Introducing a trait for key exchange (#20)
This commit is contained in:
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
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use crate::{
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errors::InternalPakeError,
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key_exchange::traits::KeyExchange,
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keypair::{Key, KeyPair},
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map_to_curve::GroupWithMapToCurve,
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slow_hash::SlowHash,
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@@ -15,6 +16,13 @@ use crate::{
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use rand_core::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
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/// Configures the underlying primitives used in OPAQUE
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/// * `Group`: a finite cyclic group along with a point representation, along
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/// with an extension trait PasswordToCurve that allows some customization on
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/// how to hash a password to a curve point. See `group::Group` and
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/// `map_to_curve::GroupWithMapToCurve`.
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/// * `KeyFormat`: a keypair type composed of public and private components
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/// * `KeyExchange`: The key exchange protocol to use in the login step
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/// * `SlowHash`: a slow hashing function, typically used for password hashing
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pub trait CipherSuite {
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/// A finite cyclic group along with a point representation along with
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/// an extension trait PasswordToCurve that allows some customization on
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@@ -23,6 +31,8 @@ pub trait CipherSuite {
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type Group: GroupWithMapToCurve;
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/// A keypair type composed of public and private components
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type KeyFormat: KeyPair<Repr = Key> + PartialEq;
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/// A key exchange protocol
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type KeyExchange: KeyExchange;
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/// A slow hashing function, typically used for password hashing
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type SlowHash: SlowHash;
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@@ -1,417 +0,0 @@
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// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
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//
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// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
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// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
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use crate::{
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errors::{utils::check_slice_size, InternalPakeError, PakeError, ProtocolError},
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keypair::{Key, KeyPair, SizedBytes},
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sized_bytes_using_constant_and_try_from,
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};
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use generic_array::{
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typenum::{U32, U64, U96},
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GenericArray,
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};
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use hkdf::Hkdf;
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use hmac::{Hmac, Mac, NewMac};
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use rand_core::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
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use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
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use std::convert::TryFrom;
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/// This module is a somewhat minimalistic implementation of a key Exchange
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/// protocol based on 3DH. It assumes a pre-exchange has allowed client and
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/// server to learn each other's static public key.
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///
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/// This private module may undergo significant changes in the near term.
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const KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
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pub(crate) const NONCE_LEN: usize = 32;
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pub(crate) const KE1_STATE_LEN: usize = KEY_LEN + KEY_LEN + NONCE_LEN;
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pub(crate) const KE2_MESSAGE_LEN: usize = NONCE_LEN + 2 * KEY_LEN;
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static STR_3DH: &[u8] = b"3DH keys";
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#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub(crate) struct KE1State {
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client_e_sk: Key,
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client_nonce: Vec<u8>,
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hashed_l1: Vec<u8>,
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}
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#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub(crate) struct KE1Message {
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pub(crate) client_nonce: Vec<u8>,
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pub(crate) client_e_pk: Key,
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}
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impl TryFrom<&[u8]> for KE1State {
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type Error = InternalPakeError;
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fn try_from(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
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let checked_bytes = check_slice_size(bytes, KE1_STATE_LEN, "ke1_state")?;
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Ok(Self {
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client_e_sk: Key::from_bytes(&checked_bytes[..KEY_LEN])?,
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client_nonce: checked_bytes[KEY_LEN..KEY_LEN + NONCE_LEN].to_vec(),
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hashed_l1: checked_bytes[KEY_LEN + NONCE_LEN..].to_vec(),
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})
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}
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}
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impl KE1State {
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pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
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let output: Vec<u8> = [
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&self.client_e_sk.to_arr(),
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&self.client_nonce[..],
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&self.hashed_l1[..],
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]
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.concat();
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output
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}
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}
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sized_bytes_using_constant_and_try_from!(KE1State, U96);
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impl KE1Message {
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pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
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[&self.client_nonce[..], &self.client_e_pk.to_arr()].concat()
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}
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}
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impl TryFrom<&[u8]> for KE1Message {
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type Error = InternalPakeError;
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fn try_from(ke1_message_bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
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let checked_bytes =
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check_slice_size(ke1_message_bytes, NONCE_LEN + KEY_LEN, "ke1_message")?;
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Ok(Self {
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client_nonce: checked_bytes[..NONCE_LEN].to_vec(),
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client_e_pk: Key::from_bytes(&checked_bytes[NONCE_LEN..])?,
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})
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}
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}
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sized_bytes_using_constant_and_try_from!(KE1Message, U64);
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pub(crate) fn generate_ke1<R: RngCore + CryptoRng, KeyFormat: KeyPair<Repr = Key>>(
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l1_component: Vec<u8>,
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rng: &mut R,
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) -> Result<(KE1State, KE1Message), ProtocolError> {
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let client_e_kp = KeyFormat::generate_random(rng)?;
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let mut client_nonce = [0u8; NONCE_LEN];
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rng.fill_bytes(&mut client_nonce);
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let ke1_message = KE1Message {
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client_nonce: client_nonce.to_vec(),
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client_e_pk: client_e_kp.public().clone(),
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};
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let l1_data: Vec<u8> = [&l1_component[..], &ke1_message.to_bytes()].concat();
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let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
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hasher.update(&l1_data);
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let hashed_l1 = hasher.finalize();
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Ok((
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KE1State {
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client_e_sk: client_e_kp.private().clone(),
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client_nonce: client_nonce.to_vec(),
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hashed_l1: hashed_l1.to_vec(),
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},
