+use crate::ciphersuite::{CipherSuite, KeGroup, OprfGroup, OprfHash};
+use crate::envelope::EnvelopeLen;
+use crate::errors::*;
+use crate::hash::OutputSize;
+use crate::key_exchange::group::Group;
+use crate::key_exchange::shared::NonceLen;
+use crate::key_exchange::{Deserialize, Ke1MessageLen, Ke2MessageLen, KeyExchange, Serialize};
+use crate::ksf::Identity;
+use crate::messages::{
+    CredentialRequestLen, CredentialResponseLen, CredentialResponseWithoutKeLen,
+    RegistrationResponseLen, RegistrationUploadLen,
+};
+use crate::opaque::*;
+use crate::tests::decode;
+use crate::tests::mock_rng::CycleRng;
+use crate::*;
+use digest::OutputSizeUser;
+use generic_array::typenum::Sum;
+use generic_array::{ArrayLength, GenericArray};
+use rand::Rng;
+use rand::rand_core::UnwrapErr;
+use rand::rngs::SysRng;
+use serde_json::Value;
+
+#[allow(non_snake_case)]
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub struct OpaqueTestVectorParameters {
+    pub dummy_public_key: Vec<u8>,
+    pub dummy_masking_key: Vec<u8>,
+    pub context: Vec<u8>,
+    #[allow(dead_code)] // client_private_key is not tested in the test vectors
+    pub client_private_key: Option<Vec<u8>>,
+    pub client_keyshare_seed: Vec<u8>,
+    pub server_public_key: Vec<u8>,
+    pub server_private_key: Vec<u8>,
+    pub server_keyshare_seed: Vec<u8>,
+    pub client_identity: Option<Vec<u8>>,
+    pub server_identity: Option<Vec<u8>>,
+    pub credential_identifier: Vec<u8>,
+    pub password: Vec<u8>,
+    pub blind_registration: Vec<u8>,
+    pub oprf_seed: Vec<u8>,
+    pub masking_nonce: Vec<u8>,
+    pub envelope_nonce: Vec<u8>,
+    pub client_nonce: Vec<u8>,
+    pub server_nonce: Vec<u8>,
+    pub registration_request: Vec<u8>,
+    pub registration_response: Vec<u8>,
+    pub registration_upload: Vec<u8>,
+    pub KE1: Vec<u8>,
+    pub blind_login: Vec<u8>,
+    pub KE2: Vec<u8>,
+    pub KE3: Vec<u8>,
+    pub export_key: Vec<u8>,
+    pub session_key: Vec<u8>,
+    pub auth_key: Vec<u8>,
+    pub randomized_pwd: Vec<u8>,
+    pub handshake_secret: Vec<u8>,
+    pub server_mac_key: Vec<u8>,
+    pub client_mac_key: Vec<u8>,
+    pub oprf_key: Vec<u8>,
+}
+
+macro_rules! parse {
+    ( $v:ident, $s:expr ) => {
+        parse_default!($v, $s, vec![])
+    };
+}
+
+macro_rules! parse_default {
+    ( $v:ident, $s:expr, $d:expr ) => {
+        match decode(&$v, $s) {
+            Some(x) => x,
+            None => $d,
+        }
+    };
+}
+
+fn populate_test_vectors<CS: CipherSuite>(values: &Value) -> OpaqueTestVectorParameters {
+    let mut rng = UnwrapErr(SysRng);
+
+    OpaqueTestVectorParameters {
+        dummy_public_key: {
+            decode(values, "client_public_key").unwrap_or_else(|| {
+                KeGroup::<CS>::serialize_sk(&KeGroup::<CS>::random_sk(&mut UnwrapErr(SysRng)))
+                    .to_vec()
+            })
+        },
+        dummy_masking_key: {
+            match decode(values, "masking_key") {
+                Some(value) => value,
+                None => {
+                    let mut bytes =
+                        GenericArray::<u8, <OprfHash<CS> as OutputSizeUser>::OutputSize>::default();
+                    rng.fill_bytes(&mut bytes);
+                    bytes.to_vec()
+                }
+            }
+        },
+        context: parse!(values, "Context"),
+        client_private_key: decode(values, "client_private_key"),
+        client_keyshare_seed: parse!(values, "client_keyshare_seed"),
+        server_public_key: parse!(values, "server_public_key"),
+        server_private_key: parse!(values, "server_private_key"),
+        server_keyshare_seed: parse!(values, "server_keyshare_seed"),
+        client_identity: decode(values, "client_identity"),
+        server_identity: decode(values, "server_identity"),
+        credential_identifier: parse!(values, "credential_identifier"),
+        password: parse!(values, "password"),
+        blind_registration: parse!(values, "blind_registration"),
+        oprf_seed: parse!(values, "oprf_seed"),
+        masking_nonce: parse!(values, "masking_nonce"),
+        envelope_nonce: parse!(values, "envelope_nonce"),
+        client_nonce: parse!(values, "client_nonce"),
+        server_nonce: parse!(values, "server_nonce"),
+        registration_request: parse!(values, "registration_request"),
+        registration_response: parse!(values, "registration_response"),
+        registration_upload: parse!(values, "registration_upload"),
+        KE1: parse!(values, "KE1"),
+        KE2: parse!(values, "KE2"),
+        KE3: parse!(values, "KE3"),
+        blind_login: parse!(values, "blind_login"),
+        export_key: parse!(values, "export_key"),
+        session_key: parse!(values, "session_key"),
+        auth_key: parse!(values, "auth_key"),
+        randomized_pwd: parse!(values, "randomized_password"),
+        handshake_secret: parse!(values, "handshake_secret"),
+        server_mac_key: parse!(values, "server_mac_key"),
+        client_mac_key: parse!(values, "client_mac_key"),
+        oprf_key: parse!(values, "oprf_key"),
+    }
+}
+
+fn get_password_file_bytes<CS: CipherSuite>(parameters: &OpaqueTestVectorParameters) -> Vec<u8>
+where
+    // RegistrationUpload: (KePk + Hash) + Envelope
+    <KeGroup<CS> as Group>::PkLen: Add<OutputSize<OprfHash<CS>>>,
+    Sum<<KeGroup<CS> as Group>::PkLen, OutputSize<OprfHash<CS>>>:
+        ArrayLength + Add<EnvelopeLen<CS>>,
+    RegistrationUploadLen<CS>: ArrayLength,
+    // ServerRegistration = RegistrationUpload
+{
+    let password_file = ServerRegistration::<CS>::finish(
+        RegistrationUpload::deserialize(&parameters.registration_upload).unwrap(),
+    );
+
+    password_file.serialize().to_vec()
+}
+
+macro_rules! json_to_test_vectors {
+    ( $v:ident, $vector_type:expr, $cs:expr, $cs_ty:ty) => {
+        $v[$vector_type]
+            .as_array()
+            .into_iter()
+            .flatten()
+            .filter_map(|x| {
+                if let Some(val) = x.get($cs) {
+                    Some(populate_test_vectors::<$cs_ty>(val))
+                } else {
+                    None
+                }
+            })
+            .collect::<Vec<OpaqueTestVectorParameters>>()
+    };
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn tests() -> Result<(), ProtocolError> {
+    let rfc: Value =
+        serde_json::from_str(super::parser::rfc_to_json(super::rfc9807_vectors::VECTORS).as_str())
+            .expect("Could not parse json");
+
+    std::eprintln!("{}", serde_json::to_string_pretty(&rfc).unwrap());
+
+    #[cfg(feature = "ristretto255")]
+    {
+        struct Ristretto255Sha512NoKsf;
+        impl CipherSuite for Ristretto255Sha512NoKsf {
+            type OprfCs = Ristretto255;
+            type KeyExchange = TripleDh<Ristretto255, sha2::Sha512>;
+            type Ksf = Identity;
+        }
+
+        let ristretto_real_tvs = json_to_test_vectors!(
+            rfc,
+            "Real",
