From 0fc34487773be5cbc1fca5a611b628e1982f1865 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kevin Lewi Date: Fri, 9 Oct 2020 10:51:58 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] Updating opaque interfaces to include ids from the internet draft (#56) --- src/envelope.rs | 170 ++++++++++++-- src/errors.rs | 21 ++ src/opaque.rs | 430 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- src/serialization/mod.rs | 29 ++- src/serialization/tests.rs | 147 ++++++++---- src/tests/opaque_ke_test.rs | 54 ++--- src/tests/serialization.rs | 230 ------------------- 7 files changed, 625 insertions(+), 456 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 src/tests/serialization.rs diff --git a/src/envelope.rs b/src/envelope.rs index a6beec7..02ec225 100644 --- a/src/envelope.rs +++ b/src/envelope.rs @@ -4,9 +4,9 @@ // LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree. use crate::{ - errors::{InternalPakeError, ProtocolError}, + errors::{InternalPakeError, PakeError, ProtocolError}, hash::Hash, - serialization::{serialize, tokenize}, + serialization::{serialize, tokenize, u8_to_credential_type, CredentialType}, }; use digest::Digest; use generic_array::{ @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ use generic_array::{ use hkdf::Hkdf; use hmac::{Hmac, Mac, NewMac}; use rand_core::{CryptoRng, RngCore}; +use std::collections::HashMap; // Constant string used as salt for HKDF computation const STR_ENVU: &[u8] = b"EnvU"; @@ -39,14 +40,59 @@ const NONCE_LEN: usize = 32; pub(crate) struct Envelope { nonce: Vec, ciphertext: Vec, + auth_data: Vec, hmac: GenericArray::OutputSize>, } +pub(crate) struct OpenedEnvelopeECF { + pub(crate) credentials_map: HashMap>, + pub(crate) export_key: GenericArray, +} + pub(crate) struct OpenedEnvelope { pub(crate) plaintext: Vec, pub(crate) export_key: GenericArray, } +/// Representation for the format of the envelope +pub struct EnvelopeCredentialsFormat { + pub(crate) secret_credentials: Vec, + pub(crate) cleartext_credentials: Vec, +} + +impl EnvelopeCredentialsFormat { + /// Creates a new envelope credentials format with validity checking + /// An ECF is valid if: + /// - skU is a secret credential + /// - pkS is either a secret or cleartext credential + pub fn new( + secret_credentials: Vec, + cleartext_credentials: Vec, + ) -> Result { + if !secret_credentials.iter().any(|&v| v == CredentialType::SkU) { + // No skU found in secret credentials + return Err(ProtocolError::ServerInvalidEnvelopeCredentialsFormatError); + } + if !secret_credentials.iter().any(|&v| v == CredentialType::PkS) + && !cleartext_credentials + .iter() + .any(|&v| v == CredentialType::PkS) + { + // No pkS found in either secret credentials or cleartext_credentials + return Err(ProtocolError::ServerInvalidEnvelopeCredentialsFormatError); + } + Ok(Self { + secret_credentials, + cleartext_credentials, + }) + } + + /// Uses the default setting for the envelope credentials format + pub fn default() -> Result { + Self::new(vec![CredentialType::SkU], vec![CredentialType::PkS]) + } +} + impl Envelope { /// The additional number of bytes added to the plaintext pub(crate) fn additional_size() -> usize { @@ -57,10 +103,6 @@ impl Envelope { ::OutputSize::to_usize() } - fn hmac_size() -> usize { - ::OutputSize::to_usize() - } - fn export_key_size() -> usize { ExportKeySize::to_usize() } @@ -68,11 +110,13 @@ impl Envelope { pub(crate) fn new( nonce: Vec, ciphertext: Vec, + auth_data: Vec, hmac: GenericArray::OutputSize>, ) -> Self { Self { nonce, ciphertext, + auth_data, hmac, } } @@ -81,48 +125,98 @@ impl Envelope { /// nonce | ciphertext | hmac /// nonce_size bytes | variable length | hmac_size bytes pub(crate) fn from_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result { - let ciphertext_start = NONCE_LEN; - let ciphertext_end = bytes.len() - Self::hmac_size(); - - Ok(Self::new( - bytes[..ciphertext_start].to_vec(), - bytes[ciphertext_start..ciphertext_end].to_vec(), - GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&bytes[ciphertext_end..]), - )) + let (result, remainder) = Self::deserialize(bytes) + .map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::IncompatibleEnvelopeCredentialsError)?; + if !remainder.is_empty() { + return Err(InternalPakeError::IncompatibleEnvelopeCredentialsError); + } + Ok(result) } pub(crate) fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec { - [&self.nonce[..], &self.ciphertext[..], &self.hmac[..]].concat() + self.serialize() } pub(crate) fn serialize(&self) -> Vec { [ &self.nonce[..], - &serialize((&self.ciphertext).to_vec(), 2)[..], - &serialize(vec![], 2)[..], - &serialize((&self.hmac).to_vec(), 2)[..], + &serialize(&self.ciphertext, 2)[..], + &serialize(&self.auth_data, 2)[..], + &serialize(&self.hmac, 2)[..], ] .concat() } pub(crate) fn deserialize(input: &[u8]) -> Result<(Self, Vec), ProtocolError> { + if input.len() < NONCE_LEN { + return Err(ProtocolError::VerificationError( + PakeError::SerializationError, + )); + } + let nonce = &input[..NONCE_LEN]; let (ciphertext, remainder) = tokenize(input[NONCE_LEN..].to_vec(), 2)?; - let (_, remainder) = tokenize(remainder, 2)?; + let (auth_data, remainder) = tokenize(remainder, 2)?; let (hmac, remainder) = tokenize(remainder, 2)?; Ok(( Self::new( nonce.to_vec(), ciphertext, + auth_data, GenericArray::clone_from_slice(&hmac[..]), ), remainder, )) } + fn serialize_extensions( + cred_format: Vec, + credentials: &HashMap>, + ) -> Result, InternalPakeError> { + let mut ret = Vec::new(); + for index_type in cred_format { + match &credentials.get(&index_type) { + Some(v) => { + ret.push(index_type as u8 + 1); + ret.extend(serialize(&v, 2)); + } + None => return Err(InternalPakeError::IncompatibleEnvelopeCredentialsError), + } + } + Ok(ret) + } + + fn deserialize_extensions( + bytes: &[u8], + ) -> Result>, InternalPakeError> { + let mut credentials: HashMap> = HashMap::new(); + let mut bytes_copy: Vec = Vec::new(); + bytes_copy.extend_from_slice(&bytes); + while !bytes_copy.is_empty() { + let t = u8_to_credential_type(bytes_copy[0]) + .ok_or(InternalPakeError::IncompatibleEnvelopeCredentialsError)?; + let (cred, remainder) = tokenize(bytes_copy[1..].to_vec(), 2) + .map_err(|_| InternalPakeError::IncompatibleEnvelopeCredentialsError)?; + bytes_copy = remainder; + credentials.insert(t, cred); + } + Ok(credentials) + } + + pub(crate) fn seal( + key: &[u8], + ecf: EnvelopeCredentialsFormat, + credentials: HashMap>, + rng: &mut R, + ) -> Result<(Self, GenericArray), InternalPakeError> { + let plaintext = Self::serialize_extensions(ecf.secret_credentials, &credentials)?; + let aad = Self::serialize_extensions(ecf.cleartext_credentials, &credentials)?; + Self::seal_raw(key, &plaintext, &aad, rng) + } + /// Uses a key to convert the plaintext into an envelope, authenticated by the aad field. /// Note that a new nonce is sampled for each call to seal. - pub(crate) fn seal( + pub(crate) fn seal_raw( key: &[u8], plaintext: &[u8], aad: &[u8], @@ -152,14 +246,42 @@ impl Envelope { hmac.update(&aad); Ok(( - Self::new(nonce, ciphertext.to_vec(), hmac.finalize().into_bytes()), + Self::new( + nonce, + ciphertext.to_vec(), + aad.to_vec(), + hmac.finalize().into_bytes(), + ), *GenericArray::from_slice(&export_key), )) } + pub(crate) fn open(&self, key: &[u8]) -> Result { + let mut credentials_map = Self::deserialize_extensions(&self.auth_data)?; + let opened = self.open_raw(key, &self.auth_data)?; + let plaintext_map = Self::deserialize_extensions(&opened.plaintext)?; + + for (i, plaintext) in plaintext_map { + if credentials_map.contains_key(&i) { + // Trying to set a credential that was already provided in the aad + return Err(InternalPakeError::IncompatibleEnvelopeCredentialsError); + } + credentials_map.insert(i, plaintext); + } + + Ok(OpenedEnvelopeECF { + credentials_map, + export_key: opened.export_key, + }) + } + /// Attempts to decrypt the envelope using a key, which is successful only if the key and /// aad used to construct the envelope are the same. - pub(crate) fn open(&self, key: &[u8], aad: &[u8]) -> Result { + pub(crate) fn open_raw( + &self, + key: &[u8], + aad: &[u8], + ) -> Result { let h = Hkdf::::new(Some(&self.nonce), &key); let mut okm = vec![0u8; self.ciphertext.len() + Self::hmac_key_size() + Self::export_key_size()]; @@ -205,8 +327,8 @@ mod tests { rng.fill_bytes(&mut msg); let (envelope, export_key_1) = - Envelope::::seal(&key, &msg, b"aad", &mut rng).unwrap(); - let opened_envelope = envelope.open(&key, b"aad").unwrap(); + Envelope::::seal_raw(&key, &msg, b"aad", &mut rng).unwrap(); + let opened_envelope = envelope.open_raw(&key, b"aad").unwrap(); assert_eq!