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ke1_message,
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))
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}
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pub(crate) struct KE2State {
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km3: Vec<u8>,
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hashed_transcript: Vec<u8>,
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shared_secret: Vec<u8>,
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}
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pub(crate) struct KE2Message {
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server_nonce: Vec<u8>,
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server_e_pk: Key,
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mac: Vec<u8>,
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}
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impl KE2State {
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pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
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let output: Vec<u8> = [
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&self.km3[..],
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&self.hashed_transcript[..],
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&self.shared_secret[..],
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]
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.concat();
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output
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}
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}
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impl TryFrom<&[u8]> for KE2State {
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type Error = ProtocolError;
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fn try_from(ke1_message_bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
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let checked_bytes = check_slice_size(ke1_message_bytes, 3 * KEY_LEN, "ke2_state")?;
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Ok(Self {
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km3: checked_bytes[..KEY_LEN].to_vec(),
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hashed_transcript: checked_bytes[KEY_LEN..2 * KEY_LEN].to_vec(),
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shared_secret: checked_bytes[2 * KEY_LEN..].to_vec(),
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})
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}
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}
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impl KE2Message {
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pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
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let output: Vec<u8> = [
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&self.server_nonce[..],
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&self.server_e_pk.to_arr(),
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&self.mac[..],
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]
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.concat();
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output
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}
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}
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impl TryFrom<&[u8]> for KE2Message {
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type Error = ProtocolError;
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fn try_from(ke1_message_bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
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let checked_bytes = check_slice_size(ke1_message_bytes, KE2_MESSAGE_LEN, "ke2_message")?;
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Ok(Self {
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server_nonce: checked_bytes[..NONCE_LEN].to_vec(),
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server_e_pk: Key::from_bytes(&checked_bytes[NONCE_LEN..NONCE_LEN + KEY_LEN])?,
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mac: checked_bytes[NONCE_LEN + KEY_LEN..].to_vec(),
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})
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}
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}
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// The triple of public and private components used in the 3DH computation
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struct TripleDHComponents {
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pk1: Key,
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sk1: Key,
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pk2: Key,
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sk2: Key,
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pk3: Key,
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sk3: Key,
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}
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// Consists of a shared secret, followed by two mac keys
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type TripleDHDerivationResult = (
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GenericArray<u8, U32>,
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GenericArray<u8, U32>,
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GenericArray<u8, U32>,
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);
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// Internal function which takes the public and private components of the client and server keypairs, along
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// with some auxiliary metadata, to produce the shared secret and two MAC keys
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fn derive_3dh_keys<KeyFormat: KeyPair<Repr = Key>>(
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dh: TripleDHComponents,
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client_nonce: &[u8],
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server_nonce: &[u8],
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client_s_pk: KeyFormat::Repr,
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server_s_pk: KeyFormat::Repr,
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) -> Result<TripleDHDerivationResult, ProtocolError> {
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let ikm: Vec<u8> = [
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&KeyFormat::diffie_hellman(dh.pk1, dh.sk1)[..],
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&KeyFormat::diffie_hellman(dh.pk2, dh.sk2)[..],
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&KeyFormat::diffie_hellman(dh.pk3, dh.sk3)[..],
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]
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.concat();
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let info: Vec<u8> = [
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STR_3DH,
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&client_nonce,
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&server_nonce,
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&client_s_pk.to_arr(),
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&server_s_pk.to_arr(),
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]
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.concat();
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const OUTPUT_SIZE: usize = 32;
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let mut okm = [0u8; 3 * OUTPUT_SIZE];
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let h = Hkdf::<Sha256>::new(None, &ikm);
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h.expand(&info, &mut okm)
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.map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HkdfError)?;
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Ok((
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*GenericArray::from_slice(&okm[..OUTPUT_SIZE]),
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*GenericArray::from_slice(&okm[OUTPUT_SIZE..2 * OUTPUT_SIZE]),
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*GenericArray::from_slice(&okm[2 * OUTPUT_SIZE..]),
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))
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}
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pub(crate) fn generate_ke2<R: RngCore + CryptoRng, KeyFormat: KeyPair<Repr = Key>>(
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rng: &mut R,
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l1_bytes: Vec<u8>,
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l2_bytes: Vec<u8>,
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client_e_pk: KeyFormat::Repr,
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client_s_pk: KeyFormat::Repr,
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server_s_sk: KeyFormat::Repr,
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client_nonce: Vec<u8>,
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) -> Result<(KE2State, KE2Message), ProtocolError> {
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let server_e_kp = KeyFormat::generate_random(rng)?;
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let mut server_nonce = [0u8; NONCE_LEN];
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rng.fill_bytes(&mut server_nonce);
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let (shared_secret, km2, km3) = derive_3dh_keys::<KeyFormat>(
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TripleDHComponents {
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pk1: client_e_pk.clone(),
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sk1: server_e_kp.private().clone(),
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pk2: client_e_pk,
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sk2: server_s_sk.clone(),
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pk3: client_s_pk.clone(),
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sk3: server_e_kp.private().clone(),
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},
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&client_nonce,
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&server_nonce,
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client_s_pk,
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KeyFormat::public_from_private(&server_s_sk),
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)?;
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let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
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hasher.update(&l1_bytes);
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let hashed_l1 = hasher.finalize();
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let transcript2: Vec<u8> = [
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&hashed_l1[..],
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&l2_bytes[..],
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&server_nonce[..],
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&server_e_kp.public().to_arr(),
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]
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.concat();
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let mut hasher2 = Sha256::new();
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hasher2.update(&transcript2);