+            "ristretto255-SHA512, ristretto255",
+            Ristretto255Sha512NoKsf
+        );
+
+        let ristretto_fake_tvs = json_to_test_vectors!(
+            rfc,
+            "Fake",
+            "ristretto255-SHA512, ristretto255",
+            Ristretto255Sha512NoKsf
+        );
+
+        assert!(
+            !(ristretto_real_tvs.is_empty() || ristretto_fake_tvs.is_empty()),
+            "Parsing error"
+        );
+
+        // There should be 2 real test vectors and 1 fake test vector
+        assert_eq!(ristretto_real_tvs.len(), 2);
+        assert_eq!(ristretto_fake_tvs.len(), 1);
+
+        test_registration_request::<Ristretto255Sha512NoKsf>(&ristretto_real_tvs)?;
+        test_registration_response::<Ristretto255Sha512NoKsf>(&ristretto_real_tvs)?;
+        test_registration_upload::<Ristretto255Sha512NoKsf>(&ristretto_real_tvs)?;
+        test_ke1::<Ristretto255Sha512NoKsf>(&ristretto_real_tvs)?;
+        test_ke2::<Ristretto255Sha512NoKsf>(&ristretto_real_tvs)?;
+        test_ke3::<Ristretto255Sha512NoKsf>(&ristretto_real_tvs)?;
+        test_server_login_finish::<Ristretto255Sha512NoKsf>(&ristretto_real_tvs)?;
+        test_fake_vectors::<Ristretto255Sha512NoKsf>(&ristretto_fake_tvs)?;
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(all(feature = "ristretto255", feature = "curve25519"))]
+    {
+        struct Ristretto255Sha512Curve25519NoKsf;
+        impl CipherSuite for Ristretto255Sha512Curve25519NoKsf {
+            type OprfCs = crate::Ristretto255;
+            type KeyExchange = TripleDh<crate::Curve25519, sha2::Sha512>;
+            type Ksf = Identity;
+        }
+
+        let ristretto_real_tvs = json_to_test_vectors!(
+            rfc,
+            "Real",
+            "ristretto255-SHA512, curve25519",
+            Ristretto255Sha512Curve25519NoKsf
+        );
+
+        let ristretto_fake_tvs = json_to_test_vectors!(
+            rfc,
+            "Fake",
+            "ristretto255-SHA512, curve25519",
+            Ristretto255Sha512Curve25519NoKsf
+        );
+
+        assert!(
+            !(ristretto_real_tvs.is_empty() || ristretto_fake_tvs.is_empty()),
+            "Parsing error"
+        );
+
+        // There should be 2 real test vectors and 1 fake test vector
+        assert_eq!(ristretto_real_tvs.len(), 2);
+        assert_eq!(ristretto_fake_tvs.len(), 1);
+
+        test_registration_request::<Ristretto255Sha512Curve25519NoKsf>(&ristretto_real_tvs)?;
+        test_registration_response::<Ristretto255Sha512Curve25519NoKsf>(&ristretto_real_tvs)?;
+        test_registration_upload::<Ristretto255Sha512Curve25519NoKsf>(&ristretto_real_tvs)?;
+        test_ke1::<Ristretto255Sha512Curve25519NoKsf>(&ristretto_real_tvs)?;
+        test_ke2::<Ristretto255Sha512Curve25519NoKsf>(&ristretto_real_tvs)?;
+        test_ke3::<Ristretto255Sha512Curve25519NoKsf>(&ristretto_real_tvs)?;
+        test_server_login_finish::<Ristretto255Sha512Curve25519NoKsf>(&ristretto_real_tvs)?;
+        test_fake_vectors::<Ristretto255Sha512Curve25519NoKsf>(&ristretto_fake_tvs)?;
+    }
+
+    struct P256Sha256NoKsf;
+    impl CipherSuite for P256Sha256NoKsf {
+        type OprfCs = p256::NistP256;
+        type KeyExchange = TripleDh<p256::NistP256, sha2::Sha256>;
+        type Ksf = Identity;
+    }
+
+    let p256_real_tvs = json_to_test_vectors!(
+        rfc,
+        "Real",
+        "P256-SHA256, P256_XMD:SHA-256_SSWU_RO_",
+        P256Sha256NoKsf
+    );
+    let p256_fake_tvs = json_to_test_vectors!(
+        rfc,
+        "Fake",
+        "P256-SHA256, P256_XMD:SHA-256_SSWU_RO_",
+        P256Sha256NoKsf
+    );
+
+    assert!(
+        !(p256_real_tvs.is_empty() || p256_fake_tvs.is_empty()),
+        "Parsing error"
+    );
+
+    // There should be 2 real test vectors and 1 fake test vector
+    assert_eq!(p256_real_tvs.len(), 2);
+    assert_eq!(p256_fake_tvs.len(), 1);
+
+    test_registration_request::<P256Sha256NoKsf>(&p256_real_tvs)?;
+    test_registration_response::<P256Sha256NoKsf>(&p256_real_tvs)?;
+    test_registration_upload::<P256Sha256NoKsf>(&p256_real_tvs)?;
+    test_ke1::<P256Sha256NoKsf>(&p256_real_tvs)?;
+    test_ke2::<P256Sha256NoKsf>(&p256_real_tvs)?;
+    test_ke3::<P256Sha256NoKsf>(&p256_real_tvs)?;
+    test_server_login_finish::<P256Sha256NoKsf>(&p256_real_tvs)?;
+    test_fake_vectors::<P256Sha256NoKsf>(&p256_fake_tvs)?;
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+fn test_registration_request<CS: CipherSuite>(
+    tvs: &[OpaqueTestVectorParameters],
+) -> Result<(), ProtocolError> {
+    for parameters in tvs {
+        let mut rng = CycleRng::new(parameters.blind_registration.to_vec());
+        let client_registration_start_result =
+            ClientRegistration::<CS>::start(&mut rng, &parameters.password)?;
+        assert_eq!(
+            hex::encode(&parameters.registration_request),
+            hex::encode(client_registration_start_result.message.serialize())
+        );
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+fn test_registration_response<CS: CipherSuite>(
+    tvs: &[OpaqueTestVectorParameters],
+) -> Result<(), ProtocolError>
+where
+    // RegistrationResponse: KgPk + KePk
+    <OprfGroup<CS> as voprf::Group>::ElemLen: Add<<KeGroup<CS> as Group>::PkLen>,
+    RegistrationResponseLen<CS>: ArrayLength,
+{
+    for parameters in tvs {
+        let server_setup = ServerSetup::<CS>::deserialize(
+            &[
+                parameters.oprf_seed.as_slice(),
+                &parameters.server_private_key,
+                &parameters.dummy_public_key,
+            ]
+            .concat(),
+        )?;
+        let server_registration_start_result = ServerRegistration::<CS>::start(
+            &server_setup,
+            RegistrationRequest::deserialize(&parameters.registration_request).unwrap(),
+            &parameters.credential_identifier,
+        )?;
+        assert_eq!(
+            hex::encode(&parameters.server_public_key),
+            hex::encode(server_setup.keypair().public().serialize()),
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            hex::encode(&parameters.oprf_key),
+            hex::encode(server_registration_start_result.oprf_key)
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            hex::encode(&parameters.registration_response),
+            hex::encode(server_registration_start_result.message.serialize())
+        );
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+fn test_registration_upload<CS: CipherSuite>(
+    tvs: &[OpaqueTestVectorParameters],
+) -> Result<(), ProtocolError>
+where
+    // RegistrationUpload: (KePk + Hash) + Envelope
+    <KeGroup<CS> as Group>::PkLen: Add<OutputSize<OprfHash<CS>>>,
+    Sum<<KeGroup<CS> as Group>::PkLen, OutputSize<OprfHash<CS>>>:
+        ArrayLength + Add<EnvelopeLen<CS>>,
+    RegistrationUploadLen<CS>: ArrayLength,
+{
+    for parameters in tvs {
+        let mut rng = CycleRng::new(parameters.blind_registration.to_vec());