(&msg.to_vec(), &opened_envelope.plaintext); assert_eq!(&export_key_1.to_vec(), &opened_envelope.export_key.to_vec()); } diff --git a/src/errors.rs b/src/errors.rs index b5b524b..359ad13 100644 --- a/src/errors.rs +++ b/src/errors.rs @@ -40,6 +40,9 @@ pub enum InternalPakeError { /// This error occurs when the envelope seal open hmac check fails /// HMAC check in seal open failed. SealOpenHmacError, + /// This error occurs when the envelope cannot be constructed properly + /// based on the credentials that were specified to be required. + IncompatibleEnvelopeCredentialsError, } /// Represents an error in password checking @@ -80,6 +83,9 @@ pub enum ProtocolError { /// This error occurs when the server answer cannot be handled /// Server response cannot be handled. ServerError, + /// This error occurs when the server specifies an envelope credentials + /// format that is invalid + ServerInvalidEnvelopeCredentialsFormatError, /// This error occurs when the client request cannot be handled /// Client request cannot be handled. ClientError, @@ -127,4 +133,19 @@ pub(crate) mod utils { } Ok(slice) } + + pub fn check_slice_size_atleast<'a>( + slice: &'a [u8], + expected_len: usize, + arg_name: &'static str, + ) -> Result<&'a [u8], InternalPakeError> { + if slice.len() < expected_len { + return Err(InternalPakeError::SizeError { + name: arg_name, + len: expected_len, + actual_len: slice.len(), + }); + } + Ok(slice) + } } diff --git a/src/opaque.rs b/src/opaque.rs index c704faf..b38ac5a 100644 --- a/src/opaque.rs +++ b/src/opaque.rs @@ -7,19 +7,25 @@ use crate::{ ciphersuite::CipherSuite, - envelope::{Envelope, ExportKeySize}, - errors::{utils::check_slice_size, InternalPakeError, PakeError, ProtocolError}, + envelope::{Envelope, EnvelopeCredentialsFormat, ExportKeySize}, + errors::{ + utils::{check_slice_size, check_slice_size_atleast}, + InternalPakeError, PakeError, ProtocolError, + }, group::Group, hash::Hash, key_exchange::traits::{KeyExchange, ToBytes}, keypair::{KeyPair, SizedBytes}, oprf, oprf::OprfClientBytes, - serialization::{serialize, tokenize, CredentialType, ProtocolMessageType}, + serialization::{ + serialize, tokenize, u8_to_credential_type, CredentialType, ProtocolMessageType, + }, slow_hash::SlowHash, }; use generic_array::{typenum::Unsigned, GenericArray}; use rand_core::{CryptoRng, RngCore}; +use std::collections::HashMap; use std::{convert::TryFrom, marker::PhantomData}; use zeroize::Zeroize; @@ -28,6 +34,8 @@ use zeroize::Zeroize; /// The message sent by the client to the server, to initiate registration pub struct RegisterFirstMessage { + /// User identity + id_u: Vec, /// blinded password information alpha: Grp, } @@ -35,42 +43,44 @@ pub struct RegisterFirstMessage { impl TryFrom<&[u8]> for RegisterFirstMessage { type Error = ProtocolError; fn try_from(first_message_bytes: &[u8]) -> Result { - let checked_slice = check_slice_size( - first_message_bytes, - Grp::ElemLen::to_usize(), - "first_message_bytes", - )?; + let elem_len = Grp::ElemLen::to_usize(); + let checked_slice = + check_slice_size_atleast(first_message_bytes, elem_len, "first_message_bytes")?; + + let id_u = checked_slice[..checked_slice.len() - elem_len].to_vec(); + // Check that the message is actually containing an element of the // correct subgroup - let arr = GenericArray::from_slice(checked_slice); + let arr = GenericArray::from_slice(&checked_slice[checked_slice.len() - elem_len..]); let alpha = Grp::from_element_slice(arr)?; - Ok(Self { alpha }) + Ok(Self { id_u, alpha }) } } impl RegisterFirstMessage { - /// byte representation for the registration request - fn to_bytes(&self) -> GenericArray { - self.alpha.to_arr() + /// Byte representation for the registration request + pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec { + [&self.id_u[..], &self.alpha.to_arr().to_vec()[..]].concat() } -} -impl RegisterFirstMessage { /// Serialization into bytes pub fn serialize(&self) -> Vec { let mut registration_request: Vec = Vec::new(); - registration_request.extend_from_slice(&serialize(Vec::new(), 2)); - registration_request.extend_from_slice(&serialize((&self.to_bytes()).to_vec(), 2)); + registration_request.extend_from_slice(&serialize(&self.id_u, 2)); + registration_request.extend_from_slice(&serialize(&self.alpha.to_arr(), 2)); let mut output: Vec = Vec::new(); output.push(ProtocolMessageType::from(self) as u8 + 1); - output.extend_from_slice(&serialize(registration_request, 3)); + output.extend_from_slice(&serialize(®istration_request, 3)); output } /// Deserialization from bytes pub fn deserialize(input: &[u8]) -> Result { - if input[0] != ProtocolMessageType::RegistrationRequest as u8 + 1 { + if input.is_empty() + || input.is_empty() + || input[0] != ProtocolMessageType::RegistrationRequest as u8 + 1 + { return Err(PakeError::SerializationError.into()); } @@ -79,14 +89,23 @@ impl RegisterFirstMessage { return Err(PakeError::SerializationError.into()); } - let (_, remainder) = tokenize(data, 2)?; + let (id_u, remainder) = tokenize(data, 2)?; let (alpha_bytes, remainder) = tokenize(remainder, 2)?; if !remainder.is_empty() { return Err(PakeError::SerializationError.into()); } - Self::try_from(&alpha_bytes[..]) + let checked_slice = check_slice_size( + &alpha_bytes, + Grp::ElemLen::to_usize(), + "first_message_bytes", + )?; + // Check that the message is actually containing an element of the + // correct subgroup + let arr = GenericArray::from_slice(checked_slice); + let alpha = Grp::from_element_slice(arr)?; + Ok(Self { id_u, alpha }) } } @@ -95,6 +114,10 @@ impl RegisterFirstMessage { pub struct RegisterSecondMessage { /// The server's oprf output beta: Grp, + /// Server's static public key + server_s_pk: Vec, + /// Envelope credentials format + ecf: EnvelopeCredentialsFormat, } impl TryFrom<&[u8]> for RegisterSecondMessage @@ -103,17 +126,25 @@ where { type Error = ProtocolError; - fn try_from(second_message_bytes: &[u8]) -> Result { - let checked_slice = check_slice_size( - second_message_bytes, - Grp::ElemLen::to_usize(), - "second_message_bytes", - )?; + fn try_from(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result { + let elem_len = Grp::ElemLen::to_usize(); + let checked_slice = check_slice_size_atleast(bytes, elem_len, "second_message_bytes")?; + // Check that the message is actually containing an element of the // correct subgroup - let arr = GenericArray::from_slice(&checked_slice); + let arr = GenericArray::from_slice(&checked_slice[..elem_len]); let beta = Grp::from_element_slice(arr)?; - Ok(Self { beta }) + + let server_s_pk = checked_slice[elem_len..].to_vec(); + + // Note that we use a default envelope credentials format here, since it + // is not included in the byte representation + let ecf = EnvelopeCredentialsFormat::default()?; + Ok(Self { + beta, + server_s_pk, + ecf, + }) } } @@ -121,30 +152,47 @@ impl RegisterSecondMessage where Grp: Group, { - /// byte representation for the registration response message - fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec { - self.beta.to_arr().to_vec() + /// Byte representation for the registration response message. This does not + /// include the envelope credentials format + pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec { + [&self.beta.to_arr().to_vec()[..], &self.server_s_pk[..]].concat() } /// Serialization into bytes pub fn serialize(&self) -> Vec { let mut registration_response: Vec = Vec::new(); - registration_response.extend_from_slice(&serialize((&self.to_bytes()).to_vec(), 2)); - registration_response.extend_from_slice(&serialize(Vec::new(), 2)); + registration_response.extend_from_slice(&serialize(&self.beta.to_arr(), 2)); + registration_response.extend_from_slice(&serialize(&self.server_s_pk, 2)); - // TODO: The following should not be hardcoded, but instead be customizable - registration_response.extend_from_slice(&[1u8, CredentialType::SkU as u8 + 1]); - registration_response.extend_from_slice(&[1u8, CredentialType::PkS as u8 + 1]); + // Handle ecf serialization + let secret_credentials: Vec = self + .ecf + .secret_credentials + .iter() + .map(|&x| x as u8 + 1) + .collect(); + let cleartext_credentials: Vec = self + .ecf + .cleartext_credentials + .iter() + .map(|&x| x as u8 + 1) + .collect(); + let ecf_serialized = [ + serialize(&secret_credentials, 1), + serialize(&cleartext_credentials, 1), + ] + .concat(); + registration_response.extend_from_slice(&ecf_serialized); let mut output: Vec = Vec::new(); output.push(ProtocolMessageType::from(self) as u8 + 1); - output.extend_from_slice(&serialize(registration_response, 3)); + output.extend_from_slice(&serialize(®istration_response, 3)); output } /// Deserialization from bytes pub fn deserialize(input: &[u8]) -> Result { - if input[0] != ProtocolMessageType::RegistrationResponse as u8 + 1 { + if input.is_empty() || input[0] != ProtocolMessageType::RegistrationResponse as u8 + 1 { return Err(PakeError::SerializationError.into()); } @@ -154,18 +202,39 @@ where } let (beta_bytes, remainder) = tokenize(data, 2)?; - let (_, remainder) = tokenize(remainder, 2)?; + let (server_s_pk, remainder) = tokenize(remainder, 2)?; - // TODO: The following should affect what is placed in the envelope rather than - // being ignored - let (_, remainder) = tokenize(remainder, 1)?; - let (_, remainder) = tokenize(remainder, 1)?; + // Handle ecf deserialization + let (secret_credentials, remainder) = tokenize(remainder, 1)?; + let (cleartext_credentials, remainder) = tokenize(remainder, 1)?; + let sc = secret_credentials + .iter() + .map(|x| u8_to_credential_type(*x).ok_or(PakeError::SerializationError)) + .collect::, _>>()?; + let cc = cleartext_credentials + .iter() + .map(|x| u8_to_credential_type(*x).ok_or(PakeError::SerializationError)) + .collect::, _>>()?; + let ecf = EnvelopeCredentialsFormat::new(sc, cc)?; if !remainder.is_empty() { return Err(PakeError::SerializationError.into()); } - Self::try_from(&beta_bytes[..]) + let checked_slice = check_slice_size( + &beta_bytes, + Grp::ElemLen::to_usize(), + "second_message_bytes", + )?; + // Check that the message is actually containing an element of the + // correct subgroup + let arr = GenericArray::from_slice(&checked_slice); + let beta = Grp::from_element_slice(arr)?; + Ok(Self { + ecf, + server_s_pk, + beta, + }) } } @@ -213,17 +282,17 @@ where pub fn serialize(&self) -> Vec { let mut registration_upload: Vec = Vec::new(); registration_upload.extend_from_slice(&self.envelope.serialize()); - registration_upload.extend_from_slice(&serialize(self.client_s_pk.to_arr().to_vec(), 2)); + registration_upload.extend_from_slice(&serialize(&self.client_s_pk.to_arr(), 2)); let mut output: Vec = Vec::new(); output.push(ProtocolMessageType::from(self) as u8 + 1); - output.extend_from_slice(&serialize(registration_upload, 3)); + output.extend_from_slice(&serialize(®istration_upload, 3)); output } /// Deserialization from bytes pub fn deserialize(input: &[u8]) -> Result { - if input[0] != ProtocolMessageType::RegistrationUpload as u8 + 1 { + if input.is_empty() || input[0] != ProtocolMessageType::RegistrationUpload as u8 + 1 { return Err(PakeError::SerializationError.into()); } @@ -248,6 +317,8 @@ where /// The message sent by the user to the server, to initiate registration pub struct LoginFirstMessage { + /// User identity + id_u: Vec, /// blinded password information alpha: CS::Group, ke1_message: >::KE1Message, @@ -256,27 +327,7 @@ pub struct LoginFirstMessage { impl TryFrom<&[u8]> for LoginFirstMessage { type Error = ProtocolError; fn try_from(first_message_bytes: &[u8]) -> Result { - let min_expected_len = ::ElemLen::to_usize(); - let checked_slice = (if first_message_bytes.len() <= min_expected_len { - Err(InternalPakeError::SizeError { - name: "first_message_bytes", - len: min_expected_len, - actual_len: first_message_bytes.len(), - }) - } else { - Ok(first_message_bytes) - })?; - // Check that the message is actually containing an element of the - // correct subgroup - let elem_len = ::ElemLen::to_usize(); - let arr = GenericArray::from_slice(&checked_slice[..elem_len]); - let alpha = CS::Group::from_element_slice(arr)?; - - let ke1_message = - >::KE1Message::try_from( - &checked_slice[elem_len..], - )?; - Ok(Self { alpha, ke1_message }) + Self::deserialize(first_message_bytes) } } @@ -289,33 +340,46 @@ impl LoginFirstMessage { /// Serialization into bytes pub fn serialize(&self) -> Vec { let mut credential_request: Vec = Vec::new(); - credential_request.extend_from_slice(&serialize(Vec::new(), 2)); - credential_request.extend_from_slice(&serialize((&self.alpha.to_arr()).to_vec(), 2)); + credential_request.extend_from_slice(&serialize(&self.id_u, 2)); + credential_request.extend_from_slice(&serialize(&self.alpha.to_arr(), 2)); let mut output: Vec = Vec::new(); output.push(ProtocolMessageType::from(self) as u8 + 1); - output.extend_from_slice(&serialize(credential_request, 3)); + output.extend_from_slice(&serialize(&credential_request, 3)); output.extend_from_slice(&self.ke1_message.to_bytes()); output } /// Deserialization from bytes pub fn deserialize(input: &[u8]) -> Result { - if input[0] != ProtocolMessageType::CredentialRequest as u8 + 1 { + if input.is_empty() || input[0] != ProtocolMessageType::CredentialRequest as u8 + 1 { return Err(PakeError::SerializationError.into()); } let (data, ke1m) = tokenize(input[1..].to_vec(), 3)?; - let (_, remainder) = tokenize(data, 2)?; + let (id_u, remainder) = tokenize(data, 2)?; let (alpha_bytes, remainder) = tokenize(remainder, 2)?; if !remainder.is_empty() { return Err(PakeError::SerializationError.into()); } - let concatenated = [&alpha_bytes[..], &ke1m[..]].concat(); - Self::try_from(&concatenated[..]) + let elem_len = ::ElemLen::to_usize(); + let checked_slice = check_slice_size(&alpha_bytes, elem_len, "login_first_message_bytes")?; + let arr = GenericArray::from_slice(&checked_slice[..elem_len]); + let alpha = ::from_element_slice(arr)?; + + let ke1_message = + >::KE1Message::try_from( + &ke1m[..], + )?; + + Ok(Self { + id_u, + alpha, + ke1_message, + }) } } @@ -333,28 +397,25 @@ impl LoginSecondMessage { /// Serialization into bytes pub fn serialize(&self) -> Vec { let mut credential_response: Vec = Vec::new(); - credential_response.extend_from_slice(&serialize((&self.beta.to_arr()).to_vec(), 2)); - credential_response.extend_from_slice(&serialize((&self.envelope.to_bytes()).to_vec(), 2)); - credential_response.extend_from_slice(&serialize(Vec::new(), 2)); + credential_response.extend_from_slice(&serialize(&self.beta.to_arr(), 2)); + credential_response.extend_from_slice(&serialize(&self.envelope.to_bytes(), 2)); let mut output: Vec = Vec::new(); output.push(ProtocolMessageType::from(self) as u8 + 1); - output.extend_from_slice(&serialize(credential_response, 3)); + output.extend_from_slice(&serialize(&credential_response, 3)); output.extend_from_slice(&self.ke2_message.to_bytes()); output } /// Deserialization from bytes pub fn deserialize(input: &[u8]) -> Result { - if input[0] != ProtocolMessageType::CredentialResponse as u8 + 1 { + if input.is_empty() || input[0] != ProtocolMessageType::CredentialResponse as u8 + 1 { return Err(PakeError::SerializationError.into()); } let (data, ke2m) = tokenize(input[1..].to_vec(), 3)?; - let (beta_bytes, remainder) = tokenize(data, 2)?; let (envelope_bytes, remainder) = tokenize(remainder, 2)?; - let (_, remainder) = tokenize(remainder, 2)?; if !remainder.is_empty() { return Err(PakeError::SerializationError.into()); @@ -368,15 +429,9 @@ impl LoginSecondMessage { impl TryFrom<&[u8]> for LoginSecondMessage { type Error = ProtocolError; fn try_from(second_message_bytes: &[u8]) -> Result { - let key_len = <::Repr as SizedBytes>::Len::to_usize(); - let envelope_size = key_len + Envelope::::additional_size(); let elem_len = ::ElemLen::to_usize(); - let ke2_message_size = CS::KeyExchange::ke2_message_size(); - let checked_slice = check_slice_size( - second_message_bytes, - elem_len + envelope_size + ke2_message_size, - "login_second_message_bytes", - )?; + let checked_slice = + check_slice_size_atleast(second_message_bytes, elem_len, "login_second_message_bytes")?; // Check that the message is actually containing an element of the // correct subgroup @@ -384,12 +439,14 @@ impl TryFrom<&[u8]> for LoginSecondMessage { let arr = GenericArray::from_slice(beta_bytes); let beta = CS::Group::from_element_slice(arr)?; - let envelope = - Envelope::::from_bytes(&checked_slice[elem_len..elem_len + envelope_size])?; + let (envelope, remainder) = Envelope::::deserialize(&checked_slice[elem_len..])