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let hashed_transcript = hasher2.finalize();
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let mut mac = Hmac::<Sha256>::new_varkey(&km2).map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HmacError)?;
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mac.update(&hashed_transcript);
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Ok((
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KE2State {
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km3: km3.to_vec(),
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hashed_transcript: hashed_transcript.to_vec(),
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shared_secret: shared_secret.to_vec(),
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},
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KE2Message {
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server_nonce: server_nonce.to_vec(),
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server_e_pk: server_e_kp.public().clone(),
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mac: mac.finalize().into_bytes().to_vec(),
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},
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))
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}
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pub(crate) struct KE3State {
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pub(crate) shared_secret: Vec<u8>,
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}
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pub(crate) struct KE3Message {
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mac: Vec<u8>,
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}
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impl TryFrom<&[u8]> for KE3State {
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type Error = ProtocolError;
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fn try_from(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
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let checked_bytes = check_slice_size(bytes, KEY_LEN, "ke3_state")?;
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Ok(Self {
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shared_secret: checked_bytes.to_vec(),
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})
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}
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}
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impl KE3Message {
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pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
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self.mac.clone()
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}
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}
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impl TryFrom<&[u8]> for KE3Message {
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type Error = ProtocolError;
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fn try_from(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
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let checked_bytes = check_slice_size(bytes, KEY_LEN, "ke3_message")?;
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Ok(Self {
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mac: checked_bytes.to_vec(),
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})
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}
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}
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pub(crate) fn generate_ke3<KeyFormat: KeyPair<Repr = Key>>(
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l2_component: Vec<u8>,
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ke2_message: KE2Message,
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ke1_state: &KE1State,
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server_s_pk: KeyFormat::Repr,
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client_s_sk: KeyFormat::Repr,
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) -> Result<(KE3State, KE3Message), ProtocolError> {
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let (shared_secret, km2, km3) = derive_3dh_keys::<KeyFormat>(
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TripleDHComponents {
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pk1: ke2_message.server_e_pk.clone(),
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sk1: ke1_state.client_e_sk.clone(),
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pk2: server_s_pk.clone(),
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sk2: ke1_state.client_e_sk.clone(),
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pk3: ke2_message.server_e_pk.clone(),
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sk3: client_s_sk.clone(),
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},
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&ke1_state.client_nonce,
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&ke2_message.server_nonce,
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KeyFormat::public_from_private(&client_s_sk),
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server_s_pk,
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)?;
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let transcript: Vec<u8> = [
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&ke1_state.hashed_l1[..],
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&l2_component[..],
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&ke2_message.server_nonce[..],
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&ke2_message.server_e_pk[..],
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]
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.concat();
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let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
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hasher.update(&transcript);
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let hashed_transcript = hasher.finalize();
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let mut server_mac =
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Hmac::<Sha256>::new_varkey(&km2).map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HmacError)?;
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server_mac.update(&hashed_transcript);
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if ke2_message.mac != server_mac.finalize().into_bytes().to_vec() {
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return Err(ProtocolError::VerificationError(
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PakeError::KeyExchangeMacValidationError,
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));
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}
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let mut client_mac =
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Hmac::<Sha256>::new_varkey(&km3).map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HmacError)?;
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client_mac.update(&hashed_transcript);
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Ok((
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KE3State {
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shared_secret: shared_secret.to_vec(),
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},
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KE3Message {
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mac: client_mac.finalize().into_bytes().to_vec(),
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},
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))
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}
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// Outputs a shared secret
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pub(crate) fn finish_ke(
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ke3_message: KE3Message,
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ke2_state: &KE2State,
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) -> Result<Vec<u8>, ProtocolError> {
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let mut client_mac =
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Hmac::<Sha256>::new_varkey(&ke2_state.km3).map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HmacError)?;
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client_mac.update(&ke2_state.hashed_transcript);
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if ke3_message.mac != client_mac.finalize().into_bytes().to_vec() {
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return Err(ProtocolError::VerificationError(
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PakeError::KeyExchangeMacValidationError,
|
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));
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}
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Ok(ke2_state.shared_secret.to_vec())
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}
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@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
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// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
|
||||
// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
|
||||
|
||||
//! Includes instantiations of key exchange protocols used in the
|
||||
//! login step for OPAQUE
|
||||
|
||||
pub(crate) mod traits;
|
||||
pub mod tripledh;
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
|
||||
// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
|
||||
// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::{
|
||||
errors::{InternalPakeError, ProtocolError},
|
||||
keypair::{Key, KeyPair},
|
||||
};
|
||||
use rand_core::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
|
||||
|
||||
use std::convert::TryFrom;
|
||||
|
||||
pub trait KeyExchange {
|
||||
type KE1State: TryFrom<Vec<u8>, Error = InternalPakeError> + ToBytes;
|
||||
type KE2State: TryFrom<Vec<u8>, Error = ProtocolError> + ToBytes;
|
||||
type KE1Message: TryFrom<Vec<u8>, Error = InternalPakeError> + ToBytes;
|
||||
type KE2Message: TryFrom<Vec<u8>, Error = ProtocolError> + ToBytes;
|
||||
type KE3Message: TryFrom<Vec<u8>, Error = ProtocolError> + ToBytes;
|
||||
|
||||
fn generate_ke1<R: RngCore + CryptoRng, KeyFormat: KeyPair<Repr = Key>>(
|
||||
l1_component: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
rng: &mut R,
|
||||
) -> Result<(Self::KE1State, Self::KE1Message), ProtocolError>;
|
||||
|
||||
fn generate_ke2<R: RngCore + CryptoRng, KeyFormat: KeyPair<Repr = Key>>(
|
||||
rng: &mut R,
|
||||
l1_bytes: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
l2_bytes: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
ke1_message: Self::KE1Message,
|
||||
client_s_pk: KeyFormat::Repr,
|
||||
server_s_sk: KeyFormat::Repr,
|
||||
) -> Result<(Self::KE2State, Self::KE2Message), ProtocolError>;
|
||||
|
||||
fn generate_ke3<KeyFormat: KeyPair<Repr = Key>>(
|
||||
l2_component: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
ke2_message: Self::KE2Message,
|
||||
ke1_state: &Self::KE1State,
|
||||
server_s_pk: KeyFormat::Repr,
|
||||
client_s_sk: KeyFormat::Repr,
|
||||
) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, Self::KE3Message), ProtocolError>;
|
||||
|
||||
fn finish_ke(
|
||||
ke3_message: Self::KE3Message,
|
||||
ke2_state: &Self::KE2State,
|
||||
