Introducing a trait for key exchange (#20)
This commit is contained in:
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// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
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//
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// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
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// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
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//! Includes instantiations of key exchange protocols used in the
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//! login step for OPAQUE
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pub(crate) mod traits;
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pub mod tripledh;
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// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
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//
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// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
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// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
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use crate::{
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errors::{InternalPakeError, ProtocolError},
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keypair::{Key, KeyPair},
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};
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use rand_core::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
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use std::convert::TryFrom;
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pub trait KeyExchange {
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type KE1State: TryFrom<Vec<u8>, Error = InternalPakeError> + ToBytes;
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type KE2State: TryFrom<Vec<u8>, Error = ProtocolError> + ToBytes;
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type KE1Message: TryFrom<Vec<u8>, Error = InternalPakeError> + ToBytes;
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type KE2Message: TryFrom<Vec<u8>, Error = ProtocolError> + ToBytes;
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type KE3Message: TryFrom<Vec<u8>, Error = ProtocolError> + ToBytes;
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fn generate_ke1<R: RngCore + CryptoRng, KeyFormat: KeyPair<Repr = Key>>(
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l1_component: Vec<u8>,
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rng: &mut R,
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) -> Result<(Self::KE1State, Self::KE1Message), ProtocolError>;
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fn generate_ke2<R: RngCore + CryptoRng, KeyFormat: KeyPair<Repr = Key>>(
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rng: &mut R,
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l1_bytes: Vec<u8>,
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l2_bytes: Vec<u8>,
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ke1_message: Self::KE1Message,
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client_s_pk: KeyFormat::Repr,
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server_s_sk: KeyFormat::Repr,
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) -> Result<(Self::KE2State, Self::KE2Message), ProtocolError>;
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fn generate_ke3<KeyFormat: KeyPair<Repr = Key>>(
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l2_component: Vec<u8>,
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ke2_message: Self::KE2Message,
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ke1_state: &Self::KE1State,
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server_s_pk: KeyFormat::Repr,
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client_s_sk: KeyFormat::Repr,
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) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, Self::KE3Message), ProtocolError>;
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fn finish_ke(
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ke3_message: Self::KE3Message,
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ke2_state: &Self::KE2State,
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) -> Result<Vec<u8>, ProtocolError>;
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fn ke1_state_size() -> usize;
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fn ke2_message_size() -> usize;
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}
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pub trait ToBytes {
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fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8>;
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}
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@@ -0,0 +1,417 @@
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// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
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//
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// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
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// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
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//! An implementation of the Triple Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol
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use crate::{
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errors::{utils::check_slice_size, InternalPakeError, PakeError, ProtocolError},
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key_exchange::traits::{KeyExchange, ToBytes},
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keypair::{Key, KeyPair, SizedBytes},
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sized_bytes_using_constant_and_try_from,
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};
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use generic_array::{
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typenum::{U64, U96},
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GenericArray,
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};
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use hkdf::Hkdf;
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use hmac::{Hmac, Mac, NewMac};
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use rand_core::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
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use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
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use std::convert::TryFrom;
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const KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
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pub(crate) const NONCE_LEN: usize = 32;
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const KE1_STATE_LEN: usize = KEY_LEN + KEY_LEN + NONCE_LEN;
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const KE2_MESSAGE_LEN: usize = NONCE_LEN + 2 * KEY_LEN;
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static STR_3DH: &[u8] = b"3DH keys";
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/// The Triple Diffie-Hellman key exchange implementation
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pub struct TripleDH {}
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impl KeyExchange for TripleDH {
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type KE1State = KE1State;
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type KE2State = KE2State;
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type KE1Message = KE1Message;
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type KE2Message = KE2Message;
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type KE3Message = KE3Message;
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fn generate_ke1<R: RngCore + CryptoRng, KeyFormat: KeyPair<Repr = Key>>(
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l1_component: Vec<u8>,
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rng: &mut R,
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) -> Result<(Self::KE1State, Self::KE1Message), ProtocolError> {
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let client_e_kp = KeyFormat::generate_random(rng)?;