?; + let ke2_message_size = CS::KeyExchange::ke2_message_size(); + let checked_remainder = + check_slice_size_atleast(&remainder, ke2_message_size, "login_second_message_bytes")?; let ke2_message = >::KE2Message::try_from( - &checked_slice[elem_len + envelope_size..], + &checked_remainder, )?; Ok(Self { @@ -417,6 +474,14 @@ impl TryFrom<&[u8]> for LoginThirdMessage { } impl LoginThirdMessage { + /// Serialization into bytes + pub fn serialize(&self) -> Vec { + let mut output: Vec = Vec::new(); + output.push(ProtocolMessageType::from(self) as u8 + 1); + output.extend_from_slice(&self.ke3_message.to_bytes()); + output + } + /// byte representation for the login finalization pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec { self.ke3_message.to_bytes() @@ -428,6 +493,10 @@ impl LoginThirdMessage { /// The state elements the client holds to register itself pub struct ClientRegistration { + /// User identity + id_u: Vec, + /// Server identity + id_s: Vec, /// a blinding factor pub(crate) blinding_factor: ::Scalar, /// the client's password @@ -436,7 +505,10 @@ pub struct ClientRegistration { impl TryFrom<&[u8]> for ClientRegistration { type Error = ProtocolError; - fn try_from(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result { + fn try_from(input: &[u8]) -> Result { + let (id_u, bytes) = tokenize(input.to_vec(), 2)?; + let (id_s, bytes) = tokenize(bytes.to_vec(), 2)?; + let min_expected_len = ::ScalarLen::to_usize(); let checked_slice = (if bytes.len() <= min_expected_len { Err(InternalPakeError::SizeError { @@ -455,6 +527,8 @@ impl TryFrom<&[u8]> for ClientRegistration { let blinding_factor = CS::Group::from_scalar_slice(blinding_factor_bytes)?; let password = checked_slice[scalar_len..].to_vec(); Ok(Self { + id_u, + id_s, blinding_factor, password, }) @@ -465,6 +539,8 @@ impl ClientRegistration { /// byte representation for the client's registration state pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec { let output: Vec = [ + &serialize(&self.id_u, 2), + &serialize(&self.id_s, 2), &CS::Group::scalar_as_bytes(&self.blinding_factor)[..], &self.password, ] @@ -502,6 +578,23 @@ impl ClientRegistration { password: &[u8], pepper: Option<&[u8]>, blinding_factor_rng: &mut R, + ) -> Result<(RegisterFirstMessage, Self), ProtocolError> { + Self::start_with_user_and_server_name( + &Vec::new(), + &Vec::new(), + password, + pepper, + blinding_factor_rng, + ) + } + + /// Same as ClientRegistration::start, but also accepts a username and server name as input + pub fn start_with_user_and_server_name( + user_name: &[u8], + server_name: &[u8], + password: &[u8], + pepper: Option<&[u8]>, + blinding_factor_rng: &mut R, ) -> Result<(RegisterFirstMessage, Self), ProtocolError> { let OprfClientBytes { alpha, @@ -509,8 +602,13 @@ impl ClientRegistration { } = oprf::generate_oprf1::(&password, pepper, blinding_factor_rng)?; Ok(( - RegisterFirstMessage:: { alpha }, + RegisterFirstMessage:: { + id_u: user_name.to_vec(), + alpha, + }, Self { + id_u: user_name.to_vec(), + id_s: server_name.to_vec(), blinding_factor, password: password.to_vec(), }, @@ -561,6 +659,17 @@ impl ClientRegistration { r2: RegisterSecondMessage, server_s_pk: &::Repr, rng: &mut R, + ) -> Result, ProtocolError> { + let mut r2_cloned = r2; + r2_cloned.server_s_pk = server_s_pk.to_arr().to_vec(); + self.finish_using_transmitted_server_public_key(r2_cloned, rng) + } + + /// Same as finish, but without the server public key check + pub fn finish_using_transmitted_server_public_key( + self, + r2: RegisterSecondMessage, + rng: &mut R, ) -> Result, ProtocolError> { let client_static_keypair = CS::KeyFormat::generate_random(rng)?; @@ -570,12 +679,21 @@ impl ClientRegistration { &self.blinding_factor, )?; - let (envelope, export_key) = Envelope::::seal( - &password_derived_key, - &client_static_keypair.private().to_arr(), - &server_s_pk.to_arr(), - rng, - )?; + let mut credentials_map: HashMap> = HashMap::new(); + credentials_map.insert( + CredentialType::SkU, + client_static_keypair.private().to_arr().to_vec(), + ); + credentials_map.insert( + CredentialType::PkU, + client_static_keypair.public().to_arr().to_vec(), + ); + credentials_map.insert(CredentialType::PkS, r2.server_s_pk); + credentials_map.insert(CredentialType::IdU, self.id_u.clone()); + credentials_map.insert(CredentialType::IdS, self.id_s.clone()); + + let (envelope, export_key) = + Envelope::::seal(&password_derived_key, r2.ecf, credentials_map, rng)?; Ok(( RegisterThirdMessage { @@ -632,36 +750,36 @@ where >: generic_array::ArrayLength, { type Error = ProtocolError; - fn try_from(server_registration_bytes: &[u8]) -> Result { - let key_len = <::Repr as SizedBytes>::Len::to_usize(); - let scalar_len = ::ScalarLen::to_usize(); - let envelope_size = key_len + Envelope::::additional_size(); - if server_registration_bytes.len() == scalar_len { + /// The format of a serialized ServerRegistration object: + /// oprf_key | client_s_pk | envelope + fn try_from(input: &[u8]) -> Result { + let scalar_len = ::ScalarLen::to_usize(); + if input.len() == scalar_len { return Ok(Self { - oprf_key: CS::Group::from_scalar_slice(GenericArray::from_slice( - server_registration_bytes, - ))?, + oprf_key: CS::Group::from_scalar_slice(GenericArray::from_slice(input))?, client_s_pk: None, envelope: None, }); } - let checked_bytes = check_slice_size( - server_registration_bytes, - envelope_size + key_len + scalar_len, - "server_registration_bytes", - )?; + // Need to do this check manually because envelope is variable-size + let key_len = <::Repr as SizedBytes>::Len::to_usize(); + + let checked_bytes = + check_slice_size_atleast(&input, scalar_len + key_len, "server_registration_bytes")?; + let oprf_key_bytes = GenericArray::from_slice(&checked_bytes[..scalar_len]); let oprf_key = CS::Group::from_scalar_slice(oprf_key_bytes)?; let unchecked_client_s_pk = ::Repr::from_bytes( &checked_bytes[scalar_len..scalar_len + key_len], )?; let client_s_pk = CS::KeyFormat::check_public_key(unchecked_client_s_pk)?; + + let envelope = Envelope::::from_bytes(&checked_bytes[scalar_len + key_len..])