+        let client_registration_start_result =
+            ClientRegistration::<CS>::start(&mut rng, &parameters.password)?;
+
+        let mut finish_registration_rng = CycleRng::new(parameters.envelope_nonce.to_vec());
+        let result = client_registration_start_result.state.finish(
+            &mut finish_registration_rng,
+            &parameters.password,
+            RegistrationResponse::deserialize(&parameters.registration_response).unwrap(),
+            ClientRegistrationFinishParameters::new(
+                Identifiers {
+                    client: parameters.client_identity.as_deref(),
+                    server: parameters.server_identity.as_deref(),
+                },
+                None,
+            ),
+        )?;
+        assert_eq!(
+            hex::encode(&parameters.auth_key),
+            hex::encode(result.auth_key)
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            hex::encode(&parameters.randomized_pwd),
+            hex::encode(result.randomized_pwd)
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            hex::encode(&parameters.registration_upload),
+            hex::encode(result.message.serialize())
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            hex::encode(&parameters.export_key),
+            hex::encode(result.export_key)
+        );
+    }
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+fn test_ke1<CS: CipherSuite>(tvs: &[OpaqueTestVectorParameters]) -> Result<(), ProtocolError>
+where
+    // CredentialRequest: KgPk + Ke1Message
+    <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE1Message: Serialize,
+    <OprfGroup<CS> as voprf::Group>::ElemLen: Add<Ke1MessageLen<CS>>,
+    CredentialRequestLen<CS>: ArrayLength,
+{
+    for parameters in tvs {
+        let client_login_start = [
+            parameters.blind_login.as_slice(),
+            &parameters.client_keyshare_seed,
+            &parameters.client_nonce,
+        ]
+        .concat();
+
+        let mut client_login_start_rng = CycleRng::new(client_login_start);
+        let client_login_start_result =
+            ClientLogin::<CS>::start(&mut client_login_start_rng, &parameters.password)?;
+        assert_eq!(
+            hex::encode(&parameters.KE1),
+            hex::encode(client_login_start_result.message.serialize())
+        );
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+fn test_ke2<CS: CipherSuite>(tvs: &[OpaqueTestVectorParameters]) -> Result<(), ProtocolError>
+where
+    <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE1Message: Deserialize,
+    // RegistrationUpload: (KePk + Hash) + Envelope
+    <KeGroup<CS> as Group>::PkLen: Add<OutputSize<OprfHash<CS>>>,
+    Sum<<KeGroup<CS> as Group>::PkLen, OutputSize<OprfHash<CS>>>:
+        ArrayLength + Add<EnvelopeLen<CS>>,
+    RegistrationUploadLen<CS>: ArrayLength,
+    // ServerRegistration = RegistrationUpload
+    // CredentialResponseWithoutKeLen: (KgPk + Nonce) + MaskedResponse
+    <OprfGroup<CS> as voprf::Group>::ElemLen: Add<NonceLen>,
+    Sum<<OprfGroup<CS> as voprf::Group>::ElemLen, NonceLen>:
+        ArrayLength + Add<MaskedResponseLen<CS>>,
+    CredentialResponseWithoutKeLen<CS>: ArrayLength,
+    // CredentialResponse: CredentialResponseWithoutKeLen + Ke2Message
+    <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE2Message: Serialize,
+    CredentialResponseWithoutKeLen<CS>: Add<Ke2MessageLen<CS>>,
+    CredentialResponseLen<CS>: ArrayLength,
+{
+    for parameters in tvs {
+        let server_setup = ServerSetup::<CS>::deserialize(
+            &[
+                parameters.oprf_seed.as_slice(),
+                &parameters.server_private_key,
+                &parameters.dummy_public_key,
+            ]
+            .concat(),
+        )?;
+
+        let record =
+            ServerRegistration::<CS>::deserialize(&get_password_file_bytes::<CS>(parameters))?;
+
+        let mut server_keyshare_seed_and_nonce_rng = CycleRng::new(
+            [
+                parameters.dummy_masking_key.as_slice(),
+                &parameters.masking_nonce,
+                &parameters.server_keyshare_seed,
+                &parameters.server_nonce,
+            ]
+            .concat(),
+        );
+        let server_login_start_result = ServerLogin::<CS>::start(
+            &mut server_keyshare_seed_and_nonce_rng,
+            &server_setup,
+            Some(record),
+            CredentialRequest::<CS>::deserialize(&parameters.KE1).unwrap(),
+            &parameters.credential_identifier,
+            ServerLoginParameters {
+                context: Some(&parameters.context),
+                identifiers: Identifiers {
+                    client: parameters.client_identity.as_deref(),
+                    server: parameters.server_identity.as_deref(),
+                },
+            },
+        )?;
+        assert_eq!(
+            hex::encode(&parameters.handshake_secret),
+            hex::encode(server_login_start_result.handshake_secret)
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            hex::encode(&parameters.server_mac_key),
+            hex::encode(server_login_start_result.server_mac_key)
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            hex::encode(&parameters.oprf_key),
+            hex::encode(server_login_start_result.oprf_key)
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            hex::encode(&parameters.KE2),
+            hex::encode(server_login_start_result.message.serialize())
+        );
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+fn test_ke3<CS: CipherSuite>(tvs: &[OpaqueTestVectorParameters]) -> Result<(), ProtocolError>
+where
+    <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE2Message: Deserialize + Serialize,
+    <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE3Message: Serialize,
+{
+    for parameters in tvs {
+        let client_login_start = [
+            parameters.blind_login.as_slice(),
+            &parameters.client_keyshare_seed,
+            &parameters.client_nonce,
+        ]
+        .concat();
+        let mut client_login_start_rng = CycleRng::new(client_login_start);
+        let client_login_start_result =
+            ClientLogin::<CS>::start(&mut client_login_start_rng, &parameters.password)?;
+
+        let client_login_finish_result = client_login_start_result.state.finish(
+            &mut UnwrapErr(SysRng),
+            &parameters.password,
+            CredentialResponse::<CS>::deserialize(&parameters.KE2)?,
+            ClientLoginFinishParameters::new(
+                Some(&parameters.context.clone()),
+                Identifiers {
+                    client: parameters.client_identity.as_deref(),
+                    server: parameters.server_identity.as_deref(),
+                },
+                None,
+            ),
+        )?;
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            hex::encode(&parameters.session_key),