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, ProtocolError>;
|
||||
|
||||
fn ke1_state_size() -> usize;
|
||||
|
||||
fn ke2_message_size() -> usize;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub trait ToBytes {
|
||||
fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8>;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,417 @@
|
||||
// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
|
||||
// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
|
||||
|
||||
//! An implementation of the Triple Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol
|
||||
use crate::{
|
||||
errors::{utils::check_slice_size, InternalPakeError, PakeError, ProtocolError},
|
||||
key_exchange::traits::{KeyExchange, ToBytes},
|
||||
keypair::{Key, KeyPair, SizedBytes},
|
||||
sized_bytes_using_constant_and_try_from,
|
||||
};
|
||||
use generic_array::{
|
||||
typenum::{U64, U96},
|
||||
GenericArray,
|
||||
};
|
||||
use hkdf::Hkdf;
|
||||
use hmac::{Hmac, Mac, NewMac};
|
||||
use rand_core::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
|
||||
|
||||
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
|
||||
use std::convert::TryFrom;
|
||||
|
||||
const KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
|
||||
pub(crate) const NONCE_LEN: usize = 32;
|
||||
const KE1_STATE_LEN: usize = KEY_LEN + KEY_LEN + NONCE_LEN;
|
||||
const KE2_MESSAGE_LEN: usize = NONCE_LEN + 2 * KEY_LEN;
|
||||
|
||||
static STR_3DH: &[u8] = b"3DH keys";
|
||||
|
||||
/// The Triple Diffie-Hellman key exchange implementation
|
||||
pub struct TripleDH {}
|
||||
|
||||
impl KeyExchange for TripleDH {
|
||||
type KE1State = KE1State;
|
||||
type KE2State = KE2State;
|
||||
type KE1Message = KE1Message;
|
||||
type KE2Message = KE2Message;
|
||||
type KE3Message = KE3Message;
|
||||
|
||||
fn generate_ke1<R: RngCore + CryptoRng, KeyFormat: KeyPair<Repr = Key>>(
|
||||
l1_component: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
rng: &mut R,
|
||||
) -> Result<(Self::KE1State, Self::KE1Message), ProtocolError> {
|
||||
let client_e_kp = KeyFormat::generate_random(rng)?;
|
||||
let mut client_nonce = [0u8; NONCE_LEN];
|
||||
rng.fill_bytes(&mut client_nonce);
|
||||
|
||||
let ke1_message = KE1Message {
|
||||
client_nonce: client_nonce.to_vec(),
|
||||
client_e_pk: client_e_kp.public().clone(),
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let l1_data: Vec<u8> = [&l1_component[..], &ke1_message.to_bytes()].concat();
|
||||
let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
|
||||
hasher.update(&l1_data);
|
||||
let hashed_l1 = hasher.finalize();
|
||||
|
||||
Ok((
|
||||
KE1State {
|
||||
client_e_sk: client_e_kp.private().clone(),
|
||||
client_nonce: client_nonce.to_vec(),
|
||||
hashed_l1: hashed_l1.to_vec(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
ke1_message,
|
||||
))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn generate_ke2<R: RngCore + CryptoRng, KeyFormat: KeyPair<Repr = Key>>(
|
||||
rng: &mut R,
|
||||
l1_bytes: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
l2_bytes: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
ke1_message: Self::KE1Message,
|
||||
client_s_pk: KeyFormat::Repr,
|
||||
server_s_sk: KeyFormat::Repr,
|
||||
) -> Result<(Self::KE2State, Self::KE2Message), ProtocolError> {
|
||||
let server_e_kp = KeyFormat::generate_random(rng)?;
|
||||
let mut server_nonce = [0u8; NONCE_LEN];
|
||||
rng.fill_bytes(&mut server_nonce);
|
||||
|
||||
let (shared_secret, km2, km3) = derive_3dh_keys::<KeyFormat>(
|
||||
TripleDHComponents {
|
||||
pk1: ke1_message.client_e_pk.clone(),
|
||||
sk1: server_e_kp.private().clone(),
|
||||
pk2: ke1_message.client_e_pk,
|
||||
sk2: server_s_sk.clone(),
|
||||
pk3: client_s_pk.clone(),
|
||||
sk3: server_e_kp.private().clone(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
&ke1_message.client_nonce,
|
||||
&server_nonce,
|
||||
client_s_pk,
|
||||
KeyFormat::public_from_private(&server_s_sk),
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
|
||||
hasher.update(&l1_bytes);
|
||||
let hashed_l1 = hasher.finalize();
|
||||
|
||||
let transcript2: Vec<u8> = [
|
||||
&hashed_l1[..],
|
||||
&l2_bytes[..],
|
||||
&server_nonce[..],
|
||||
&server_e_kp.public().to_arr(),
|
||||
]
|
||||
.concat();
|
||||
|
||||
let mut hasher2 = Sha256::new();
|
||||
hasher2.update(&transcript2);
|
||||
let hashed_transcript = hasher2.finalize();
|
||||
|
||||
let mut mac = Hmac::<Sha256>::new_varkey(&km2).map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HmacError)?;
|
||||
mac.update(&hashed_transcript);
|
||||
|
||||
Ok((
|
||||
KE2State {
|
||||
km3: km3.to_vec(),
|
||||
hashed_transcript: hashed_transcript.to_vec(),
|
||||
shared_secret: shared_secret.to_vec(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
KE2Message {
|
||||
server_nonce: server_nonce.to_vec(),
|
||||
server_e_pk: server_e_kp.public().clone(),
|
||||
mac: mac.finalize().into_bytes().to_vec(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn generate_ke3<KeyFormat: KeyPair<Repr = Key>>(
|
||||
l2_component: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
ke2_message: Self::KE2Message,
|
||||
ke1_state: &Self::KE1State,
|
||||
server_s_pk: KeyFormat::Repr,
|
||||
client_s_sk: KeyFormat::Repr,
|
||||
) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, Self::KE3Message), ProtocolError> {
|
||||
let (shared_secret, km2, km3) = derive_3dh_keys::<KeyFormat>(
|
||||
TripleDHComponents {
|
||||
pk1: ke2_message.server_e_pk.clone(),
|
||||
sk1: ke1_state.client_e_sk.clone(),
|
||||
pk2: server_s_pk.clone(),
|
||||
sk2: ke1_state.client_e_sk.clone(),
|
||||
pk3: ke2_message.server_e_pk.clone(),
|
||||
sk3: client_s_sk.clone(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
&ke1_state.client_nonce,
|
||||
&ke2_message.server_nonce,
|
||||
KeyFormat::public_from_private(&client_s_sk),
|
||||
server_s_pk,
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let transcript: Vec<u8> = [
|
||||
&ke1_state.hashed_l1[..],
|
||||
&l2_component[..],
|
||||
&ke2_message.server_nonce[..],
|
||||
&ke2_message.server_e_pk[..],
|
||||
]
|
||||
.concat();
|
||||
|
||||
let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
|
||||
hasher.update(&transcript);
|
||||
let hashed_transcript = hasher.finalize();
|
||||
|
||||
let mut server_mac =
|
||||
Hmac::<Sha256>::new_varkey(&km2).map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HmacError)?;
|
||||
server_mac.update(&hashed_transcript);
|
||||
|
||||
if ke2_message.mac != server_mac.finalize().into_bytes().to_vec() {
|
||||
return Err(ProtocolError::VerificationError(
|
||||
PakeError::KeyExchangeMacValidationError,
|
||||
));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let mut client_mac =
|
||||
Hmac::<Sha256>::new_varkey(&km3).map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HmacError)?;
|
||||
client_mac.update(&hashed_transcript);
|
||||
|
||||
Ok((
|
||||
shared_secret.to_vec(),
|
||||
KE3Message {
|
||||
mac: client_mac.finalize().into_bytes().to_vec(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn finish_ke(
|
||||
ke3_message: Self::KE3Message,
|
||||
ke2_state: &Self::KE2State,
|
||||
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, ProtocolError> {
|
||||
let mut client_mac =
|
||||
Hmac::<Sha256>::new_varkey(&ke2_state.km3).map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HmacError)?;
|
||||
client_mac.update(&ke2_state.hashed_transcript);
|
||||
|
||||
if ke3_message.mac != client_mac.finalize().into_bytes().to_vec() {
|
||||
return Err(ProtocolError::VerificationError(
|
||||
PakeError::KeyExchangeMacValidationError,
|
||||
));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(ke2_state.shared_secret.to_vec())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn ke1_state_size() -> usize {
|
||||
KE1_STATE_LEN
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn ke2_message_size() -> usize {
|
||||
KE2_MESSAGE_LEN
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The client state produced after the first key exchange message
|
||||
#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
|
||||
pub struct KE1State {
|
||||
client_e_sk: Key,
|
||||
client_nonce: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
hashed_l1: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The first key exchange message
|
||||
#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
|
||||
pub struct KE1Message {
|
||||
pub(crate) client_nonce: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub(crate) client_e_pk: Key,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl TryFrom<Vec<u8>> for KE1State {
|
||||
type Error = InternalPakeError;
|
||||
|
||||
fn try_from(bytes: Vec<u8>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
|
||||
let checked_bytes = check_slice_size(&bytes, KE1_STATE_LEN, "ke1_state")?;
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(Self {
|
||||
client_e_sk: Key::from_bytes(&checked_bytes[..KEY_LEN])?,
|
||||
client_nonce: checked_bytes[KEY_LEN..KEY_LEN + NONCE_LEN].to_vec(),
|
||||
hashed_l1: checked_bytes[KEY_LEN + NONCE_LEN..].to_vec(),
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl ToBytes for KE1State {
|
||||
fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
let output: Vec<u8> = [
|
||||
&self.client_e_sk.to_arr(),
|
||||
&self.client_nonce[..],
|
||||
&self.hashed_l1[..],
|
||||
]
|
||||
.concat();
|
||||
output
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
sized_bytes_using_constant_and_try_from!(KE1State, U96);
|
||||
|
||||
impl ToBytes for KE1Message {
|
||||
fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
[&self.client_nonce[..], &self.client_e_pk.to_arr()].concat()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl TryFrom<Vec<u8>> for KE1Message {
|
||||
type Error = InternalPakeError;
|
||||
|
||||
fn try_from(ke1_message_bytes: Vec<u8>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
|
||||
let checked_bytes =
|
||||
check_slice_size(&ke1_message_bytes, NONCE_LEN + KEY_LEN, "ke1_message")?;
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(Self {
|
||||
client_nonce: checked_bytes[..NONCE_LEN].to_vec(),
|
||||
client_e_pk: Key::from_bytes(&checked_bytes[NONCE_LEN..])?,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
sized_bytes_using_constant_and_try_from!(KE1Message, U64);
|
||||
|
||||
/// The server state produced after the second key exchange message
|
||||
pub struct KE2State {
|
||||
km3: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
hashed_transcript: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
shared_secret: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The second key exchange message
|
||||
pub struct KE2Message {
|
||||
server_nonce: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
server_e_pk: Key,
|
||||
mac: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl ToBytes for KE2State {
|
||||
fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
let output: Vec<u8> = [
|
||||
&self.km3[..],
|
||||
&self.hashed_transcript[..],
|
||||
&self.shared_secret[..],
|
||||
]
|
||||
.concat();
|
||||
output
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl TryFrom<Vec<u8>> for KE2State {
|
||||
type Error = ProtocolError;
|
||||
|
||||
fn try_from(ke1_message_bytes: Vec<u8>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
|
||||
let checked_bytes = check_slice_size(&ke1_message_bytes, 3 * KEY_LEN, "ke2_state")?;
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(Self {
|
||||
km3: checked_bytes[..KEY_LEN].to_vec(),
|
||||
