Files
opaque-vx/src/envelope.rs
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339 lines
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Rust

// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates.
//
// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the
// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree.
use crate::{
errors::{utils::check_slice_size_atleast, InternalPakeError, PakeError, ProtocolError},
hash::Hash,
keypair::Key,
serialization::{serialize, tokenize},
};
use digest::Digest;
use generic_array::{typenum::Unsigned, GenericArray};
use generic_bytes::SizedBytes;
use hkdf::Hkdf;
use hmac::{Hmac, Mac, NewMac};
use rand::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
use std::convert::TryFrom;
// Constant string used as salt for HKDF computation
const STR_PAD: &[u8] = b"Pad";
const STR_AUTH_KEY: &[u8] = b"AuthKey";
const STR_EXPORT_KEY: &[u8] = b"ExportKey";
const NONCE_LEN: usize = 32;
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
pub(crate) enum InnerEnvelopeMode {
Base = 1,
CustomIdentifier = 2,
}
impl TryFrom<u8> for InnerEnvelopeMode {
type Error = PakeError;
fn try_from(x: u8) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
match x {
1 => Ok(InnerEnvelopeMode::Base),
2 => Ok(InnerEnvelopeMode::CustomIdentifier),
_ => Err(PakeError::SerializationError),
}
}
}
pub(crate) struct InnerEnvelope {
mode: InnerEnvelopeMode,
nonce: Vec<u8>,
ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
}
impl InnerEnvelope {
pub(crate) fn serialize(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
[
&[self.mode as u8],
&self.nonce[..],
&serialize(&self.ciphertext, 2)[..],
]
.concat()
}
pub(crate) fn deserialize(input: &[u8]) -> Result<(Self, Vec<u8>), ProtocolError> {
if input.is_empty() {
return Err(ProtocolError::VerificationError(
PakeError::SerializationError,
));
}
let mode = InnerEnvelopeMode::try_from(input[0])?;
let bytes = &input[1..];
if bytes.len() < NONCE_LEN {
return Err(ProtocolError::VerificationError(
PakeError::SerializationError,
));
}
let nonce = &bytes[..NONCE_LEN];
let (ciphertext, remainder) = tokenize(&bytes[NONCE_LEN..], 2)?;
Ok((
Self {
mode,
nonce: nonce.to_vec(),
ciphertext,
},
remainder,
))
}
}
/// This struct is an instantiation of the envelope as described in
/// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-06#section-4
///
/// Note that earlier versions of this specification described an
/// implementation of this envelope using an encryption scheme that
/// satisfied random-key robustness
/// (https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-05#section-4).
/// The specification update has simplified this assumption by taking
/// an XOR-based approach without compromising on security, and to avoid
/// the confusion around the implementation of an RKR-secure encryption.
pub(crate) struct Envelope<D: Hash> {
inner_envelope: InnerEnvelope,
hmac: GenericArray<u8, <D as Digest>::OutputSize>,
}
// Note that this struct represents an envelope that has been "opened" with the asssociated
// key. This key is also used to derive the export_key parameter, which is technically
// unrelated to the envelope's encrypted and authenticated contents.
pub(crate) struct OpenedEnvelope<D: Hash> {
pub(crate) client_s_sk: Vec<u8>,
pub(crate) export_key: GenericArray<u8, <D as Digest>::OutputSize>,
}
pub(crate) struct OpenedInnerEnvelope<D: Hash> {
pub(crate) plaintext: Vec<u8>,
pub(crate) export_key: GenericArray<u8, <D as Digest>::OutputSize>,
}
impl<D: Hash> Envelope<D> {
fn hmac_key_size() -> usize {
<D as Digest>::OutputSize::to_usize()
}
fn export_key_size() -> usize {
<D as Digest>::OutputSize::to_usize()
}
pub(crate) fn get_mode(&self) -> InnerEnvelopeMode {
self.inner_envelope.mode
}
/// The format of the output is:
/// mode | nonce | ciphertext | hmac
/// u8 | nonce_size bytes | variable length | hmac_size bytes
pub(crate) fn from_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, InternalPakeError> {
let (result, remainder) = Self::deserialize(bytes)
.map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::InvalidEnvelopeStructureError)?;
if !remainder.is_empty() {
return Err(InternalPakeError::InvalidEnvelopeStructureError);
}
Ok(result)
}
pub(crate) fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
self.serialize()
}
pub(crate) fn serialize(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
[&self.inner_envelope.serialize(), &self.hmac[..]].concat()
}
pub(crate) fn deserialize(input: &[u8]) -> Result<(Self, Vec<u8>), ProtocolError> {
let (inner_envelope, remainder) = InnerEnvelope::deserialize(input)?;
let hmac_key_size = Self::hmac_key_size();
let hmac_and_remainder =
check_slice_size_atleast(&remainder, hmac_key_size, "hmac_key_size")?;
Ok((
Self {
inner_envelope,
hmac: GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&hmac_and_remainder[..hmac_key_size]),
},
hmac_and_remainder[hmac_key_size..].to_vec(),
))
}
pub(crate) fn seal<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
rng: &mut R,
key: &[u8],
client_s_sk: &[u8],
server_s_pk: &[u8],
optional_ids: Option<(Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>)>,
) -> Result<(Self, GenericArray<u8, <D as Digest>::OutputSize>), InternalPakeError> {
let aad = construct_aad(server_s_pk, &optional_ids);
Self::seal_raw(rng, key, &client_s_sk, &aad, mode_from_ids(&optional_ids))
}
/// Uses a key to convert the plaintext into an envelope, authenticated by the aad field.