+            hex::encode(&client_login_finish_result.session_key)
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            hex::encode(&parameters.handshake_secret),
+            hex::encode(&client_login_finish_result.handshake_secret)
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            hex::encode(&parameters.client_mac_key),
+            hex::encode(&client_login_finish_result.client_mac_key)
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            hex::encode(&parameters.KE3),
+            hex::encode(client_login_finish_result.message.serialize())
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            hex::encode(&parameters.export_key),
+            hex::encode(client_login_finish_result.export_key)
+        );
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+fn test_server_login_finish<CS: CipherSuite>(
+    tvs: &[OpaqueTestVectorParameters],
+) -> Result<(), ProtocolError>
+where
+    <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE1Message: Deserialize,
+    <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE3Message: Deserialize,
+    // RegistrationUpload: (KePk + Hash) + Envelope
+    <KeGroup<CS> as Group>::PkLen: Add<OutputSize<OprfHash<CS>>>,
+    Sum<<KeGroup<CS> as Group>::PkLen, OutputSize<OprfHash<CS>>>:
+        ArrayLength + Add<EnvelopeLen<CS>>,
+    RegistrationUploadLen<CS>: ArrayLength,
+    // ServerRegistration = RegistrationUpload
+{
+    for parameters in tvs {
+        let server_setup = ServerSetup::<CS>::deserialize(
+            &[
+                parameters.oprf_seed.as_slice(),
+                &parameters.server_private_key,
+                &parameters.dummy_public_key,
+            ]
+            .concat(),
+        )?;
+
+        let record =
+            ServerRegistration::<CS>::deserialize(&get_password_file_bytes::<CS>(parameters))?;
+
+        let mut server_keyshare_seed_and_nonce_rng = CycleRng::new(
+            [
+                parameters.dummy_masking_key.as_slice(),
+                &parameters.masking_nonce,
+                &parameters.server_keyshare_seed,
+                &parameters.server_nonce,
+            ]
+            .concat(),
+        );
+        let server_login_start_result = ServerLogin::<CS>::start(
+            &mut server_keyshare_seed_and_nonce_rng,
+            &server_setup,
+            Some(record),
+            CredentialRequest::<CS>::deserialize(&parameters.KE1).unwrap(),
+            &parameters.credential_identifier,
+            ServerLoginParameters {
+                context: Some(&parameters.context),
+                identifiers: Identifiers {
+                    client: parameters.client_identity.as_deref(),
+                    server: parameters.server_identity.as_deref(),
+                },
+            },
+        )?;
+
+        let server_login_result = server_login_start_result.state.finish(
+            CredentialFinalization::deserialize(&parameters.KE3)?,
+            ServerLoginParameters {
+                context: Some(&parameters.context),
+                identifiers: Identifiers {
+                    client: parameters.client_identity.as_deref(),
+                    server: parameters.server_identity.as_deref(),
+                },
+            },
+        )?;
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            hex::encode(&parameters.session_key),
+            hex::encode(&server_login_result.session_key)
+        );
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+fn test_fake_vectors<CS: CipherSuite>(
+    tvs: &[OpaqueTestVectorParameters],
+) -> Result<(), ProtocolError>
+where
+    <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE1Message: Deserialize,
+    // CredentialResponseWithoutKeLen: (KgPk + Nonce) + MaskedResponse
+    <OprfGroup<CS> as voprf::Group>::ElemLen: Add<NonceLen>,
+    Sum<<OprfGroup<CS> as voprf::Group>::ElemLen, NonceLen>:
+        ArrayLength + Add<MaskedResponseLen<CS>>,
+    CredentialResponseWithoutKeLen<CS>: ArrayLength,
+    // CredentialResponse: CredentialResponseWithoutKeLen + Ke2Message
+    <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE2Message: Serialize,
+    CredentialResponseWithoutKeLen<CS>: Add<Ke2MessageLen<CS>>,
+    CredentialResponseLen<CS>: ArrayLength,
+{
+    for parameters in tvs {
+        let server_setup = ServerSetup::<CS>::deserialize(
+            &[
+                parameters.oprf_seed.as_slice(),
+                &parameters.server_private_key,
+                &parameters.dummy_public_key,
+            ]
+            .concat(),
+        )?;
+
+        let mut server_keyshare_seed_and_nonce_rng = CycleRng::new(
+            [
+                parameters.dummy_masking_key.as_slice(),
+                &parameters.masking_nonce,
+                &parameters.server_keyshare_seed,
+                &parameters.server_nonce,
+            ]
+            .concat(),
+        );
+        let server_login_start_result = ServerLogin::<CS>::start(
+            &mut server_keyshare_seed_and_nonce_rng,
+            &server_setup,
+            None,
+            CredentialRequest::<CS>::deserialize(&parameters.KE1).unwrap(),
+            &parameters.credential_identifier,
+            ServerLoginParameters {
+                context: Some(&parameters.context),
+                identifiers: Identifiers {
+                    client: parameters.client_identity.as_deref(),
+                    server: parameters.server_identity.as_deref(),
+                },
+            },
+        )?;
+        assert_eq!(
+            hex::encode(&parameters.KE2),
+            hex::encode(server_login_start_result.message.serialize())
+        );
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}

src/tests/voprf_test_vectors.rs

@@ -1,157 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
-//
-// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
-// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
-
-use crate::tests::mock_rng::CycleRng;
-use crate::{errors::*, group::Group, oprf};
-use curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoPoint;
-use generic_array::GenericArray;
-use serde_json::Value;
-use sha2::Sha512;
-
-struct VOPRFTestVectorParameters {
-    sksm: Vec<u8>,
-    input: Vec<u8>,
-    blind: Vec<u8>,
-    blinded_element: Vec<u8>,
-    evaluation_element: Vec<u8>,
-    unblinded_element: Vec<u8>,
-    info: Vec<u8>,
-    output: Vec<u8>,
-}
-
-// Taken from https://github.com/cfrg/draft-irtf-cfrg-voprf/blob/master/draft-irtf-cfrg-voprf.md
-// in base mode
-static OPRF_RISTRETTO255_SHA512: &'static [&str] = &[
-    r#"
-    {
-        "sksm": "c604c785ada70d77a5256ae21767de8c3304115237d262134f5e46e512cf8e03",
-        "input": "00",
-        "blind": "5ed895206bfc53316d307b23e46ecc6623afb3086da74189a416012be037e50b",
-        "blinded_element": "5cccd309ec729aebe398c53e19c0ab09c24a29f01036960bdad109852e7bdb44",
-        "evaluation_element": "86bd5eeabf29a87cb4a5c7207cb3ade5297e65f9b74c979bd3551891f4b21515",