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let mut client_nonce = [0u8; NONCE_LEN];
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rng.fill_bytes(&mut client_nonce);
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let ke1_message = KE1Message {
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client_nonce: client_nonce.to_vec(),
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client_e_pk: client_e_kp.public().clone(),
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};
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let l1_data: Vec<u8> = [&l1_component[..], &ke1_message.to_bytes()].concat();
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let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
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hasher.update(&l1_data);
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let hashed_l1 = hasher.finalize();
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Ok((
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KE1State {
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client_e_sk: client_e_kp.private().clone(),
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client_nonce: client_nonce.to_vec(),
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hashed_l1: hashed_l1.to_vec(),
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},
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ke1_message,
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))
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}
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fn generate_ke2<R: RngCore + CryptoRng, KeyFormat: KeyPair<Repr = Key>>(
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rng: &mut R,
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l1_bytes: Vec<u8>,
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l2_bytes: Vec<u8>,
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ke1_message: Self::KE1Message,
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client_s_pk: KeyFormat::Repr,
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server_s_sk: KeyFormat::Repr,
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) -> Result<(Self::KE2State, Self::KE2Message), ProtocolError> {
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let server_e_kp = KeyFormat::generate_random(rng)?;
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let mut server_nonce = [0u8; NONCE_LEN];
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rng.fill_bytes(&mut server_nonce);
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let (shared_secret, km2, km3) = derive_3dh_keys::<KeyFormat>(
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TripleDHComponents {
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pk1: ke1_message.client_e_pk.clone(),
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sk1: server_e_kp.private().clone(),
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pk2: ke1_message.client_e_pk,
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sk2: server_s_sk.clone(),
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pk3: client_s_pk.clone(),
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sk3: server_e_kp.private().clone(),
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},
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&ke1_message.client_nonce,
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&server_nonce,
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client_s_pk,
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KeyFormat::public_from_private(&server_s_sk),
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)?;
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let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
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hasher.update(&l1_bytes);
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let hashed_l1 = hasher.finalize();
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let transcript2: Vec<u8> = [
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&hashed_l1[..],
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&l2_bytes[..],
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&server_nonce[..],
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&server_e_kp.public().to_arr(),
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]
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.concat();
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let mut hasher2 = Sha256::new();
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hasher2.update(&transcript2);
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let hashed_transcript = hasher2.finalize();
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let mut mac = Hmac::<Sha256>::new_varkey(&km2).map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HmacError)?;
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mac.update(&hashed_transcript);
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Ok((
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KE2State {
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km3: km3.to_vec(),
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hashed_transcript: hashed_transcript.to_vec(),
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shared_secret: shared_secret.to_vec(),
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},
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KE2Message {
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server_nonce: server_nonce.to_vec(),
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server_e_pk: server_e_kp.public().clone(),
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mac: mac.finalize().into_bytes().to_vec(),
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},
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))
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}
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fn generate_ke3<KeyFormat: KeyPair<Repr = Key>>(
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l2_component: Vec<u8>,
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ke2_message: Self::KE2Message,
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ke1_state: &Self::KE1State,
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server_s_pk: KeyFormat::Repr,
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client_s_sk: KeyFormat::Repr,
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) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, Self::KE3Message), ProtocolError> {
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let (shared_secret, km2, km3) = derive_3dh_keys::<KeyFormat>(
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TripleDHComponents {
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pk1: ke2_message.server_e_pk.clone(),
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sk1: ke1_state.client_e_sk.clone(),
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pk2: server_s_pk.clone(),
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sk2: ke1_state.client_e_sk.clone(),
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pk3: ke2_message.server_e_pk.clone(),
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sk3: client_s_sk.clone(),
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},
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&ke1_state.client_nonce,
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&ke2_message.server_nonce,
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KeyFormat::public_from_private(&client_s_sk),
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server_s_pk,
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)?;
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let transcript: Vec<u8> = [
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&ke1_state.hashed_l1[..],
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&l2_component[..],
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&ke2_message.server_nonce[..],
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&ke2_message.server_e_pk[..],
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]
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.concat();
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let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
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hasher.update(&transcript);