hashed_transcript: checked_bytes[KEY_LEN..2 * KEY_LEN].to_vec(),
|
||||
shared_secret: checked_bytes[2 * KEY_LEN..].to_vec(),
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl ToBytes for KE2Message {
|
||||
fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
let output: Vec<u8> = [
|
||||
&self.server_nonce[..],
|
||||
&self.server_e_pk.to_arr(),
|
||||
&self.mac[..],
|
||||
]
|
||||
.concat();
|
||||
output
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl TryFrom<Vec<u8>> for KE2Message {
|
||||
type Error = ProtocolError;
|
||||
|
||||
fn try_from(ke2_message_bytes: Vec<u8>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
|
||||
let checked_bytes = check_slice_size(&ke2_message_bytes, KE2_MESSAGE_LEN, "ke2_message")?;
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(Self {
|
||||
server_nonce: checked_bytes[..NONCE_LEN].to_vec(),
|
||||
server_e_pk: Key::from_bytes(&checked_bytes[NONCE_LEN..NONCE_LEN + KEY_LEN])?,
|
||||
mac: checked_bytes[NONCE_LEN + KEY_LEN..].to_vec(),
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The triple of public and private components used in the 3DH computation
|
||||
struct TripleDHComponents {
|
||||
pk1: Key,
|
||||
sk1: Key,
|
||||
pk2: Key,
|
||||
sk2: Key,
|
||||
pk3: Key,
|
||||
sk3: Key,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Consists of a shared secret, followed by two mac keys
|
||||
type TripleDHDerivationResult = (
|
||||
GenericArray<u8, <Sha256 as Digest>::OutputSize>,
|
||||
GenericArray<u8, <Sha256 as Digest>::OutputSize>,
|
||||
GenericArray<u8, <Sha256 as Digest>::OutputSize>,
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
// Internal function which takes the public and private components of the client and server keypairs, along
|
||||
// with some auxiliary metadata, to produce the shared secret and two MAC keys
|
||||
fn derive_3dh_keys<KeyFormat: KeyPair<Repr = Key>>(
|
||||
dh: TripleDHComponents,
|
||||
client_nonce: &[u8],
|
||||
server_nonce: &[u8],
|
||||
client_s_pk: KeyFormat::Repr,
|
||||
server_s_pk: KeyFormat::Repr,
|
||||
) -> Result<TripleDHDerivationResult, ProtocolError> {
|
||||
let ikm: Vec<u8> = [
|
||||
&KeyFormat::diffie_hellman(dh.pk1, dh.sk1)[..],
|
||||
&KeyFormat::diffie_hellman(dh.pk2, dh.sk2)[..],
|
||||
&KeyFormat::diffie_hellman(dh.pk3, dh.sk3)[..],
|
||||
]
|
||||
.concat();
|
||||
|
||||
let info: Vec<u8> = [
|
||||
STR_3DH,
|
||||
&client_nonce,
|
||||
&server_nonce,
|
||||
&client_s_pk.to_arr(),
|
||||
&server_s_pk.to_arr(),
|
||||
]
|
||||
.concat();
|
||||
|
||||
const OUTPUT_SIZE: usize = 32;
|
||||
let mut okm = [0u8; 3 * OUTPUT_SIZE];
|
||||
let h = Hkdf::<Sha256>::new(None, &ikm);
|
||||
h.expand(&info, &mut okm)
|
||||
.map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HkdfError)?;
|
||||
Ok((
|
||||
*GenericArray::from_slice(&okm[..OUTPUT_SIZE]),
|
||||
*GenericArray::from_slice(&okm[OUTPUT_SIZE..2 * OUTPUT_SIZE]),
|
||||
*GenericArray::from_slice(&okm[2 * OUTPUT_SIZE..]),
|
||||
))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The third key exchange message
|
||||
pub struct KE3Message {
|
||||
mac: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl ToBytes for KE3Message {
|
||||
fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
self.mac.clone()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl TryFrom<Vec<u8>> for KE3Message {
|
||||
type Error = ProtocolError;
|
||||
|
||||
fn try_from(bytes: Vec<u8>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
|
||||
let checked_bytes = check_slice_size(&bytes, KEY_LEN, "ke3_message")?;
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(Self {
|
||||
mac: checked_bytes.to_vec(),
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ macro_rules! sized_bytes_using_constant_and_try_from {
|
||||
<Self::Len as generic_array::typenum::Unsigned>::to_usize(),
|
||||
"bytes",
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
std::convert::TryFrom::try_from(checked_bytes)
|
||||
std::convert::TryFrom::try_from(checked_bytes.to_vec())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
+13
-2
@@ -13,7 +13,8 @@
|
||||
//! OPAQUE is a protocol between a client and a server. They must first agree on a collection of primitives
|
||||
//! to be kept consistent throughout protocol execution. These include:
|
||||
//! * a finite cyclic group along with a point representation,
|
||||
//! * a keypair type, and
|
||||
//! * a keypair type,
|
||||
//! * a key exchange protocol, and
|
||||
//! * a slow hashing function.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! We will use the following choices in this example:
|
||||
@@ -23,6 +24,7 @@
|
||||
//! impl CipherSuite for Default {
|
||||
//! type Group = curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoPoint;
|
||||
//! type KeyFormat = opaque_ke::keypair::X25519KeyPair;
|
||||
//! type KeyExchange = opaque_ke::key_exchange::tripledh::TripleDH;
|
||||
//! type SlowHash = opaque_ke::slow_hash::NoOpHash;
|
||||
//! }
|
||||
//! ```
|
||||
@@ -43,6 +45,7 @@
|
||||
//! # impl CipherSuite for Default {
|
||||
//! # type Group = curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoPoint;
|
||||
//! # type KeyFormat = opaque_ke::keypair::X25519KeyPair;
|
||||
//! # type KeyExchange = opaque_ke::key_exchange::tripledh::TripleDH;
|
||||
//! # type SlowHash = opaque_ke::slow_hash::NoOpHash;
|
||||
//! # }
|
||||
//! use rand_core::{OsRng, RngCore};
|
||||
@@ -74,6 +77,7 @@
|
||||
//! # impl CipherSuite for Default {
|
||||
//! # type Group = curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoPoint;
|
||||
//! # type KeyFormat = opaque_ke::keypair::X25519KeyPair;
|
||||
//! # type KeyExchange = opaque_ke::key_exchange::tripledh::TripleDH;
|
||||
//! # type SlowHash = opaque_ke::slow_hash::NoOpHash;
|
||||
//! # }
|
||||
//! use rand_core::{OsRng, RngCore};
|
||||
@@ -102,6 +106,7 @@
|
||||
//! # impl CipherSuite for Default {
|
||||
//! # type Group = curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoPoint;
|
||||
//! # type KeyFormat = opaque_ke::keypair::X25519KeyPair;
|
||||
//! # type KeyExchange = opaque_ke::key_exchange::tripledh::TripleDH;
|
||||
//! # type SlowHash = opaque_ke::slow_hash::NoOpHash;
|
||||
//! # }
|
||||
//! # use rand_core::{OsRng, RngCore};
|
||||
@@ -133,6 +138,7 @@
|
||||
//! # impl CipherSuite for Default {
|
||||
//! # type Group = curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoPoint;
|
||||
//! # type KeyFormat = opaque_ke::keypair::X25519KeyPair;
|
||||
//! # type KeyExchange = opaque_ke::key_exchange::tripledh::TripleDH;
|
||||
//! # type SlowHash = opaque_ke::slow_hash::NoOpHash;
|
||||
//! # }
|
||||
//! # use rand_core::{OsRng, RngCore};
|
||||
@@ -166,6 +172,7 @@
|
||||
//! # impl CipherSuite for Default {
|
||||
//! # type Group = curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoPoint;
|
||||
//! # type KeyFormat = opaque_ke::keypair::X25519KeyPair;
|
||||
//! # type KeyExchange = opaque_ke::key_exchange::tripledh::TripleDH;
|
||||
//! # type SlowHash = opaque_ke::slow_hash::NoOpHash;
|
||||
//! # }
|
||||
//! # use rand_core::{OsRng, RngCore};
|
||||
@@ -207,6 +214,7 @@
|
||||
//! # impl CipherSuite for Default {
|
||||
//! # type Group = curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoPoint;
|
||||
//! # type KeyFormat = opaque_ke::keypair::X25519KeyPair;
|
||||
//! # type KeyExchange = opaque_ke::key_exchange::tripledh::TripleDH;
|
||||
//! # type SlowHash = opaque_ke::slow_hash::NoOpHash;
|
||||
//! # }
|
||||
//! # use rand_core::{OsRng, RngCore};
|
||||
@@ -235,6 +243,7 @@
|
||||
//! # impl CipherSuite for Default {
|
||||
//! # type Group = curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoPoint;
|
||||
//! # type KeyFormat = opaque_ke::keypair::X25519KeyPair;
|
||||
//! # type KeyExchange = opaque_ke::key_exchange::tripledh::TripleDH;
|
||||
//! # type SlowHash = opaque_ke::slow_hash::NoOpHash;
|
||||
//! # }
|
||||
//! # use rand_core::{OsRng, RngCore};
|
||||
@@ -278,6 +287,7 @@
|
||||
//! # impl CipherSuite for Default {
|
||||
//! # type Group = curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoPoint;
|
||||
//! # type KeyFormat = opaque_ke::keypair::X25519KeyPair;
|
||||
//! # type KeyExchange = opaque_ke::key_exchange::tripledh::TripleDH;
|
||||
//! # type SlowHash = opaque_ke::slow_hash::NoOpHash;
|
||||
//! # }
|
||||
//! # use rand_core::{OsRng, RngCore};
|
||||
@@ -333,6 +343,7 @@
|
||||
//! # impl CipherSuite for Default {
|
||||
//! # type Group = curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoPoint;
|
||||
//! # type KeyFormat = opaque_ke::keypair::X25519KeyPair;
|
||||
//! # type KeyExchange = opaque_ke::key_exchange::tripledh::TripleDH;
|
||||
//! # type SlowHash = opaque_ke::slow_hash::NoOpHash;
|
||||
//! # }
|
||||
//! # use rand_core::{OsRng, RngCore};
|
||||
@@ -387,7 +398,7 @@ mod envelope;
|
||||
mod group;
|
||||
mod map_to_curve;
|
||||
|
||||
mod key_exchange;
|
||||
pub mod key_exchange;
|
||||
pub mod keypair;
|
||||
|
||||
mod oprf;
|
||||
|
||||
+95
-56
@@ -10,10 +10,7 @@ use crate::{
|
||||
envelope::{Envelope, ExportKeySize},
|
||||
errors::{utils::check_slice_size, InternalPakeError, PakeError, ProtocolError},
|
||||
group::Group,
|
||||
key_exchange::{
|
||||
finish_ke, generate_ke1, generate_ke2, generate_ke3, KE1Message, KE1State, KE2Message,
|
||||
KE2State, KE3Message, KE1_STATE_LEN, KE2_MESSAGE_LEN,
|
||||
},
|
||||
key_exchange::traits::{KeyExchange, ToBytes},
|
||||
keypair::{Key, KeyPair, SizedBytes},
|
||||
oprf,
|
||||
oprf::OprfClientBytes,
|
||||
@@ -133,27 +130,29 @@ where
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The message sent by the user to the server, to initiate registration
|
||||
pub struct LoginFirstMessage<Grp> {
|
||||
pub struct LoginFirstMessage<CS: CipherSuite> {
|
||||
/// blinded password information
|
||||
alpha: Grp,
|
||||
ke1_message: KE1Message,
|
||||
alpha: CS::Group,
|
||||
ke1_message: <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE1Message,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl<Grp: Group> TryFrom<&[u8]> for LoginFirstMessage<Grp> {
|
||||
impl<CS: CipherSuite> TryFrom<&[u8]> for LoginFirstMessage<CS> {
|
||||
type Error = ProtocolError;
|
||||
fn try_from(first_message_bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
|
||||
// Check that the message is actually containing an element of the
|
||||
// correct subgroup
|
||||
let elem_len = Grp::ElemLen::to_usize();
|
||||
let elem_len = <CS::Group as Group>::ElemLen::to_usize();
|
||||
let arr = GenericArray::from_slice(&first_message_bytes[..elem_len]);
|
||||
let alpha = Grp::from_element_slice(arr)?;
|
||||
let alpha = CS::Group::from_element_slice(arr)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let ke1_message = KE1Message::try_from(&first_message_bytes[elem_len..])?;
|
||||
let ke1_message = <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE1Message::try_from(
|
||||
first_message_bytes[elem_len..].to_vec(),
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
Ok(Self { alpha, ke1_message })
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl<Grp: Group> LoginFirstMessage<Grp> {
|
||||
impl<CS: CipherSuite> LoginFirstMessage<CS> {
|
||||
/// byte representation for the login request
|
||||
pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
[&self.alpha.to_arr()[..], &self.ke1_message.to_bytes()].concat()
|
||||
@@ -162,19 +161,25 @@ impl<Grp: Group> LoginFirstMessage<Grp> {
|
||||
|
||||
/// The answer sent by the server to the user, upon reception of the
|
||||
/// login attempt.