-        "unblinded_element": "3c7f2d901c0d4f245503a186086fbdf5d8b4408432b25c5163e8b5a19c258348",
-        "info": "4f505246207465737420766563746f7273",
-        "output": "0bb570873cc0402ca38f1a2c395301f2a3627616e305f2bc54bb08c3f6ea9871eb71074e52e36b90778ba7c3e3429ef7170245c9e01647f3827fdef84d3ba930"
-    }
-    "#,
-    r#"
-    {
-        "sksm": "c604c785ada70d77a5256ae21767de8c3304115237d262134f5e46e512cf8e03",
-        "input": "5a5a5a5a5a5a5a5a5a5a5a5a5a5a5a5a5a",
-        "blind": "ed8366feb6b1d05d1f46acb727061e43aadfafe9c10e5a64e7518d63e3263503",
-        "blinded_element": "227d63ca69e93bd062193c1e97fff3d5ebf628f646009d77c4e22ba6429be154",
-        "evaluation_element": "063b91a12e7cbb98dfeb75d8a7eeb83aacf9fd6df7e0b4197466fb77a27fa631",
-        "unblinded_element": "804ec6774764ed50a0bbad0a5f477aa04df7323acab8f98ca6e468b7790bca4c",
-        "info": "4f505246207465737420766563746f7273",
-        "output": "af7cc264dbc96a6b898ba0fa33bfa9e1407bf1dcfbf8772204d470d4458b8f047806679dbfa251f656b906edf9fa638e268adf979bd0e2380a092047d61f9db9"
-    }
-    "#,
-];
-
-fn decode(values: &Value, key: &str) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
-    values[key]
-        .as_str()
-        .and_then(|s| hex::decode(&s.to_string()).ok())
-}
-
-fn populate_test_vectors(values: &Value) -> VOPRFTestVectorParameters {
-    VOPRFTestVectorParameters {
-        sksm: decode(&values, "sksm").unwrap(),
-        input: decode(&values, "input").unwrap(),
-        blind: decode(&values, "blind").unwrap(),
-        blinded_element: decode(&values, "blinded_element").unwrap(),
-        evaluation_element: decode(&values, "evaluation_element").unwrap(),
-        unblinded_element: decode(&values, "unblinded_element").unwrap(),
-        info: decode(&values, "info").unwrap(),
-        output: decode(&values, "output").unwrap(),
-    }
-}
-
-// Tests input -> blind, blinded_element
-#[test]
-fn test_blind() -> Result<(), PakeError> {
-    for tv in OPRF_RISTRETTO255_SHA512 {
-        let parameters = populate_test_vectors(&serde_json::from_str(tv).unwrap());
-        let mut rng = CycleRng::new(parameters.blind.to_vec());
-
-        let (token, blinded_element) =
-            oprf::blind::<_, RistrettoPoint, Sha512>(&parameters.input, &mut rng)?;
-
-        assert_eq!(
-            &parameters.blind,
-            &RistrettoPoint::scalar_as_bytes(&token.blind).to_vec()
-        );
-        assert_eq!(
-            &parameters.blinded_element,
-            &blinded_element.to_arr().to_vec()
-        );
-    }
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-// Tests sksm, blinded_element -> evaluation_element
-#[test]
-fn test_evaluate() -> Result<(), PakeError> {
-    for tv in OPRF_RISTRETTO255_SHA512 {
-        let parameters = populate_test_vectors(&serde_json::from_str(tv).unwrap());
-        let evaluation_element = oprf::evaluate::<RistrettoPoint>(
-            RistrettoPoint::from_element_slice(GenericArray::from_slice(
-                &parameters.blinded_element,
-            ))
-            .unwrap(),
-            &RistrettoPoint::from_scalar_slice(GenericArray::from_slice(&parameters.sksm)).unwrap(),
-        );
-
-        assert_eq!(
-            &parameters.evaluation_element,
-            &evaluation_element.to_arr().to_vec()
-        );
-    }
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-// Tests sksm, evaluation_element -> evaluation_element
-#[test]
-fn test_unblind() -> Result<(), PakeError> {
-    for tv in OPRF_RISTRETTO255_SHA512 {
-        let parameters = populate_test_vectors(&serde_json::from_str(tv).unwrap());
-
-        let token = oprf::Token {
-            data: parameters.input,
-            blind: RistrettoPoint::from_scalar_slice(GenericArray::from_slice(
-                &parameters.blind[..],
-            ))
-            .unwrap(),
-        };
-
-        let unblinded_element = oprf::unblind::<RistrettoPoint>(
-            &token,
-            RistrettoPoint::from_element_slice(GenericArray::from_slice(
-                &parameters.evaluation_element,
-            ))
-            .unwrap(),
-        );
-
-        assert_eq!(&parameters.unblinded_element, &unblinded_element);
-    }
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-// Tests input, unblinded_element, info -> output
-#[test]
-fn test_finalize() -> Result<(), PakeError> {
-    for tv in OPRF_RISTRETTO255_SHA512 {
-        let parameters = populate_test_vectors(&serde_json::from_str(tv).unwrap());
-
-        let output = oprf::finalize::<RistrettoPoint, Sha512>(
-            &parameters.input,
-            &parameters.unblinded_element,
-            &parameters.info,
-        );
-
-        assert_eq!(&parameters.output, &output.to_vec());
-    }
-    Ok(())
-}

taplo.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+[formatting]
+allowed_blank_lines = 1
+reorder_keys = true

tests/remote_key.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,653 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) VexaHub and contributors.
+// Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates.
+
+#![cfg(test_hsm)]
+#![allow(type_alias_bounds)]
+
+use std::env;
+use std::sync::{LazyLock, Mutex};
+use std::vec::Vec;
+
+#[cfg(feature = "ecdsa")]
+use ::ecdsa::SignatureSize;
+use cryptoki::context::{CInitializeArgs, Pkcs11};
+use cryptoki::mechanism::Mechanism;
+use cryptoki::mechanism::elliptic_curve::{EcKdf, Ecdh1DeriveParams};
+use cryptoki::object::{Attribute, AttributeType, KeyType, ObjectClass, ObjectHandle};
+use cryptoki::session::{Session, UserType};
+use cryptoki::types::AuthPin;
+#[cfg(feature = "ecdsa")]
+use digest::Digest;
+use digest::OutputSizeUser;
+#[cfg(feature = "ecdsa")]
+use elliptic_curve::PrimeCurve;
+use elliptic_curve::group::Curve;
+use elliptic_curve::group::prime::PrimeCurveAffine;
+use elliptic_curve::pkcs8::der::asn1::{OctetString, OctetStringRef};
+use elliptic_curve::pkcs8::der::{Decode, Encode};
+use elliptic_curve::pkcs8::{AssociatedOid, ObjectIdentifier};
+use elliptic_curve::point::{AffineCoordinates, DecompressPoint};
+use elliptic_curve::sec1::{FromEncodedPoint, ModulusSize, Tag, ToEncodedPoint};
+use elliptic_curve::{AffinePoint, CurveArithmetic, FieldBytesSize, Group as _, ProjectivePoint};
+use generic_array::typenum::Unsigned;
+use generic_array::{ArrayLength, GenericArray};
+use opaque_vx::key_exchange::KeyExchange;
+use opaque_vx::key_exchange::group::Group;
+#[cfg(all(feature = "ristretto255", feature = "ed25519"))]
+use opaque_vx::key_exchange::group::ed25519::{self, Ed25519};
+use opaque_vx::key_exchange::group::elliptic_curve::NonIdentity;
+#[cfg(feature = "ecdsa")]
+use opaque_vx::key_exchange::sigma_i::ecdsa::{self, Ecdsa, PreHash};
+#[cfg(all(feature = "ristretto255", feature = "ed25519"))]
+use opaque_vx::key_exchange::sigma_i::pure_eddsa::PureEddsa;
+#[cfg(feature = "ecdsa")]
+use opaque_vx::key_exchange::sigma_i::{CachedMessage, HashOutput, Message, SigmaI};