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let hashed_transcript = hasher.finalize();
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let mut server_mac =
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Hmac::<Sha256>::new_varkey(&km2).map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HmacError)?;
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server_mac.update(&hashed_transcript);
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if ke2_message.mac != server_mac.finalize().into_bytes().to_vec() {
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return Err(ProtocolError::VerificationError(
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PakeError::KeyExchangeMacValidationError,
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));
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}
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let mut client_mac =
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Hmac::<Sha256>::new_varkey(&km3).map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HmacError)?;
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client_mac.update(&hashed_transcript);
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Ok((
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shared_secret.to_vec(),
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KE3Message {
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mac: client_mac.finalize().into_bytes().to_vec(),
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},
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))
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}
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fn finish_ke(
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ke3_message: Self::KE3Message,
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ke2_state: &Self::KE2State,
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) -> Result<Vec<u8>, ProtocolError> {
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let mut client_mac =
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Hmac::<Sha256>::new_varkey(&ke2_state.km3).map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HmacError)?;
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client_mac.update(&ke2_state.hashed_transcript);
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if ke3_message.mac != client_mac.finalize().into_bytes().to_vec() {
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return Err(ProtocolError::VerificationError(
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PakeError::KeyExchangeMacValidationError,
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));
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}
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Ok(ke2_state.shared_secret.to_vec())
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}
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fn ke1_state_size() -> usize {
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KE1_STATE_LEN
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}
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fn ke2_message_size() -> usize {
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KE2_MESSAGE_LEN
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}
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}
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/// The client state produced after the first key exchange message
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#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub struct KE1State {
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client_e_sk: Key,
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client_nonce: Vec<u8>,
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hashed_l1: Vec<u8>,
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}
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/// The first key exchange message
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#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub struct KE1Message {
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pub(crate) client_nonce: Vec<u8>,
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pub(crate) client_e_pk: Key,
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}
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impl TryFrom<Vec<u8>> for KE1State {
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type Error = InternalPakeError;
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fn try_from(bytes: Vec<u8>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
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let checked_bytes = check_slice_size(&bytes, KE1_STATE_LEN, "ke1_state")?;
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Ok(Self {
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client_e_sk: Key::from_bytes(&checked_bytes[..KEY_LEN])?,
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client_nonce: checked_bytes[KEY_LEN..KEY_LEN + NONCE_LEN].to_vec(),
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hashed_l1: checked_bytes[KEY_LEN + NONCE_LEN..].to_vec(),
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})
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}
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}
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impl ToBytes for KE1State {
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fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
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let output: Vec<u8> = [
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&self.client_e_sk.to_arr(),
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&self.client_nonce[..],
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&self.hashed_l1[..],
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]
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.concat();
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output
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}
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}
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sized_bytes_using_constant_and_try_from!(KE1State, U96);
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impl ToBytes for KE1Message {
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fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
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[&self.client_nonce[..], &self.client_e_pk.to_arr()].concat()
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}
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}
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impl TryFrom<Vec<u8>> for KE1Message {
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type Error = InternalPakeError;
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fn try_from(ke1_message_bytes: Vec<u8>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
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let checked_bytes =
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check_slice_size(&ke1_message_bytes, NONCE_LEN + KEY_LEN, "ke1_message")?;
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Ok(Self {
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client_nonce: checked_bytes[..NONCE_LEN].to_vec(),
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client_e_pk: Key::from_bytes(&checked_bytes[NONCE_LEN..])?,
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})
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}
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}
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sized_bytes_using_constant_and_try_from!(KE1Message, U64);
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/// The server state produced after the second key exchange message
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pub struct KE2State {
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km3: Vec<u8>,
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hashed_transcript: Vec<u8>,
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shared_secret: Vec<u8>,
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}
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/// The second key exchange message
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pub struct KE2Message {
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server_nonce: Vec<u8>,