/// Note that a new nonce is sampled for each call to seal.
pub(crate) fn seal_raw<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
rng: &mut R,
key: &[u8],
plaintext: &[u8],
aad: &[u8],
mode: InnerEnvelopeMode,
) -> Result<(Self, GenericArray<u8, <D as Digest>::OutputSize>), InternalPakeError> {
let mut nonce = vec![0u8; NONCE_LEN];
rng.fill_bytes(&mut nonce);
let h = Hkdf::<D>::new(Some(&nonce), &key);
let mut xor_key = vec![0u8; plaintext.len()];
let mut hmac_key = vec![0u8; Self::hmac_key_size()];
let mut export_key = vec![0u8; Self::export_key_size()];
h.expand(STR_PAD, &mut xor_key)
.map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HkdfError)?;
h.expand(STR_AUTH_KEY, &mut hmac_key)
.map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HkdfError)?;
h.expand(STR_EXPORT_KEY, &mut export_key)
.map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HkdfError)?;
let ciphertext: Vec<u8> = xor_key
.iter()
.zip(plaintext.iter())
.map(|(&x1, &x2)| x1 ^ x2)
.collect();
let inner_envelope = InnerEnvelope {
mode,
nonce,
ciphertext,
};
let mut hmac =
Hmac::<D>::new_varkey(&hmac_key).map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HmacError)?;
hmac.update(&inner_envelope.serialize());
hmac.update(&aad);
let hmac_bytes = hmac.finalize().into_bytes();
Ok((
Self {
inner_envelope,
hmac: hmac_bytes,
},
GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&export_key),
))
}
pub(crate) fn open(
&self,
key: &[u8],
server_s_pk: &[u8],
optional_ids: &Option<(Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>)>,
) -> Result<OpenedEnvelope<D>, InternalPakeError> {
// First, check that mode matches
if self.inner_envelope.mode != mode_from_ids(optional_ids) {
return Err(InternalPakeError::IncompatibleEnvelopeModeError);
}
let aad = construct_aad(server_s_pk, optional_ids);
let opened = self.open_raw(key, &aad)?;
if opened.plaintext.len() != <Key as SizedBytes>::Len::to_usize() {
// Plaintext should consist of a single key
return Err(InternalPakeError::UnexpectedEnvelopeContentsError);
}
Ok(OpenedEnvelope {
client_s_sk: opened.plaintext,
export_key: opened.export_key,
})
}
/// Attempts to decrypt the envelope using a key, which is successful only if the key and
/// aad used to construct the envelope are the same.
pub(crate) fn open_raw(
&self,
key: &[u8],
aad: &[u8],
) -> Result<OpenedInnerEnvelope<D>, InternalPakeError> {
let h = Hkdf::<D>::new(Some(&self.inner_envelope.nonce), &key);
let mut xor_key = vec![0u8; self.inner_envelope.ciphertext.len()];
let mut hmac_key = vec![0u8; Self::hmac_key_size()];
let mut export_key = vec![0u8; Self::export_key_size()];
h.expand(STR_PAD, &mut xor_key)
.map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HkdfError)?;
h.expand(STR_AUTH_KEY, &mut hmac_key)
.map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HkdfError)?;
h.expand(STR_EXPORT_KEY, &mut export_key)
.map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HkdfError)?;
let mut hmac =
Hmac::<D>::new_varkey(&hmac_key).map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::HmacError)?;
hmac.update(&self.inner_envelope.serialize());
hmac.update(aad);
if hmac.verify(&self.hmac).is_err() {
return Err(InternalPakeError::SealOpenHmacError);
}
let plaintext: Vec<u8> = xor_key
.iter()
.zip(self.inner_envelope.ciphertext.iter())
.map(|(&x1, &x2)| x1 ^ x2)
.collect();
Ok(OpenedInnerEnvelope {
plaintext,
export_key: GenericArray::<u8, <D as Digest>::OutputSize>::clone_from_slice(
&export_key,
),
})
}
}
// Helper functions
fn construct_aad(server_s_pk: &[u8], optional_ids: &Option<(Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>)>) -> Vec<u8> {
let ids = optional_ids
.iter()
.flat_map(|(l, r)| [serialize(l, 2), serialize(r, 2)].concat())
.collect();
[server_s_pk.to_vec(), ids].concat()
}
pub(crate) fn mode_from_ids(optional_ids: &Option<(Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>)>) -> InnerEnvelopeMode {
match optional_ids {
Some(_) => InnerEnvelopeMode::CustomIdentifier,
None => InnerEnvelopeMode::Base,
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use rand::rngs::OsRng;
#[test]
fn seal_and_open() {
let mut rng = OsRng;
let mut key = [0u8; 32];
rng.fill_bytes(&mut key);
let mut msg = [0u8; 100];
rng.fill_bytes(&mut msg);
let (envelope, export_key_1) = Envelope::<sha2::Sha256>::seal_raw(
&mut rng,
&key,
&msg,
b"aad",
InnerEnvelopeMode::Base,
)
.unwrap();
let opened_envelope = envelope.open_raw(&key, b"aad").unwrap();
assert_eq!(&msg.to_vec(), &opened_envelope.plaintext);
assert_eq!(&export_key_1.to_vec(), &opened_envelope.export_key.to_vec());
}
}