+use opaque_vx::key_exchange::tripledh::TripleDh;
+use opaque_vx::keypair::{KeyPair, PublicKey};
+use opaque_vx::ksf::Identity;
+use opaque_vx::{
+    CipherSuite, ClientLogin, ClientLoginFinishParameters, ClientLoginStartResult,
+    ClientRegistration, ClientRegistrationFinishParameters, ClientRegistrationStartResult,
+    ServerLogin, ServerLoginParameters, ServerLoginStartResult, ServerRegistration, ServerSetup,
+};
+#[cfg(all(feature = "curve25519", feature = "ristretto255"))]
+use opaque_vx::{Curve25519, Ristretto255};
+use p256::NistP256;
+use p384::NistP384;
+use p521::NistP521;
+use rand::rngs::OsRng;
+use sha2::{Sha256, Sha384, Sha512};
+use subtle::{Choice, ConditionallySelectable, ConstantTimeEq};
+
+type OprfGroup<CS: CipherSuite> = <CS::OprfCs as voprf::CipherSuite>::Group;
+type OprfHash<CS: CipherSuite> = <CS::OprfCs as voprf::CipherSuite>::Hash;
+type KeGroup<CS: CipherSuite> = <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::Group;
+
+#[test]
+fn triple_dh_p256() {
+    struct Suite;
+
+    impl CipherSuite for Suite {
+        type OprfCs = NistP256;
+        type KeyExchange = TripleDh<NistP256, Sha256>;
+        type Ksf = Identity;
+    }
+
+    test::<Suite>(
+        Mechanism::EccKeyPairGen,
+        NistP256::OID,
+        Attribute::Derive(true),
+        Mechanism::Sha256Hmac,
+    );
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn triple_dh_p384() {
+    struct Suite;
+
+    impl CipherSuite for Suite {
+        type OprfCs = NistP384;
+        type KeyExchange = TripleDh<NistP384, Sha384>;
+        type Ksf = Identity;
+    }
+
+    test::<Suite>(
+        Mechanism::EccKeyPairGen,
+        NistP384::OID,
+        Attribute::Derive(true),
+        Mechanism::Sha384Hmac,
+    );
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn triple_dh_p521() {
+    struct Suite;
+
+    impl CipherSuite for Suite {
+        type OprfCs = NistP521;
+        type KeyExchange = TripleDh<NistP521, Sha512>;
+        type Ksf = Identity;
+    }
+
+    test::<Suite>(
+        Mechanism::EccKeyPairGen,
+        NistP521::OID,
+        Attribute::Derive(true),
+        Mechanism::Sha512Hmac,
+    );
+}
+
+#[test]
+#[cfg(all(feature = "curve25519", feature = "ristretto255"))]
+fn triple_dh_curve25519() {
+    struct Suite;
+
+    impl CipherSuite for Suite {
+        type OprfCs = Ristretto255;
+        type KeyExchange = TripleDh<Curve25519, Sha512>;
+        type Ksf = Identity;
+    }
+
+    test::<Suite>(
+        // This should be [`Mechanism::EccMontgomeryKeyPairGen`], but SoftHSM has an incorrect
+        // implementation. See https://github.com/softhsm/SoftHSMv2/issues/647.
+        Mechanism::EccEdwardsKeyPairGen,
+        ObjectIdentifier::new("1.3.101.110").unwrap(),
+        Attribute::Derive(true),
+        Mechanism::Sha512Hmac,
+    );
+}
+
+#[test]
+#[cfg(feature = "ecdsa")]
+fn sigma_i_p256() {
+    struct Suite;
+
+    impl CipherSuite for Suite {
+        type OprfCs = NistP256;
+        type KeyExchange = SigmaI<Ecdsa<NistP256, Sha256>, NistP256, Sha256>;
+        type Ksf = Identity;
+    }
+
+    test::<Suite>(
+        Mechanism::EccKeyPairGen,
+        NistP256::OID,
+        Attribute::Sign(true),
+        Mechanism::Sha256Hmac,
+    );
+}
+
+#[test]
+#[cfg(feature = "ecdsa")]
+fn sigma_i_p384() {
+    struct Suite;
+
+    impl CipherSuite for Suite {
+        type OprfCs = NistP384;
+        type KeyExchange = SigmaI<Ecdsa<NistP384, Sha384>, NistP384, Sha384>;
+        type Ksf = Identity;
+    }
+
+    test::<Suite>(
+        Mechanism::EccKeyPairGen,
+        NistP384::OID,
+        Attribute::Sign(true),
+        Mechanism::Sha384Hmac,
+    );
+}
+
+#[test]
+#[cfg(all(feature = "ristretto255", feature = "ed25519"))]
+fn sigma_i_ed25519() {
+    struct Suite;
+
+    impl CipherSuite for Suite {
+        type OprfCs = Ristretto255;
+        type KeyExchange = SigmaI<PureEddsa<Ed25519>, Ristretto255, Sha512>;
+        type Ksf = Identity;
+    }
+
+    test::<Suite>(
+        Mechanism::EccEdwardsKeyPairGen,
+        ObjectIdentifier::new_unwrap("1.3.101.112"),
+        Attribute::Sign(true),
+        Mechanism::Sha512Hmac,
+    );
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone)]
+struct RemoteKey(ObjectHandle);
+
+trait Pkcs11PublicKey
+where
+    Self: Group,
+{
+    fn pkcs11_public_key(data: &[u8]) -> PublicKey<Self>;
+}
+
+trait Pkcs11KeyExchange<KE: KeyExchange> {
+    fn pkcs11_key_exchange<CS: CipherSuite>(
+        &self,
+        server_pk: &PublicKey<KE::Group>,
+        data: KE::KE2BuilderData<'_, CS>,
+    ) -> KE::KE2BuilderInput<CS>;
+}
+
+fn test<CS: 'static + CipherSuite>(
+    dh_mechanism: Mechanism,
+    oid: ObjectIdentifier,
+    attribute: Attribute,
+    hmac_mechanism: Mechanism,
+) where
+    KeGroup<CS>: Pkcs11PublicKey,
+    RemoteKey: Pkcs11KeyExchange<CS::KeyExchange>,
+{
+    let (remote_key, pk) = pkcs11_generate_key_pair(dh_mechanism, oid, attribute);
+
+    let keypair = KeyPair::new(RemoteKey(remote_key), pk);
+    let oprf_seed = pkcs11_generate_oprf_seed(<OprfHash<CS> as OutputSizeUser>::OutputSize::U64);
+    let server_setup = ServerSetup::new_with_key_pair_and_seed(&mut OsRng, keypair, oprf_seed);
+
+    const PASSWORD: &str = "password";
+
+    let ClientRegistrationStartResult {
+        message,
+        state: client,
+    } = ClientRegistration::<CS>::start(&mut OsRng, PASSWORD.as_bytes()).unwrap();
+    let key_material_info = server_setup.key_material_info(&[]);
+    let key_material = pkcs11_hkdf::<CS>(
+        key_material_info.ikm,
+        hmac_mechanism,
+        Vec::from_iter(key_material_info.info.into_iter().flatten().copied()),
+    );
+    let message = ServerRegistration::start_with_key_material(&server_setup, key_material, message)
+        .unwrap()
+        .message;
+    let message = client
+        .finish(
+            &mut OsRng,
+            PASSWORD.as_bytes(),
+            message,
+            ClientRegistrationFinishParameters::default(),
+        )
+        .unwrap()
+        .message;
+    let file = ServerRegistration::finish(message);
+
+    let ClientLoginStartResult {
+        message,
+        state: client,
+    } = ClientLogin::<CS>::start(&mut OsRng, PASSWORD.as_bytes()).unwrap();
+    let key_material_info = server_setup.key_material_info(&[]);
+    let key_material = pkcs11_hkdf::<CS>(
+        key_material_info.ikm,
+        hmac_mechanism,
+        Vec::from_iter(key_material_info.info.into_iter().flatten().copied()),
+    );
+    let builder = ServerLogin::builder_with_key_material(
+        &mut OsRng,
+        &server_setup,
+        key_material,
+        Some(file),
+        message,
+        ServerLoginParameters::default(),
+    )
+    .unwrap();
+    let shared_secret = builder
+        .private_key()
+        .pkcs11_key_exchange(server_setup.keypair().public(), builder.data());
+
+    let ServerLoginStartResult {
+        message,
+        state: server,
+        ..