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server_e_pk: Key,
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mac: Vec<u8>,
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}
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impl ToBytes for KE2State {
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fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
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let output: Vec<u8> = [
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&self.km3[..],
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&self.hashed_transcript[..],
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&self.shared_secret[..],
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]
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.concat();
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output
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}
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}
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impl TryFrom<Vec<u8>> for KE2State {
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type Error = ProtocolError;
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fn try_from(ke1_message_bytes: Vec<u8>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
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let checked_bytes = check_slice_size(&ke1_message_bytes, 3 * KEY_LEN, "ke2_state")?;
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Ok(Self {
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km3: checked_bytes[..KEY_LEN].to_vec(),
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hashed_transcript: checked_bytes[KEY_LEN..2 * KEY_LEN].to_vec(),
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shared_secret: checked_bytes[2 * KEY_LEN..].to_vec(),
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})
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}
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}
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impl ToBytes for KE2Message {
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fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
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let output: Vec<u8> = [
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&self.server_nonce[..],
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&self.server_e_pk.to_arr(),
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&self.mac[..],
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]
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.concat();
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output
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}
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}
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impl TryFrom<Vec<u8>> for KE2Message {
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type Error = ProtocolError;
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fn try_from(ke2_message_bytes: Vec<u8>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
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let checked_bytes = check_slice_size(&ke2_message_bytes, KE2_MESSAGE_LEN, "ke2_message")?;
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Ok(Self {
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server_nonce: checked_bytes[..NONCE_LEN].to_vec(),
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server_e_pk: Key::from_bytes(&checked_bytes[NONCE_LEN..NONCE_LEN + KEY_LEN])?,
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mac: checked_bytes[NONCE_LEN + KEY_LEN..].to_vec(),
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})
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}
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}
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// The triple of public and private components used in the 3DH computation
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struct TripleDHComponents {
|
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pk1: Key,
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sk1: Key,
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pk2: Key,
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sk2: Key,
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pk3: Key,
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sk3: Key,
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}
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// Consists of a shared secret, followed by two mac keys
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type TripleDHDerivationResult = (
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GenericArray<u8, <Sha256 as Digest>::OutputSize>,
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GenericArray<u8, <Sha256 as Digest>::OutputSize>,
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GenericArray<u8, <Sha256 as Digest>::OutputSize>,
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);
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// Internal function which takes the public and private components of the client and server keypairs, along
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// with some auxiliary metadata, to produce the shared secret and two MAC keys
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fn derive_3dh_keys<KeyFormat: KeyPair<Repr = Key>>(
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dh: TripleDHComponents,
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client_nonce: &[u8],
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server_nonce: &[u8],
|
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client_s_pk: KeyFormat::Repr,
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server_s_pk: KeyFormat::Repr,
|
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) -> Result<TripleDHDerivationResult, ProtocolError> {
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let ikm: Vec<u8> = [
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&KeyFormat::diffie_hellman(dh.pk1, dh.sk1)[..],
|
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&KeyFormat::diffie_hellman(dh.pk2, dh.sk2)[..],
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&KeyFormat::diffie_hellman(dh.pk3, dh.sk3)[..],
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]
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.concat();
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let info: Vec<u8> = [
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STR_3DH,
|
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&client_nonce,
|
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&server_nonce,
|
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&client_s_pk.to_arr(),
|
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&server_s_pk.to_arr(),
|
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]
|
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.concat();
|
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|
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const OUTPUT_SIZE: usize = 32;
|
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let mut okm = [0u8; 3 * OUTPUT_SIZE];
|
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let h = Hkdf::<Sha256>::new(None, &ikm);
|
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h.expand(&info, &mut okm)
|
||||
.map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HkdfError)?;
|
||||
Ok((
|
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*GenericArray::from_slice(&okm[..OUTPUT_SIZE]),
|
||||
*GenericArray::from_slice(&okm[OUTPUT_SIZE..2 * OUTPUT_SIZE]),
|
||||
*GenericArray::from_slice(&okm[2 * OUTPUT_SIZE..]),
|
||||
))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The third key exchange message
|
||||
pub struct KE3Message {
|
||||
mac: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl ToBytes for KE3Message {
|
||||
fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
self.mac.clone()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl TryFrom<Vec<u8>> for KE3Message {
|
||||
type Error = ProtocolError;
|
||||
|
||||
fn try_from(bytes: Vec<u8>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
|
||||
let checked_bytes = check_slice_size(&bytes, KEY_LEN, "ke3_message")?;
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(Self {
|
||||
mac: checked_bytes.to_vec(),
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user