?; + Ok(Self { - envelope: Some(Envelope::::from_bytes( - &checked_bytes[checked_bytes.len() - envelope_size..], - )?), + envelope: Some(envelope), client_s_pk: Some(client_s_pk), oprf_key, }) @@ -720,6 +838,30 @@ where pub fn start( message: RegisterFirstMessage, rng: &mut R, + ) -> Result<(RegisterSecondMessage, Self), ProtocolError> { + Self::start_with_server_pk(message, &Vec::new(), rng) + } + + /// Same as start, but with the ability to supply a server_s_pk as input + pub fn start_with_server_pk( + message: RegisterFirstMessage, + server_s_pk: &[u8], + rng: &mut R, + ) -> Result<(RegisterSecondMessage, Self), ProtocolError> { + Self::start_with_server_pk_and_ecf( + message, + server_s_pk, + EnvelopeCredentialsFormat::default()?, + rng, + ) + } + + /// Same as start, but with the ability to supply a server_s_pk as input and envelope credentials format + pub fn start_with_server_pk_and_ecf( + message: RegisterFirstMessage, + server_s_pk: &[u8], + ecf: EnvelopeCredentialsFormat, + rng: &mut R, ) -> Result<(RegisterSecondMessage, Self), ProtocolError> { // RFC: generate oprf_key (salt) and v_u = g^oprf_key let oprf_key = CS::Group::random_scalar(rng); @@ -728,7 +870,11 @@ where let beta = oprf::generate_oprf2::(message.alpha, &oprf_key)?; Ok(( - RegisterSecondMessage { beta }, + RegisterSecondMessage { + beta, + server_s_pk: server_s_pk.to_vec(), + ecf, + }, Self { envelope: None, client_s_pk: None, @@ -786,6 +932,10 @@ where /// The state elements the client holds to perform a login pub struct ClientLogin { + /// User identity + id_u: Vec, + /// Server identity + id_s: Vec, /// A blinding factor, which is used to mask (and unmask) secret /// information before transmission blinding_factor: ::Scalar, @@ -796,7 +946,10 @@ pub struct ClientLogin { impl TryFrom<&[u8]> for ClientLogin { type Error = ProtocolError; - fn try_from(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result { + fn try_from(input: &[u8]) -> Result { + let (id_u, bytes) = tokenize(input.to_vec(), 2)?; + let (id_s, bytes) = tokenize(bytes.to_vec(), 2)?; + let scalar_len = ::ScalarLen::to_usize(); let ke1_state_size = >::ke1_state_size(); @@ -809,7 +962,7 @@ impl TryFrom<&[u8]> for ClientLogin { actual_len: bytes.len(), }) } else { - Ok(bytes) + Ok(bytes.clone()) })?; let blinding_factor_bytes = GenericArray::from_slice(&checked_slice[..scalar_len]); @@ -820,6 +973,8 @@ impl TryFrom<&[u8]> for ClientLogin { )?; let password = bytes[scalar_len + ke1_state_size..].to_vec(); Ok(Self { + id_u, + id_s, blinding_factor, password, ke1_state, @@ -831,6 +986,8 @@ impl ClientLogin { /// byte representation for the client's login state pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec { let output: Vec = [ + &serialize(&self.id_u, 2), + &serialize(&self.id_s, 2), &CS::Group::scalar_as_bytes(&self.blinding_factor)[..], &self.ke1_state.to_bytes(), &self.password, @@ -875,6 +1032,17 @@ impl ClientLogin { password: &[u8], pepper: Option<&[u8]>, rng: &mut R, + ) -> Result<(LoginFirstMessage, Self), ProtocolError> { + Self::start_with_user_and_server_name(&Vec::new(), &Vec::new(), password, pepper, rng) + } + + /// Same as start, but allows the user to supply a username and server name + pub fn start_with_user_and_server_name( + user_name: &[u8], + server_name: &[u8], + password: &[u8], + pepper: Option<&[u8]>, + rng: &mut R, ) -> Result<(LoginFirstMessage, Self), ProtocolError> { let OprfClientBytes { alpha, @@ -883,11 +1051,17 @@ impl ClientLogin { let (ke1_state, ke1_message) = CS::KeyExchange::generate_ke1(alpha.to_arr().to_vec(), rng)?; - let l1 = LoginFirstMessage { alpha, ke1_message }; + let l1 = LoginFirstMessage { + id_u: user_name.to_vec(), + alpha, + ke1_message, + }; Ok(( l1, Self { + id_u: user_name.to_vec(), + id_s: server_name.to_vec(), blinding_factor, password: password.to_vec(), ke1_state, @@ -933,7 +1107,7 @@ impl ClientLogin { pub fn finish( self, l2: LoginSecondMessage, - server_s_pk: &<::KeyFormat as KeyPair>::Repr, + _server_s_pk: &<::KeyFormat as KeyPair>::Repr, _client_e_sk_rng: &mut R, ) -> Result, ProtocolError> { let l2_bytes: Vec = [&l2.beta.to_arr()[..], &l2.envelope.to_bytes()].concat(); @@ -946,7 +1120,7 @@ impl ClientLogin { let opened_envelope = &l2 .envelope - .open(&password_derived_key, &server_s_pk.to_arr()) + .open(&password_derived_key) .map_err(|e| match e { InternalPakeError::SealOpenHmacError => PakeError::InvalidLoginError, err => PakeError::from(err), @@ -956,8 +1130,12 @@ impl ClientLogin { l2_bytes, l2.ke2_message, &self.ke1_state, - server_s_pk.clone(), - ::Repr::from_bytes(&opened_envelope.plaintext)?, + ::Repr::from_bytes( + &opened_envelope.credentials_map[&CredentialType::PkS], + )?, + ::Repr::from_bytes( + &opened_envelope.credentials_map[&CredentialType::SkU], + )?, )?; Ok(( diff --git a/src/serialization/mod.rs b/src/serialization/mod.rs index 97f5e95..261e589 100644 --- a/src/serialization/mod.rs +++ b/src/serialization/mod.rs @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ // // This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the // LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree. + use crate::errors::PakeError; use crate::{ @@ -9,8 +10,8 @@ use crate::{ hash::Hash, keypair::KeyPair, opaque::{ - LoginFirstMessage, LoginSecondMessage, RegisterFirstMessage, RegisterSecondMessage, - RegisterThirdMessage, + LoginFirstMessage, LoginSecondMessage, LoginThirdMessage, RegisterFirstMessage, + RegisterSecondMessage, RegisterThirdMessage, }, }; @@ -20,9 +21,10 @@ pub enum ProtocolMessageType { RegistrationUpload, CredentialRequest, CredentialResponse, + KeyExchange, } -#[allow(dead_code)] +#[derive(Copy, Clone, Eq, Hash, PartialEq)] pub enum CredentialType { SkU, PkU, @@ -31,6 +33,17 @@ pub enum CredentialType { IdS, } +pub(crate) fn u8_to_credential_type(x: u8) -> Option { + match x { + 1 => Some(CredentialType::SkU), + 2 => Some(CredentialType::PkU), + 3 => Some(CredentialType::PkS), + 4 => Some(CredentialType::IdU), + 5 => Some(CredentialType::IdS), + _ => None, + } +} + impl From<&RegisterFirstMessage> for ProtocolMessageType { fn from(_mt: &RegisterFirstMessage) -> Self { ProtocolMessageType::RegistrationRequest @@ -61,7 +74,13 @@ impl From<&LoginSecondMessage> for ProtocolMessageType { } } -pub(crate) fn serialize(input: Vec, max_bytes: usize) -> Vec { +impl From<&LoginThirdMessage> for ProtocolMessageType { + fn from(_mt: &LoginThirdMessage) -> Self { + ProtocolMessageType::KeyExchange + } +} + +pub(crate) fn serialize(input: &[u8], max_bytes: usize) -> Vec { let mut output: Vec = Vec::new(); output.extend_from_slice(&input.len().to_be_bytes()[8 - max_bytes..]); output.extend_from_slice(&input[..]); @@ -69,7 +88,7 @@ pub(crate) fn serialize(input: Vec, max_bytes: usize) -> Vec { } pub(crate) fn tokenize(input: Vec, size_bytes: usize) -> Result<(Vec, Vec), PakeError> { - if size_bytes > 8 { + if size_bytes > 8 || input.len() < size_bytes { return Err(PakeError::SerializationError); } diff --git a/src/serialization/tests.rs b/src/serialization/tests.rs index c7221ec..8b73877 100644 --- a/src/serialization/tests.rs +++ b/src/serialization/tests.rs @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ // // This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the // LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree. + use crate::{ ciphersuite::CipherSuite, envelope::Envelope, @@ -12,10 +13,10 @@ use crate::{ }, keypair::{KeyPair, SizedBytes, X25519KeyPair}, opaque::*, + serialization::{serialize, ProtocolMessageType}, }; use curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoPoint; -use generic_array::typenum::Unsigned; use proptest::{collection::vec, prelude::*}; use rand_core::{OsRng, RngCore}; @@ -31,6 +32,8 @@ impl CipherSuite for Default { type SlowHash = crate::slow_hash::NoOpHash; } +const MAX_ID_LENGTH: usize = 10; + fn random_ristretto_point() -> RistrettoPoint { let mut rng = OsRng; let mut random_bits = [0u8; 64]; @@ -50,8 +53,21 @@ fn client_registration_roundtrip() { let pw = b"hunter2"; let mut rng = OsRng; let sc = ::random_scalar(&mut rng); - // serialization order: scalar, password - let bytes: Vec = [&sc.as_bytes()[..], &pw[..]].concat(); + let id_u_length: usize = rng.gen_range(0, MAX_ID_LENGTH); + let id_s_length: usize = rng.gen_range(0, MAX_ID_LENGTH); + let mut id_u = [0u8; MAX_ID_LENGTH]; + rng.fill_bytes(&mut id_u); + let mut id_s = [0u8; MAX_ID_LENGTH]; + rng.fill_bytes(&mut id_s); + + // serialization order: id_u, id_s, scalar, password + let bytes: Vec = [ + &serialize(&id_u[..id_u_length], 2)[..], + &serialize(&id_s[..id_s_length], 2)[..], + &sc.as_bytes()[..], + &pw[..], + ] + .concat(); let reg = ClientRegistration::::try_from(&bytes[..]).unwrap(); let reg_bytes = reg.to_bytes(); assert_eq!