|
||||
pub struct LoginSecondMessage<Grp, KeyFormat> {
|
||||
pub struct LoginSecondMessage<Grp, KeyFormat, KE>
|
||||
where
|
||||
KeyFormat: KeyPair<Repr = Key>,
|
||||
KE: KeyExchange,
|
||||
{
|
||||
_key_format: PhantomData<KeyFormat>,
|
||||
_key_exchange: PhantomData<KE>,
|
||||
/// the server's oprf output
|
||||
beta: Grp,
|
||||
/// the user's sealed information,
|
||||
envelope: Envelope,
|
||||
ke2_message: KE2Message,
|
||||
ke2_message: KE::KE2Message,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl<Grp, KeyFormat> LoginSecondMessage<Grp, KeyFormat>
|
||||
impl<Grp, KeyFormat, KE> LoginSecondMessage<Grp, KeyFormat, KE>
|
||||
where
|
||||
Grp: Group,
|
||||
KeyFormat: KeyPair,
|
||||
KeyFormat: KeyPair<Repr = Key>,
|
||||
KE: KeyExchange,
|
||||
{
|
||||
/// byte representation for the login response
|
||||
pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
@@ -187,19 +192,21 @@ where
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl<Grp, KeyFormat> TryFrom<&[u8]> for LoginSecondMessage<Grp, KeyFormat>
|
||||
impl<Grp, KeyFormat, KE> TryFrom<&[u8]> for LoginSecondMessage<Grp, KeyFormat, KE>
|
||||
where
|
||||
Grp: Group,
|
||||
KeyFormat: KeyPair,
|
||||
KeyFormat: KeyPair<Repr = Key>,
|
||||
KE: KeyExchange,
|
||||
{
|
||||
type Error = ProtocolError;
|
||||
fn try_from(second_message_bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
|
||||
let key_len = <KeyFormat::Repr as SizedBytes>::Len::to_usize();
|
||||
let envelope_size = key_len + Envelope::additional_size();
|
||||
let elem_len = Grp::ElemLen::to_usize();
|
||||
let ke2_message_size = KE::ke2_message_size();
|
||||
let checked_slice = check_slice_size(
|
||||
second_message_bytes,
|
||||
elem_len + envelope_size + KE2_MESSAGE_LEN,
|
||||
elem_len + envelope_size + ke2_message_size,
|
||||
"login_second_message_bytes",
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -210,10 +217,13 @@ where
|
||||
let beta = Grp::from_element_slice(arr)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let envelope = Envelope::from_bytes(&checked_slice[elem_len..elem_len + envelope_size])?;
|
||||
let ke2_message = KE2Message::try_from(&checked_slice[elem_len + envelope_size..])?;
|
||||
|
||||
let ke2_message =
|
||||
KE::KE2Message::try_from(checked_slice[elem_len + envelope_size..].to_vec())?;
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(Self {
|
||||
_key_format: PhantomData,
|
||||
_key_exchange: PhantomData,
|
||||
beta,
|
||||
envelope,
|
||||
ke2_message,
|
||||
@@ -223,20 +233,20 @@ where
|
||||
|
||||
/// The answer sent by the client to the server, upon reception of the
|
||||
/// sealed envelope
|
||||
pub struct LoginThirdMessage {
|
||||
ke3_message: KE3Message,
|
||||
pub struct LoginThirdMessage<CS: CipherSuite> {
|
||||
ke3_message: <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE3Message,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl TryFrom<&[u8]> for LoginThirdMessage {
|
||||
impl<CS: CipherSuite> TryFrom<&[u8]> for LoginThirdMessage<CS> {
|
||||
type Error = ProtocolError;
|
||||
|
||||
fn try_from(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
|
||||
let ke3_message = KE3Message::try_from(&bytes[..])?;
|
||||
let ke3_message = <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE3Message::try_from(bytes.to_vec())?;
|
||||
Ok(Self { ke3_message })
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl LoginThirdMessage {
|
||||
impl<CS: CipherSuite> LoginThirdMessage<CS> {
|
||||
/// byte representation for the login finalization
|
||||
pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
self.ke3_message.to_bytes()
|
||||
@@ -299,6 +309,7 @@ impl<CS: CipherSuite> ClientRegistration<CS> {
|
||||
/// impl CipherSuite for Default {
|
||||
/// type Group = curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoPoint;
|
||||
/// type KeyFormat = opaque_ke::keypair::X25519KeyPair;
|
||||
/// type KeyExchange = opaque_ke::key_exchange::tripledh::TripleDH;
|
||||
/// type SlowHash = opaque_ke::slow_hash::NoOpHash;
|
||||
/// }
|
||||
/// let mut rng = OsRng;
|
||||
@@ -349,6 +360,7 @@ impl<CS: CipherSuite> ClientRegistration<CS> {
|
||||
/// impl CipherSuite for Default {
|
||||
/// type Group = curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoPoint;
|
||||
/// type KeyFormat = opaque_ke::keypair::X25519KeyPair;
|
||||
/// type KeyExchange = opaque_ke::key_exchange::tripledh::TripleDH;
|
||||
/// type SlowHash = opaque_ke::slow_hash::NoOpHash;
|
||||
/// }
|
||||
/// let mut client_rng = OsRng;
|
||||
@@ -513,6 +525,7 @@ where
|
||||
/// impl CipherSuite for Default {
|
||||
/// type Group = curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoPoint;
|
||||
/// type KeyFormat = opaque_ke::keypair::X25519KeyPair;
|
||||
/// type KeyExchange = opaque_ke::key_exchange::tripledh::TripleDH;
|
||||
/// type SlowHash = opaque_ke::slow_hash::NoOpHash;
|
||||
/// }
|
||||
/// let mut client_rng = OsRng;
|
||||
@@ -559,6 +572,7 @@ where
|
||||
/// impl CipherSuite for Default {
|
||||
/// type Group = curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoPoint;
|
||||
/// type KeyFormat = opaque_ke::keypair::X25519KeyPair;
|
||||
/// type KeyExchange = opaque_ke::key_exchange::tripledh::TripleDH;
|
||||
/// type SlowHash = opaque_ke::slow_hash::NoOpHash;
|
||||
/// }
|
||||
/// let mut client_rng = OsRng;
|
||||
@@ -596,7 +610,7 @@ pub struct ClientLogin<CS: CipherSuite> {
|
||||
blinding_factor: <CS::Group as Group>::Scalar,
|
||||
/// The user's password
|
||||
password: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
ke1_state: KE1State,
|
||||
ke1_state: <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE1State,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl<CS: CipherSuite> TryFrom<&[u8]> for ClientLogin<CS> {
|
||||
@@ -605,8 +619,11 @@ impl<CS: CipherSuite> TryFrom<&[u8]> for ClientLogin<CS> {
|
||||
let scalar_len = <CS::Group as Group>::ScalarLen::to_usize();
|
||||
let blinding_factor_bytes = GenericArray::from_slice(&bytes[..scalar_len]);
|
||||
let blinding_factor = CS::Group::from_scalar_slice(blinding_factor_bytes)?;
|
||||
let ke1_state = KE1State::try_from(&bytes[scalar_len..scalar_len + KE1_STATE_LEN])?;
|
||||
let password = bytes[scalar_len + KE1_STATE_LEN..].to_vec();
|
||||
let ke1_state_size = <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::ke1_state_size();
|
||||
let ke1_state = <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE1State::try_from(
|
||||
bytes[scalar_len..scalar_len + ke1_state_size].to_vec(),
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
let password = bytes[scalar_len + ke1_state_size..].to_vec();
|
||||
Ok(Self {
|
||||
_key_format: PhantomData,
|
||||
blinding_factor,
|
||||