+    } = builder.clone().build(shared_secret).unwrap();
+
+    let message = client
+        .clone()
+        .finish(
+            &mut OsRng,
+            PASSWORD.as_bytes(),
+            message,
+            ClientLoginFinishParameters::default(),
+        )
+        .map(|result| result.message);
+
+    message
+        .map(|message| {
+            server
+                .finish(message, ServerLoginParameters::default())
+                .unwrap()
+        })
+        .unwrap();
+}
+
+static SESSION: LazyLock<Mutex<Session>> = LazyLock::new(|| {
+    let module = env::var("PKCS11_MODULE").expect("`PKCS11_MODULE` environment variable");
+    let pkcs11 = Pkcs11::new(module).unwrap();
+    pkcs11.initialize(CInitializeArgs::OsThreads).unwrap();
+
+    let slot = pkcs11.get_slots_with_token().unwrap()[0];
+
+    let so_pin = AuthPin::new("abcdef".into());
+    pkcs11.init_token(slot, &so_pin, "Test Token").unwrap();
+
+    let user_pin = AuthPin::new("fedcba".into());
+
+    {
+        let session = pkcs11.open_rw_session(slot).unwrap();
+        session.login(UserType::So, Some(&so_pin)).unwrap();
+        session.init_pin(&user_pin).unwrap();
+    }
+
+    let session = pkcs11.open_rw_session(slot).unwrap();
+    session.login(UserType::User, Some(&user_pin)).unwrap();
+
+    Mutex::new(session)
+});
+
+fn pkcs11_generate_key_pair<G: Group + Pkcs11PublicKey>(
+    mechanism: Mechanism,
+    oid: ObjectIdentifier,
+    attribute: Attribute,
+) -> (ObjectHandle, PublicKey<G>) {
+    let session = SESSION.lock().unwrap();
+    let (pk, remote_key) = session
+        .generate_key_pair(
+            &mechanism,
+            &[
+                Attribute::Token(false),
+                Attribute::EcParams(oid.to_der().unwrap()),
+            ],
+            &[Attribute::Token(false), attribute],
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+    let Attribute::EcPoint(pk) = session
+        .get_attributes(pk, &[AttributeType::EcPoint])
+        .unwrap()
+        .pop()
+        .unwrap()
+    else {
+        unreachable!()
+    };
+    drop(session);
+
+    let pk = OctetString::from_der(&pk).unwrap();
+    let pk = G::pkcs11_public_key(pk.as_bytes());
+
+    (remote_key, pk)
+}
+
+fn pkcs11_generate_oprf_seed(length: u64) -> ObjectHandle {
+    SESSION
+        .lock()
+        .unwrap()
+        .generate_key(
+            &Mechanism::GenericSecretKeyGen,
+            &[Attribute::Token(false), Attribute::ValueLen(length.into())],
+        )
+        .unwrap()
+}
+
+// SoftHSM, nor any other popular HSM at the time of writing, supports HKDF. So
+// we instead implement HKDF by hand on top of the HSMs HMAC, which is supported
+// by almost all HSMs and still protects the OPRF seed.
+fn pkcs11_hkdf<CS: CipherSuite>(
+    hmac: ObjectHandle,
+    mechanism: Mechanism,
+    info: Vec<u8>,
+) -> GenericArray<u8, <OprfGroup<CS> as voprf::Group>::ScalarLen> {
+    let mut okm = GenericArray::default();
+    let mut prev: Option<Vec<u8>> = None;
+    let chunk_len = <OprfHash<CS> as OutputSizeUser>::OutputSize::USIZE;
+
+    if okm.len() > chunk_len * 255 {
+        panic!("invalid length");
+    }
+
+    let session = SESSION.lock().unwrap();
+
+    for (block_n, block) in (0..).zip(okm.chunks_mut(chunk_len)) {
+        let mut data = Vec::new();
+
+        if let Some(ref prev) = prev {
+            data.extend(prev.as_slice())
+        };
+
+        data.extend(&info);
+        data.extend(&[block_n + 1]);
+
+        let output = session.sign(&mechanism, hmac, &data).unwrap();
+        block.copy_from_slice(&output[..block.len()]);
+        prev = Some(output);
+    }
+
+    okm
+}
+
+impl Pkcs11PublicKey for NistP256 {
+    fn pkcs11_public_key(data: &[u8]) -> PublicKey<NistP256> {
+        pkcs11_ec_public_key(data)
+    }
+}
+
+impl Pkcs11PublicKey for NistP384 {
+    fn pkcs11_public_key(data: &[u8]) -> PublicKey<NistP384> {
+        pkcs11_ec_public_key(data)
+    }
+}
+
+impl Pkcs11PublicKey for NistP521 {
+    fn pkcs11_public_key(data: &[u8]) -> PublicKey<NistP521> {
+        pkcs11_ec_public_key(data)
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(all(feature = "curve25519", feature = "ristretto255"))]
+impl Pkcs11PublicKey for Curve25519 {
+    fn pkcs11_public_key(data: &[u8]) -> PublicKey<Curve25519> {
+        PublicKey::deserialize(data).unwrap()
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(all(feature = "ristretto255", feature = "ed25519"))]
+impl Pkcs11PublicKey for Ed25519 {
+    fn pkcs11_public_key(data: &[u8]) -> PublicKey<Ed25519> {
+        PublicKey::deserialize(data).unwrap()
+    }
+}
+
+impl Pkcs11KeyExchange<TripleDh<NistP256, Sha256>> for RemoteKey {
+    fn pkcs11_key_exchange<CS: CipherSuite>(
+        &self,
+        server_pk: &PublicKey<NistP256>,
+        client_pk: &PublicKey<NistP256>,
+    ) -> GenericArray<u8, <NistP256 as Group>::PkLen> {
+        pkcs_11_ecdsa_derive_secret::<NistP256>(self.0, server_pk, client_pk)
+    }
+}
+
+impl Pkcs11KeyExchange<TripleDh<NistP384, Sha384>> for RemoteKey {
+    fn pkcs11_key_exchange<CS: CipherSuite>(
+        &self,
+        server_pk: &PublicKey<NistP384>,
+        client_pk: &PublicKey<NistP384>,
+    ) -> GenericArray<u8, <NistP384 as Group>::PkLen> {
+        pkcs_11_ecdsa_derive_secret::<NistP384>(self.0, server_pk, client_pk)
+    }
+}
+
+impl Pkcs11KeyExchange<TripleDh<NistP521, Sha512>> for RemoteKey {
+    fn pkcs11_key_exchange<CS: CipherSuite>(
+        &self,
+        server_pk: &PublicKey<NistP521>,
+        client_pk: &PublicKey<NistP521>,
+    ) -> GenericArray<u8, <NistP521 as Group>::PkLen> {
+        pkcs_11_ecdsa_derive_secret::<NistP521>(self.0, server_pk, client_pk)
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(all(feature = "curve25519", feature = "ristretto255"))]
+impl Pkcs11KeyExchange<TripleDh<Curve25519, Sha512>> for RemoteKey {
+    fn pkcs11_key_exchange<CS: CipherSuite>(
+        &self,
+        _: &PublicKey<Curve25519>,
+        pk: &PublicKey<Curve25519>,
+    ) -> GenericArray<u8, <Curve25519 as Group>::PkLen> {