(reg_bytes, bytes); @@ -62,24 +78,28 @@ fn server_registration_roundtrip() { // If we don't have envelope and client_pk, the server registration just // contains the prf key let mut rng = OsRng; - let sc = ::random_scalar(&mut rng); + let oprf_key = ::random_scalar(&mut rng); let mut oprf_bytes: Vec = vec![]; - oprf_bytes.extend_from_slice(sc.as_bytes()); + oprf_bytes.extend_from_slice(oprf_key.as_bytes()); let reg = ServerRegistration::::try_from(&oprf_bytes[..]).unwrap(); let reg_bytes = reg.to_bytes(); assert_eq!(reg_bytes, oprf_bytes); // If we do have envelope and client pk, the server registration contains // the whole kit - let key_len = - <<::KeyFormat as KeyPair>::Repr as SizedBytes>::Len::to_usize(); - let envelope_size = key_len + Envelope::::additional_size(); - let mut mock_envelope_bytes = vec![0u8; envelope_size]; - rng.fill_bytes(&mut mock_envelope_bytes); - println!("{}", mock_envelope_bytes.len()); + + // Construct a mock envelope + let mut mock_envelope_bytes = Vec::new(); + mock_envelope_bytes.extend_from_slice(&[0; NONCE_LEN]); // empty nonce + mock_envelope_bytes.extend_from_slice(&[0, 0]); // empty ciphertext + mock_envelope_bytes.extend_from_slice(&[0, 0]); // empty auth_data + // length-32 hmac + mock_envelope_bytes.extend_from_slice(&[0, 32]); + mock_envelope_bytes.extend_from_slice(&[0; 32]); + let mock_client_kp = Default::generate_random_keypair(&mut rng).unwrap(); - // serialization order: scalar, public key, envelope + // serialization order: oprf_key, public key, envelope let mut bytes = Vec::::new(); - bytes.extend_from_slice(sc.as_bytes()); + bytes.extend_from_slice(oprf_key.as_bytes()); bytes.extend_from_slice(&mock_client_kp.public().to_arr()); bytes.extend_from_slice(&mock_envelope_bytes); let reg = ServerRegistration::::try_from(&bytes[..]).unwrap(); @@ -91,10 +111,21 @@ fn server_registration_roundtrip() { fn register_first_message_roundtrip() { let pt = random_ristretto_point(); let pt_bytes = pt.to_arr().to_vec(); - let header = [1, 0, 0, 36, 0, 0, 0, 32]; + + let mut rng = OsRng; + let id_length: usize = rng.gen_range(0, MAX_ID_LENGTH); + let mut id = [0u8; MAX_ID_LENGTH]; + rng.fill_bytes(&mut id); + + let alpha_length: usize = 32; + let total_length: usize = alpha_length + id_length + 4; let mut input = Vec::new(); - input.extend_from_slice(&header); + input.extend_from_slice(&[ProtocolMessageType::RegistrationRequest as u8 + 1]); + input.extend_from_slice(&total_length.to_be_bytes()[8 - 3..]); + input.extend_from_slice(&id_length.to_be_bytes()[8 - 2..]); + input.extend_from_slice(&id[..id_length]); + input.extend_from_slice(&alpha_length.to_be_bytes()[8 - 2..]); input.extend_from_slice(pt_bytes.as_slice()); let r1 = RegisterFirstMessage::::deserialize(input.as_slice()).unwrap(); @@ -105,14 +136,24 @@ fn register_first_message_roundtrip() { #[test] fn register_second_message_roundtrip() { let pt = random_ristretto_point(); - let pt_bytes = pt.to_arr(); - let header = [2, 0, 0, 40, 0, 32]; - let tail = [0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 3]; + let beta_bytes = pt.to_arr(); + let mut rng = OsRng; + let skp = Default::generate_random_keypair(&mut rng).unwrap(); + let pubkey_bytes = skp.public().to_arr(); + let credential_types = [1, 1, 1, 3]; + + let beta_length: usize = beta_bytes.len(); + let pubkey_length: usize = pubkey_bytes.len(); + let total_length: usize = beta_length + pubkey_length + credential_types.len() + 4; let mut input = Vec::new(); - input.extend_from_slice(&header); - input.extend_from_slice(pt_bytes.as_slice()); - input.extend_from_slice(&tail); + input.extend_from_slice(&[ProtocolMessageType::RegistrationResponse as u8 + 1]); + input.extend_from_slice(&total_length.to_be_bytes()[8 - 3..]); + input.extend_from_slice(&beta_length.to_be_bytes()[8 - 2..]); + input.extend_from_slice(beta_bytes.as_slice()); + input.extend_from_slice(&pubkey_length.to_be_bytes()[8 - 2..]); + input.extend_from_slice(&pubkey_bytes.as_slice()); + input.extend_from_slice(&credential_types); let r2 = RegisterSecondMessage::::deserialize(input.as_slice()).unwrap(); let r2_bytes = r2.serialize(); @@ -125,9 +166,6 @@ fn register_third_message_roundtrip() { let skp = Default::generate_random_keypair(&mut rng).unwrap(); let pubkey_bytes = skp.public().to_arr(); - let header = [3, 0, 0, 136]; - let intermediate = [0, 32]; - let mut key = [0u8; 32]; rng.fill_bytes(&mut key); @@ -135,12 +173,17 @@ fn register_third_message_roundtrip() { rng.fill_bytes(&mut msg); let (envelope, _) = - Envelope::::seal(&key, &msg, &pubkey_bytes, &mut rng).unwrap(); + Envelope::::seal_raw(&key, &msg, &pubkey_bytes, &mut rng).unwrap(); + let envelope_bytes = envelope.serialize(); + + let pubkey_length: usize = pubkey_bytes.len(); + let total_length: usize = pubkey_length + envelope_bytes.len() + 2; let mut input = Vec::new(); - input.extend_from_slice(&header); - input.extend_from_slice(&envelope.serialize()); - input.extend_from_slice(&intermediate); + input.extend_from_slice(&[ProtocolMessageType::RegistrationUpload as u8 + 1]); + input.extend_from_slice(&total_length.to_be_bytes()[8 - 3..]); + input.extend_from_slice(&envelope_bytes); + input.extend_from_slice(&pubkey_length.to_be_bytes()[8 - 2..]); input.extend_from_slice(&pubkey_bytes[..]); let r3 = RegisterThirdMessage::::deserialize(&input[..]).unwrap(); @@ -150,11 +193,12 @@ fn register_third_message_roundtrip() { #[test] fn login_first_message_roundtrip() { - let pt = random_ristretto_point(); - let pt_bytes = pt.to_arr().to_vec(); - let header = [4, 0, 0, 36, 0, 0, 0, 32]; - let mut rng = OsRng; + let alpha = random_ristretto_point(); + let alpha_bytes = alpha.to_arr().to_vec(); + let id_length: usize = rng.gen_range(0, MAX_ID_LENGTH); + let mut id = [0u8; MAX_ID_LENGTH]; + rng.fill_bytes(&mut id); let client_e_kp = Default::generate_random_keypair(&mut rng).unwrap(); let mut client_nonce = [0u8; NONCE_LEN]; @@ -162,9 +206,16 @@ fn login_first_message_roundtrip() { let ke1m: Vec = [&client_nonce[..], &client_e_kp.public()].concat(); + let alpha_length = alpha_bytes.len(); + let total_length_without_ke1m: usize = id_length + alpha_length + 4; + let mut input = Vec::new(); - input.extend_from_slice(&header); - input.extend_from_slice(pt_bytes.as_slice()); + input.extend_from_slice(&[ProtocolMessageType::CredentialRequest as u8 + 1]); + input.extend_from_slice(&total_length_without_ke1m.to_be_bytes()[8 - 3..]); + input.extend_from_slice(&id_length.to_be_bytes()[8 - 2..]); + input.extend_from_slice(&id[..id_length]); + input.extend_from_slice(&alpha_length.to_be_bytes()[8 - 2..]); + input.extend_from_slice(&alpha_bytes); input.extend_from_slice(&ke1m[..]); let l1 = LoginFirstMessage::::deserialize(input.as_slice()).unwrap(); @@ -176,15 +227,11 @@ fn login_first_message_roundtrip() { fn login_second_message_roundtrip() { let pt = random_ristretto_point(); let pt_bytes = pt.to_arr().to_vec(); - let header = [5, 0, 0, 134, 0, 32]; let mut rng = OsRng; let skp = Default::generate_random_keypair(&mut rng).unwrap(); let pubkey_bytes = skp.public().to_arr(); - let intermediate1 = [0, 96]; - let intermediate2 = [0, 0]; - let mut key = [0u8; 32]; rng.fill_bytes(&mut key); @@ -192,7 +239,7 @@ fn login_second_message_roundtrip() { rng.fill_bytes(&mut msg); let (envelope, _) = - Envelope::::seal(&key, &msg, &pubkey_bytes, &mut rng).unwrap(); + Envelope::::seal_raw(&key, &msg, &pubkey_bytes, &mut rng).unwrap(); let server_e_kp = Default::generate_random_keypair(&mut rng).unwrap(); let mut mac = [0u8; 32]; @@ -202,15 +249,18 @@ fn login_second_message_roundtrip() { let ke2m: Vec = [&server_nonce[..], &server_e_kp.public(), &mac[..]].concat(); + let total_length_without_ke2m: usize = pt_bytes.len() + envelope.to_bytes().len() + 4; + let mut input = Vec::new(); - input.extend_from_slice(&header); + input.extend_from_slice(&[ProtocolMessageType::CredentialResponse as u8 + 1]); + input.extend_from_slice(&total_length_without_ke2m.to_be_bytes()[8 - 3..]); + input.extend_from_slice(&pt_bytes.len().to_be_bytes()[8 - 2..]); input.extend_from_slice(pt_bytes.as_slice()); - input.extend_from_slice(&intermediate1[..]); + input.extend_from_slice(&envelope.to_bytes().len().to_be_bytes()[8 - 2..]); input.extend_from_slice(&envelope.to_bytes()); - input.extend_from_slice(&intermediate2[..]); input.extend_from_slice(&ke2m[..]); - let l2 = LoginSecondMessage::::deserialize(input.as_slice()).unwrap(); + let l2 = LoginSecondMessage::::deserialize(&input).unwrap(); let l2_bytes = l2.serialize(); assert_eq!