@@ -629,7 +646,11 @@ impl<CS: CipherSuite> ClientLogin<CS> {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type ClientLoginFinishResult = (LoginThirdMessage, Vec<u8>, GenericArray<u8, ExportKeySize>);
|
||||
type ClientLoginFinishResult<CS> = (
|
||||
LoginThirdMessage<CS>,
|
||||
Vec<u8>,
|
||||
GenericArray<u8, ExportKeySize>,
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
impl<CS: CipherSuite> ClientLogin<CS> {
|
||||
/// Returns an initial "blinded" password request to send to the server, as well as a ClientLogin
|
||||
@@ -648,6 +669,7 @@ impl<CS: CipherSuite> ClientLogin<CS> {
|
||||
/// impl CipherSuite for Default {
|
||||
/// type Group = curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoPoint;
|
||||
/// type KeyFormat = opaque_ke::keypair::X25519KeyPair;
|
||||
/// type KeyExchange = opaque_ke::key_exchange::tripledh::TripleDH;
|
||||
/// type SlowHash = opaque_ke::slow_hash::NoOpHash;
|
||||
/// }
|
||||
/// let mut client_rng = OsRng;
|
||||
@@ -658,14 +680,14 @@ impl<CS: CipherSuite> ClientLogin<CS> {
|
||||
password: &[u8],
|
||||
pepper: Option<&[u8]>,
|
||||
rng: &mut R,
|
||||
) -> Result<(LoginFirstMessage<CS::Group>, Self), ProtocolError> {
|
||||
) -> Result<(LoginFirstMessage<CS>, Self), ProtocolError> {
|
||||
let OprfClientBytes {
|
||||
alpha,
|
||||
blinding_factor,
|
||||
} = oprf::generate_oprf1::<R, CS::Group>(&password, pepper, rng)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let (ke1_state, ke1_message) =
|
||||
generate_ke1::<_, CS::KeyFormat>(alpha.to_arr().to_vec(), rng)?;
|
||||
CS::KeyExchange::generate_ke1::<_, CS::KeyFormat>(alpha.to_arr().to_vec(), rng)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let l1 = LoginFirstMessage { alpha, ke1_message };
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -699,6 +721,7 @@ impl<CS: CipherSuite> ClientLogin<CS> {
|
||||
/// impl CipherSuite for Default {
|
||||
/// type Group = curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoPoint;
|
||||
/// type KeyFormat = opaque_ke::keypair::X25519KeyPair;
|
||||
/// type KeyExchange = opaque_ke::key_exchange::tripledh::TripleDH;
|
||||
/// type SlowHash = opaque_ke::slow_hash::NoOpHash;
|
||||
/// }
|
||||
/// let mut client_rng = OsRng;
|
||||
@@ -715,10 +738,10 @@ impl<CS: CipherSuite> ClientLogin<CS> {
|
||||
/// ```
|
||||
pub fn finish<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
|
||||
self,
|
||||
l2: LoginSecondMessage<CS::Group, CS::KeyFormat>,
|
||||
server_s_pk: &<CS::KeyFormat as KeyPair>::Repr,
|
||||
l2: LoginSecondMessage<CS::Group, CS::KeyFormat, CS::KeyExchange>,
|
||||
server_s_pk: &<<CS as CipherSuite>::KeyFormat as KeyPair>::Repr,
|
||||
_client_e_sk_rng: &mut R,
|
||||
) -> Result<ClientLoginFinishResult, ProtocolError> {
|
||||
) -> Result<ClientLoginFinishResult<CS>, ProtocolError> {
|
||||
let l2_bytes: Vec<u8> = [&l2.beta.to_arr()[..], &l2.envelope.to_bytes()].concat();
|
||||
|
||||
let password_derived_key = get_password_derived_key::<CS::Group, CS::SlowHash>(
|
||||
@@ -735,7 +758,7 @@ impl<CS: CipherSuite> ClientLogin<CS> {
|
||||
err => PakeError::from(err),
|
||||
})?;
|
||||
|
||||
let (ke3_state, ke3_message) = generate_ke3::<CS::KeyFormat>(
|
||||
let (shared_secret, ke3_message) = CS::KeyExchange::generate_ke3::<CS::KeyFormat>(
|
||||
l2_bytes,
|
||||
l2.ke2_message,
|
||||
&self.ke1_state,
|
||||
@@ -745,32 +768,38 @@ impl<CS: CipherSuite> ClientLogin<CS> {
|
||||
|
||||
Ok((
|
||||
LoginThirdMessage { ke3_message },
|
||||
ke3_state.shared_secret,
|
||||
shared_secret,
|
||||
*export_key,
|
||||
))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The state elements the server holds to record a login
|
||||
pub struct ServerLogin {
|
||||
ke2_state: KE2State,
|
||||
pub struct ServerLogin<CS: CipherSuite> {
|
||||
ke2_state: <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE2State,
|
||||
_cs: PhantomData<CS>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl TryFrom<&[u8]> for ServerLogin {
|
||||
impl<CS: CipherSuite> TryFrom<&[u8]> for ServerLogin<CS> {
|
||||
type Error = ProtocolError;
|
||||
fn try_from(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
|
||||
Ok(Self {
|
||||
ke2_state: KE2State::try_from(&bytes[..])?,
|
||||
_cs: PhantomData,
|
||||
ke2_state: <CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::KE2State::try_from(bytes.to_vec())?,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type ServerLoginStartResult<CS> = (
|
||||
LoginSecondMessage<<CS as CipherSuite>::Group, <CS as CipherSuite>::KeyFormat>,
|
||||
ServerLogin,
|
||||
LoginSecondMessage<
|
||||
<CS as CipherSuite>::Group,
|
||||
<CS as CipherSuite>::KeyFormat,
|
||||
<CS as CipherSuite>::KeyExchange,
|
||||
>,
|
||||
ServerLogin<CS>,
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
impl ServerLogin {
|
||||
impl<CS: CipherSuite> ServerLogin<CS> {
|
||||
/// byte representation for the server's login state
|
||||
pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
self.ke2_state.to_bytes()
|
||||
@@ -795,6 +824,7 @@ impl ServerLogin {
|
||||
/// impl CipherSuite for Default {
|
||||
/// type Group = curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoPoint;
|
||||
/// type KeyFormat = opaque_ke::keypair::X25519KeyPair;
|
||||
/// type KeyExchange = opaque_ke::key_exchange::tripledh::TripleDH;
|
||||
/// type SlowHash = opaque_ke::slow_hash::NoOpHash;
|
||||
/// }
|
||||
/// let mut client_rng = OsRng;
|
||||
@@ -809,10 +839,10 @@ impl ServerLogin {
|
||||
/// let (login_m2, server_login_state) = ServerLogin::start(p_file, &server_kp.private(), login_m1, &mut server_rng)?;
|
||||
/// # Ok::<(), ProtocolError>(())
|
||||
/// ```
|
||||
pub fn start<CS: CipherSuite, R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
|
||||
pub fn start<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
|
||||
password_file: ServerRegistration<CS>,
|
||||
server_s_sk: &Key,
|
||||
l1: LoginFirstMessage<CS::Group>,
|
||||
l1: LoginFirstMessage<CS>,
|
||||
rng: &mut R,
|
||||
) -> Result<ServerLoginStartResult<CS>, ProtocolError> {
|
||||
let l1_bytes = &l1.to_bytes();
|
||||
@@ -825,24 +855,30 @@ impl ServerLogin {
|
||||
|
||||
let l2_component: Vec<u8> = [&beta.to_arr()[..], &envelope.to_bytes()].concat();
|
||||
|
||||
let (ke2_state, ke2_message) = generate_ke2::<_, CS::KeyFormat>(
|
||||
let (ke2_state, ke2_message) = CS::KeyExchange::generate_ke2::<_, CS::KeyFormat>(
|
||||
rng,
|
||||
l1_bytes.to_vec(),
|
||||
l2_component,
|
||||
l1.ke1_message.client_e_pk,
|
||||
l1.ke1_message,
|
||||
client_s_pk,
|
||||
server_s_sk.clone(),
|
||||
l1.ke1_message.client_nonce.to_vec(),
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let l2 = LoginSecondMessage {
|
||||
_key_format: PhantomData,
|
||||
_key_exchange: PhantomData,
|
||||
beta,
|
