* Moving id_u and id_s from ClientLoginStartParameters to ClientLoginFinishParameters * Updating envelope format to support two fixed modes
330 lines
10 KiB
Rust
330 lines
10 KiB
Rust
// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
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//
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// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
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// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
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use crate::{
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errors::{InternalPakeError, PakeError, ProtocolError},
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hash::Hash,
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serialization::{serialize, tokenize},
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};
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use digest::Digest;
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use generic_array::{
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typenum::{Unsigned, U32},
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GenericArray,
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};
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use hkdf::Hkdf;
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use hmac::{Hmac, Mac, NewMac};
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use rand_core::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
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use std::convert::TryFrom;
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// Constant string used as salt for HKDF computation
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const STR_ENVU: &[u8] = b"EnvU";
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/// The length of the "export key" output by the client registration
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/// and login finish steps
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pub(crate) type ExportKeySize = U32;
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const NONCE_LEN: usize = 32;
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#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
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pub(crate) enum InnerEnvelopeMode {
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Base = 0,
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CustomIdentifier = 1,
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}
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impl TryFrom<u8> for InnerEnvelopeMode {
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type Error = PakeError;
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fn try_from(x: u8) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
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match x {
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0 => Ok(InnerEnvelopeMode::Base),
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1 => Ok(InnerEnvelopeMode::CustomIdentifier),
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_ => Err(PakeError::SerializationError),
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}
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}
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}
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/// This struct is an instantiation of the envelope as described in
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/// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-06#section-4
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///
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/// Note that earlier versions of this specification described an
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/// implementation of this envelope using an encryption scheme that
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/// satisfied random-key robustness
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/// (https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-05#section-4).
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/// The specification update has simplified this assumption by taking
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/// an XOR-based approach without compromising on security, and to avoid
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/// the confusion around the implementation of an RKR-secure encryption.
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pub(crate) struct Envelope<D: Hash> {
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mode: InnerEnvelopeMode,
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nonce: Vec<u8>,
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ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
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auth_data: Vec<u8>,
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hmac: GenericArray<u8, <D as Digest>::OutputSize>,
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}
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pub(crate) struct OpenedEnvelope {
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pub(crate) client_s_sk: Vec<u8>,
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pub(crate) export_key: GenericArray<u8, ExportKeySize>,
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}
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pub(crate) struct OpenedInnerEnvelope {
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pub(crate) plaintext: Vec<u8>,
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pub(crate) export_key: GenericArray<u8, ExportKeySize>,
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}
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impl<D: Hash> Envelope<D> {
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/// The additional number of bytes added to the plaintext
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pub(crate) fn additional_size() -> usize {
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NONCE_LEN + <D as Digest>::OutputSize::to_usize()
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}
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fn hmac_key_size() -> usize {
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<D as Digest>::OutputSize::to_usize()
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}
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fn export_key_size() -> usize {
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ExportKeySize::to_usize()
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}
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pub(crate) fn get_mode(&self) -> InnerEnvelopeMode {
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self.mode
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}
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pub(crate) fn new(
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mode: InnerEnvelopeMode,
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nonce: Vec<u8>,
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ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
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auth_data: Vec<u8>,
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hmac: GenericArray<u8, <D as Digest>::OutputSize>,
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) -> Self {
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Self {
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mode,
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nonce,
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ciphertext,
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auth_data,
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hmac,
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}
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}
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/// The format of the output is:
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/// mode | nonce | ciphertext | hmac
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/// u8 | nonce_size bytes | variable length | hmac_size bytes
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pub(crate) fn from_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, InternalPakeError> {
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let (result, remainder) = Self::deserialize(bytes)
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.map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::InvalidEnvelopeStructureError)?;
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if !remainder.is_empty() {
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return Err(InternalPakeError::InvalidEnvelopeStructureError);
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}
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Ok(result)
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}
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pub(crate) fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
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self.serialize()
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}
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pub(crate) fn serialize(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
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[
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&[self.mode as u8],
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&self.nonce[..],
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&serialize(&self.ciphertext, 2)[..],
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&serialize(&self.auth_data, 2)[..],
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&serialize(&self.hmac, 2)[..],
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]
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.concat()
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}
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pub(crate) fn deserialize(input: &[u8]) -> Result<(Self, Vec<u8>), ProtocolError> {
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if input.is_empty() {
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return Err(ProtocolError::VerificationError(
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PakeError::SerializationError,
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));
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}
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let mode = InnerEnvelopeMode::try_from(input[0])?;
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let bytes = &input[1..];
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if bytes.len() < NONCE_LEN {
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return Err(ProtocolError::VerificationError(
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PakeError::SerializationError,
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));
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}
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let nonce = &bytes[..NONCE_LEN];
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let (ciphertext, remainder) = tokenize(&bytes[NONCE_LEN..], 2)?;
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let (auth_data, remainder) = tokenize(&remainder, 2)?;
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let (hmac, remainder) = tokenize(&remainder, 2)?;
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Ok((
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Self::new(
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mode,
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nonce.to_vec(),
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ciphertext,
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auth_data,
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GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&hmac[..]),
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),
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remainder,
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))
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}
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pub(crate) fn seal<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
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rng: &mut R,
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key: &[u8],
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client_s_sk: &[u8],
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server_s_pk: &[u8],
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optional_ids: Option<(Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>)>,
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) -> Result<(Self, GenericArray<u8, ExportKeySize>), InternalPakeError> {
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let plaintext = serialize(&client_s_sk, 2);
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let aad = construct_aad(server_s_pk, &optional_ids);
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Self::seal_raw(rng, key, &plaintext, &aad, mode_from_ids(&optional_ids))
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}
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/// Uses a key to convert the plaintext into an envelope, authenticated by the aad field.