(input, l2_bytes); } @@ -219,6 +269,13 @@ fn login_second_message_roundtrip() { fn client_login_roundtrip() { let pw = b"hunter2"; let mut rng = OsRng; + let id_u_length: usize = rng.gen_range(0, MAX_ID_LENGTH); + let id_s_length: usize = rng.gen_range(0, MAX_ID_LENGTH); + let mut id_u = [0u8; MAX_ID_LENGTH]; + rng.fill_bytes(&mut id_u); + let mut id_s = [0u8; MAX_ID_LENGTH]; + rng.fill_bytes(&mut id_s); + let sc = ::random_scalar(&mut rng); let client_e_kp = Default::generate_random_keypair(&mut rng).unwrap(); @@ -230,8 +287,10 @@ fn client_login_roundtrip() { hasher.update(l1_data); let hashed_l1 = hasher.finalize(); - // serialization order: scalar, password, ke1_state + // serialization order: id_u, id_s, scalar, password, ke1_state let bytes: Vec = [ + &serialize(&id_u[..id_u_length], 2)[..], + &serialize(&id_s[..id_s_length], 2)[..], &sc.as_bytes()[..], &pw[..], client_e_kp.public(), diff --git a/src/tests/opaque_ke_test.rs b/src/tests/opaque_ke_test.rs index 56be884..3d1cfeb 100644 --- a/src/tests/opaque_ke_test.rs +++ b/src/tests/opaque_ke_test.rs @@ -64,35 +64,35 @@ pub struct TestVectorParameters { static TEST_VECTOR: &str = r#" { - "client_s_pk": "b2341df425f90244c72d8e19b249ca0d6d1a3a3dfe6ee1773e1b782a81efef29", - "client_s_sk": "701e8cd1263abd2f2a22d4dc94b1d5fe3c9cb14030e7e7c154745825b059fd7f", - "client_e_pk": "97cb1eb93a69542597517b110ccca457d5ce8d8bfcbfb2a9258bb7b4bd7f716e", - "client_e_sk": "80616968ed8daae02c02d3ba41a70104ed0deecd2276e058994d601a1351b359", - "server_s_pk": "e12d737e520eaf8504fbf302c2945011bff360bdf02ee102f2ebd6a883c80e02", - "server_s_sk": "9075d3d3c5b6bc2f6218e7672c0532c619ce09dddf196006c5ffdaf628a3d760", - "server_e_pk": "f73d27d7ca78ded52209bc3bae000f9d95b147360edac1e97c148a3a7396a279", - "server_e_sk": "a0e59a07908fc793c590fd83343003a54330e24af908ed31c921e6e6504c3248", + "client_s_pk": "db67c19dde3ff9df4226c638056bf740811d6136b41d81a9995a29d8ae4da74a", + "client_s_sk": "c0580c0dcfba5b38e3bf7dd110bd5025c319678b30c8baecaf9c2ef3c959f253", + "client_e_pk": "c3a4413191704cbe3ee1cc8293a565e260a3cbadfdb091bc00e953b33883c363", + "client_e_sk": "18be455fafb4cbe97a7531c2fc4ff2ce9b7bfc0119b0fcd7660443ddd0ec4068", + "server_s_pk": "2d3e373aaa1b3fb0df397789b671ca33f1b880bcc5ebc89b9e390b5ebb720e1d", + "server_s_sk": "48bb316e50d6c93a6d4a95eba0652ab147eb422c7207bc780ebd47f952a8f164", + "server_e_pk": "6bcb8d80d0fcf242e4ed4d414375d66a696d1bfe220af29681c89835444b9d7b", + "server_e_sk": "b88df6767ae031eb77be76b66ad467bea6ff26a41db963ff3b4db81ed6c72452", "password": "70617373776f7264", - "blinding_factor_raw": "ca2d8ae51794579bd0f46044d7daccf222b4590053536b48575bc169f7478fd0a0b580fb0aae948c26ba403a2e7b98f563e434a0aad93f4105419c474453c34e", - "blinding_factor": "5a9a073b1a1efedebdb404bc073ae74b316920d68ab628bed0c500cae95d6e02", + "blinding_factor_raw": "7235ed80e9335579c8fbda9e61e8c92358b53267f33d14002cf1ee8e4a452190706c642cda5611d54aba2d8aebe91c20d230ce350d6bc76ccde2bbe3c3b38af3", + "blinding_factor": "ccfacfd5e65693b9ea7b1bbe8c61d83e20bc67a54465d0659573f2801a474b0a", "pepper": "706570706572", - "oprf_key": "203fabe2af9c8dc668b81db1ece9c2412c94c276495f33202479886de1b12907", - "envelope_nonce": "b0076712e01fecdb12301d5d7da92236e47f20494e68defb32084f1ab6c3d4f8", - "client_nonce": "b9f09e9b0606fa88c4194011d5c204861b73c43cbf1ea0d08c03ec2fd6d05572", - "server_nonce": "a213c02274e7f20fc3b571d25e98854c5dae2cfde6c9bf228a66bf3eff3e2a97", - "r1": "01000024000000207e2c67a156ab27490f20008fcae9e9f722d8a9f4eeac373a711259981ca05dd5", - "r2": "020000280020710fdd19883e869e784c84f2864fa0bfc227662404b77cc8a54d79ae7fb931ea000001010103", - "r3": "03000088b0076712e01fecdb12301d5d7da92236e47f20494e68defb32084f1ab6c3d4f80020923b1d26cac4e3d91cec445b3322f4cc69a727f184353cb4dfe6d55a4c7d2bb400000020b77fbd41eacb8434f102c8c29cd4831e708046d38615df566675421ae8eb49330020b2341df425f90244c72d8e19b249ca0d6d1a3a3dfe6ee1773e1b782a81efef29", - "l1": "04000024000000207e2c67a156ab27490f20008fcae9e9f722d8a9f4eeac373a711259981ca05dd5b9f09e9b0606fa88c4194011d5c204861b73c43cbf1ea0d08c03ec2fd6d0557297cb1eb93a69542597517b110ccca457d5ce8d8bfcbfb2a9258bb7b4bd7f716e", - "l2": "050000860020710fdd19883e869e784c84f2864fa0bfc227662404b77cc8a54d79ae7fb931ea0060b0076712e01fecdb12301d5d7da92236e47f20494e68defb32084f1ab6c3d4f8923b1d26cac4e3d91cec445b3322f4cc69a727f184353cb4dfe6d55a4c7d2bb4b77fbd41eacb8434f102c8c29cd4831e708046d38615df566675421ae8eb49330000a0e59a07908fc793c590fd83343003a54330e24af908ed31c921e6e6504c3248f73d27d7ca78ded52209bc3bae000f9d95b147360edac1e97c148a3a7396a27939ccf2a17a5b281068665b4865e6c6331533461a8e10a4ceffc4c6a6609c326a", - "l3": "127144e6469e001d56237a58c8c869a8173e042bf2ff19d8331441d36ada9c3f", - "client_registration_state": "5a9a073b1a1efedebdb404bc073ae74b316920d68ab628bed0c500cae95d6e0270617373776f7264", - "client_login_state": "5a9a073b1a1efedebdb404bc073ae74b316920d68ab628bed0c500cae95d6e0280616968ed8daae02c02d3ba41a70104ed0deecd2276e058994d601a1351b359b9f09e9b0606fa88c4194011d5c204861b73c43cbf1ea0d08c03ec2fd6d05572f258311568d792d6ebecee225c0fde4512139e29a435e9f9a0b82dc3809a83ab70617373776f7264", - "server_registration_state": "203fabe2af9c8dc668b81db1ece9c2412c94c276495f33202479886de1b12907", - "server_login_state": "ebc0953924d55ad66aa801a7c85f47f35889b90002451a04fb7134b8a2a5a33cd69098c0a81ce06f58cbe4fd6ba23c9c1404ad6f639ba64d5f0f7bf0a041fc5872b17f13bd41cbfbdfa8d74bc94ec1abcc77b9a3da8fbad918ca0a5f84a81443", - "password_file": "203fabe2af9c8dc668b81db1ece9c2412c94c276495f33202479886de1b12907b2341df425f90244c72d8e19b249ca0d6d1a3a3dfe6ee1773e1b782a81efef29b0076712e01fecdb12301d5d7da92236e47f20494e68defb32084f1ab6c3d4f8923b1d26cac4e3d91cec445b3322f4cc69a727f184353cb4dfe6d55a4c7d2bb4b77fbd41eacb8434f102c8c29cd4831e708046d38615df566675421ae8eb4933", - "export_key": "da3a52148a58168c9f804df5e216e3d3f16e935d4d70a5eb249433d88e02ae4c", - "shared_secret": "72b17f13bd41cbfbdfa8d74bc94ec1abcc77b9a3da8fbad918ca0a5f84a81443" + "oprf_key": "44f6b4ad762943517e400ce878e0c1409573ee98d96c14e5a507e601788c2207", + "envelope_nonce": "ed0eb006204e163097595826da4f4e8df648fdcb54feef22cefbbdd1c9e85038", + "client_nonce": "774cd501736601475cea7a382cb1d38b34c574baab82c0e87cbe3dcf9de3d0a6", + "server_nonce": "a627d3525b162594be0c134ccf5fd4cab719e37ec945e70a128d66abb3bb58c4", + "r1": "010000240000002060ebaf93d439cd229e8fd843b9cd2656d40cba15981f04464c9842f98557f30b", + "r2": "020000280020ab7af6fd8628eded06289ccf85ad8e2f4bc8d584129b923cdc6a2865300a8f6a000001010103", + "r3": "030000aeed0eb006204e163097595826da4f4e8df648fdcb54feef22cefbbdd1c9e85038002358a913a1bcdee339dde801af723f204f5cdc9335e0256eed49a4b36a226a1a062ddc9500230300202d3e373aaa1b3fb0df397789b671ca33f1b880bcc5ebc89b9e390b5ebb720e1d0020a2eb1b19e25b90e0089e543dd391ca362f05d01fa6d521d00c35312755c665f00020db67c19dde3ff9df4226c638056bf740811d6136b41d81a9995a29d8ae4da74a", + "l1": "040000240000002060ebaf93d439cd229e8fd843b9cd2656d40cba15981f04464c9842f98557f30b774cd501736601475cea7a382cb1d38b34c574baab82c0e87cbe3dcf9de3d0a6c3a4413191704cbe3ee1cc8293a565e260a3cbadfdb091bc00e953b33883c363", + "l2": "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", + "l3": "28b18759b0f5977c607170b7ceb1b5d75bffbc185991ae001c0fded87f826d89", + "client_registration_state": "00000000ccfacfd5e65693b9ea7b1bbe8c61d83e20bc67a54465d0659573f2801a474b0a70617373776f7264", + "client_login_state": "00000000ccfacfd5e65693b9ea7b1bbe8c61d83e20bc67a54465d0659573f2801a474b0a18be455fafb4cbe97a7531c2fc4ff2ce9b7bfc0119b0fcd7660443ddd0ec4068774cd501736601475cea7a382cb1d38b34c574baab82c0e87cbe3dcf9de3d0a68d5a62ba390f1ee0419616e1a135e609ad248c7a3ee7edf4fb90f575148758d070617373776f7264", + "server_registration_state": "44f6b4ad762943517e400ce878e0c1409573ee98d96c14e5a507e601788c2207", + "server_login_state": "14e5fe977591bb71f1e2bcd0542d26023c818048a257781fe276a3e8f9e0be4d58075843e2050013c815c6ef3d015a4ef1294543225832281adec71e1a92fa32a783f8c52f881f276f1c780f21b3fcb4eb36b75daea84b3bb9f7ce0699842864", + "password_file": "44f6b4ad762943517e400ce878e0c1409573ee98d96c14e5a507e601788c2207db67c19dde3ff9df4226c638056bf740811d6136b41d81a9995a29d8ae4da74aed0eb006204e163097595826da4f4e8df648fdcb54feef22cefbbdd1c9e85038002358a913a1bcdee339dde801af723f204f5cdc9335e0256eed49a4b36a226a1a062ddc9500230300202d3e373aaa1b3fb0df397789b671ca33f1b880bcc5ebc89b9e390b5ebb720e1d0020a2eb1b19e25b90e0089e543dd391ca362f05d01fa6d521d00c35312755c665f0", + "export_key": "48e39aeec42923ada9a239b231ff290efb1d4d01ccec8cd820a42dde10ff0d09", + "shared_secret": "a783f8c52f881f276f1c780f21b3fcb4eb36b75daea84b3bb9f7ce0699842864" } "#; diff --git a/src/tests/serialization.rs b/src/tests/serialization.rs deleted file mode 100644 index c5a5660..0000000 --- a/src/tests/serialization.rs +++ /dev/null @@ -1,230 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. and its affiliates. -// -// This source code is licensed under the MIT license found in the -// LICENSE file in the root directory of this source tree. - -use crate::{ - ciphersuite::CipherSuite, - envelope::Envelope, - group::Group, - key_exchange::{ - traits::{KeyExchange, ToBytes}, - tripledh::{TripleDH, NONCE_LEN}, - }, - keypair::{KeyPair, SizedBytes, X25519KeyPair}, - opaque::*, -}; - -use curve25519_dalek::ristretto::RistrettoPoint; -use generic_array::typenum::Unsigned; -use proptest::{collection::vec, prelude::*}; -use rand_core::{OsRng, RngCore}; - -use sha2::{Digest, Sha256}; -use std::convert::TryFrom; - -struct Default; -impl CipherSuite for Default { - type Group = RistrettoPoint; - type KeyFormat = crate::keypair::X25519KeyPair; - type KeyExchange = TripleDH; - type Hash = sha2::Sha256; - type SlowHash = crate::slow_hash::NoOpHash; -} - -fn random_ristretto_point() -> RistrettoPoint { - let mut rng = OsRng; - let mut random_bits = [0u8; 64]; - rng.fill_bytes(&mut random_bits); - - // This is because RistrettoPoint is on an obsolete sha2 version - let mut bits = [0u8; 64]; - let mut hasher = sha2::Sha512::new(); - hasher.update(&random_bits[..]); - bits.copy_from_slice(&hasher.finalize()); - - RistrettoPoint::from_uniform_bytes(&bits) -} - -#[test] -fn client_registration_roundtrip() { - let pw = b"hunter2"; - let mut rng = OsRng; - let sc = ::random_scalar(&mut rng); - // serialization order: scalar, password - let bytes: Vec = [&sc.as_bytes()[..], &pw[..]].concat(); - let reg = ClientRegistration::::try_from(&bytes[..]).unwrap(); - let reg_bytes = reg.to_bytes(); - assert_eq!(reg_bytes, bytes); -} - -#[test] -fn server_registration_roundtrip() { - // If we don't have envelope and client_pk, the server registration just - // contains the prf key - let mut rng = OsRng; - let sc = ::random_scalar(&mut rng); - let mut oprf_bytes: Vec = vec![]; - oprf_bytes.extend_from_slice(sc.as_bytes()); - let reg = ServerRegistration::::try_from(&oprf_bytes[..]).unwrap(); - let reg_bytes = reg.to_bytes(); - assert_eq!(reg_bytes, oprf_bytes); - // If we do have envelope and client pk, the server registration contains - // the whole kit - let key_len = - <<::KeyFormat as KeyPair>::Repr as SizedBytes>::Len::to_usize(); - let envelope_size = key_len + Envelope::::additional_size(); - let mut mock_envelope_bytes = vec![0u8; envelope_size]; - rng.fill_bytes(&mut mock_envelope_bytes); - println!("{}", mock_envelope_bytes.len()); - let mock_client_kp = Default::generate_random_keypair(&mut rng).unwrap(); - // serialization order: scalar, public key, envelope - let mut bytes = Vec::::new(); - bytes.extend_from_slice(sc.as_bytes()); - bytes.extend_from_slice(&mock_client_kp.public().to_arr()); - bytes.extend_from_slice(&mock_envelope_bytes); - let reg = ServerRegistration::::try_from(&bytes[..]).unwrap(); - let reg_bytes = reg.to_bytes(); - assert_eq!(reg_bytes, bytes); -} - -#[test] -fn register_first_message_roundtrip() { - let pt = random_ristretto_point(); - let pt_bytes = pt.to_arr(); - let r1 = RegisterFirstMessage::::try_from(pt_bytes.as_slice()).unwrap(); - let r1_bytes = r1.to_bytes(); - assert_eq!(pt_bytes, r1_bytes); -} - -#[test] -fn register_second_message_roundtrip() { - let pt = random_ristretto_point(); - let pt_bytes = pt.to_arr(); - - let message = pt_bytes.to_vec(); - let r2 = RegisterSecondMessage::::try_from(&message[..]).unwrap(); - let r2_bytes = r2.to_bytes(); - assert_eq!(message, r2_bytes); -} - -#[test] -fn register_third_message_roundtrip() { - let mut rng = OsRng; - let skp = Default::generate_random_keypair(&mut rng).unwrap(); - let pubkey_bytes = skp.public().to_arr(); - - let mut key = [0u8; 32]; - rng.fill_bytes(&mut key); - - let mut msg = [0u8; 32]; - rng.fill_bytes(&mut msg); - - let (ciphertext, _) = - Envelope::::seal(&key, &msg, &pubkey_bytes, &mut rng).unwrap(); - - let message: Vec = [&ciphertext.to_bytes(), &pubkey_bytes[..]].concat(); - let r3 = RegisterThirdMessage::::try_from(&message[..]).unwrap(); - let r3_bytes = r3.to_bytes(); - assert_eq!(message, r3_bytes); -} - -#[test] -fn client_login_roundtrip() { - let pw = b"hunter2"; - let mut rng = OsRng; - let sc = ::random_scalar(&mut rng); - - let client_e_kp = Default::generate_random_keypair(&mut rng).unwrap(); - let mut client_nonce = [0u8; NONCE_LEN]; - rng.fill_bytes(&mut client_nonce); - - let l1_data = [&sc.to_bytes()[..], &client_nonce, client_e_kp.public()].concat(); - let mut hasher = Sha256::new(); - hasher.update(l1_data); - let hashed_l1 = hasher.finalize(); - - // serialization order: scalar, password, ke1_state - let bytes: Vec = [ - &sc.as_bytes()[..], - &pw[..], - client_e_kp.public(), - &client_nonce, - hashed_l1.as_slice(), - ] - .concat(); - let reg = ClientLogin::::try_from(&bytes[..]).unwrap(); - let reg_bytes = reg.to_bytes(); - assert_eq!(reg_bytes, bytes); -} - -#[test] -fn login_first_message_roundtrip() { - let mut rng = OsRng; - - let client_e_kp = Default::generate_random_keypair(&mut rng).unwrap(); - let mut client_nonce = [0u8; NONCE_LEN]; - rng.fill_bytes(&mut client_nonce); - - let ke1m: Vec = [&client_nonce[..], &client_e_kp.public()].concat(); - let reg = >::KE1Message::try_from( - &ke1m[..], - ) - .unwrap(); - let reg_bytes = reg.to_bytes(); - assert_eq!(reg_bytes, ke1m); -} - -proptest! { - - #[test] - fn test_nocrash_register_first_message(bytes in vec(any::(), 0..200)) { - RegisterFirstMessage::::try_from(&bytes[..]).map_or(true, |_| true); - } - - #[test] - fn test_nocrash_register_second_message(bytes in vec(any::(), 0..200)) { - RegisterSecondMessage::::try_from(&bytes[..]).map_or(true, |_| true); - } - - #[test] - fn test_nocrash_register_third_message(bytes in vec(any::(), 0..200)) { - RegisterThirdMessage::::try_from(&bytes[..]).map_or(true, |_| true); - } - - #[test] - fn test_nocrash_login_first_message(bytes in vec(any::(), 0..500)) { - LoginFirstMessage::::try_from(&bytes[..]).map_or(true, |_| true); - } - - #[test] - fn test_nocrash_login_second_message(bytes in vec(any::(), 0..500)) { - LoginSecondMessage::::try_from(&bytes[..]).map_or(true, |_| true); - } - - #[test] - fn test_nocrash_login_third_message(bytes in vec(any::(), 0..500)) { - LoginThirdMessage::::try_from(&bytes[..]).map_or(true, |_| true); - } - - #[test] - fn test_nocrash_client_registration(bytes in vec(any::(), 0..700)) { - ClientRegistration::::try_from(&bytes[..]).map_or(true, |_| true); - } - - #[test] - fn test_nocrash_server_registration(bytes in vec(any::(), 0..700)) { - ServerRegistration::::try_from(&bytes[..]).map_or(true, |_| true); - } - - #[test] - fn test_nocrash_client_login(bytes in vec(any::(), 0..700)) { - ClientLogin::::try_from(&bytes[..]).map_or(true, |_| true); - } - - #[test] - fn test_nocrash_server_login(bytes in vec(any::(), 0..700)) { - ServerLogin::::try_from(&bytes[..]).map_or(true, |_| true); - } - -}