||||
envelope,
|
||||
ke2_message,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
Ok((l2, Self { ke2_state }))
|
||||
Ok((
|
||||
l2,
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
_cs: PhantomData,
|
||||
ke2_state,
|
||||
},
|
||||
))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// From the client's second & final message, check the client's
|
||||
@@ -864,6 +900,7 @@ impl ServerLogin {
|
||||
/// impl CipherSuite for Default {
|
||||
/// type Group = curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoPoint;
|
||||
/// type KeyFormat = opaque_ke::keypair::X25519KeyPair;
|
||||
/// type KeyExchange = opaque_ke::key_exchange::tripledh::TripleDH;
|
||||
/// type SlowHash = opaque_ke::slow_hash::NoOpHash;
|
||||
/// }
|
||||
/// let mut client_rng = OsRng;
|
||||
@@ -880,13 +917,15 @@ impl ServerLogin {
|
||||
/// let mut server_transport = server_login_state.finish(login_m3)?;
|
||||
/// # Ok::<(), ProtocolError>(())
|
||||
/// ```
|
||||
pub fn finish(&self, message: LoginThirdMessage) -> Result<Vec<u8>, ProtocolError> {
|
||||
finish_ke(message.ke3_message, &self.ke2_state).map_err(|e| match e {
|
||||
ProtocolError::VerificationError(PakeError::KeyExchangeMacValidationError) => {
|
||||
ProtocolError::VerificationError(PakeError::InvalidLoginError)
|
||||
}
|
||||
err => err,
|
||||
})
|
||||
pub fn finish(&self, message: LoginThirdMessage<CS>) -> Result<Vec<u8>, ProtocolError> {
|
||||
<CS::KeyExchange as KeyExchange>::finish_ke(message.ke3_message, &self.ke2_state).map_err(
|
||||
|e| match e {
|
||||
ProtocolError::VerificationError(PakeError::KeyExchangeMacValidationError) => {
|
||||
ProtocolError::VerificationError(PakeError::InvalidLoginError)
|
||||
}
|
||||
err => err,
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+20
-12
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ use crate::{
|
||||
ciphersuite::CipherSuite,
|
||||
errors::*,
|
||||
group::Group,
|
||||
key_exchange::NONCE_LEN,
|
||||
key_exchange::tripledh::{TripleDH, NONCE_LEN},
|
||||
keypair::{Key, KeyPair, X25519KeyPair},
|
||||
opaque::*,
|
||||
slow_hash::NoOpHash,
|
||||
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ struct X255193dhNoSlowHash;
|
||||
impl CipherSuite for X255193dhNoSlowHash {
|
||||
type Group = EdwardsPoint;
|
||||
type KeyFormat = X25519KeyPair;
|
||||
type KeyExchange = TripleDH;
|
||||
type SlowHash = NoOpHash;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -282,7 +283,7 @@ fn generate_parameters<CS: CipherSuite>() -> TestVectorParameters {
|
||||
let client_login_state = client_login.to_bytes().to_vec();
|
||||
|
||||
let mut server_e_sk_rng = CycleRng::new(server_e_kp.private().to_vec());
|
||||
let (l2, server_login) = ServerLogin::start(
|
||||
let (l2, server_login) = ServerLogin::<CS>::start(
|
||||
password_file,
|
||||
server_s_kp.private(),
|
||||
l1,
|
||||
@@ -448,10 +449,10 @@ fn test_l2() -> Result<(), PakeError> {
|
||||
let parameters = populate_test_vectors(&serde_json::from_str(TEST_VECTOR).unwrap());
|
||||
|
||||
let mut server_e_sk_rng = CycleRng::new(parameters.server_e_sk);
|
||||
let (l2, server_login) = ServerLogin::start::<X255193dhNoSlowHash, _>(
|
||||
let (l2, server_login) = ServerLogin::<X255193dhNoSlowHash>::start(
|
||||
ServerRegistration::try_from(¶meters.password_file[..]).unwrap(),
|
||||
&Key::try_from(¶meters.server_s_sk[..]).unwrap(),
|
||||
LoginFirstMessage::<EdwardsPoint>::try_from(¶meters.l1[..]).unwrap(),
|
||||
LoginFirstMessage::<X255193dhNoSlowHash>::try_from(¶meters.l1[..]).unwrap(),
|
||||
&mut server_e_sk_rng,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
@@ -473,8 +474,10 @@ fn test_l3() -> Result<(), PakeError> {
|
||||
ClientLogin::<X255193dhNoSlowHash>::try_from(¶meters.client_login_state[..])
|
||||
.unwrap()
|
||||
.finish(
|
||||
LoginSecondMessage::<EdwardsPoint, X25519KeyPair>::try_from(¶meters.l2[..])
|
||||
.unwrap(),
|
||||
LoginSecondMessage::<EdwardsPoint, X25519KeyPair, TripleDH>::try_from(
|
||||
¶meters.l2[..],
|
||||
)
|
||||
.unwrap(),
|
||||
&Key::try_from(¶meters.server_s_pk[..])?,
|
||||
&mut client_e_sk_rng,
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -497,10 +500,11 @@ fn test_l3() -> Result<(), PakeError> {
|
||||
fn test_server_login_finish() -> Result<(), ProtocolError> {
|
||||
let parameters = populate_test_vectors(&serde_json::from_str(TEST_VECTOR).unwrap());
|
||||
|
||||
let shared_secret = ServerLogin::try_from(¶meters.server_login_state[..])
|
||||
.unwrap()
|
||||
.finish(LoginThirdMessage::try_from(¶meters.l3[..])?)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
let shared_secret =
|
||||
ServerLogin::<X255193dhNoSlowHash>::try_from(¶meters.server_login_state[..])
|
||||
.unwrap()
|
||||
.finish(LoginThirdMessage::try_from(¶meters.l3[..])?)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
hex::encode(parameters.shared_secret),
|
||||
@@ -529,8 +533,12 @@ fn test_complete_flow(
|
||||
let p_file = server_state.finish(register_m3)?;
|
||||
let (login_m1, client_login_state) =
|
||||
ClientLogin::<X255193dhNoSlowHash>::start(login_password, None, &mut client_rng)?;
|
||||
let (login_m2, server_login_state) =
|
||||
ServerLogin::start(p_file, &server_kp.private(), login_m1, &mut server_rng)?;
|
||||
let (login_m2, server_login_state) = ServerLogin::<X255193dhNoSlowHash>::start(
|
||||
p_file,
|
||||
&server_kp.private(),
|
||||
login_m1,
|
||||
&mut server_rng,
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let client_login_result =
|
||||
client_login_state.finish(login_m2, &server_kp.public(), &mut client_rng);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -7,7 +7,10 @@ use crate::{
|
||||
ciphersuite::CipherSuite,
|
||||
envelope::Envelope,
|
||||
group::Group,
|
||||
key_exchange::{KE1Message, NONCE_LEN},
|
||||
key_exchange::{
|
||||
traits::{KeyExchange, ToBytes},
|
||||
tripledh::{TripleDH, NONCE_LEN},
|
||||
},
|
||||
keypair::{KeyPair, SizedBytes, X25519KeyPair},
|
||||
opaque::*,
|
||||
};
|
||||
@@ -23,6 +26,7 @@ struct Default;
|
||||
impl CipherSuite for Default {
|
||||
type Group = RistrettoPoint;
|
||||
type KeyFormat = crate::keypair::X25519KeyPair;
|
||||
type KeyExchange = TripleDH;
|
||||
type SlowHash = crate::slow_hash::NoOpHash;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -160,7 +164,7 @@ fn login_first_message_roundtrip() {
|
||||
rng.fill_bytes(&mut client_nonce);
|
||||
|
||||
let ke1m: Vec<u8> = [&client_nonce[..], &client_e_kp.public()].concat();
|
||||
let reg = KE1Message::try_from(&ke1m[..]).unwrap();
|
||||
let reg = <TripleDH as KeyExchange>::KE1Message::try_from(ke1m[..].to_vec()).unwrap();
|
||||
let reg_bytes = reg.to_bytes();
|
||||
assert_eq!(reg_bytes, ke1m);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user