+        let shared_secret = pkcs_11_dh_derive_secret(self.0, &pk.serialize());
+
+        GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&shared_secret)
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "ecdsa")]
+impl Pkcs11KeyExchange<SigmaI<Ecdsa<NistP256, Sha256>, NistP256, Sha256>> for RemoteKey {
+    fn pkcs11_key_exchange<CS: CipherSuite>(
+        &self,
+        _: &PublicKey<NistP256>,
+        message: &Message<CS, NistP256>,
+    ) -> (ecdsa::Signature<NistP256>, PreHash<Sha256>) {
+        pkcs_11_ecdsa_sign::<NistP256, Sha256>(self.0, message.hash())
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "ecdsa")]
+impl Pkcs11KeyExchange<SigmaI<Ecdsa<NistP384, Sha384>, NistP384, Sha384>> for RemoteKey {
+    fn pkcs11_key_exchange<CS: CipherSuite>(
+        &self,
+        _: &PublicKey<NistP384>,
+        message: &Message<CS, NistP384>,
+    ) -> (ecdsa::Signature<NistP384>, PreHash<Sha384>) {
+        pkcs_11_ecdsa_sign::<NistP384, Sha384>(self.0, message.hash())
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(all(feature = "ristretto255", feature = "ed25519"))]
+impl Pkcs11KeyExchange<SigmaI<PureEddsa<Ed25519>, Ristretto255, Sha512>> for RemoteKey {
+    fn pkcs11_key_exchange<CS: CipherSuite>(
+        &self,
+        _: &PublicKey<Ed25519>,
+        message: &Message<CS, Ristretto255>,
+    ) -> (ed25519::Signature, CachedMessage<CS, Ristretto255>) {
+        pkcs_11_eddsa_sign(self.0, message)
+    }
+}
+
+fn pkcs11_ec_public_key<G>(data: &[u8]) -> PublicKey<G>
+where
+    G: Group<Pk = NonIdentity<G>> + CurveArithmetic,
+    FieldBytesSize<G>: ModulusSize,
+    AffinePoint<G>:
+        FromEncodedPoint<G> + ToEncodedPoint<G> + PrimeCurveAffine<Curve = ProjectivePoint<G>>,
+{
+    PublicKey::deserialize(
+        elliptic_curve::PublicKey::<G>::from_sec1_bytes(data)
+            .unwrap()
+            .to_encoded_point(true)
+            .as_bytes(),
+    )
+    .unwrap()
+}
+
+fn pkcs_11_dh_derive_secret(sk: ObjectHandle, pk: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
+    let session = SESSION.lock().unwrap();
+    let shared_secret = session
+        .derive_key(
+            &Mechanism::Ecdh1Derive(Ecdh1DeriveParams::new(EcKdf::null(), pk)),
+            sk,
+            &[
+                Attribute::Token(false),
+                Attribute::KeyType(KeyType::GENERIC_SECRET),
+                Attribute::Class(ObjectClass::SECRET_KEY),
+                Attribute::Extractable(true),
+            ],
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+    let Attribute::Value(shared_secret) = session
+        .get_attributes(shared_secret, &[AttributeType::Value])
+        .unwrap()
+        .pop()
+        .unwrap()
+    else {
+        unreachable!()
+    };
+    drop(session);
+
+    shared_secret
+}
+
+fn pkcs_11_ecdsa_derive_secret<G>(
+    server_sk: ObjectHandle,
+    server_pk: &PublicKey<G>,
+    client_pk: &PublicKey<G>,
+) -> GenericArray<u8, <G as Group>::PkLen>
+where
+    G: Group<Pk = NonIdentity<G>> + CurveArithmetic,
+    AffinePoint<G>: DecompressPoint<G> + ToEncodedPoint<G>,
+    FieldBytesSize<G>: ModulusSize,
+{
+    let client_pk_point = client_pk.to_group_type();
+    let client_pk = client_pk.serialize();
+    let client_pk = OctetStringRef::new(&client_pk).unwrap();
+    let client_pk = client_pk.to_der().unwrap();
+
+    let shared_secret_bytes = pkcs_11_dh_derive_secret(server_sk, &client_pk);
+    let shared_secret_point = AffinePoint::<G>::decompress(
+        &GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&shared_secret_bytes),
+        Choice::from(0),
+    )
+    .unwrap();
+    let mut shared_secret = GenericArray::default();
+    shared_secret[1..].copy_from_slice(&shared_secret_bytes);
+
+    let shifted_client_pk = client_pk_point.0.to_point() + ProjectivePoint::<G>::generator();
+    let shifted_client_pk = shifted_client_pk.to_affine().to_encoded_point(true);
+    let shifted_client_pk = OctetStringRef::new(shifted_client_pk.as_bytes()).unwrap();
+    let shifted_client_pk = shifted_client_pk.to_der().unwrap();
+
+    let check_point = pkcs_11_dh_derive_secret(server_sk, &shifted_client_pk);
+
+    let shifted_server_pk = server_pk.to_group_type().0.to_point() + shared_secret_point;
+    let shifted_server_pk = shifted_server_pk.to_affine();
+
+    let tag = u8::conditional_select(
+        &(Tag::CompressedEvenY as u8),
+        &(Tag::CompressedOddY as u8),
+        check_point.ct_ne(&shifted_server_pk.x()),
+    );
+    shared_secret[0] = tag;
+
+    shared_secret
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "ecdsa")]
+fn pkcs_11_ecdsa_sign<G: CurveArithmetic + PrimeCurve, H: Clone + Digest>(
+    sk: ObjectHandle,
+    hashes: HashOutput<H>,
+) -> (ecdsa::Signature<G>, PreHash<H>)
+where
+    SignatureSize<G>: ArrayLength<u8>,
+{
+    let sign_pre_hash = hashes.sign.finalize();
+
+    let session = SESSION.lock().unwrap();
+    let signature = session.sign(&Mechanism::Ecdsa, sk, &sign_pre_hash).unwrap();
+    drop(session);
+
+    let signature = ::ecdsa::Signature::from_slice(&signature).unwrap();
+
+    (
+        ecdsa::Signature(signature),
+        PreHash(hashes.verify.finalize()),
+    )
+}
+
+#[cfg(all(feature = "ristretto255", feature = "ed25519"))]
+fn pkcs_11_eddsa_sign<CS: CipherSuite>(
+    sk: ObjectHandle,
+    message: &Message<CS, Ristretto255>,
+) -> (ed25519::Signature, CachedMessage<CS, Ristretto255>) {
+    use cryptoki::mechanism::eddsa::{EddsaParams, EddsaSignatureScheme};
+
+    let mut message_bytes = Vec::new();
+    message
+        .sign_message()
+        .for_each(|bytes| message_bytes.extend_from_slice(bytes));
+
+    let session = SESSION.lock().unwrap();
+    let signature = session
+        .sign(
+            &Mechanism::Eddsa(EddsaParams::new(EddsaSignatureScheme::Pure)),
+            sk,
+            &message_bytes,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+    drop(session);
+
+    let signature = ed25519::Signature::from_slice(&signature).unwrap();
+
+    (signature, message.to_cached())
+}