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/// Note that a new nonce is sampled for each call to seal.
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pub(crate) fn seal_raw<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
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rng: &mut R,
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key: &[u8],
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plaintext: &[u8],
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aad: &[u8],
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mode: InnerEnvelopeMode,
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) -> Result<(Self, GenericArray<u8, ExportKeySize>), InternalPakeError> {
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let mut nonce = vec![0u8; NONCE_LEN];
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rng.fill_bytes(&mut nonce);
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let h = Hkdf::<D>::new(Some(&nonce), &key);
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let mut okm = vec![0u8; plaintext.len() + Self::hmac_key_size() + Self::export_key_size()];
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h.expand(STR_ENVU, &mut okm)
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.map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HkdfError)?;
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let xor_key = &okm[..plaintext.len()];
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let hmac_key = &okm[plaintext.len()..plaintext.len() + Self::hmac_key_size()];
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let export_key = &okm[plaintext.len() + Self::hmac_key_size()..];
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let ciphertext: Vec<u8> = xor_key
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.iter()
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.zip(plaintext.iter())
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.map(|(&x1, &x2)| x1 ^ x2)
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.collect();
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let mut hmac =
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Hmac::<D>::new_varkey(&hmac_key).map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HmacError)?;
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hmac.update(&nonce);
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hmac.update(&ciphertext);
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hmac.update(&aad);
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Ok((
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Self::new(
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mode,
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nonce,
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ciphertext.to_vec(),
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aad.to_vec(),
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hmac.finalize().into_bytes(),
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),
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*GenericArray::from_slice(&export_key),
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))
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}
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pub(crate) fn open(
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&self,
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key: &[u8],
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server_s_pk: &[u8],
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optional_ids: &Option<(Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>)>,
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) -> Result<OpenedEnvelope, InternalPakeError> {
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// First, check that mode matches
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if self.mode != mode_from_ids(optional_ids) {
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return Err(InternalPakeError::IncompatibleEnvelopeModeError);
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}
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let aad = construct_aad(server_s_pk, optional_ids);
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let opened = self.open_raw(key, &aad)?;
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let (client_s_sk, remainder) = tokenize(&opened.plaintext, 2)
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.map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::UnexpectedEnvelopeContentsError)?;
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if !remainder.is_empty() {
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// Should not have anything else in plaintext
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return Err(InternalPakeError::UnexpectedEnvelopeContentsError);
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}
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Ok(OpenedEnvelope {
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client_s_sk,
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export_key: opened.export_key,
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})
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}
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/// Attempts to decrypt the envelope using a key, which is successful only if the key and
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/// aad used to construct the envelope are the same.
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pub(crate) fn open_raw(
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&self,
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key: &[u8],
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aad: &[u8],
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) -> Result<OpenedInnerEnvelope, InternalPakeError> {
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let h = Hkdf::<D>::new(Some(&self.nonce), &key);
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let mut okm =
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vec![0u8; self.ciphertext.len() + Self::hmac_key_size() + Self::export_key_size()];
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h.expand(STR_ENVU, &mut okm)
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.map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HkdfError)?;
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let xor_key = &okm[..self.ciphertext.len()];
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let hmac_key = &okm[self.ciphertext.len()..self.ciphertext.len() + Self::hmac_key_size()];
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let export_key = &okm[self.ciphertext.len() + Self::hmac_key_size()..];
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let mut hmac =
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Hmac::<D>::new_varkey(&hmac_key).map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HmacError)?;
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hmac.update(&self.nonce);
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hmac.update(&self.ciphertext);
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hmac.update(aad);
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if hmac.verify(&self.hmac).is_err() {
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return Err(InternalPakeError::SealOpenHmacError);
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}
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let plaintext: Vec<u8> = xor_key
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.iter()
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.zip(self.ciphertext.iter())
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.map(|(&x1, &x2)| x1 ^ x2)
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.collect();
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Ok(OpenedInnerEnvelope {
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plaintext,
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export_key: *GenericArray::from_slice(&export_key),
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})
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}
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}
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// Helper functions
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fn construct_aad(server_s_pk: &[u8], optional_ids: &Option<(Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>)>) -> Vec<u8> {
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optional_ids
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.iter()
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.flat_map(|(l, r)| [serialize(server_s_pk, 2), serialize(l, 2), serialize(r, 2)].concat())
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.collect()
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}
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pub(crate) fn mode_from_ids(optional_ids: &Option<(Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>)>) -> InnerEnvelopeMode {
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match optional_ids {
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Some(_) => InnerEnvelopeMode::CustomIdentifier,
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None => InnerEnvelopeMode::Base,
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}
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tests {
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use super::*;
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use rand_core::OsRng;
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#[test]
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fn seal_and_open() {
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let mut rng = OsRng;
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let mut key = [0u8; 32];
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rng.fill_bytes(&mut key);
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let mut msg = [0u8; 100];
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rng.fill_bytes(&mut msg);
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let (envelope, export_key_1) = Envelope::<sha2::Sha256>::seal_raw(
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&mut rng,
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&key,
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&msg,
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b"aad",
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InnerEnvelopeMode::Base,
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)
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.unwrap();
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let opened_envelope = envelope.open_raw(&key, b"aad").unwrap();
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assert_eq!(&msg.to_vec(), &opened_envelope.plaintext);
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assert_eq!(&export_key_1.to_vec(), &opened_envelope.export_key.to_vec());
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}
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}
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